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ABSTRACT
In South Africa the left-wing is currently in an ascendant mode.
Yet it is not an unproblematic ascendancy. For one thing, because
Marxism has been interwoven with so much of the South African struggle,
the South African Left are now unable to disentangle themselves from
the contemporary 'collapse of the Marxist dream'. And this translates
into a South African socio-political issue because 'a s the Left
accumulates influence and power in South Africa so the problems and
limitations of historical materialism acquire a wider social
significance.
This thesis will argue that a key problem with the historical
materialist paradigm has been its limitations when dealing with
communication and the media. However, there have been historical
materialists (usually those who consciously stepped outside 'mainstream
Marxist' discourse) who made considerable advances in attempting to
develop historical materialism's capacity for dealing with
communication, the media and the subjective. This thesis will examine
some of the work which has attempted to 'reconstruct' historical
materialism away from a narrow materialism. The aim will be to give
some direction to the development of a New Left approach to
communication. Such a reconstruction is seen as a precondition if the
Left-wing is to find a formula for dealing with Information Age
relations of production.
(iv)
A N~w Left communicology able to deal with the 'superstructuralism'
of the Information Age offers a specific perspective on how to
construct a development strategy for South Africa. This will be
discussed, and the thesis will attempt to tie together the notions of
..
communication, development and democracy.
The relationship between communication and democracy will be
especially important for the New Left approach ·that will be favoured in
this thesis. So an important theme in the thesis will be the question
of developing a ·left-hegemony based upon a democratic-pluralism. This
will entail examining the role that media and an institutionalised
social-dialogue can play in building a left-wing democracy. The extent
to which the left-wing media in South Africa have contributed to a
democratic dialogue is discussed. This will then be extended into a
discussion of how media can contribute to the reconstruction,
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CHAPTER 1:
RETHINKING THE LEFTIST STRUGGLE IN SOUTH AFRICA
A struggle between the Left and Right in South Africa intensified
after 1976 [1]. The resolution of this struggle during the 1990s will
seemingly grant considerable power to the Left (a reversal of trends in
other parts of the world). This makes South Africa an important
contemporary focal point for social theorists. It is thus hardly
surprising to find Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCS) theorists
engaged in trying to understand the South African phenomenon, and in
the process often re-working CCS itself (Tomaselli, Tomaselli, Louw &
Chetty, 1988; Tomaselli, 1988; and Muller & Tomaselli, 1989).
During the 1970s CCS theorists of the Birmingham School were
closely tied to the growing LEFTIST concern at the 'collapse of the
Marxist dream'[2] -- a collapse first significantly manifested within
the Western European communist parties of the 1970s (and spreading to
Eastern Europe in the 1980s). This collapse was associated with the
failures of Marxist-Lenininism. However, because Marxism, and then
Marxist-Leninism had come to dominate so much of the leftist discourse,
a collapse of this particular interpretation of leftist praxis rippled
through the entire left-wing, negatively affecting even those leftist
positions outside (and often opposed to) the Marxist-Leninist camp.
Thomas Kuhn (1974) notes how once a paradigm becomes dominant, this
ascendant position tends to wipe out the memory of an era when this was
not the case. So it is that many leftists (both Marxist and others)
have 'forgotten' that Marx had to engage in battles with other leftist
positions (eg. Bakunin, Proudon, Lasalle and Feuerbach) in order to
establish the hegemony [3] of his particular vision (see Kolakowski,
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1981: Vol 1). Following Marx's success, Marxism became 'naturalized'
as 'mainstream' leftist discourse; a naturalization that was
institutionalized by the Second International (1889-1914). The next
battle was between Lenin's interpretation of Marxism and that of
Bernstein's (social-democracy). Lenin won and his success was
naturalized and institutionalized by the Third International (1919-
1943). The hegemony of the Marxist and Marxist-Leninist
interpretation/s was never absolute within the Left: there were always
many socialisms. However, the hegemony of Marx, and later of his
Leninist followers certainly exerted a very powerful narrowing
influence on leftist theory and practice.
If the crisis and disintegration of Marxist-Leninism is not to be
translated into a full-scale rout of the entire 'leftist project' (see
Robertson, 1985: 181), then some 'new thinking' on the Left is now
urgently required (see Habermas, 1990). The collapse of Eastern Europe,
to some extent, transported the left back to the fluidity of the 1850s-
1860s. The era when so many simply acquiesced to the idea that there
was one 'correct' definition of what it means to be 'leftist', is over.
The possibility for debate and new thinking is consequently opened up.
Such rethinking will have to break out of the bounds of all past
'naturalizations' and methodological 'purities'. The rethinking will
require an openness to the full range of leftist possibilities from
anarchist to social-democrat, and for a diversity of 'mixes' between
~thes e . (Furthermore, for the purposes of such debate the 'zone' where
social democrat blurs into 'liberal' should not be too clearly
demarcated). However, because Marxism and Marxist-Leninism have become
so deeply entangled with the left-wing project as a whole, any
'rethink' will need to work from this legacy (which contains both
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negative and positive features). This will require an engagement with
historical materialism. Ultimately, however, I would agree with
Habermas' (1979) view that it is an engagement that will require a
reconstruction of historical materialism.
CCS represents one particular attempt to rethink leftist praxis and
to deal with the 'collapse of the Marxist dream'. In dealing with this
collapse CCS turned to an examination of the relationship between
communication and power within historical material contexts. A
European leftist to have also moved in this direction was Jurgen
Habermas (1990). CCS is thus a 'New Leftist' [4] attempt to 're-
formulate' historical materialism in a way that this paradigm can meet
the challenges of a multinational 'Information Age'. capitalismj the
'post-modern' eraj and the methodological problems (theoretical and
practical) within Marxism. Much of the collapse of the Marxist dream
has been due to inertia (one might even say a conservatism): many
Marxists -- especially Marxist-Leninists -- clung to a view of the
world that was rooted in Victorian capitalism (the mode of production
confronted by Marx himself) (see Habermas, 1990: 11-12). As the
capitalist mode of production mutated into the electronic and
Information Age, many Marxists got left behind. The New Left-oriented
CCS attempted to deal with the 'new' capitalism wherein the
superstructures had become so dominant. For CCS, a left-wing concern
with challenging capitalism meant coming to grips with communication,
culture, ideology, ·a nd hegemony (Hall et aI, 1980). In other words, it
meant coming to terms with superstructural phenomena, and the
relationship between superstructural phenomena and power relationships
(wherein power ~elationships were understood to have both material and
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subjective dimensions}. CCS was an intellectual intervention aimed at
understanding, and/or redressing the declining intellectual and
political (hegemonic) fortunes of the Left within a world where
capitalism, instead of withering away, was becoming stronger. As
Richard Johnson (director of the Birmingham School) said, this
intellectual interventionist approach manifested itself in a CCS
concern with the "relationship between academic knowledges and
political aspirations" (Johnson in Punter, 1986: 277).
CCS subsequently migrated to South Africa in the 1980s (Tomaselli
et al 1983; Tomaselli, 1985a, 1986b; Muller & Tomaselli, 1989; and
EKUS, 1989). This migration took place as a part of the rapid
importation and proliferation of many leftist theories into South
African academe. (This trend was a reversal of the declining fortunes
of leftist theories in First World academe). This growth of a
significant South African academic-left was a parallel development to
the emergence of a strong internal leftist constituency following the
Soweto uprising in 1976. In South Africa, CCS faced many of the same
concerns as those which had confronted the 'New Left' in Europe or
North America, which is not surprising given the international nature
of multinational capitalism, and the international crisis of Leftist
praxis. For this reason, criticising South African CCS for being
"harnessed to European intellectual climates" (Masilela, 1988) is a
spurious argument. However, South African CCS also faced some unique
and contextually specific concerns.
·The South African Left [5] -- both within the South African
Communist Party (SACP) and without -- finds itself in the peculiar
position of being relatively ascendant at a time when the Left (in its
various forms) is in decline and crisis elsewhere in the world. In
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fact, the South African Left faces the real prospect of inheriting some
degree of power during the 1990s. However, this power will almost
certainly be 'diluted' because it will be 'shared' with sections of the
old ruling hegemony. This possibility of power raises numerous
questions and problems, especially around the issue of how a (leftist)
counter-hegemony transforms itself so as to become hegemonic in
society. This is made especially problematic given the declining
fortunes of the Left elsewhere, and g iven the legacy of distorted
leftist praxis in its Leninist-Marxist form. For CCS, a 'New Left'
initiative concerned with the superstructures, and embedded within the
broader South African Left, presents a fascinating context for
engagement.
Meeting the challenge of engaging with this context calls for a
critical appraisal of (local and international) Leftist theory and
practice. Hence in the current context, raising and discussing
questions becomes a valuable exercise; and not necessarily with a view
to finding hard and fast 'New Leftist' solutions to the questions.
Quite the opposite -- given the disasters that have resulted from the
past leftist orthodoxies that have congealed from previous struggles,
one might hope that those involved in the South African struggle will
desist from codifying and reifying any of their 'solutions'. In fact,
CCS holds that any 'solutions' given would vary, and indeed change,
depending on the position (historically and materially) of the person
dealing with the issue to be solved . Further, a ' solution offered would
vary depending on the power relationships in which such a person found
him/herself, and the discourse into which s/he were interpellated at
that historical material juncture. Hence this thesis will not provide
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'solutions'; rather it seeks primarily to raise questions, problems and
challenges from a South African 'New Left'/CCS perspective. But, in
the very act of raising and discussing questions, 'answers' emerge.
These 'answers', however, must be seen to be 'relative' and
historically materially specific -- ie. they are embedded in a
particular moment. They can mean little more than that which their
specificity gives them.
Problems/challenges for the South African Left in the early 1990s
are the following:
* Since February 1990 the internal context has changed -- this requires
a new approach to left-wing mobilization and organization. What was
appropriate for counter-hegemonic resistance is not necessarily
appropriate for building hegemony. For example, due to years of
bannings, state harassment, and mainstream media hostility etc, the
South African Left failed to communicate with the non-left. This is,
in part, tied to the emphasis on in-group solidarity as a
clandestine organizing principle. The changed context requires that
the Left redefines its notion of 'struggle' into a form appropriate
to winning votes and building alliances between different
constituencies. It should be of concern to leftists that the main
leftist nodal point -- the African National Congress -- had
difficulties, during the first year of its unbanning, in restructu-
ring itself into a form of struggle that fitted the changed needs.
* The collapse of East European Marxist-Leninism deprived the South
African Left of an ally, and sources of finance. Leninists-Marxists
had traditionally chosen to serve the interests of people who had
become revolutionary because of their conditions of impoverishment.
As the 20th Century progressed, this was increasingly manifested in
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Soviet support for national liberation movements in the Third World
[6] -- like the ANC. At the same time the Soviets rejected
socialists (such as the British Labour Party) who served the
interests of the 'labour aristocracy' of the First World. The
collapse of East European 'state socialism' therefore greatly
strengthened the hand of the South African Right in the battle for
hegemony. (This seems to have been one important reason behind the
National Party (NP) government's shift from armed conflict to
'negotiations' in February 1990). The East European model may only
have represented one particular form of a broad range of positions
constituting 'the Left' (Robertson, 1985: 181). However, the
collapse of this model sent ripples through the entire spectrum of
left-wing positions. Ironically, even the position of the South
African non-Stalinist left (who have been long-critical of Stalinist
state socialism) such as the popularists, the 'New Left', and
even Trotskyists has been seriously weakened by the events of
1989 in Eastern Europe. Hence the 'New Left' and/or CCS now face
many of the same challenges/problems posed to the wider South
African Left. It is possible that in the medium-to-long term in
a world re-ordered around the North-South axis -- that the South's
(see footnote 4) control of oil-revenues may ultimately become a new
source of backing for leftist opposition to multi-national
capitalism (HNC). But even if this were to occur, during the short-
t~rm reshuffling "f o l l owi ng the collapse of state socialism, the Left
faces significant problems.
* The East European collapse has discredited (perhaps prematurely in
terms of Third World problems) the notion of social planning. Harket
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economics is now in favour -- a laissez faire approach that seems to
complement and/or be linked to both the post-modern condition and the
adoption of information technology. The irony is that in the South
African context it is the very notion of planning (and state
intervention), as a means of overcoming the massive socio-economic
problems and mass misery, wherein lies the real appeal for
socialism-as-planning. It may be that South Africa is not yet ready
for a post-structural and post-modern world because of the legacy of
apartheid. South Africa may first have to pass through a
'structural' or 'modern' period. But given the East European
experience, the South African Left will now be forced to consider
the questions of central planning versus a producers' democracy
versus a market (whether capitalist or 'socialist').
* The collapse of Soviet hegemony shifted the world balance of power
toward a world capitalist hegemonic ascendancy. This hegemony is
closely aligned to South African centre-right forces, now
represented by the 'reformed' National Party and its allies). This
would be a real political and economic threat to South African
leftists should they win the first one-person-one-vote elections.
* The ascendancy of world capitalism also dramatically increases the
probability of the South African left being co-opted, rather than
becoming ascendant. South Africa could become just another Third
World dependency of multinational capitalism (MNC), ruled by a
comprador ruling elite. (See Fanon, 1968, for a discussion of such
social formations). In other words, the South African struggle may
still be co-opted (in a manner similar to the way elements of the
Kenyan Mau-Mau were transformed into a tame 'nationalist' comprador
class). With the world balance of power having shifted in favour of
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MNC, the local Right's position has been greatly strengthened. The
Right, in conjunction with world-MNC forces, will almost certainly
invest considerable energy into co-opting sections of the Congress
alliance into a comprador relationship with MNC. (If this succeeds,
this will insert South Africa into an alliance with the North in a
North-South polarized world). Such a co-opted group would, of
course, be in a position to trade upon prior links to 'the
struggle'. And, by manipulating calls to 'solidarity', this group
will be in a strong position to construct a reified hegemony. Such
a comprador group with prior 'struggle' links will even be in a
position to effectively use 'socialist' rhetoric as a means of
engendering mass support, while de facto serving MNC interests. (In
other words, 'superstructural' power relationships will appear to
have changed, but material power relationships will be, by and
large, unaltered). If the South African Left allowed this to occur,
'socialism' would be still further discredited. One might then find
the South African left ultimately congealing around other nodal
points (a break-away from the Congress-alliance? PAC? AZAPO? etc)
and linking themselves to the 'South' in a North-South conflict.
* Historical materialism, socialism and Marxism are facing major
theoretical challenges to their validity across a wide front, ranging
from the 'New Right' to post-modernists. This leftist theoretical
malaise became apparent in Western Europe/North America during the
1Q70s (see Hanninen & Paldan, 1984), and in the Eastern Europe during
the 1980 (when their 'Marxist' ruling elites seemingly 'lost their
nerve' -- in part, based upon a recognition of this malaise -- and
tried to unsuccessfully implement 'revolutions from above'). The
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South African Left cannot operate like an island -- this world-wide
crisis of leftist praxis will impact on, and hence have to be dealt
with, in the local context. Both locally and internationally the
'New Left' are in a better position to deal with the malaise/crisis
because, unlike orthodox Marxists, the 'New Left' has developed a
theoretical tradition of both acknowledging and trying to deal with
the .i n a d e q u a c i e s of orthodox historical materialism, socialism and
Marxism. In the process, the New Left has developed a storehouse of
leftist conceptual tools which offer some hope of finding a way out
of the crisis.
* A new mode of production -- centred on information technology and
instantaneous world-wide electronic communication -- has become
dominant in the era of MNC. Once more capitalism has demonstrated a
capacity for mut~ting and evolving (in ways unforeseen by Marx) in
such a way as to confound the predicted collapse of capitalism.
Orthodox historical materialism (and conventional socialism) has
shown itself to be ill-equipped to analytically deal with this new
mode of production and social relations wherein the superstructures
are so dominant. This thesis will give prominence to both the
Frankfurt School and Enzensberger's challenge to Marxists over this
issue.
* What constituency should the South African Left seek to serve? -- the
working class (ie. virtually a 'labour aristocracy' in contemporary
South Africa?); an alliance between the working class and the lumpen
proleteriat?; or an alliance between the working class and the petit
bourgeoisie (a petit-bourgeoisie increasi~gly becoming the 'workers'
who staff the electronic communication network)? and so on. Dealing
with choices such as these will create tensions within the Left. The
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choice of a constituency will have enormous consequences -- for
example, if the 'Leninist' route (to serve the weakest and most
disadvantaged) is chosen, an on-going conflict with MNC will result.
If, on the other hand, a social-democrat ('Bernstein') approach is
adopted -- ie. serving a labour aristocracy (an 'aristocracy' which
may include both workers and the petit bourgeoisie) -- then serious
conflict with MNC will be avoided.
* The South African Left's constituency has expectations which are so
high that they are unlikely to be fulfilled in the short-to-medium
term (if ever). Amongst a significant grassroots sector of this
constituency, these expectations are often linked to a 'cut-and-
paste' Marxism/socialism, which manifests itself as a shallow
rhetoric. This is likely to put a severe strain on any future Leftist
hegemony.
Solving the above problems/challenges presents the South African Left
with the prospects of intense activity (theoretical and practical) for
at least the short to medium term. A New Left initiative like CCS
offers one of the potential (leftist) approaches for dealing with these
above problems/challenges. Each approach will have its strengths and
weaknesses. Each has its place in tackling the unfolding social
problems of South Africa. But given the less than ideal track record
of the 'non-New Left' approaches, both overseas and locally, the
importation of CCS into South Africa seems a valuable exercise:
applying CCS to this context may just throw up some useful !nsights and
'solutions' that the other Leftist approaches will 'miss'. In
particular, a South African-based CCS (situated amidst such stark re-
orderings of power relationships during the next decade) potentially
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has much to contribute in the field of developing an understanding of
the relationship between power and superstructural arrangements (ego
culture, knowledge, ideology, and the media). Further, because a South
African CCS will be witness to a shift from counter-hegemony (ie.
struggle) to a Leftist hegemony, considerable potential exists for
developing an understanding of a praxis of culture, knowledge, ideology
and the media.
DEFINING 'THE STRUGGLE'
Before one can 'rethink' the struggle, it is first necessary to
define what 'the struggle' is and/or has been. Amongst the South
African Left the term 'the struggle' has been so extensively used that
it has tended to become cliched or rhetorical. Yet beneath the
appearance of this cliche lay a process all too real for those caught
up in a society engaged in the civil war of the 1980s. Hence, terms
like 'the struggle' became too important to be ignored, or worse still,
dismissed as mere rhetoric, or cliched. Rather, a term like 'the
struggle' merits being moved out of the realm of rhetoric, with its
substance, descriptive and explanatory power being recognised. This is
of particular importance for those engaged in applying CCS to the South
African context, since CCS is, as Richard Johnson has noted, concerned
with the "relationship between academic knowledges and political
aspirations" (in Punter, 1986: 277). A CCS in South Africa will be
centrally concerned with 'the struggle' and its relationship to the
superstructures.
The point about the notion of 'the struggle' is that it has meant
different things to different people. In part, this is deliberate:
movements like the African National Congress (ANC) and United
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Democratic Front (UDF) have been characterised as being multi-class,
multi-party, multi-ethnic, multi-religious 'movements' or 'alliances'.
This meant that a 'vagueness' when it came to policy was an advantage
in the 1980s. Defining too closely what 'the struggle' was and what
its aims were would have been counter-productive for the construction
of the broadest possible alliance against apartheid. Since the
unbanning of the ANC in 1990, however, this vagueness has, to some
extent, become a liability in the process of constituency building for
a future election (particularly since the ANC lost the 'middle ground'
following its unbanning).
However, perhaps the very 'vagueness' of the notion of 'the
struggle' in part served to 'define' it in the South Africa of the
1980s: the notion acquired sufficient substance for it to have a
recognisable 'meaning'. Those in the Left 'alliance' knew they were
involved, and knew what they meant by 'struggle'. Those outside and
opposed to the 'alliance' were aware of its existence and their
hostility to it. Applying Robertson's (1985: 30; see footnote 1)
definition of 'left-wing' and 'right-wing' to to those 'inside' and
'outside' the alliance helps to give some substance to what the
struggle meant.
A key feature of the anti-apartheid struggle is that most South
African Marxists and social democrats threw in their lot with the left-
wing Congress alliance. The SACP forms an important part of the
Congress movement,and has 'backgrounded' the notion of 'class
struggle' through its adoption of the 'two-stage' theory of revolution.
The United Democratic Front (UDF) attracted, amongst others, many of
the country's social democrats; and the Congress of South African Trade
Unions (COSATU) has provided a home for workerists. By the end of the
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1980s the ANC, UDF, COSATU and SACP collectively constituted the
components of the left-wing mass democratic movement (MDM). Within the
MDM constituency, socialists and Marxists formed an important, and
growing, sub-constituency, especially since this grouping had its base
amongst especially the black youth which is demographically on the
increase. In this sense South Africa has gone against the
international trend -- South Africa in the 1990s is a place where
communists and socialists have a significant mass following. To some
extent this mass following developed as a result of 40-years of the NP-
government's virulent anti-communist and anti-socialist propaganda.
Hatred for the NP's apartheid policies was translated into an
'adherence' for that which the NP opposed. At one level then it is an
'adherence' that sometimes takes the form of a shallow 'cut-and-paste
Marxist' rhetoric at the grassroots level of political organization.
But at another level, the success of communism and socialism in South
Africa is the outcome of the realistic flexibility of South African
leftist theoreticans and practitioners, who adopted a popularist
'revisionism'.
What is clear is that socialism -- in both its Marxist-Leninist and
other forms -- has become a significant factor in contemporary South
Africa. South African socialists have adopted two different strategies
for furthering their constituency's interests: (1) through a popular-
alliance; and (2) through a workerist (trade unionist) route. The
workerists -- seeing class conflict as central -- .seek to organise a
specifically working class constituency so that, if in a post-apartheid
society, the bourgeoisie and petit-bourgeoisie are ascendant, the
working class (socialists) will have an organised voice.
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The popularists have down-played 'class struggle' in favour of a
broad anti-apartheid struggle, a key feature of the struggle, having
represented the position of the ANC and UDF. Even COSATU and the SACP
have subsumed themselves into this popularis~ alliance (although
tensions can be expected to develop over time along the currently muted
popularist-workerist cleavage). The result was the growth of a Left-
alliance that had a membership wider than only communists and
socialists (ie. it also successfully incorporated nationalists, social-
democrats and even some liberals into a leftist project). Communists
and socialists within the popular alliance have then either not been
Marxists or they have been de facto 'practical' revisionists. It is
this de facto (practical) revisionism which is of central significance
for this thesis: there is a need to formalize this 'revision' and to
theoretically 'rethink' what is meant by 'the struggle' and 'the Left'
within such a popular alliance. It is thus the popular-alliance
strategy, of both the MDM and the ANC, which interests this writer.
This is because such a strategy may ~ave been pragmatic, but it
significantly ALTERED Marxist theory: it means that the South African
'struggle' did not conform to a Marxist (ie. class) one, although it
contained significant proletarian and Marxist voices. The lessons for
leftist praxis · are clear. The success of Marxism in South Africa would
appear to be tied to the pragmatic 'revisionism' adopted by Marxists
and socialists over decades of work within a popularist struggle.
Through this pragmatism, the South African Left came to represent a
constituency very similar to that of Solidarity in Polandj but with a
major difference -- whereas in Poland, labels like 'socialist' and
'Marxist' are dirty words, in South Africa they are adopted with pride
by this Leftist constituency. For this reason, South Africa seems
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destined to be the last major country in the world in which 'Marxists'
(and even Leninists) will have a significant influence over policy.
This gives the South African struggle a significance beyond South
Africa ~tself. This scenario places a particular burden onto the
shoulders of the South African Left -- to demonstrate that 'socialism'
and 'democracy' are not counterpoles (an impression that the legacy of
Leninist vanguardist rule in Eastern Europe has left). If socialism is
to have meaning it needs to derive from a grassroots base, and hence
should be inseparable from democracy. A challenge is to actually
construct such a democratic-socialism. A key assumption in this thesis
is that the construction of such a democracy will be centrally tied up
with the communication policy and media infrastructure in society. The
Information Age has developed the technology for an interactive
democracy (public sphere). If the Left is serious about empowering
'the masses' then it has to demonstrate a 'trust' for those same masses
(something that vanguardism does not do) -- this means putting in place
a dialogical 'public sphere' which would enable the grassroots to make
themselves heard. This conception of a Left hegemony is premised upon
a move away from not only vanguardist leadership, but even away from
the notion of 'consultation' with the 'masses' (a notion which can
still serve 'vanguardist' ends). Instead of 'leadership' or
'consultation' it is premised upon the idea of mass 'participation'. A
Left hegemony built upon these principles should be in a position to
fac~litate the achievement of the 'real' wishes of the majority (as
these wishes shift over time), and hence avoid another Eastern Europe.
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NEW FORMS OF STRUGGLE REQUIRED
The unbanning of the ANC and other anti-apartheid organizations in
February 1990 significantly altered the terrain of struggle in South
Africa. With the prospect of one-person-one-vote elections the Left
will need to reorient itself away from an emphasis on a vanguard-led
armed struggle, mass mobilization and diplomatic foreign manoeuvers
towards electoral politics and hegemonic alliance-building. During the
first year of its unbanning. the ANC experienced some difficulty in
achieving such a re-orientation (See editorials in WIP, No 69. 1990;
and WIP No 70/71, 1990). This greatly weakened the leftist position as
1990 unfolded. The popularist policy of the MDM already provides a
good foundation for such an electoral-oriented struggle. but the ANC
had as yet to learn how to capitalize on the experience many in the MDM
acquired in the 1980s. Re-orienting the struggle towards winning an
election also requires that the Left pays serious attention towards the
superstructures as sites of struggle to a far greater extent than has
been the case in the past . CCS is equipped to contribute to the wider
Left-wing struggle with regard to both superstructural analysis and
practice, and with regard to theorizing the popularist ' r ev i s i on' of
Marxist theory towards a New Leftist ' pa r l i ame nt ary' approach to
hegemony-building.
In dealing with the above ' r ev i s i on ' , this thesis will, to some
extent, engage in a similar 're-thinking ' of Leftist praxis as found in
Althusserian and in certain post-Althusserians ' work, like Poulantzas,
Laclau and Mouffe. and Hindness and Hirst. For example, the (rather
Maoist) Althusserian notion of granting de facto dominance to the
' aut onomous ' (from the material base) political Ideological State
Apparatus may, after all, have value in the intensely POLITICAL
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struggle for hegemony in the coming years. This is perhaps even more
true of Poulantzas' modification of Althusserian theory such that class
alliances are foregroundedj and socialists are given the task of
actually representing interests other than those exclusively of the
working class. This places the onus on the Left to move beyond
'proclaiming' rhetorically that they represent 'the People'. Instead,
the Left will have to learn how to manipulate 'ideology' and
'discourse' (in the ISAs) in order to win over 'the people' (ie. not
only the working class)~
The Right has historically invested considerable energy in the
direction of 'ideological' and communicative struggle. Between 1978
and 1989, for example, the NP-hegemony placed considerable emphasis on
Andre Beaufre's (1965) concern with 'psychological' and 'communication'
struggle within their counter-revolutionary programme. This is an
indication of the weighting they give to this area (Louw & Tomaselli,
1989). Prior to the reforms of 1990 the NP-hegemony, however, had
no 'saleable' message with which to win mass support for Rightist
policies in a Beaufre/WHAM (Win Hearts and Hinds) programme. But the
reforms provided the NP with a potential base upon which to construct a
South African-type (centre-Right) Democratic Turnhalle Alliance as it
did in Namibia. Further, in the wake of the reforms, the NP utilized
its knowledge of the tactics and strategy of communicative struggle
built up during the 1980s to develop and propagate a new 'reform
disGourse'. The NP increasingly co-opted elements of HDH/ANC discourse
[7] during the course of 1990-1991, so blurring the formerly easily
discernible left-wing/right-wing nature of the 1980s struggle. This
increases the pressure on the Left to pay attention to ideological and
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communicative struggle ie. to 'revise' leftist praxis such that
discourse and the superstructures are given serious attention. If
British CCS grew increasingly concerned during the 1980s with
'revising' Leftist strategy and developing a superstructural
interventionism to challenge the Thatcherist threat to the British Left
(see Punter, 1986: Chapters 3 and 14), so a South African CCS will be
concerned in the 1990s with the challenge that a reformed-Right (a
conservative, but de-racialised capitalism) poses to the South African
Left. Despite the difficulties of shifting academic methods into new
contexts, CCS is a project that is transferable (Muller & Tomaselli,
1989). The South African Left must not be too hasty in rejecting the
possible value of CCS' New Leftist solutions and 'revisions',
formulated in the British context when they come to meeting the new
challenges offered by a reformed-Right in South Africa. (For a
rejection of this sort see Sitas, 1990).
Laclau & Mouffe (1985) have perhaps taken the 'revision' process to
its extreme. They have been concerned with looking to groups other than
the working class as potential radical agents; and considering how
radical groups (and/or classes) do not 'exist-in-themselves', but have
to be built through 'hegemonic labour'. For Ernst Laclau and Chantelle
Mouffe the struggle is for the minds of the petit bourg~oisie within
ideology (or discourse). Like Gorz (1982) Laclau & Mouffe abandon the
working class. This thesis will NOT go as far as this. If there is
some overlap betwe~n this thesis and Laclau and Mouffe, there are also
some significant differences . .
Whereas Laclau and Moufe were inclined towards a 'radical-liberal'
rethinking of leftist struggle, this thesis will be more inclined
towards a search for a 'radical-socialist'and democratic
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reconstruction. In part, the difference is due to the contexts within
which they work: Laclau & Mouffe are concerned with Europe/North
America where economic deprivations are less sharp than those in
Africa. The South African context is different: economic deprivation
and class conflict are very apparent, and hence socialism (and even
communism) is still on the social agenda, in a way that may appear
anachronistic to those outside South Africa. A popular-alliance in
South Africa will, of necessity, have to pay serious attention to
(state-socialist) 'affirmative action' programmes and economic
struggles. Further, in the South African context, the working class
would demographically constitute the heart of the Left constituency
(although in a left-alliance non-working class sectors would also be
important). This would make the Gorz (1982) move appear somewhat out
of place in contemporary South Africa. Consequently, the
reconstruction of Leftist struggle to be examined in the chapters that
follow will lean more towards the Habermasian reconstruction of
historical materialism model.
From the post-Althusserian 'discourse' school, the thesis will, at
most, be inclined toward Nicos Poulantzas' concern with political
(superstructural) struggle and alliances (including a socialist concern
with certain non-working class interests), rather than a full-blown
shift into 'discourse' (superstructuralism) per se. Utilizing
Poulantzas means that a concern for pluralism and democracy is built
intq the socialist ~econstruction being proposed. CCS is well placed
to examine how these Eurocommunist ideas can be critically integrated
into the South African struggle such that their overt idealism (ie.
abandonment of the 'material' within historical materialism) is
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avoided, while their sophisticated grasp of ideology and the
superstructures are appropriated. CCS has traditionally used Antonio
Gramsci's work to steer itself clear of idealism. A reading of Gramsci
and Poulantzas in unison offers a means of building a Left-wing respect
for a (leftist) democracy constructed upon a healthy pluralist civil
society. In other words, a socialist democracy is conceptualized within
which the Left has to engage in ideological-labour to win popular
support for socialist policies (rather than to 'proclaim' support). In
this view a single political party or movement does not replace civil
society (eg. in Eastern Europe civil society was collapsed into the
Communist Party). Rather, civil society becomes a 'space' for
d~alectical engagement -- a valuable terrain of struggle -- and a
'space' to be cherished if the social dialectic is not to be killed. In
this regard, Habermas wrote:
Everyone should be justified in expecting that the
institutionalization of the process for the non-exclusive formation
of public opinion and democratic political will can ratify their
assumption that these processes of public communication are being
conducted rationally and effectively .•• which ought to ensure that
all socially relevant questions can be taken up and dealt with
thoroughly and imaginatively until solutions have been found that,
while respecting the integrity of every individual and every form
of social life, are uniformly in everybody's interests" (Habermas,
1990: 15-16).
A Poulantzian-type popular struggle is, above all else, premised upon
alliance-building. This implies moving the superstructures centre-
stage within Leftist struggle. Communication for mobilization,
alliance building, organization and co-ordination is seen as central in
expanding and holding together a popular alliance. Further, if
socialism's influence is to be expanded within the popular alliance,
this will require that the socialist constituency develops effective
communication in the sense of: (1) learning to 'use' the alliance's
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communication network to 'bargain' the best possible position for
itself; and (2) developing rhetorical skills to 'sell' socialism to
others in the alliance. Yet communication is an area that is poorly
developed (relative to other areas) within historical materialism. In
this regard too, the South African experience has revealed a need to
RECONSTRUCT historical materialism and to develop a more systematic
historical materialist approach to communication. This is of more
than theoretical concern in the South African case especially if
socialism is to be practically promoted within popular social
structures.
A key to preventing the 'reconstruction' examined in this thesis
from drifting into the sort of superstructuralism of the Laclau and
Mouffe or Hindness and Hirst types will be through explicitly
incorporating the 'totality' theorists (ie. the Frankfurt School,
Gramsci, Volosinov and Korsch), who examine the subject- object. In
this regard CCS has a tradition of drawing on a wide range of
theoretical inputs (so much so that some might even regard it as
eclectic) (see Bennett, et aI, 1981; and Hall et aI, 1981). But in
meeting the challenges of the 'Leftist crisis', the South African
struggle's implicit 'revisionism', and the wider post-modernist
condition, CCS (in which various theoretical strands are pulled
together, and reshuffled into new configurations) seems the only
sensible way forward. This thesis would argue that the pool of
theorists drawn upon by CCS needs to be widened still further to
incorporate Habermas, the Frankfurt School, Enzensberger, Poulantzas,
Volosinov, Karl Korsch, and Armand Mattelart. These theorists often
have different assumptions, premises and conclusions, which is often
derivative of the differing contexts they worked in. (See Chapters 2
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and 3). But then, the same could be said of the structuralists,
culturalists and Gramsci, which did not inhibit ees seeking to
integrate these 'positions' into a unified ees re-interpretation of the
leftist project. ees has therefore created an interesting precedent
for the 'rethinking' of leftists praxis: theoretical differences are no
basis for assumed necessary incompatibility. The contemporary leftist
crisis demands an openness towards theoretical experimentation rather
than a retreat into methodological pedanticism.
In particular, Habermas' (1979) work on the reconstruction of
historical materialism is valuable in preventing a drift into
superstructuralist praxis. Habermas' reconstructive work, by working
explicitly within the totality approach, prevents a superstructural
analysis becoming 'detached' from a concern with the economic base. As
important for an alliance-approach to struggle, is Habermas' (1974)
work on the 'public sphere'. He offers the Left a communication model
for dialogical (ie. democratic) organization such that civil society
becomes a site of struggle. But there is a need to go 'beyond'
Habermas' (1979) 'theoretical' challenge and also consider
Enzensberger's (1974) 'practical' challenge to develop a 'praxis'
communication. In addition, on a practical level, the experiences in
Chile (Hattelart, 1983: 356- 376), Nicaragua (Hattelart, 1986), and
South Africa's own Grassroots model (Louw, 1989; Johnson, 1991) are
excellent examples of leftist-communication as 'democracy-in-action'
(which complement Habermas' approach).
Incorporating Habermas and Enzensberger into ees would, to some
extent, give new directions to ees. ees would be channeled into an
explicit examination of the potential role the superstructures could
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play in the struggle to ensure the victory of a Left-wing hegemony over
the Right-wing. Four potential roles for · ' c ommu n i c a t i o n ' are
immediately apparent: communication to (1) strengthen the popular
alliance through improved intra-alliance dialogue (and to counter any
right-wing attempts to disrupt the popular alliance); (2) widen the
Left-alliance by recruiting new sectors and members; (3) 'disrupt' the
NP-alliance; and (4) 'promote' socialism within the popular alliance.
(This would include working to 'expose' the anti-leftist foreign power
attempts to 'confuse' and 'deflect' the course of the struggle).
A composite reading of Enzensberger (communicative praxis), Gramsci
(hegemony) and Poulantzas (class fractions and alliances) would direct
the New Left towards a consideration of: (a) seeking other potential
allies for the Left; and (b) finding 'ways' of communicating with
different sectors of the population. A Left alliance would benefit by
learning to communicate with different sectors differently. The
rhetorical communication methods of advertising (which are implicitly
'class-based') and public relations offer some guidance in this regard.
The Congress-alliance -- if it is to expand its net -- will need to
maximise its communicative impact in each sector of the population (in
terms of class, language, ethnicity, occupation, local issues, etc).
For Marxists to move in these directions, again requires a
reconstruction of the historical materialism upon which they base their
actions. In other words, there is also the need to develop rhetorical
communication skills. Sophisticated media and communication skills need
to be diffused throughout the Congress-alliance. In this area the NP
is currently better placed than the ANC because the ruling hegemony
controls a wide range of highly trained, professional communicators
(journalists, PR officers, advertising specialists, media technicians,
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media bureaucrats, etc).
Expanding the Leftist support-base further requires developing
every communicative avenue available, from using the Rightist media
where possible (a difficult, but not entirely impossible task,
especially since the Right has reformed itself) to developing an
'alternative' (left-wing) media network. Where possible, such a media
network should avoid 'mixing' its messages: ideally separate
'socialist', 'nationalist', and 'liberal' media should be created for
the different sectors. This requires recognizing that the Left has to
think beyond the 'alternative media', which, in the early 1990s, only
communicated with a small section of the converted (ie. at present the
total sales of all the left-wing weekly newspapers [8] is only 206 000
per week). This alternative (left) media is important, but it can only
constitute one part of the overall media usage. A left-wing network
was partially, but precariously, in place in the print sector in 1991.
This network needs expansion in other fields, such as: radio, film,
video, audio-cassette, computer-networking, etc. In addition to media-
hardware, such a network requires, above all else, more trained
Congress-alliance personnel. Training is required in both basic media
skills, but also in more skilled media work and in media theory.
Various 'alternative' media training projects have been offered in the
Cape Province, Transvaal and Natal. (See Pinnock, 1990, and Mackay &
Louw, 1990) .
.There are also considerations of 'what' message is to be
communicated. Clearly, the wider the anti-apartheid alliance, the more
likely it is to be successful. The larger the constituency represented
the more a Leftist bloc (or alliance) will influence the outcome of the
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negotiations and/or elections following on from such negotiations. It
is in this regard that a Leftist bloc would be ill-advised to stress
either a (Marxist) class-based conflict or a (Black Consciousness)
race-based conflict. Both will alienate potential left-wing allies.
Hence, 'purists' might better serve socialism by confining their
activities to clear 'workerist' (trade union?) activities, and avoid
alliance-building (popular) work, where their orthodoxy could alienate
potential ANC allies.
Building a left-alliance also requires engaging in a struggle with
the apartheid sign system, or what Keyan Tomaselli calls the "struggle
for the sign" (Tomaselli, 1986b: 14). The first anti-apartheid group
to recognise the importance of such mobilization through 'signs' was
the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) during the 1970s. However, BCM
mobilized exclusivist (racial) s igns and in this way (ie. by
restricting their appeal) ruled themselves out as a serious (widely-
based) counter-hegemonic force. Building a Left-wing alliance requires
systematically developing an alternative (counter-hegemonic) 'sign'
system which is able to attract the largest possible number of people
into the anti-apartheid movement. In a negotiation-type conflict an
exclusivist (either class or race) sign system would be damaging to an
anti-apartheid alliance, since it would presumably exclude the
possibility of incorporating elements of the 'sympathetic' bourgeoisie
and petit-bourgeoisie into 'the struggle'. Incorporating the latter
into the MDM durin~ the 1980s became the task of such initiatives as
the Five Freedoms Forum (FFF), the Cape Democrats, Johannesburg
Democratic Action Committee (J9dac), Durban Democratic Association
(DDA), etc. However, such work melted away after the unbanning of the
ANC. Building an anti-apartheid counter-hegemony requires a set of
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'integrative' signs which can serve to unify the various constituencies
of 'the struggle'. During the 1980s both the 'Freedom Charter' and
'Mandela' took on the characteristics of such unifying signs. The
activists generating such signs (as well as 'undermining' NP-hegemony
signs) would benefit by more 'professionalisation' and communicative
training.
Leftist South Africans within the Congress movement, to be
successful, need to emulate the communicative 'professionalism' of both
the NP and BCM. Socialists (Marxist and non-Marxist) within the ANC
also need to concern themselves with this area to prevent being 'Qut-
communicated' by the nationalists, liberals, and even capitalists
within the Congress-alliance. But since communication has not been a
'traditional' area of concern for Marxists, some 'revision' and
'deve lopment' of the historical material paradigm is necessary, ie .
South African Marxists will need to 'reconstruct' their paradigm to
enable it to deal more 'effectively' with: (1) popular-alliance (multi-
class; multi-ethnic; multi-religious; etc) politics; and (2)
communication and communicative 'struggle'. CCS is par excellence the
'site' at which to read context and politics into communication (and
vice versa), and to examine and develop the role of communication
within social transformative processes. Any 'reconstruction', however,
need not start from scratch because certain leftist theorists have made
important moves in the direction required when they considered the
issues of ideology, · superstructure, culture, etc. The epistemology of
this Marxist turn to the 'subjective' contains important insights,
themes and lessons for any South African New Left communicology. This
epistemology will be discussed in chapter 2.
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THE CRISIS IN WESTERN MARXISM
Some have criticised the 'importation' of so-called 'First World'
theories and debates (including left wing theories/debates) into South
Africa, claiming that this is a form of neo-colonialism (see Masilela,
1988:1; and Sitas, 1984: 2-3). Such views reflect an extremely narrow
nationalist-exclusivism. Certainly, from an historical material
perspective, each context is unique, and so care must be taken when
using a theory outside of the context in which that theory was
developed. However, no context constitutes a separate island in
today's world. The contemporary world is linked by a global information
network and MNC relations of production. (Even the Soviet Union is now
seemingly set to be incorporated into this MNC net). Given this
'globalization', no theory can be exclusively pegged to only one
context. Rather, theories shift across contexts, mutating as they move
(Muller and Tomaselli, 1989). So no theory is exclusively 'European'
or 'African'. Both Towa and Hountondji (see Hountondji, 1983) have
pointed out the limits of such arguments.
South African Leftists ignore at their own peril the so-called
'First World' theories of Western Marxists (not to mention the errors
of 'Second World' East European 'Marxist' praxis). This is not to
suggest that such theories should, or even can, be transported
unproblematically to South Africa. Such a simple transference
can result in simplistic 'cut-and-paste' Marxism (see, ego
Wigston, 1988). However, the theories (and practices) of both the
First and Second Worlds have already dealt with many of the
methodological problems with which the South African Left will have to
resolve. This is perhaps especially true for a left-wing in
ascendancy. The work of Leftist theorists outside South Africa
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· 11 h that work deals with the problems and crisesperhaps espeCla y were
of Marxism -- forms part of the heritage of Leftist praxis. A thorough
grounding in such work is one way of avoiding the wasted energy of 're-
inventing the wheel'. The ANC's Pallo Jordon (1990) appears to agree
in so far as he refers to the Left's European experiences when looking
at a South African left-wing problem.
It is significant to note that of all the schools of historical
materialism, it is the New Left (including CCS) which has been least
devastated by the collapse of East European 'state socialism'. In .ma ny
of the other schools of Marxism the Soviet collapse resulted in a deep
pessimism and failure of nerve. But because the New Left/CCS has
acknowledged, and attempted to deal with, the problematics of
historical materialism for more than two decades, the impact of the
Soviet collapse has produced less of a trauma; although as Habermas
(1990:10) has noted, this left "cannot pretend that nothing has
happened ". The collapse of state socialism has, in fact, resulted in
something of a 'confirmation' of many of the critical positions adopted
by the New Left and Critical Theorists. Perhaps Adorno will be proven
correct -- it will be the Critical Theorists (and by extension the New
Left) who will be the heirs to the Marxist legacy once the Soviet
'wrong turn' has been relegated to history. South Africa is not so
historically materially specific that the failure of forms of Marxism
elsewhere can be brushed aside. Neither is South Africa so specific
that the attempts by Western Marxists to 're-work' historical
materialism has no explanatory value here. The reverse is, of course,
also true -- the Left outside South Africa could undoubtedly learn much
from the South African left (for example: Davies et al, 1976; Erwin,
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1985; Innes & Plaut, 1978; Lambert, 1980; Legassick, 1974; and Wolpe,
1972. See also Deacon, (1988) particularly given that in the 1990s it
is only the South African Left which is in any way ascendant.
For this thesis -- with its concern about the role of
communication, ideology and hegemony within a Leftist struggle the
work of the Birmingham School is of special interest. During the 1970s
CCS in Britain reflected the growing recognition that Western Marxism
was in crisis. Under the directorship of Stuart Hall, the Birmingham
School made significant strides in trying to come to terms with, and
solve, Marxism's theoretical problems (Hall et aI, 1980). Their work
in this area has a relevance beyond Britain and the 'First World'.
But the Birmingham School/CCS was not alone in recognizing the
problems Marxism faced. Between the two World Wars there was a
recognition amongst some of the most astute Marxists that something was
'amiss' with Marxist theory and practice, especially that 'Marxism'
associated with the Marxist-Leninist interpretation (and
institutionalization) of leftist-praxis in the USSR. These critical
theorists have been generically labelled 'Western Marxists' (Aronowitz,
1981). It is noteworthy that the attempts to 'reformulate' Marxism
have, from the outset, been closely tied to a consideration (from
within the historical material paradigm) of the role of the
superstructures, the 'subjective', culture and communication. A
central concern of the 'reformulators' was to overcome the limitations
of the crude base-superstructure model associated with orthodox
Marxism. In the orthodox model, struggle took place in the economic
sphere -- this would roughly correspond to the workerist position in
South 'Africa.
In a sense then, we can find the early origins of CCS in the work
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of 'reformulators' like Georg Lukacs, members of the Frankfurt School,
Korsch, Gramsci and Volosinov. These early theorists sounded early
warning signals of what, by the 1970s, could be discerned as the coming
'collapse of the Marxist dream'. Yet they all, continued to work
WITHIN historical materialism despite their recognition of
methodological problems. These theorists might be termed the
'totality' group (Jay, 1984): they saw the superstructures as part of a
historical material process, in which the base and superstructures were
part of a dialectical totality. Struggle here was both economic (base),
and political-discursive (superstructural). This 'totality' position
would complement theorists of popular struggle in South Africa
(although popular practice has operated somewhat differently).
Others like the Althusserians and post-Althusserians responded to
the Marxist crisis by moving 'out' of historical materialism in an
attempt to deal with the crisis. Neither Althusser nor Poulantzas (as
Eurocommunists) would have regarded themselves as having moved
'outside' the paradigm. However, the implications of Althusser
granting the superstructures 'autonomy' was to de facto abandon a core
feature of the historical materialist/realist paradigm (see Sayer,
1979). It was Laclau and Mouffe, building on the Althusserian legacy,
who took Althusser's 'autonomy' notion to its logical conclusion. As a
consequence, these two scholars explicitly operate outside the
paradigm, although they remain 'socialists'. These theorists might be
termed the 'discourse' group: they came to see social reality
(including the economic base) as being constructed in discourse.
Struggle became discursive and political (ie. superstructural/
discourse-based rather than economic). This view moves very close to a
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liberal position and hence complements the rather creative leftist-
strategy that underpinned many of HDH 'middle ground' (eg. FFF)
structures in South Africa in the 1980s.
The work of both the 'totality' and 'discourse' groups deserves
serious attention from Leftists trying to deal with the contemporary
'superstructural age' and the (related?) post-modern condition
(Lyotard, 1984). It can be demonstrated that the former are of direct
concern for the South African Left because South Africa is integrated
into the superstructural age in which communication, information and
media play such centrally binding roles within HNC. Hence to argue
that the totality group (eg. the Frankfurt School) is concerned with
so-called 'First World' issues only is to ignore the importance for the
South African Left of developing a means for dealing with the impact of
the HNC Information Age on South African society.
The HNC Information Age is a 'superstructural' mode of production.
Capitalism has mutated once again -- in a way unforeseen by Harx.
Communication and the media have moved centre stage in HNC (at least in
its heartland). To some extent this was achieved by relocating the
modes of production associated with earlier phases of capitalism (eg
when steel/heavy industry, or the chemical industry were dominant) to
peripheral Third World areas. This may be one reason why Harx's
theories (developed to deal with Victorian capitalism) still have such
considerable explanatory power in the Third World. South Africa sits
in an ambiguous position: in many respects it shares many of the
characteristics of the newly industrialised Third World with its large
(and growing) urban proletariat working in the 'dirty' heavy industries
which require cheap unskilled labour. Dirty industries have been
relocated here because the societies, with their massive unemployment
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problems, are more concerned with 'jobs' than with the 'environment'.
On the other hand, South Africa -- as a sub-metropole of MNC -- has
simultaneously entered (as a marginal player) the 'superstructural age'
of electronic information networks, where a significant (and growing)
portion of the population is integrated into the 'second-hand reality'
of a media-centric world.
The South African Left reflects the ambiguities of the South African
context: 'superstructural' concerns are, as yet, marginalised within
the local praxis. However, sections of the South African Left have
shown themselves adept at utilizing the 'superstructural gaps' that the
Information Age provided (see Louw, 1989dj Cape Educational Computer
Society, nd» -- for example, the alternative media made creative use
of desk-top publishing methods (Pinnock, 1991)j they made extensive
use of photocopiers, and video units have been established (see
Steenveld, 1991j Maingard, 1991). Media Resource Centres and media
training schemes have been developed (Criticos, 1989aj and Mackay and
Louw, 1990)j left-oriented community libraries integrated themselves
into local and world-wide computer networks using modems (Karlsson,
1989)j and the Congress-alliance uses computer networking in
operations, including underground military operations (eg Operation
Vula). This utilization of information and communication technology
constitutes a de facto 'superstructural practice'.
Despite this practical work, surprisingly little has been done by
local leftists to theorize this superstructural work and hence to
produce a coherent 'superstructural praxis' (see Tomaselli, 1988/9j
Kaplan, 1991). It is this void that CCS fills by, in the first
instance, sifting through the work done by Western Marxists on the
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superstructures to ascertain its potential value in South Africa; and
secondly, by developing a local understanding of the superstructural
age as it impacts upon South Africa (so as to ensure that the local
Left does not get caught in a time-warp as did the Second World
Marxists).
THE COLLAPSE OF EASTERN EUROPE
The collapse of Soviet 'state socialism' in Eastern Europe is the
outcome of multiple causation, too complex to be addressed as a sub-
theme in this thesis. A few brief (and hence very limited)
introductory remarks are, ·howe v e r , necessary.
One reason for the collapse would appear to be that the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was constructed upon a larger
economic base (able to, for example, extract enormous resources from
the Third World, not to mention the vast natural resources of North
America). Capitalist relations of production are also effectively
geared to extracting maximum labour power. The USSR/Comecon, although
well-endowed with natural resources, was in relative terms no match for
the resource-base available to MNC. This meant that capitalism could
set the pace, and it remained for the Second and Third Worlds to scurry
along trying to keep up (see Bahro, 1981: 8-9).
A smaller resource-base meant it was impossible to match the arms
build-up by the United States of America without severely damaging the ·
non-military sectors of the Soviet economy. But the USSR found itself
trapped into an arms race because of Lenin's interpretation of Marxism.
Through this interpretation socialists served the weakest and most
exploited sections of the proletariat -- who were increasingly found in
the MNC-dependent Third World as the 20th Century progressed (Lenin,
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1975: 101-114). Bernstein's (1961) interpretation of Marxism, would
have resulted in socialism de facto serving the First World's 'labour
aristocracy' instead (eg. the position of West European social
democrats, and a position with which MNC appears able to co-exist).
Lenin's option, on the other hand, meant an on-going conflict with
world-capitalism, and hence condemned the USSR to an arms race it could
not win -- which eventually (economically) crippled the socialist
experiment inside the USSR [9]. Gorbachev's glasnost effectively
ended the USSR's threat to MNC by terminating Soviet support for
revolutionary movements around the world (with obvious serious
implications for peripheral regions like South Africa).
If the arms race was not crippling enough, to make matters worse,
the Comecon resource-base also had to provide for a huge
bureaucratically-managed 'cradle-to-the-grave' social welfare system
and a full-employment policy. Providing social welfare created an
additional economic drain which multinational capitalism did not have
to match. Further, a full-employment policy made any economic
structural readjustment (such as those caused by shifts to new modes of
production based upon new technologies) difficult to implement because
it made labour immobile.
As a result, when the First World re-ordered its relations of
production into the MNC-Information format around the new electronic-
informatics technology, Comecon could not keep pace. For example, mass
nation-wide television was only introduced in the USSR during the 1970s
(Mickiewicz, 1988). Comecon did not have sufficient capital to engage
in a similar economic restructuring while resources were simultaneously
being poured into defence and welfare. This capital shortage was
seriously exacerbated by the reconstruction required after the Armenian
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earthquake and Chernobyl disasters. By not 'keeping up', the Soviet
bloc fell even further behind the economic power of MNC, and hence
eventually lost the capacity to even maintain parity with the NATO arms
build-up (especially when the USA integrated electronic-Information Age
technology into its weaponry). The USSR's weakening military position
in relation to the USA was finally demonstrated in Afghanistan.
The problem was severely compounded by the conservatism and inertia
(see Bahro, 1981: Chapter 9) of the bureaucrats and securocrats (the
powerful nomenklatura) who did not want to engage in an economic
restructuring anyway. In 'state socialism' these apparachniks
developed a vested interest in maintaining existing relations of
production (in this case built upon earlier steel and chemical
technology) social and economic relations which benefited
themselves. These (heavy industry) relations of production, of course,
also complemented their 'inert-Marxism' derived from Marx's analysis of
the Victorian capitalism. (The USSR had after all, modelled its
industrialisation on a 'socialised' heavy industry Fordist model of
capitalism). Soviet Marxists appeared not to go through the same soul-
searching undertaken by the Western Marxists trying to come to terms
with the re-ordering of capitalism into its MNC-Information format.
Hence they were ill-equipped to deal with those shifts into new modes
of production wherein the superstructures became more central than the "
material base. Soviet Marxism became inert, (ironically) conservative,
and -caught in a time-warp. The central planning structures that had
initially served the rapid industrialization of the USSR so well, later
undermined the USSR's 'socialist experiment'.
Nomenklatura inertia acted to block full use being made of
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Information Age possibilities within the Soviet bloc made possible by
the new 'Superstructural Age'. The new MNC information relations of
production precisely appear to depend upon a lessening of the
centralised control. The capacity for instantaneous world-wide
communication (which increases the capacity for control, when needed)
seems to have lessened the day-to-day need for rigid chains of command.
Multinational capitalism loosened and granted more 'gaps' and greater
autonomy. The Thatcher-Reagan championing of 'the market' is more than
rhetoric -- it reflected deeper shifts within MNC. Information Age
efficiency meant granting increased autonomy to First World information
workers (hence the proliferation of Personal Computers (PCs); a growing
pluralism in civil society (even the USA is being increasingly 'de-
homogenized'); and a growing 'individuation' in the (second hand)
worlds people are able to construct for themselves. (Members of the
same society -- or even household -- no longer have to 'live' in the
same 'world' because each can now construct their own 'lived reality'
by using the information technology in different configurations). For
the Soviet nomenklatura, such a superstructural 'loosening' would have
been threatening to their interests (i.e. a need for centralised
control). Hence, the creative possibilities inherent in making
Information technology (PCs, photostat machines, etc) widely available
were denied in the Soviet bloc. But as Enzensberger (1974) pointed out,
the denial of such possibilities is economically destructive and
results in social retardation. The events in Eastern Europe in 1989-
1990 seem to have validated Enzensberger's argument.
The outcome of the above circumstances was that during the 1980s
.
East European 'Marxist' ruling elites seemed to 'lose their nerve'.
Preliminary early warning signals of the East European crisis emerged
37
in the 1970s in the work of certain Marxist intellectuals such as East
Germany's Rudolf Bahro (1981)j and Yugoslavia's Mihailo Markovic (1982)
and his 'Praxis group' (Markovic & Petrovic, 1979). By the early 1980s ·
these voices were joined by Soviet intellectuals like Boris Kagarlitsky
(1988j 1990) and those in the 'Novosibirsk group .' like Aganbegyan
(1988). The result of the 'loss of nerve' was that these ruling elites
began implementing revolutions from above during the 1980s. In certain
instances these revolutions could be seen to represent a confirmation
of elements of Trotsky's (1972) prediction that sections the
nomenklatura would eventually transform themselves into a new
capitalist class. Certain of the new (reformed) 'non-Marxist' ruling
elites of Eastern Europe (eg. Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania) reflect
strong connections with elements from the previous 'Marxist'
nomenklatura.
Gorbachev (1988, 1988:90) moved to 'reform' Soviet Marxism into a
"socialist market". The key to this shift was the 1987 Law on the
State Enterprise (Gorbachev, 1988: 86). This Law sought to take power
away from the central planners (and bureaucrats) in Moscow and to place
management decisions at the local grassroots level -- ie "control from
below" (Gorbachev, 1988:33). Each enterprise would be controlled by a
"work collective" (Gorbachev, 1988:32) who, together with the director,
would be responsible for taking 'market decisions', or what Gorbachev
(1988:33) calls "self-accounting and self-financing" and "self-
management" (1988:47). · The notion of a "work collective" remains
socialist. In fact, the notion bears certain similarities to the
Yugoslav and/or Markovic's (1982) proposal for grassroots worker
control of production. Initially Gorbachev's model remained more
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oriented towards retaining much 'central planning' (Gorbachev, 1988:
90) than Markovic's. But by 1989 the proponents of Perestroika had
shifted to contemplating renting out state enterprises to "work
collectives" or even to private lessees. In essence, these were moves
towards de facto privatization and the abandonment of state ownership.
This has seriously opened the door towards the growth of a large
private sector. Speeding up moves in the latter direction is strongly
advocated by Boris Yeltsin and the Inter-Regional group of Deputies,
who have come to represent the interests of the the Co-operatives (ie.
the proto-private sector). The challenge these reforms represent to
the power of the bureaucrats and securocrats has propelled this
important social sector into an alliance with the conservative United
Front of Working People of Russia.
Whether the Soviet reforms end up creating a 'private sector' or a
'workers self-management sector' only the future will tell. Whichever
it is, both represent the same underlying phenomenon -- a shift towards
Information Age social relations (with its inherent laissez faire
'anti'-structuralist and/or anti-planning bias). So once again the
USSR follows the lead of capitalism. Just as Stalin attempted to catch
up to capitalism's 'steel age' by adopting Fordist methods, so now
Gorbachev attempts to catch up to MNC's 'information age' by moves
towards 'the market'.
Whatever the outcome internally to the USSR, the effects of
Perestroika (and the related Glasnost) on Marxists (and other
'leftists') world-wide has been profound -- creating a crisis in
leftist circles far deeper than Khrushchev's 1956 denouncement of
Stalin. The effects on the South African Left have been ambiguous
on the one hand the collapse of Soviet power appears to have emboldened
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the Np-government sufficiently (because of the weakening of the Left
world-wide) to lead to the 1990 reforms. This created a significant
window of opportunity for the South African left. But on the other
hand, the East European collapse strengthened the Right and weakened
the Left's ability to seize this opportunity.
One possible interpretation of the East European collapse is to see
it as the death-knell of socialism. This has certainly been the
Rightist interpretation, and their mass media have had difficulty in
containing their glee at the prospect. However, it might be that the
Right's celebrations are premature. Bolshevism represented only one
form of leftist praxis. Other schools of socialism exist, and while
capitalism continues to exploit large sections of the world's
population, the Left continues to have a potential constituency. As
Habermas (1990:21) says: "the hope that humanity can emancipate itself
from self-imposed tutelage and degrading living conditions has not lost
its power". But if the Left is to develop a successful future praxis
it will need to pay serious attention to the Second World (state
iocialist) disaster. This is especially true in 'Sou t h Africa moving
toward a new social order which may reflect a strong leftist-
orientation.
For South Africans then, the Comecon experience is an important
lesson in what not to do. Socialism without democracy proved to be
destructive to socialism (see Gorbachev, 1988: 47-48), hence the
linking of Perestroika to a call for "democratization" (Gorbachev,
1990: 44). Democracy, in turn, requires an open communication flow.
This forms the very basis of Habermas's democratic socialist world view
which underpins the New Leftism of this thesis. Eastern Europe has
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also shown the need for a healthy autonomous civil society. It
demonstrates that any attempt to collapse civil society into 'The
Party' undermines democracy, and thereby undermines socialism (see
Markovic, 1982: ix-xi). These lessons hold serious implications for
the re-construction of the South African media away from the Rightist
media of the past towards a media that can serve all South Africans.
For this reason it is perhaps not surprising to find, amongst the South
African Left, moves toward a 'Swedish-type' print media model for South
Africa (see Rhodes Journalism Review, No 1, 1990).
From an explicitly New Left perspective, one 'valuable' outcome of
the East European collapse is that it demonstrated the need for
historical materialism to come to terms with the work of western
Marxists on, for example, the superstructures. In many respects it
vindicates those in the New Left who had argued for a democratic
socialism and an open communication system. The East European demise
now 'empirically' demonstrates the disaster of closed communications.
The Soviets tried to curtail the information flow within society and,
in consequence, 'socialism' paid a heavy price. Media control helped
breed social inertia which prevented Comecon from being able to shift
into the new 'Information Age' mode of production quickly enough so as
to remain a credible challenge to MNC.
South Africa is as yet not fully integrated into the 'Information
Age'. The challenge for the Left is to steer South Africa into the
'Information Age' (oie. avoid the Comecon disaster). However, it needs
to ~o so without becoming a dependency of MNC, and/or facilitating the
reproduction within South Africa of exploitative relations of
production. In short, history may have given to the South African Left
an opportunity to demonstrate that democratic socialism and an advanced
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economy based upon electronic-information technology are not only
compatible but are complementary.
THE NEW INFORMATION AGE
The USA has for decades represented the heart and pace-setter of
the world-system of MNC. It became an 'information society' (Naisbitt,
1984: Chapter 1), based on a growing merger between the electronic
media, telecommunications, computers, satellites, and so on. The
proliferation of MNC is tied to the functioning of an information-
technology that facilitates instantaneous world-wide electronic
communications. This has become the life-blood of multinational
corporations (and the related world banking and financial systems). MNC
is thus systematically transforming US society into an 'information
age' that has penetrated all the continents. So the shift towards
'information' in the USA has come to have great significance for the
rest of the world (see Collins, 1990).
The 'information society' is the outcome of the impact of
information technology on economic and human relationships within MNC,
(Bell, 1973; Porat, 1977; and Beniger, 1986). A shift in. the mode of
production has taken place: a growing proportion of human labour is now
occupied in a 'service economy' which is concerned with moving
'information' around. The resultant (MNC) 'superstructural' mode of
production (which is geared ~oward s information-processing rather than
manufacturing) is, however, no less governed by the exploitative
relations of production associated with capitalism. What has changed
for many workers is the nature of the labour engaged in as well as
their product (which has become less 'material'). In other words, the
argument -- provided in Toffler (1980) and Masuda (1980) -- that the
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information age is necessarily progressive is not true if measured by
leftist criteria.
Naisbitt, following Daniel Bell (1973), argues that the years 1956-
57 represented a socio-economic turning point for American capitalism
(Naisbitt, 1984:13). During this period the USA shifted from an
industrial mode of production to an information-based mode of
production. (This coincided with a population shift from northern USA
to southern USA). In the 1980s the rapid diffusion of technology
associated with the electronic movement of information (see Smith,
1981) altered the relations of production in the First World
irrevocably away from 'industry' and towards 'information' (see Bell,
1973j and Jameson, 1984). The Information Age was born in the USA but
has subsequently proliferated elsewhere.
In 1950 only 17% of Americans worked in the 'information sector'.
By 1984 the figure was 60% and climbing rapidly (Naisbitt, 1984:14).
As David Birch said of Americans: "We are working ourselves out of the
manufacturing business and into the thinking business" (in Naisbitt,
1984:17). The Thatcher revolution in Britain represented a
considerable economic shift from 'industry' to 'information' (in part
seen as a shift in labour from manufacturing in northern Britain to
information in south east Britain). In part, the move towards an
information society in the First World was facilitated by the
relocation of the industrial sector with its p~llution and need for
cheap labour -- to the Third World. (This is one reason why Marxism
still retains relevance in Third World societies wherein workers in
manufacturing are becoming so demographically dominant). So the
'superstructural age' is one in which the First World sits astride a
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world-wide information-network which (superstructurally) links the
world in a way which effectively places the (First World-based) MNCs in
control of the industrial-complexes which are increasingly found in the
Third World. In, the First World, however, it is the petit-bourgeoisie
which is growing, while the percentage of workers declines. This has
serious implications for a workerist-oriented Marxism. Part of the
explanation of the collapse of the Marxist dream was that most
historical materialists did not adjust to these shifts in MNC quickly
enough.
South Africa finds itself in a curious position -- in part South
Africa, like other Third World countries, is experiencing an expanding
industrial sector and hence a growing working class. But the country
also represents an important sub-metropole of MNC, and for this reason
has, to a considerable extent, been integrated into the wider
information society, albeit as a junior partner of the First World
metropoles (see, for example, Kaplan, 1990). In a post-apartheid era
the likelihood is that the Pretoria-Witwatersrand megalopolis will
increasingly become the key organizational metropole for Africa. This
will increase the rate at which South Africa is integrated into the MNC
Information Age. And as South Africa is increasingly pulled into the
'superstructural age', so the crisis faced by historical materialism
will become increasingly apparent (ie. it is a crisis from which not
even the South African left is ultimately immune, despite what the
leftist-grassroots might presently believe). For this reason the Left
will find itself pulled in two directions simultaneously. The
workerists will pull in one direction (and will be able to call upon
the support of a considerable working class constituency), while the
New Left will pull in another direction. (The New Left will, of course,
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be able to point to the Second World disaster caused by inertia and/or
not adjusting to the Information Age quickly enough).
What is clear is that the 'Information Age' (which took off in the
1960s and then exponentially exploded in the 1970s and 1980s) has
posed, and still poses, a serious 'superstructural challenge' to
historical materialism. And it is not only a 'First World' issue (as
the collapse of the Second World has demonstrated). It is a challenge
the South African left cannot ignore any more than can the left in
other parts of a world increasingly unified by an expanding HNC
network.
To date, the 'superstructural challenge' has not been particularly
well met by historical materialists -- in part because historical
materialists have generally been loath to take the non-material
'superstructures' seriously enough. Enzensberger went so far as to
say: " So far there is no Marxist theory of the media" (1974: 96). But
there are exceptions -- those working within the historical material
paradigm who did challenge the orthodoxies of the rigid materialists;
and who tried to re-direct the attention of the (usually unwilling)
Left towards the changes taking place in capitalism, revealing serious
gaps in Marxist theory and practice. Some of this work (eg. the
structuralists and culturalists) has been integrated into CCS, while
some (such as the Frankfurt School) has yet to be incorporated.
Some of the most important early Marxist work on the emergence of
this new (superstructurally-based) mode of production was produced by
the Frankfurt School from the 1930s to the 1950s. Their work on the
'Culture Industry' (see Adorno & Horkheimer, 1979) was remarkable for
pointing to the growing social importance of media and culture before
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media and information technology had become central to capitalist
relations of production. Much of their resultant pessimism (from a
Marxist perspective) which was generated before and during the Second
World War has only been fully vindicated in the last two decades.
Instead of attacking the Frankfurt School for their pessimism, the Left
might have been better off dealing with the shifts taking place in
capitalism to which the School had tried to draw attention. The School
pioneered work about the superstructures of vital interest for leftists
concerned with the Information Age and the (related) collapse of the
Marxist dream. It is, in fact, no accident that Habermas (the most
significant defender of (reconstructed) historical materialism in the
contemporary 'Information' and/or 'Post Modern' world) is a direct heir
to the School's approach.
Turning to the superstructures poses a number of questions. For
example, when ees approaches the superstructures, should any aspect of
the 'orthodox 'base-superstructure' approach be utilized? Or should
the 'totality approach' (eg the Frankfurt School, Gramsci, Volosinov,
etc) be privileged? Alternatively, some might argue that a
(structuralist) 'discourse approach' (Althusserian/ post-Althusserian)
is the key. Certain post-modernists (such as Derrida) would argue
that leftists serious about coming to terms with the contemporary
conditions would have to abandon 'structuralisms', like historical
materialism, completely. In its place would be put a (leftist) post-
structural discourse-based deconstruction of the post-modern era.
Perhaps in meeting the challenge of the 'superstructural age' and/or
dealing with the contemporary world-wide Leftist crisis, the Left would
benefit from an openness to each of these 'approaches' (recognizing
that each has its strengths and weaknesses). This thesis, however, in
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constructing a Leftist approach to the superstructural age, will
foreground the 'discourse' and 'totality' approaches -- see Chapters 2
and 3. (Because the orthodox Marxist base-superstructure approach is
seen to be 'too' materialist, while the post-structural approach is
seen to be 'too' superstructural/idealist'). But marrying these two
approaches is not unproblematic. The difficulty can best be recognized
by noting that Althusser's structuralist-discourse method is explicitly
anti-humanist, while the totality approach is an overtly humanist-
Marxism. However, that does not make the two approaches necessarily
incompatible -- after all, Volosinov succeeded in working within a
'totality' framework while dealing with 'discourse' issues.
Perhaps it is Enzensberger (1974), drawing on the Frankfurt School
member, WaIter Benjamin, who best expresses the challenge to the Left
in the superstructural age. Developments in electronic-information
technology should be seen as opportunities for a leftist social
transformation. As with Habermas, Enzensberger recognized the potential
modern information technology holds for (socialist) human liberation.
It is a liberation that differs from that sketched out by Marx himself
because it is based upon a different mode of production (ie.
'information' rather than 'heavy industry'). The information age does
not have to be imprisoned within MNC relations of production. Marx
wished to 'socialize' and 'humanize' the heavy industry relations of
production of Victorian capitalism. The challenge for today's Left is
to transcend the Nineteenth century Marxist vision (and the Leninist
Twentieth century vision), and to 'rework' the 'socialist' spirit into
a form appropriate for the twenty-first century. This would present
the contemporary Left with the challenge of coming to terms with the
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superstructures, so as to attempt to 'socialize' and 'humanize' the
HNC-Information Age' relations of production. The technology created
by HNC gives us the possibility, as Habermas has noted, of a full
participative democracy (based upon an electronically mediated 'public
sphere'). Further, the technology of the Information Age contains the
potential for building a producers' democracy based on (both white and
blue collar) workers who have considerable individual autonomy.
Heeting the superstructural challenge in this way might also assist in
the formulation of a leftist challenge to the post-modern condition and
the contemporary swing to the Right. The above view of socialism
points to the possibility of even moving away from central planning,
(whether of the 'capitalist'/HNC or 'state socialist' varieties),
towards a producers-controlled 'socialist market'. MNC has created the
possibilities for such a socialist democracy.
Any notion that the South African Left should ignore such 'First
(or Northern) World' issues ie. a democracy constructed upon the
latest (information) technology -- does a great disservice to South
Africans. In fact, it is patronizing, since it implies that South
Africans are not up to joining the 'modern' ('Northern') . world, and
should be kept in a state of 'Third (Southern) World' lesser-
developedness.
THE POST-MODERN ERA
In identifying the post-modern condition, Lyotard identified one of
the "mo s t serious contemporary changes to" socialism. The dramatic loss
of influence over intellectuals (especially European intellectuals),
particularly during the 1970s, significantly reduced the capacity of
the Left to wage an effective struggle for hegemony in both the First
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and Second Worlds. Lyotard described how, since the Second World War,
the 'structuralist' knowledges -- which had come to dominate academic
discourses since the end of the nineteenth century (what he refers to
as 'grand narratives') -- have been in decline. The post-modern
condition is intimately tied to the interrelated phenomena of a leftist
theoretical/methodological malaise (one of the causes of the East
European 'failure of nerve') together with the rise of laissez fareism
in the First and Second Worlds. Significantly, Lyotard (1984:38-8)
himself notes how the decline of the 'grand narratives' seems to have
something to do with a growing social swing to the Right: that is a
gradual loss of faith in state (communist) socialist systems together
with the (related) growth in the popularity of 'free enterprise'.
'Truth', 'rationality' and 'reality' are discredited -- all concepts
central to the Marxist dream. The Enlightenment project (which
Habermas argues Marxism takes to its limits) is abandoned. In its place
are the pragmatics of capitalist 'performance', or as Lyotard says, the
new goal for post-modern knowledge ('language games') is "no longer
truth but performativity" (1984: 46). Post-modernists delight in the
deconstruction of grand narratives (like those of Hegelian philosophy,
Marxism, liberal economics, etc) which are seen to be 'totalitarian' or
'fascist'. These are then replaced by a proliferation (anarchy?) of
micro-narratives -- a sort of laissez faire of knowledge.
One of the 'grand narratives' that has been in serious crisis since
the 1970s -- as its power of explanation has been increasingly
challenged -- is Marxism (Pasquinelli in Hanninen & Paldan, 1984:24).
Marxism's hegemonic influence over so much academic discourse in the
1960s had evaporated in the First and Second Worlds by the 1980s. Even
within the South African academe of the early 1990s where Marxism
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still constitutes a highly legitimate discourse -- post-modernist and
post-structuralist discourses were making considerable inroads. It is
somewhat ironic that it was a communist -- Louis Althusser -- who
helped to give impetus, during the 1970s, to the shift within academe
away from historical materialism, and towards post-modernism. It was
Althusser's sophisticated attempts to deal with the crisis of Marxism -
- and to theorize the French Communist Party's shift away from
Stalinism towards Eurocommunism -- which inadvertently gave
significant impetus to the deconstruction of Marxist-structuralism and
hence to the subsequent rise of post-structuralism. The post-
Althusserian deconstruction of Marxism, and later its Hegelian roots,
unleashed the post-structuralist (and the related post-modernist)
challenge upon the historical material paradigm, so intensifying the
rapidity at which the Marxist dream collapsed. The post-Althusserian
[10] debate subsequently progressed so far -- ego Laclau and Mouffe
(1985), and Hirst (1979) (also see Elliott, 1986) as to raise the
question of whether socialists have to abandon historical materialism
(and class) to deal with this (post-modern) era? It is no coincidence
that the 'post-modern condition' was first 'identified' in 1979 by
someone -- Lyotard -- working within the Francophone academic tradition
(the Council of Quebec Universities). This was an academic tradition
upon which Althusserian-Marxism had deeply impacted during the 1970s.
Hence, for anyone attempting to come to terms with post-m~dernism
and/or post-structuralism, the work of the Marxist 'discourse' group
(especially the Althusserians) will be of interest.
What is remarkable is how, despite the enormous challenge posed to
Marxism by the post-modern condition, those working within the
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historical material paradigm have mostly been conspicuous by their
inertia and conservatism in the face of the challenge posed. Except
for Jurgen Habermas, Frederic Jameson and Jean Baudrillard, historical
materialists generally failed to seriously concern themselves with
these challenges (see Foster, 1983). It is through the work of Jameson
and Baudrillard that the post-modern condition has influenced
historical materialism. Jameson (1984) and Baudrillard (1975)
attempted to marry important post-modern insights with Marxist ones,
and in the process deflect Marxism into a direct concern with the
superstructural age. But only Habermas (1987) challenged (from a
Marxist perspective) post-modernist views, pointing out how they are
inherently neo-conservative and anti-rationalist (and hence a threat to
the Leftist project of 'rationalising'/humanizing the world).
Post-modernism is not a purely theoretical issue. From a New
Leftist CCS perspective, it is, for example, interesting to note how
this post-modern knowledge appears to complement the needs of
multinational capitalism. MNC requires an open world economic system;
a free interplay of resources within one unified market; a laissez
faire approach. It is not coincidental that the unstructuredness of
the post-modernist 'pure difference' reflects academic 'power
relationships' that neatly match the anarchy of the market within MNC
power relationships. In South Africa one sees a further parallel in
the way that, just as South Africa is a peripheral sub-metropole of
HNC, so too has post-modernist thinking entered South African academe
in a way that matches this peripheral sub-metropole status. So, from a
CCS perspective, it would seem that the post-modernists are not as
'unstructured' by their context as they might like to think; and their
anarchistic approach is beneficial to MNC by its very weakening of any
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coherent world view which could challenge MNC. The anti-rationalism of
post modernist knowledge matches the anti-rationalism of MNC relations
of production.
, d d't"South Africa cannot be divorced from the post-mo ern con 1 10n .
Post-modernism -- as a symptom of the crisis of the structural isms (in
both its Monopoly capitalist and Marxist fo~ms) -- may be of more
immediate concern to those ,a t the core of the MNC world hegemony (in
Europe or America), where the crisis is currently most acute. However,
for the South African Left the crisis of historical materialism cannot
be relegated to a 'First World issue'. The crisis has direct bearing
on local leftist praxis because: firstly, this crisis has, in part,
manifested itself in the altered world power relationships of the 1990s
(an alteration that directly impacts upon South Africa). Secondly, the
'collapse of the Marxist dream' is linked to the crisis of all the
structural-knowledges (including historical materialism). That South
Africa IS on the periphery of the MNC world-hegemony precisely means
that it is are not immune from the effects of any crisis (of
'modernism' and of 'structuralism') taking place at the centre.
South Africa may be a peripheral player in the post-modern world,
but it seems set to be a central player in the Leftist world of the
1990s. If the Left (including the South African left) is to find
solutions to the leftist theoretical/methodological malaise (in the
First World, Second World, and -- since South Africa is not an island,
by extension -- the Third World), some engagement with post-
structuralism and the 'discourse' approach is necessary. The most
logical point of entry into this discourse could be the point of
intersection between historical materialist-structuralism and post-
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structuralism -- ie. the Althusserian turn towards discourse. In this
regard CCS's flirtation with Althusserianism and post-Althusserianism
becomes valuable as a point of entry for dealing with the crisis of
structural-Marxism, and by extension, with post- modernism and the
post-structural challenge to Marxism. This creates, for a South
African-based CCS, the fascinating opportunity of examining the
Althusserian and post-Althusserian approaches within a peripheral post-
modernist context like South Africa. It is a context which, by virtue
of its peripheralness, has been, and is, influenced by post-
Althusserian and post-modern developments (despite the local leftist
triumphs which help to blur the greater, world-wide, leftist crisis).
But if the post-modern era is one that has seen the serious
weakening of grand narratives upon which the Left has relied, the post-
modern era has also created superstructural 'gaps' available for
exploitation by the Left. That these 'gaps' arise is not really
surprising. After all, the post-modern condition appears to be tied to
the rise of the (MNC) Information ('superstructural') Age in some way.
Enzensberger identified these (superstructural) 'gaps' as the
contradictions of this stage of capitalism. MNC has produced
photocopiers, PCs, computer networking, satellites, videos, etc. These
have all become central to the functioning of MNC. But they also
constitute spaces for creatively challenging the system. An example
would be sections of the South African alternative press (like the
Weekly Mail) which have used both PC/desk-top publishing technology,
together with a space opened up by the new laissez faire market.
Albeit that on a world-wide scale the Right is currently ascendant
and the Left in crisis, this is no reason for the Left to adopt a
Frankfurt School-type pessimism. There is no need for premature
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defeatism when confronting the growing superstructuralism of the MNC
world-network, and the related post-modernist (neo-conservative)
'anarchy'. Instead, a (redefined) Left could still adjust to the
challenges of the superstructural and/or post-modern age and seek
creative ways of leftist intervention -- a la Habermas or Enzensberger.
Such an adjustment lies at the very heart of the CCS project.
AN EMERGING WORLD CAPITALIST HEGEMONY
The collapse of Soviet power in 1989/1990 placed capitalism closer
to being globally hegemonic than it had been since 1917. MNC, and its
Information Age technology, penetrated deeply into regions previously
excluded from the world capitalist hegemony. Elections in the Eastern
European states, the USSR itself, in the newly united Germany, and
Nicaragua, as well as the Chinese uprising, all served to confirm the
general crisis of the Left. Only in South Africa and Chile can the
left be regarded as having made any serious gains (in both instances
due to mass popular discontent with the previous far-Right regimes).
These might, however, turn out to be pyrrhic victories given the wider
world context -- ie. the South African and Chilean Lefts will have
little room for maneuver in this context. (In fact, a left currently
elected on a 'socialist' platform, but then unable to deliver the goods
may further weaken the 'socialist' position).
It is possible to see the leftist crisis as the product of a
leftist failure to adapt. The Marxist, and later the Leninist-Marxist
interpretations of socialism had gained a general hegemony within the
Left by 1919. (A hegemony institutionalised by the Third
International). This only became a problem after a remarkable
conservatism and/or inertia transformed Marx's (and Lenin's)
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revolutionary ideas into dogma ill-equipped to deal with its own
methodological crisis, or with the Information/superstuctural Age,
and/or with the post-modern condition. By the late 1960s it was
becoming apparent (at least to the 'seed group' of what became the 'New
Left') that significant sectors of the Left had been caught in a 'time
warp'. The 1968 Paris Uprising highlighted this inertia -- the French
Communist Party revealing its incapacity to deal with this event. The
1970s and 1980s served to confirm both the depth of historical
materialism's methodological problems. A decline in the fortunes of
the Leninist interpretation of historical materialism was the result.
The result was a de facto (First World) capitalist world hegemony in
1990. This MNC hegemony was made especially ironic given that First
World-capitalism is far from healthy -- ie. the economies of the First
World have never fully recovered from the 1970s recession which was
triggered by the oil crisis (Beenstock, 1984). The 1980s, in fact, saw
MNC in a state of on-going crisis with key capitalist players in Europe
and North America facing enormous (and apparently irresolvable)
problems such as growing unemployment, recession and a financial sector
in trouble (see Beenstock, 1984; and Keman et aI, 1987). The
instability of the financial sector represents a deep-seated
vulnerability within MNC because, with little prospect of the Third
World debt being repaid, the crisis has seemingly been 'papering' over
by a process of 'creative accountancy' rather than being solved. The
financial sector crisis was most clearly revealed by the 1982ff
International Banking Crisis and the 1989 USA Banking (Savings & Loan
and Thrift) Crises. (A post-structural leftist might suggest that
capitalism's crisis is derived from the same underlying --
structuralist -- problems that Leninist-Marxism failed to solve). What
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is more, the influence of the New Right within HNC was considerable in
1990. This influence was tied to the fact that the 'New Right' seemed
to have adapted to the post-modern condition and to the Information Age
far more effectively than did the Left. There is some considerable
irony in the fact that during the 1970s and 1980s self-styled
'conservatives' (like the British Conservative Party and the USA's
Republican Party) manifested less inertia than supposed
'revolutionaries' within the Harxist-Leninist tradition. The New
Right's emphasis on 'pragmatics', 'power' and its championing of an
'anarchy' of the 'market' neatly complements the underlying 'spirit' of
post-modernism. The New Right both adapted to the new context, and
helped to shape this new context, while the left paid a heavy price for
its inertia.
Following the Soviet decline the world is being restructured along a
'North World'--'South World' cleavage; the former Comecon bloc
seemingly set for integration into the 'North' (perhaps as part of an
expanded EEC). In the immediate wake of the East European collapse, the
USA became a one-power world hegemony. (A status confirmed by the
USA's control of the United Nations in the 1990 USA-Iraq conflict).
However, it seems likely that this single power hegemony will be a
temporary phenomenon because of declining USA economic power. Also,
the USA seems set to be challenged, at least in the medium term, by the
two rising 'Northern' giants of a restructured (united) Europe, as well
as Japan. (Japan may -- through exploiting the incorporation of Hong
Kong into China -- succeed in integrating China into a Japanese
hegemonic bloc).
What is of central concern to the Left in this restructuring process
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is that all three potential world powers are PART of the SAME
Information Age/MNC relations of production. Whether the 'North' is
ultimately controlled by a single, double or triple power arrangement
does not alter the fact that MNC is in control. Furthermore, the
collapse of the Second World opened up these vast regions for the
penetration ('colonization') of capital. The West German take-over of
East Germany is the most obvious example of this. But the same process
is apparent throughout Eastern Europe. This has come at a particularly
opportune moment for MNC which was seemingly 'running out' of
investment opportunities towards the end of the 1980s. Hence the
opportunities offered by penetration of the Second World will be of
tremendous benefit for MNC -- and will, in all likelihood, strengthen
capitalism still further.
Within this new world relationship, Africa -- as part of the
'South' -- seems set to become a marginal comprador region of MNC.
Where South Africa will fit into this is as yet unclear. Much will
depend on how the South African left uses its local ascendancy, and
deals with the flux (internationally and internally) of the first half
of the 1990s. A key factor will be which sector (or alliance of
sectors) of the local left come to power. (It is even possible that a
ruling bloc will emerge out of an alliance of sectors of the local left
and sectors of the local right). South Africa could, on the one hand,
become an 'outpost' of the 'North' in Africa -- ie. an MNC sub-
metropole (administering the rest of Africa for MNC). Alternatively,
South Africa could opt to lose its MNC sub-metropole status, and so
become fully a part of the 'South'. PAC and AZAPO -- following a Fanon
(1968) path would presumably opt for the latter route.
There is much that militates in favour of the co-option of the South
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African struggle into a sub-metropole relationship with HNC, namely:
the enormous power of HNC in the contemporary world; the fact that the
local (reformed) Right retains considerable power (and will push for
integration in this direction); and because the socio-economic problems
and dynamics work against any future ruling elite -- even leftist
ruling elite -- being practically able to resist this course. For
example, the South African working class is a de facto privileged group
(a 'labour aristocracy') when juxtaposed to the lumpenproletariat and
rural peasants. This presents the South African left with a dilemma
who to represent in the ensuing (post-apartheid) social struggle.
Increasingly, there are signs that the ANC (as one sector of the left)
will come to represent an alliance of the working and the middle
classes against the lumpenproletariat. Such an alliance would, of
course represent a 'Bernstein route' -- ie. this left would represent
the 'labour aristocracy' against a lumpenproletariat which would face
increasing mass misery due to South Africa's position within HNC. A
South African leftist ruling group adopting the Bernstein route would
find itself: (a) in an automatic alliance with the social democrats of
the 'North', and (b) 'acceptable' (if not 'loved') by HNC. (A Leninist
route would, of course, opt for an alliance of the working class and
lumpenproletariat. This would produce a South African-HNC conflict).
A new 'leftist' South African ruling elite seems set to be
presented with two stark choices -- (1) an alliance with the labour of
the - ' No r t h ' (ie. social democrats) and being a de facto part of HNC
relations of production (in a sub-metropole status), or (2) joining the
'South' in a hostile relationship to the 'North'. The 'Bernstein
route' will probably be forced upon any new South African 'leftist'
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/ ' h' .ruling elite because: firstly, currently MNC Nort ern power 1S so
overwhelming; secondly, there is no longer a Second World to
financially and militarily back an alternative route; thirdly, a new
ruling elite would be unlikely to be in any position to meet the
massive expectations of the lumpenproletariat. (To attempt to do so
would incur the wrath of the HNC 'North' and/or lead to a mass exodus
of desperately needed white skills). Failure to meet these expectations
will produce social tension that will in all probability result in the
ruling group using force. This will increase such a ruling group's
reliance on the middle class and the 'North', so strengthening the
pull of Bernstein route. Such a scenario would leave the 'far left' in
opposition to the new (centre left) hegemony, probably aligned to the
'South'.
The role of the Marxism, historical materialism, etc has not played
itself out yet in South Africa. However, amongst other factors, the
legacy of the 'collapse of the Marxist dream' and the crisis of
historical materialism are going to weigh heavily upon any South
African left-leaning hegemony (and upon any left opposition they might
have). The Left will have to address this negative legacy, and deal
with the existing world power relationships (of the Information Age and
a 'Northern' MNC-hegemony). This requires activating a new 'way
forward' based upon a reappraisal and RECONSTRUCTION of leftist theory
and practice. Such a reconstruction will undoubtedly prove to be a long
process and will contain many constituent parts. This thesis is
primarily aimed at raising questions around the issue of rethinking
leftist praxis such that communication and the superstructures are
given more attention than historical materialism has been want to
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concede in the past.
FOOTNOTES
[ 1 ] The terms Left and Right date back to France's Estates-General just
prior to the French Revolution. At this time those supporting the
king and the traditional social order sat on the right of the
Assembly, while opponents sat on the left. From this has d~rive~
the definition that "those on the 'left' wish to change th1ngs 1n
the direction of more equality and less tradition than those on the
right" (Robertson, 1985: 181). In contemporary political
discourse, those on the Left would be seen to support, in one or
other mix, the following positions: nationalization of industry;
state control of the economy; a highly redistributive tax policy;
pacificism or arms reduction; egalitarian policies in education; a
preference for ecological rather than industrial expansionist
policies; positive discrimination towards minority groups; etc.
(Robertson, 1985: 181). Robertson's definition has the advantage of
enabling the incorporation of a broad spectrum of political players
into the category 'left'. In the case of South Africa such a broad
category is advantageous because: firstly, in the course of the
anti-apartheid struggle a wide diversity of players (including
communists, socialists, some nationalists and even some liberals)
came to adopt a 'more equality, less tradition'-type position. Only
a broad definition can cope with the de facto diversity. Secondly,
a broad definition of Left slides more easily into the democratic-
leftist position I will argue for (ie. a position influenced by,
amongst others, Habermas, Gramsci, and Eurocommunism).
For the purposes of this thesis, then, the following categorization
can serve as a guide. At the time of the 1990 Reforms, the South
African Left included a broad spectrum of organizational actors
including the ANC, PAC, SACP, COSATU, UDF/MDM, AZAPO, NACTU, WOSA,
the New Unity Movement (NEUM), Institute for a Democratic
Alternative for South Africa (Idasa) and Five Freedoms Forum (FFF).
The South African Right included those organizational actors who
were part of, or allied to, the Tricameral system: the National
Party (NP), Conservative Party (CP), Democratic Party (DP), Labour
Party, Solidarity, National Peoples Party and the Inkatha Freedom
Party. The Far Right would include: Afrikaner Weerstand Beweging
(AWB) and Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP). In 1990 the two largest
actors were the ANC and NP: the ANC representing a centre-left
position and the NP representing a centre-right position. In the
course of restructuring South Africa into a post-apartheid society '
the above categorizations are likely to undergo a series of
modifications.
[2] ·St ua r t . Ha l l (director of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural
Studi7s (CCC~) ~f the University of Birmingham from 1968 to 1979)
descr1bed th1s collapse of the Marxist dream' as a central concern
during the formative years of the Birmingham CCCS. (Interview with
author on 20 September 1989, London). The unfolding saga of this
'colla~se' has received attention elsewhere, examples being,
Aronow1tz (1981); Anderson (1983); Markovic (1982: ix-xvi); and
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Kolakowski (1981: Vol.3).
[3] Hegemony refers to a complex process described by Gramsci. This
term will be defined in Chapter 2, when Gramsci's work is examined.
[ 4 ] CCS is only one of many 'groups' that can be associated with the
'New Left' (a largely West European and North American phenomenon,
being perhaps most characteristically associated with the 1968
French Uprising). The 'New Left' has not been a clear-cut
position. One of the few coherences from which some sort of
'position' can be distilled is the New Left Review journal. The
term 'New Left' has, since the 1960s, been claimed by a variety of
groups who have been associated with the following sort of
positions: (1) New Leftists have opposed the East European state-
socialist model, Stalinists and the Communist Parties who advocated
policies in line with the East European model. But (2) they
simultaneously oppose the capitalist world-order, and (3) want to
see this capitalist world-order overthrown by (4) organized
revolutionary groups (throughout the world) utilizing whatever
'contradictions' are 'available' in their social contexts. In
other words, (5) the (orthodox Marxist) view that one has to 'wait'
for the 'right conditions' to launch a revolution is specifically
rejected. (6) The Third World is seen to offer especially
favourable conditions for revolutionary action aimed at weakening
the overall capitalist world-order -- ie. national liberation
struggles have been enthusiastically supported. (7) The working
class is no longer seen to be a reliable revolutionary actor
because the capitalist ruling classes have learned to co-opt and
'de-revolutionize' workers. The above positions -- re-arranged in
various patterns -- have influenced a remarkably wide spectrum of
leftist groups (frequently working in opposition to each other, and
yet sharing the above underlying assumptions) including:
anarchists, neo-Maoists, neo-Trotskyists, neo-Leninists, left-
Greens, feminist and gay-rights groups, and certain social-democrat
positions (eg. the Habermas-type). Kolakowski (1981, Vol 3: 492)
has called this phenomenon a 'universalization' of 'Marxist
ideology' and has suggested that it represents the 'disintegration'
of Marxism.
[ 5 ] A rough categorization of what constituted the 'South African Left'
in 1990 is given in footnote 1. Chapter 4 sketches out the way in
which the South African Left came to encompass such a broad
spectrum of players in the course of the struggle against
apartheid, so that by the 1980s 'the struggle' had come to
incorporate communists (including Leninists, Trotskyists, etc.),
socialists, social-democrats, and even nationalists and some
liberals. In terms of Robertson's (1985: 181) definition of Left,
all these players (although presumably motivated by different
' i n t e r e s t s ) were guided by left-wing principles in the context of
South Africa of the 1980s. Exactly which players will constitute
Left and Right in the future is difficult to predict. Already, . from
the shake-down of political actors and constituencies set in motion





The terms 'First World', 'Second World', and 'Third World' are used
in this thesis despite the recognition of how problematic they are.
The terms have their origin with "a French 'New Left' journalist,
Claude Bourdet, for whom the First World represented capitalism,
the Second World represented Stalinist Communism, and the Third
World represented a 'third way' (see Worsley, 1984: 307). This
third way was opposed to First World 'capitalist imperialism' but
was not pro-Stalinist. For Bourdet the 1950s and 1960s anti-
colonial movements in Africa and Asia and the New Left both shared
this 'third way' approach. The 1989 collapse of Eastern Europe to
some extent problematizes these terms because the Second World has
disappeared. The rapprochement between the former First and Second
Worlds has now created a new world 'cleavage', namely 'North' and
'South' Worlds. The exact line of cleavage has yet to congeal, but
some pattern is already becoming apparent. 'North'= former First
World and parts of the Second World; and 'South' = former Third
World and parts of the Second World. However, because this thesis
deals with both the pre- and post- East European collapse Bourdet's
journalistic terms remain valuable explanatory short-hand
definitions for this thesis.
It is possible that the reformed-NP may not be merely cynically
'co-opting' UDF/ANC discourse, but may rather be shifting its
political position towards the Left in order to facilitate an ANC-
NP ruling alliance after the first one-person-one-vote elections.
This is but one of the possible shifts under way which would
ultimately modify the categorizations of the South African Left and
Right (given in footnote 1).
[8] This figure incorporates the weekly sales of: New Nation, UmAfrika,
Weekly Mail, Vrye Weekblad, South, and New African.
[9] Marxism might have evolved in many directions. That Lenin was to
have such an enormous impact on Marxist praxis has ultimately
produced a remarkable irony for Marxism in the 1990s -- Lenin's
interpretation (arising out of the Russian context) steered Marxism
into a championing of the weakest and most disadvantaged sectors of
world labour. This interpretation produced both a catastrophe and
simultaneously an opportunity for Marxism in the 1990s.
Championing the weak meant the USSR was dragged into an arms race
with MNC which ultimately so damaged its experimental socialist
economy that it was a major factor in precipitating the collapse of
Second World Marxism (a collapse from which Marxism might
conceivably never recover -- although, perhaps like Catholicism,
Marxism may have sufficient resolve to weather its catastrophies).
On the other hand, it is this very championing of the weakest and
most disadvantaged sectors of MNC that created such an immense
credibility for Marxism in so much of the Third World (where the
"w7a ke s t and most disadvantaged citizens of world capitalism now
l1ve). The contemporary support 'Marxism' enjoys amongst such a
large percentage of South Africa's population is one example of the
'opportunity' created by the Leninist interpretation. So whereas
Marx expected socialist revolutions to take place in the most
developed nations, Marxism ironically generates inspiration in the
least developed areas instead.
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[10] The term 'post-Althusserian ' does not in any way refer to a
coherent 'school' of thinking. Neither does it refer to
Althusserians who came after Althusser -- ie. those who used the
' Al t hus s er i a n ' me t hod ' . Rather, it refers to the way in which
Althusser's ideas impacted upon an intellectual debate that was
much wider than Althusserians or even leftists. So 'post' refers
to a 'period ' following Althusser's intellectual intervention in
which many intellectuals were influenced in one or other way by
notions raised (often inadvertently) in his work. (This influence
was often 'second-hand'. In other words, it need not have come
from a direct engagement with Althusser/Althusserians. Instead, it
may have arisen from engaging with the general academic discourse
upon which his ideas had impacted). Althusser's work represented a
highly imaginative attempt in the 1970s by a Marxist to deal with
the methodological crisis of Marxism. But his 'solution ' to this
crisis proved to be no solution at all. In fact, his work seems
instead to have accellerated the process of the collapse
(deconstruction?) of the Marxist dream within the Francophone
academic world (Anderson, 1983: Chapter 2). (This then filtered
into Anglo-Saxon academic debates). But if Althusser failed to
' s ave' Marxism, he unintentionally opened up a whole new debate,
and one that proliferated well beyond the Left. What his work on
the superstructures, ISAs, ideology , anti-humanism etc . did was to
enrich the debate about 'discourse '. For intellectuals this
debate opened up a new way of understanding their own practices
and for understanding academic discourse. Althusser
(inadvertently) pushed a conceptual door slightly ajar. In the
process he helped give rise to a 'scientific revolution ' (Kuhn,
1974) once others poured through this now opened door. Once open,
there was no stopping those who wanted to explore this new
conceptual territory. This gave rise to an era of intense
engagement with issues he had raised: the post-Althusserian era
saw his (structuralist) work on discourse mutate into a post-
structuralism (see Easthope, 1988), and his anti-humanist Marxism
mutate into the anti-rationalist post-modernism. The parallel
strands of post-structuralism and post-modernism occasionally
intertwine, in particular in "pos t moder n literature [which)
obediently falls into step with the motifs and preoccupations of




TOWARD A RECONSTRUCTED HISTORICAL MATERIALISM:
MATERIALISM, THE SUBJECTIVE AND COMMUNICATION
A central concern of this thesis is Leftist praxis within the
I f t ' n Age Th1'S Age that l'S the outcome of the pervasivenorma 10 .
penetration of information technology and its impact upon contemporary
societies and their relations of production around the globe (see
Porat, 1977; Beniger, 1986; and for "a discussion of how information
and telecommunications technology are merging,· see Kaplan, 1990:14).
Praxis in such an age requires an examination of the role -- both
realized and potential -- of communication and the subjective within
leftist struggle. The challenge of the contemporary era is to build a
leftist hegemony within the context of the communicological
opportunities offered by the Information Age -- ie. finding ways of
realizing leftist aims (Robertson, 1985: 181). Writers like Toffler
(1980) and Masuda (1980) hold the view that information technology is
inherently progressive, and that this technology will automatically
lead to a better and more democratic society. Writers in Slack & Fejes
(1987) argue that this is not the case. While agreeing with the Slack
& Fejes, I disagree that information technology is necessarily 'anti-
progressive' (see, for example, Schiller, 1984). Rather, I argue that
the task of the Left is precisely to engage in leftist work (praxis)
to move society in a progressive, or leftist, direction by using and
developing the possibilities available within the Information Age.
(Following Korsch (1970), such leftist praxis will entail both
theoretical and practical work).
A key problem, however, has been that historical MATERIALISM
assumed hegemonic influence within leftist circles during the 20th
Century. As a consequence leftist theory and practice generally
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failed to pay adequate attention to the subjective and communication
(ie. the superstructures) [1]. The major exceptions to this leftist
'blindspot' will constitute the basic material of Chapters 2 and 3.
This shortfall became a serious liability for the Left from the mid-
1950s as capitalism shifted from a primarily heavy industry base
towards relations of production increasingly built on electronic
information technology. With few exceptions exceptions -- like
Herbert Schiller, Vincent Mosco, and Keyan Tomaselli -- few leftists
engaged the electronic information society. And even the exceptions
frequently devalued their relevance to a leftist communicology by
moving too close to a conspiratorial understanding of the Information
Age superstructures (see Schiller, 1973; 1984; Mosco & Herman, 1979;
Murphy, 1983; and Tomaselli, 1988/89).
The shift within capitalism from the mid-1950s ushered in by the
spread of electronic communication produced 'new' classes, changed the
proportions of class-categories, altered the relationship between
classes, and restructured the world's labour force. The failure of
the Marxist-dominated Left to adapt to these changes was one factor
that helped to precipitate the collapse of the Marxist dream in the
First and Second Worlds at the end of the 1980s.
A question arises, how did the South African Left become ascendant
when leftists in other parts of the world were in retreat? Part of
the explanation lies in the peculiar historical material context found
in ~outh Africa of "t h e 1980s and 1990s. However, part of the reason
also lies in the de facto flexibility of the South African left,
revealed in the building of a popular multi-class alliance (eg. the
ANC-SACP alliance; plus the UDF and MDM) (see SACP, 1990: 33-40).
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This popular alliance was built on extensive superstructural (ie.
political) work, and was made possible by the SACP 's two-stage theory
of revolution (SACP. 1990:38). This theory amounted to an
extraordinary revisionism. making possible multi-class leftist
hegemony building. As a result. the South African revision laid the
foundations for a possible success. But success requires that the
Left continues to display flexibility and carry the democratic-alliance
practices (learnt during the anti-apartheid counter-hegemonic stage of
struggle) i nt o the future (hegemonic stage). The Left is also placed
in the envious position of having mass credibility, and being in a able
to learn from the errors made by leftist hegemonies elsewhere.
Further , South Africa is not yet fully integrated into the MNC
Information Age. This gives the local Left the opportunity to adapt to
the Information Age -- ie. instead of 'ignoring' the superstructures.
· t he South African Left has the opportunity of building a 'socialized'
Information society in which superstructural relations of production
are imported. but modified so as to avoid MNC-exploitative relations of
production. But achieving this requires a reconstruction of historical
materialism such that the paradigm can cope more effectively with the
superstructures. media communication and subjective (O'Sullivan et al.
1983: 231-233) .
Such a reconstruction would be an application of the Contemporary .
Cultural Studies (CCS) concern with the "relationship between academic
knowledges and political aspirations" (Johnson. 1986:277). CCS is
primarily a ' s i t e' in which to read context and politics into
communication in order to develop a communicology with social
transformative intent. British CCS was concerned with the Thatcherist
threat to the Left and with seeking superstructural means to meet that
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challenge. In South Africa a restructuring racial-capitalist state
confronts the local Left. It is a state that has been forced to
concede ground and/or negotiate with the Left. Communication has a
central role to play in extracting the maximum from the negotiations
and restructurings, and to build a local leftist-hegemony. This
chapter will explore and examine the potential contribution that
Marxist theoretical work on communication (the superstructures) can
make with regard to a popular struggle based on multi-class alliances.
This is of more than theoretical interest. For the millions of
economically disadvantaged South Africans achieving success is a
highly practical concern. In addition, a popular-alliance victory
over the (anti-socialist) Right in South Africa offers a world-Left-
in-crisis an opportunity to rebuild leftist theory and practice.
A major problem is that the Left -- dominated by a Marxist
(historical materialist) interpretation of socialist praxis has
generally not paid sufficient attention to how to use the
superstructures (media, communication, etc) within its wider campaign
for social cnange. This is ironic considering the NP's Beaufre-
derived belief that the so-called 'communist onslaught' is centrally
a 'psychological' and 'superstructural' war (see Frankel, 1984). The
general lack of Marxism's concern with questions of communication is
caused in part by the fact that it is precisely in the area of
communication, media and the subjective that historical materialism
has .traditionally been theoretically weakest. It is an area that has
been a sort of 'blind spot' (Smythe, 1977) in Marxism. This 'blind
spot' tends to reproduce itself: because communication is so often
'backgrounded' by Marxists (both theoreticians and practitioners) it
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has remained a (theoretically) underdeveloped and (practically) under-
utilized area.
This blind spot needs to be addressed, especially in contemporary
South Africa where communication studies tend to shore up dominant
structures (Tomaselli, 1985). In other words, CCS should be concerned
with the political and material implications of communication, and/or
the communicative implications of political and economic structures in
societies, as well as with developing the transformative possibilities
of communication. However, a recuperation of the Marxist blind spot
requires methodological re-working of the historical materialist
paradigmj a process Habermas calls a 'reconstruction' of historical
materialism (Habermas, 1979: chapters 3 & 4). In examining the theme
of 'communication and counter-hegemony in South Africa', this thesis
will examine how to reconstruct historical materialism such that
communication and the subjective are accorded a more prominent role
than has been 'traditional' within the realist paradigm (Wilson,
1983). There is no need to start with a blank sheet. Communication
may have been backgrounded in 'mainstream' Marxism, but this is not to
say that good work has not been done. On the contrary, some
significant (and some flawed) theoretical work exists both
internationally and locally. What is required is that the most useful
of this work be brought more squarely into the heartland of Leftist
analysis and practice. In this regard three (inter-related)
challenges are posed to Leftist theorists in South Africa. These
challenges are:
Firstly, the reconstruction of historical materialism (Habermas,
1979: chapters 3 & 4), such that the resultant 'reformulated' method
is better able to deal with the 'subjective' and communication.
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Habermas may (i) not have been the first leftist to consider the need
to deal with the subjective, and (ii) certain of his formulations may
be problematic when applied to South Africa (see Louw, 1982).
However, his methodological challenge remains centrally significant
for any attempt to build a leftist approach to communication.
To examine in depth all those leftists who have moved in the
direction of a concern with the subjective/communication is beyond the
scope of this thesis. A brief overview of scholars considered to have
made the most important theoretical contribution to dealing with the
subjective from an historical materialist perspective will be
provided. It will be argued that Lukacs, the Frankfurt School,
Gramsci, Korsch and Volosinov are especially important for the
rationalist approach to be favoured in this thesis: ie. a 'totality'
interpretation of the realist paradigm (Wilson, 1983) derived from
Habermas.
A 'totality' interpretation need not necessarily be synonymous with
the Hegelian idea of totality wherein 'totality' is a method for
understanding 'truth' (where truth is equivalent to a dynamic whole).
Habermas' theory of 'totality' does not claim access to a timeless (a-
historical and abstract) truth. Totality takes from Hegel the idea of
historicity and dynamism and looks for a structured process (reality)
to 'uncover' (see Sayer 1979). Within this approach 'reality' is
assumed to exist -- ie. it is an approach built upon a humanist/
rationalist interpretation of historical materialism. As such, it
stands in contrast to the Althusserian structuralist, and/or post-
Althusserian/post-structuralist approaches to the subjective/
communication. This totality interpretation reads reality as a
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dialectical process in which subject and object meet (see Jay, 1984).
Totality is a structured process (or whole) which governs the
component parts of that process. It is an historically shifting
dynamic process of interacting objective and subjective 'components'.
I would propose that this 'subject-object' dialectical 'totality'
provides the basis for a solidly historical materialist methodology in
communication. Adopting this, rather than the Althusserian route has
a number of implications for CCS (which has hitherto tended to draw on
the anti-humanist position of the Althusserians (Bennett et aI, 1981)
rather than the humanism of the totality theorists. Unfortunately, if
the 'general pattern' in this 'totality' work is to be distilled, each
of the contributors will need to be dealt with in a rather sketchy
way.
Secondly, there exists the need to develop, from within the
historical material paradigm, the idea of active human agency. I will
provide a brief overview of the work of culturalists (such as Raymond
Williams and E.P. Thompson) -- whose ideas have been incorporated into
CCS. Each has dealt with the notion of an active subaltern class
'resistance' culture. In the South African context the notion of a
'resistance culture' needs to be extended beyond any purely working
class resistance to include other forms of resistance to the expansion
of racial-capitalism in South Africa, ego peasant, 'traditional-
African', black petit-bourgeois (to a~artheid), and even white
(leftist) petit-bourgeois forms of resistance. Certainly, demographic
trends have meant a central (and expanding) role for black working
class resistance. However, other forms of resistance were, and are
important. These need to be considered and structurally incorporated
into an understanding of the local left-wing struggle. This too
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requires a 'revision' and 'reconstruction' of historical materialism.
Thirdly, there is Enzensberger's challenge that "so far no Marxist
media theory exists" (Enzensberger, 1974:96). Developing such a
theory reguires that media 'gaps' be sought out and used. This third
challenge (somewhat- over-stated by Enzensberger) will, however, be the
subject of the next chapter, when the notion of a 'subjective praxis'
is specifically dealt with.
In dealing with the first two challenges this writer will, amongst
other things, propose a shift in emphasis within CCS. I will move
away from the Birmingham School formulation of drawing primarily upon:
(i) the Althusserian structuralists, (ii) the culturalists, and (iii)
Gramsci. This shift (or adaption) will be toward primarily: (i) a
(dialectical) 'totality' approach to historical materialism; and (ii)
the notion of an active human subject as found in the work of the
culturalists, the Birmingham School and the CCS in South Africa.
Historical materialism's earliest concerns with communication
Epistemologically, the historical materialist attempt to deal with
the 'subjective' and communication can be traced back to Marx and
Engel's German Ideology, wherein the 'base-superstructure' formulation
was enunciated (Marx & Engels, 1974: 47). This text, however, has
lent itself to an economistically reductionistic interpretation of
communication in which the (economic) base is seen to determine the
superstructures. Engels maintained that Marx never intended such a
determinist understanding of the superstructures (Marx & Engels, 1978:
760). None-the-less, because Marxists have tended to treat the
subjective/consciousness/communication as peripheral to their central
concern with political-economy, a reductionism crept in. There has
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been, in a sense, a 'dismissal' of the non-material as secondary and
derivative. The failure to deal coherently with the superstructures
led to a lack of comprehension concerning the depth of the shift
within capitalism towards a 'superstructural' (Information) mode of
production (ie. one of the reasons Comecon was 'left behind').
Because it has lent itself to a reductionism, The German Ideology
cannot consequently be considered the best text upon which to build a
rigorous leftist communication theory. Marx's work dealing with 'the
subject' -- such as the 1844 Manuscripts -- is more useful in this
regard. However, the most important Marxist attempts to deal with the
'non-material' non-reductively came after the collapse of the Second
International. Thereafter, 'subjective' phenomena -- such as
nationalism and the growing impact of the mass media, as well as the
'objective' failure of the 1929 economic crisis to bring about a
European/American revolution -- directed attention to the weaknesses
of an overly materialist interpretation of Marxism. Out of this
emerged a pool of Marxist work which 'reconstructed' historical
materialism such that materialist reductionism is transcended, but
without materialism being replaced by a subjectivism. Examples of
this are the work by Lukacs, the Frankfurt School, Volosinov and
Gramsci. This corpus of work deals with the difficult (for Marxists)
interface of subject and object. It provides a solid basis for the
construction of a Marxist approach to communication. What makes this
work so valuable is its methodological moves away from 'economism'
towards 'totality' (Jay, 1984). It offers the conceptual framework
within which the South African Left can deal with the subject-object
(race-class) interface "-- ie. issues such as race, communication,
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voluntQrism. etc. within the context of a capitalist ordering of
society. This is helpful in addressing the issue of organizing a
popularist (rather than workerist) struggle. An orthodox economist
Marxism would be hard pressed to address such a complex totality.
Dealing at some length with the 'totality approach' to
communication is particularly important to offer a counter-weight to
the 'discourse approach' (ie. the Francophone Althusserian
structuralist interpretation). which .gained widespread currency in
South Africa during the 1970s (Muller and Tomaselli, 1990). This
latter interpretation is anti-rationalist, and tends towards a
subjectivism and an intellectualizing passivity. This represents a
cul-de-sac for the Left which is inappropriate in the a context where a
facilitation of praxis is required . Although the early ' t ot a l i t y
Marxist ' work (eg. Lukacs and the Frankfurt School) is also overly
intellectual and passive, it does not necessarily have to lead into a
cul-de-sac. Rather, as the work of Benjamin, Marcuse. Habermas and
Enzensberger demonstrates, the totality interpretation offers scope for
praxis in which both the subjective and objective have a part to play.
It is hence work that is potentially valuable for those seeking to
build South Africa's left-wing media.
The next section will seek to briefly sketch the epistemology of
the mos~ significant moves within historical materialism to develop
theoretically the subject-object 'totality ' theme. (This notion of
totality is important because it offers a non-reductionistic way of
dealing with communication and the 'subjective' from a perspective
which continues to give considerable weight to the material
dimension). This concern with theory is of more than an academic
interest: with the rapid proliferation of progressive-alternative
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media in South Africa the time has come for those engaged in leftist
communication to develop greater theoretical 'awareness' of the
epistemological roots and 'possibilities'; greater rigour; and greater
self-reflexivity. Questions need to be asked (and answered) from a
leftist perspective about issues like the roles of the
superstructures, theory, white petit-bourgeois intellectuals
(academics, teachers, computer programmers, journalists and other
information workers); the role of the media; and ways of dealing with
the impact of the Information Age upon South Africa.
Lukacs' dialectical totality approach
In retrospect, Lukacs's theoretical work in the 1920s (strongly
condemned by the Third International at the time), represents a
crucial early alarm bell and/or recognition (by a Marxist) of
historical materialism's methodological shortcomings. More
importantly Lukacs' work represented an extraordinarily sophisticated
attempt to reformulate historical materialism. Hence, it is little
wonder that the New Left has so often turned to Lukacs.
Lukacs' work on dialectical totality represents a methodological
key for the reconstruction of historical materialism away from both
economism (eg. deterministic materialism) and subjectivism (eg.
Althusserianism). His History and Class Consciousness (1971) is the
first historical materialist approach to ideology which attempted to
formulate a rigorous methodological move beyond reductionistic
economism. History and Class Consciousness was first published in
1923. This is the seminal text from which an historical materialist
'totality' concern with the 'subjective' and 'communication' has
sprung. It is a text that has received insufficient attention from
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South African leftists concerned with communication/ media. The more
South Africa is integrated into the Information Age the more important
Lukacs' ideas will become.
Lukacs' rigorous adherence to Marxist humanism and rationality (as
evidenced in Marx's 1844 Manuscripts) stands in stark contrast to
Althusserian structuralism (wherein historical materialist rationality
is abandoned). Althusserianism has been very influential in South
African progressive communication/media analysis. Despite other
differences, Lukacs shares one similarity with Althusser, namely a
tendency toward passive intellectualizing/theorizing. However, Lukacs
can in part be excused this 'fault' because he was a~ early pioneer of
this work within historical materialism. Althusser' work came much
later -- when the issue of the theory-practice relationship was more
developed within the realist paradigm (see Habermas, 1974aj Markovic &
Petrovic, 1979).
The key text underpinning moves toward 'reconstruction' is:
.
Let us assume for the sake of argument that recent research had
disproved once and for all everyone of Marx's individual theses.
Even if this were to be proved, every serious 'orthodox' Marxist
would still be able to accept all such modern findings without
reservation and hence dismiss all of Marx's theses in toto --
without having to renounce his orthodoxy for a single moment.
Orthodox Marxism, therefore, does not imply the uncritical
acceptance of the results of Marx's investigations. It is not
the 'belief' in this or that thesis, nor the exegesis of a 'sacred
book'. On the contrary, orthodoxy refers exclusively to . method.
(Lukacs, 1971:1).
For Lukacs (1971:2 that method was an Hegelian (dialectical)
interpretation of historical materialism, wherein "the materialist
dialectic is a revolutionary dialectic". The dialectic was a social
(i.e. human, rather than natural) process in which contradictory
social relationships (within capitalism) drove history in a certain
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direction (toward 'rationality'= socialism). In this respect Lukacs
differed from both Korsch and Engels who did not separate 'nature' and
'humans'. The important point about Lukacs' homocentric understanding
of the dialectical process is that he understood 'socialness' as both
material and subjective. This totality of subject and object
represented ~ complex whole or process (Meszaros, 1972). This is an
understanding which opens the way for a 'totality' Marxism in which
communication, ideology and the 'subjective' require as much concern
as do economics and the 'material'.
Lukacs was attempting to move Marxism in the same direction that
Althusser would attempt later from an anti-rationalist 'discourse'
position. However, unlike Althusser, Lukacs recognized that to work
(as a Marxist) with the subjective required retaining the centrality
of 'objective reality' and theoretically working out the relationship
between the objective (material) and subjective. (Hence, Lukacs
refuses to grant any 'autonomy' to the 'superstructures' and/or
'discourse' in the way Althusser did). Lukacs came to conclusions
strikingly similar to the early humanism of Marx's own 1844
Manuscripts (only published in 1932; or nine years after Lukacs'
History and Class Consciousness was published). Hence Lukacs laid the
theoretical foundations for an approach to the superstructures that
derives from a rational humanist interpretation of historical
materialism. This interpretation that re-emerged strongly in
Habermas' Theory of Communicative Action (1984) which represents a
significant contemporary 'defence' of historical materialism from the
(post-modern) challenge to the realist paradigm's core assumptions.
(This Habermasian concern is derivative of the Frankfurt School's work
in developing Lukacs' totality theory on ideology in a much more
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'concrete' fashion -- ie. when they analyzed the superstructures as
concrete 'ideology-producing machinery').
If in Western Europe the totality approach proved useful in
theoretically 'defending' historical materialism from the post-
modernists and post structuralists, in South Africa it has a more
'practical' value. (It should be noted that within South Africa post-
modernist debates over whether reality exists or not frequently
illicit a hostile response from those who daily experience the REALITY
of apartheid -- i.e. esoteric theorizing in the face of such a reality
is seen to be inappropriate to the context). Such a 'totality!
approach is especially important for the Left because -- to state the
obvious - - chang ing apartheid society will require methods different
to those formulated by Marx for use in late 19th Century Europe.
Challenging capitalism (as material reality) alone is not sufficient
in South Africa. The South African 'struggle' requires the sort of
theoretical 'openess' to 'subjective' possibilities as posited by
Lukacs if it is to be successful. In fact, I would propose
'distilling' the historical materialist method down even further than
Lukacs proposed, such that his reliance on the working class alone to
drive the dialectic is replaced by a notion of a Leftist 'alliance-
driven' dialectical struggle (ie. the working class will be seen as
only one part of 'the struggle' -- a proposition that may have
horrified Lukacs). The South African struggle demands more than an
orthodox materialist concern about the capitalist base. It also
requires the mobilization of the superstructures (journalism,
teachers, academics, ideology, symbols, media, theory, etc.) if
apartheid superstructures are to be challenged (even in a supposedly
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'post-apartheid' South Africa). Lukacs' theory offers a formulation
whereby moving in the direction of, for example, establishing
progressive-alternative media ventures and 'cultural projects', can be
justified from within historical materialist premises, but in a way
which understands the relationship between such superstructural
activities and material conditions. This is of practical significance
-- it offers historical materialists the possibility of a
methodologically 'rigorous' approach to leftist media and cultural
work.
This thesis, following Lukacs' logic, seeks within South African
conditions a New Leftist approach to superstructural (media, culture,
etc) work. In this regard it represents an adaption -- in the South
African context -- of Marx's original project to find structural
agents of social change. In Victorian-capitalist England Marx
correctly identified the most likely structural agent of change to be
the emerging proletariat. For Marx, the proletariat was capitalism's
contradiction. As Lukacs points out, to assume that the details of
Marx's analyses can be applied carte blanche to all societies (for
example South Africa) a-historically is to abandon the historical
material method, in favour of a theoretical orthodoxy. Economism is
such an orthodoxy -- one that threatens to 'blind' the Left to the
possibility of non-economic (eg. communicative) contradictions. In
the Information Age the Left need to be open to the possibility that
white collar information workers (intellectuals, teachers, computer
programmers, journalists, etc) may be excellent structural agents of
change -- as good as, or in some contexts possibly even better than,
the working class.
It was a reaction against economistic Marxism that produced the
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return to Hegelian dialectics: economism was challenged by Lukacs,
Korsch, the Frankfurt School, Gramsci and later the New Left. Theirs
was an attempt to rescue historical materialism from reductionism by
an insistence that the notion of dialectical (Hegelian) totality
underpinned Marx's method. Economism is reductionistic because the
economic base (the objective) represents only one part of the total
dialectic. Hence, one finds in the work of Lukacs, Korsch, the
Frankfurt School and Gramsci a concern with the non-material (ie.
superstructural/subjective) 'processes' within totality; while Marx's
concern with the economic base (objective) is not abandoned. Hence,
the need arises to develop an understanding of the relationship(s)
between subject and object within the 'total' process (ie. whether
subject and object are 'contradictory' or 'complementary'). Such a
formulation opens up the prospect of helping to build a leftist
hegemony through, for example, superstructural (communication,
ideological and media) intervention. This is in addition to the
'traditional' workerist (eg. trade union) approach of exploiting
economic contradictions. More importantly, a theoretical framework is
provided through which to formulate the integration of superstructural
(eg. culture, information, media) and 'materialist' (eg. Unionist)
work. Within such a framework, media, information, communication and
cultural work can be more centrally integrated into the struggle to
build a leftist hegemony. The 'Natal Workers Theatre Movement' and the
'Cu~ture and Working Life Project' in Durban is one example of a
practically (rather than theoretically) oriented 'feeling out' of the
way forward in this area (see Von Kotze, 1988).
Given that Lukacs was a theoretical pioneer (indeed, arguably, the
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methodological pioneer) in moving beyond economism t while remaining
within the historical material paradigmt it is hardly surprising that
Lukacs should also be in the forefront of developing a revised Marxist
notion of ideology. Lukacs turned to tideologyt because of a European
concernt between the World Wars t at the apparent quelling of the
European working class as a source of revolution (ie. a concern shared
by the Frankfurt School and Gramsci). With the ascendancy of the
South African left t grounded upon a solid working class baset Lukacs
t
concern may appear to be of little relevance in South Africa of the
1980s and 1990s. However t given the likelihood of the struggle ending
in significant (negotiated) compromises with the Right t together with
the collapse of Soviet powert co-option by the Right is still a
distinct possibility. One of the dangers of the popularist alliance is
that the likelihood of sections of the alliance being co-opted into a
comprador relationship with MNC is increased. Because of this the
South African left may still face the same processes of ideological
manipulation and the co-option as have manifested themselves in
Europe/America. That MNC dominates the Information network only
serves to increase this likelihood. Hence t it is too early to assume
that South Africans can write off the work of those who have dealt
with the failure of the working class as revolutionary agents t and of
the ideological manipulation of this class.
This is not to say Lukacs t work is flawless. There are problems t
like: (a) his tconcretizingt of theory into tbourgeois t versus
tproletariant thought; and (b) his reifying and absolutizing of the
totality concept. Lukacs made the error of referring to dialectical
totality as if it were a concrete mechanismt instead of using the
notion as a heuristic tool to understand a complex process. It is in
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these areas that Gramsci can be used as an excellent corrective for
the problems in Lukacs' work. Gramsci's analysis operates within the
same totality framework as Lukacs'. However, Gramsci's work on
hegemony and on intellectuals (because it is more concretized within
real problems in the Italian context) is less theoretically
generalized than Lukacs'.
Despite the problems, however, for leftists seeking an
'application' of the Marxist (realist) method to the superstructures,
Lukacs remains an obvious starting point for developing a rigorously
historical materialist concern with the phenomena of communication and
the subjective. Lukacs does not violate the underlying premises of
the realist method (Wilson, 1983) in his attempt to expand this method
into a concern with the subjective. According to Sayer (1979) the
realist method involves a process of working from the phenomenal to
the essential. Reality (phenomena) is assumed to exist (i.e. the
assumption which Althusser, and the subsequent post-structuralists
as anti-humanists and anti-rationalists -- have sought to deny and
deconstruct). Marx, as a realist, sought to identify phenomena and
phenomenal "clusters" and then name them. Then the phenomenal
clusters are explained by the positing of those 'mechanics' beneath
the 'surface reality' that can explain the phenomenal clusters
identified. 'Reality' is taken to be the visible phenomena plus the
hidden essence. It was these assumptions and premises, and this
notion of reality, ·a nd its distortion (ie. ideology as 'false
consciousness'), that Lukacs accepted and developed. From the
Althusserian, post-structuralist and post-modernist (anti-rationalist)
perspectives these premises would be rejected. However, this thesis
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instead proposes to follow Habermas' lead (and his rationalist
challenge to post-structuralism). At root then, it is as a
consequence of adopting Lukacs' realist premises that the Frankfurt
School, Gramsci, Korsch, Volosinov and Habermas are foregrounded
within this thesis' proposed approach to communication. An alternative
would be the 'discourse' route.
In the move to examine the 'non-material' from a realist
perspective, Lukacs developed two particularly valuable concepts for
historical materialists concerned with the superstructures and
ideology. These are 'reification' and 'fetish'.
Although the notion of fetish begins in Marx's work -- ie. Marx's
discussion of commodity fetishism (Marx, 1974: 43-58) -- it was
Lukacs' totality interpretation of Marx that really drew attention to
it. Lukacs' interpretation of historical materialism drew out the
humanistic side of Marxism and hence developed the relationship
between alienation and reification. (Lukacs did this before the
publication of Marx's own work in his area -- see Marx, 1981: 61- 74).
However, it should be noted that it was another theorist using the
totality approach, namely the Frankfurt School member Herbert Marcuse
(1955:273-287), who first explicitly drew attention to the importance
of the notion of 'alienation' within Marxism.
For Lukacs, reification was the social outcome of the 'loss' of
totality. (Lukacs, 1971:83-109). Once the subject-object totality was
'split', the path was cleared for the objectification (reification) of
people: henceforth people (subjects) could be treated as 'things' or
'commodities' (objects). This objectification of people was what lay
at the heart of Lukacs' critique of capitalism which is neither
exclusively materialist nor subjective -- it harnesses an
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understanding of the totality (subject and object) of capital as a
process. If a concrete example is sought, to illustrate Lukacs'
theory, one need look no further than South Africa where racial-
capitalism's handling of black people offers a particularly striking
example of such a process of objectification the reduction of human
subjects to (materialist) units of production.
The notion of reification/alienation is potentially valuable to a
South African Contemporary Cultural Studies in two ways . Firstly, it
offers a realist route into understanding white thinking which simply
equates blacks with labour units. In other words, Lukacs' method
offers a valuable tool for the analysis of the ideology of apartheid
from within the realist paradigm; and concomitantly offers a valuable
tool for analysis of the media serving the South African white sector.
(However, when analyzing this white sector it would seem useful to
link Lukacs' work to the Frankfurt School's totality work on
authoritarian personalities and fascism (Adorno et aI, 1982). This
latter work neatly complements the totality approach to reification).
The understanding generated from this would be practically useful for
those programmes aimed at changing white thinking (especially in a
post-apartheid society).
Secondly, it offers a way to understand black worker alienation __
ie. the alienation (in totality terms) that springs from both economic .
exploitation and racial suppression. Such an understanding would be
pra~tically useful "i n progressive-alternative media work that aimed at
mobilizing the black working class sector. (In this area Black
Consciousness (populism) -- and BC media -- has been far advanced in
comparison to workerist and popularist approaches).
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For Lukacs, fetishization occurs when reification
(objectification), which is socially derived, is made to look natural.
This is the basis of his theory of ideology. In this formulation,
Lukacs, of course, is merely developing the realist paradigm's
assumption that ·' r e a l i t y ' exists and applying this to the development
of a theory of ideology as 'false consciousness'. It is, however, a
formulation more sophisticated than the economistic base-
superstructure argument. Lukacs' humanistic notion of ideology and
the superstructures offers an useful theoretical underpinning for
Gramsci's more practically-orientated work on the superstructural
'trenches' built by the bourgeoisie to defend capitalism. In South
Africa, racial-capitalism (apartheid) has not succeeded in
'naturalizing' apartheid social relations. However, a negotiated
abandoning of apartheid may well produce significant compromises to
the Right, such that de-racialised capitalism (dominated by an
indigenous black bourgeoisie) replaces the apartheid dispensation.
The Left will need to be vigilant that in any post-apartheid era such
a fetishization of a de-racialised capitalism is avoided.
For the proposed reconstruction of historical materialism, the
important thing about Lukacs' concept of 'fetish' is that it sees
'ideology' as derived from the breaking of totality. If 'totality' is
'lost' it results in either 'objectivism' or 'subjectivism'. Both
subjectivism and objectivism are examples of fetishized thinking from
a totality perspective. Applying this logic one arrives at the
following formulations:
(a) one cannot understand the superstructures/communication outside
of an understanding of economic conditions. It is this sort of
de-contextualized analysis that many idealist interpretations
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(eg. phenomenologists, hermeneuticians and post-structuralists)
undertake when they try and understand ideology, 'culture',
communication and the media as if these were 'free floating'
phenomena. Such subjectivisms are excellent examples of what
Lukacs would have called "fetishized" thinking. From an
historical materialist perspective these are 'idealisms',
criticized at length by Marx (Marx & Engels, 1980). A 'totality'
historical materialism does not deny the existence, or even the
importance of ideas (and/or the subjective) in human affairs, but
does deny that ideas/the subjective should be granted primacy in
explaining human affairs. CCS, because of the 'superstructural'
nature of its terrain of study, is continually in danger of
drifting into such an idealism (a sort of Left-Hegelianism see
McLellan, 1978). The great merit of incorporating Lukacs'
understanding of the superstructures into CCS is that it will
foreclose the possibility of a drift in such a direction. It
also curtails moves into post-structuralisms, deconstructionism
and post-modernisms (which grew out of the Althusserian
'discourse' project); or
(b) 'collapsing' the subject and object together such that the
subjective is merely (an unproblematic) derivative of the
objective (base) is also inadequate. This is how orthodox
(vulgar) Marxists approach communication and cultural studies
(see de la Haie, 1980; and Schiller, 1973). Such an objectivist
approach -- ie. where the (objective) base is seen to determine
the (subjective) superstructure -- is no less fetishized because
it too reifies (in this case objectifies) people (subjects).
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This latter problematic is one Lukacs did not himself examine.
However, the Frankfurt School (and especially Habermas) examined
this area -- hence the proposal in this thesis that this School
be incorporated into CCS.
In this Lukacsian principle lies a key to this thesis's
'reconstructed historical materialist' approach to communication,
culture etc. A CCS based on a totality interpretation of historical
materialism would see as one of its tasks, a theoretically-derived New
Leftist intervention within the dynamics of 'the struggle'. This
would be necessary to point out the dangers of conceiving of the
struggle against racial-capitalism in either exclusively economic
terms, or exclusively subjectivist terms. Both of these are forms of
fetishized or ideological thinking. The former approach (economism or
workerism), would fail to address the problem or racism, nationalism
and ethnicity in South Africa. (Failure to address the problem does
not make it disappear, as Eastern Europe has demonstrated). The
latter approach (eg. idealism, such as liberalism) would fail to
address the problem of economic exploitation. This issue is
consequently of more than mere theoretical concern.
If communication and culture have a role to play in the
construction of a leftist hegemony in South Africa, then the Lukacsian
subject-object dialectic is central to this role in two respects: (1)
apartheid has been both 'material' and 'subjective'. Leftists wishing
to build hegemony ~ill need to deal with both of these; (2) fighting
apartheid requires a 'totality' campaign -- ie. work at both a
'subjective' (communication) level and 'objective' (economic) level.
What is being proposed is a reading of Lukacs into Gramsci in order to
arrive at the notion of hegemonic work that operates in a multi-
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dimensional fashion. Such hegemonic work would avoid both: a purely
' ob j e c t i v i s t' (ie. workerist) campaign working only with 'encouraging'
economic contradictions; and a purely 'subjectivist ' campaign which
seeks to affect change only through the superstructures (ie. ignores
the role of economic contradictions).
Because of the theoretical nature of his writing, Lukacs is
difficult to operationalize in terms of practical situations. For this
reason. practitioners overlook his importance. Lukacs is important
because he raises some seminal questions and creates problems that are
seen to be centrally implicated in the development of a reconstructed
historical materialism. These questions have significant implications
for the struggle. especially a leftist struggle confronting the
challenges of the MNC Information Age.
The Frankfurt School: pioneers of leftist superstructural analysis
The Frankfurt School theorists [2] are central players in the debate
over leftist praxis. The struggle for hegemony over the Left has a
long history (see Kolakowski. 1981 (Vol 1): chapters X and XI). Marx 's
interpretation of leftist praxis became dominant as a consequence of
his winning a series of intellectual battles within the (London based)
International Working Men's Association (IWMA). Three main positions
were in competition -- those of Karl Marx, the Proudhonists (followers
of Pierre Proudon) and Michael Bakunin. Marx defeated the Proudhonists
during the 1860s. He won the intellectual battle with Bakunin in 1872.
Thereafter, Marxism became dominant ~ithin the Left, being
institutionalized as such during the Second International. No sooner
was the Marx-Bakunin struggle over, than a new struggle emerged amongst
Marxists themselves -- between Vladimir Lenin and Eduard Bernstein (see
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Kolakowski, 1981 (Vol 2): chapter IV). The Leninists won: after 1917
Marxist-Leninists controlled the USSR and were in de facto control of
the rest of the world's Left via the Third International (1919-43). The
Frankfurt School arose during this period as a challenge to Leninism.
The School represented a radical-leftist anti-Bolshevik interpretation
of Marxism that was hostile to both capitalism and Soviet state
socialism. Not surprisingly then, the Frankfurt School greatly
influenced the New Left during the 1960s. The 1980s collapse of
Eastern Europe increases the importance of the Frankfurt School for New
Leftists attempting to rebuild the Left in the wake of the damage
wrought by the failures of 'state socialism'.
The Frankfurt School represents an early warning signal for the left
concerning the collapse of the Marxist dream because of i t s failure to
deal adequately with the subjective and superstructures. The School's
work on the "culture industry" was an extraordinarily early (leftist)
recognition of the new direction capitalism was taking -- towards the
growing centrality of the superstructures within capitalist relations
of production. The School recognized the trend towards
'superstructuralization' during the 1930s-1940s, while it was still in
its infancy. Only in the 1960s did the full extent of the
superstructuralization of capitalism become obvious.
Given CCS's extensive work on media (Hall et aI, 1980) from a New
Leftist position (see Bennett, et aI, 1981), it is surprising how
little attention the Frankfurt School has received from CCS. This is
more surprising when the School's central concern with 'context',
'politics' and superstructure is noted. Because of these concerns the
School could rightly be termed the early pioneer of the approach that
was subsequently called CCS (Punter,1986). Part of the explanation for
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this neglect may lie in the fact that CCS, as an initially British New
Leftist school, shares the Anglo-Saxon (empiricist) 'unease' with the
Germanic philosophical bent so central to the Frankfurt School's work.
The Frankfurt School is significant because, like Lukacs, these
theorists were continually conscious of the methodological problems of
working in the area of the subjective/ superstructure from within
historical materialism. This is highly significant for any New Leftist
attempt to confront the (superstructural) Information Age. It makes the
School's work valuable to CCS -- since it offers CCS not only a body of
insights and concepts vis-a-vis the media; but also offers a method
able to deal with the subjective/superstructures with an in-built check
against 'slippage' into either idealism and/or superstructuralism
(Harland, 1987); or reductionistic materialism (economism). The
Frankfurt School, like Lukacs, saw the 'solution' to historical
materialism's difficulty in dealing with the subjective lying within a
'totality' interpretation of the realist paradigm. This was a pattern
established by Horkheimer (see Horkheimer, 1972: 10-46), the director
of the School from 1931 to 1958. Hence, when extracting a method out
of the School's work, from Horkheimer right through to Habermas, one
finds a similarity to Lukacs' totality method. But whereas Lukacs
dealt with the subject-object interface theoretically, the Frankfurt
School developed their theory of this interface more 'concretely'
through an examination of the media and aesthetics (the 'culture
industry') and of authority and Nazism. In fact, at times their work
became 'empirical', partly as a result of their exposure to Anglo-Saxon
empiricism in the USA. Further, the School and its contemporary
successors were always concerned with how this theory could be used
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practically to engage with social problems in a 'rational praxis' (see
Marcuse, 1968; Bloch et aI, 1980; and Habermas, 1980; and especially
Horkheimer, 1972: 26; and Habermas, 1974a: 253). It is this
practically-oriented aspect of their totality approach that makes their
work especially appealing for integration into a South African media
and cultural praxis. The School offers South African leftists a means
of conceptualizing a rationalist praxis in which both objective (eg.
capital) contradictions and subjective (eg. ideological, media, racist)
contradictions are exploited as change agents.
For the purposes and scope of this thesis it is not necessary to
deal with the entire Frankfurt School. The School was large -- both in
terms of numbers and output -- i.e. Jay identifies 28 members between
1923 and 1950 alone (Jay, 1973: 356 364), and there were major
differences in interpretation between different members. Hence,
referring to the Frankfurt School as if it were a coherent 'unity' is
problematic, because:
(a) There is ' some difficulty in identifying exactly who should be
considered a member of the 'school'. There are, for example, certain
key differences between Benjamin and others in the School. However,
Jay (1973) and Held (1980) will be accepted as having 'defined' who
constituted the School: the most important 'members' will be taken to
be - Horkheimer, Adorno, Benjamin, Marcuse and Habermas);
(b) It is difficult to decide when the school 'ended'. Should we
include Marcuse's later work and do we include Habermas? For the
purposes of this thesis both Marcuse and Habermas will be considered as
'part' of the Frankfurt School due to the fact that in their analysis
of the 'culture industry'/ideology they essentially use the totality
approach originally developed by Adorno and Horkheimer.
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(c) There is a problem with finding a 'coherence' to a Frankfurt
School 'theory'. In fact, even the most important 'members' of the
'school' changed their theoretical perceptions over time. Hence
Adorno, for example, eventually rejected the idea of totality (fearing
that 'totality' was an 'illusion'). Instead, he opted for the idea of
'fragmentation': Adorno's Minima Moralia (1978), for example,
represents an explicit turn to presenting only disjointed, broken,
momentary pictures, with a conscious avoidance of any attempt to create
'totality' out of these bits. (This 'method' has certain similarities
to Benjamin's ideas on hermeneutics). It is Adorno's later pessimistic
work -- when he even moved to a position of virtually denying the
possibility of knowledge in a post-Auschwitz world (Adorno, 1973: 361-
362) -- which can be regarded as being largely to blame for much
Marxist criticism of the School. Adorno's later work (which is not
unlike post-modernism in its pessimism and theoreticism) has been
mistakenly equated with the Frankfurt School per sej hence the widely
held leftist perception that the School was pessimistic, and ov~rly­
theorist (ie. anti-praxis). (See Chasin & Chasin, 1974). However, if
Adorno's later work is seen instead as the 'wrong turn' of only one
member of the Frankfurt School in his later life, then leftist
negativity toward the Frankfurt School as a whole becomes unnecessary.
In fact, if one emphasizes instead the Benjamin-Marcuse-Habermas
(praxis-oriented) interpretation of the Frankfurt School's dialectical "
method then the oft heard Marxist criticism of the School is to a large
extent, made redundant.
Summarizing the main lines of argument of Horkheimer, Adorno,
Benjamin, Marcuse and Habermas can do justice to none of them.
However, such an overview can serve to give a 'feel' of the Frankfurt
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School, and of shifts in emphasis between the main members. For this
reason a simplified precis of these five theorists proceeds an
examination of the School as a whole, and its value for aCeS
examination of communication, culture and the media.
* MAX HORKHEIMER, as director of the Institute for Social Research in
Frankfurt (i.e. the Frankfurt School) from 1931 to 1958, exerted a
decisive influence in the direction taken by the School: ie. a totality
interpretation of the realist paradigm (see Horkheimer, 1972:10-46).
Horkheimer saw the totality method as an antidote to the reductionism
of economistic Marxism and as a way to transcend the divide between
philosophy and empiricism. In formulating these ideas he drew upon
both Korsch and Lukacs, although he (and the rest of the School)
rejected Lukacs' optimistic Marxist holism (of the working class
representing the identical subject-object of history). He set the
School's pattern of opposition to liberal-bourgeois 'reason' (see
Horkheimer, 1978: 26-48), particularly as manifested in positivist
empiricism. The form this opposition took placed Horkheimer and the
School within the realist paradigm -- central to his work was a notion
of ideology, derived from Marx's work on commodity fetishism. His
'critical theory' is centrally concerned with exposing the system of
(subjective) 'illusion' which became institutionalized in the form of
the 'culture industry'. Yet while working within the realist
paradigm, Horkheimer simultaneously rejected the Marxism of the Third
Int~rnational and Stalin as a satisfactory alternative to capitalism
(Adorno & Horkheimer, 1982: 211-215). Horkheimer rejected the
'instrumental reason' and/or 'cult' of technocracy which he saw as
underpinning both Western capitalism and East European state socialism.
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He regarded both forms of society as being 'objectified' ie.
technocracy is seen as the reified separation of subject and object, in
which the subject is dominated by the object. A clear connection
exists between this notion of technocracy and its culture industry and
Marx's work on alienation (Marx & Engels, 1981). This theme was
developed by all the School's members, and emerges particularly
strongly in the contemporary work of Habermas. So it is Horkheimer's
assumptions which underpin the School's 'critical theory'. This
critical theory is centrally concerned with a totality understanding of
the superstructures -- ie. a critique of ideology from within the
realist paradigm. Further, the School from Horkheimer (1972: 26) to
Habermas expressed a concern with how this realist understanding of
ideology could be used for praxis. In their work on ideology and
praxis the School (following Horkheimer's lead) also drew on a wide
variety of disciplines -- including psychology, historical materialist
work, philosophy, sociology, communication, and linguistics. Given the
similarity of these concerns with those of CCS, Horkheimer's approach
could clearly be viewed as pioneering CCS work.
* THEODOR ADORNO only joined the School during its exile in the U.S.A.
(He was also an exile from Nazi Germany). In 1953 he became a co-
director of the School (now back in Frankfurt) with Horkheimer, a
position, in fact, which serves to illustrate his obvious prominence
within the School. His central influence can be most clearly discerned
in his co-authorship with Horkheimer of the Dialectic of Enlightenment:
the "Sc hoo l ' s most centrally important work from a CCS perspective.
However, despite his clearly central position, Adorno's work __
especially his later writing remains, in many respects, unlike the
rest of the School's because of his return to a philosophical idealism.
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Adorno developed the extreme notion that 'reason' was so defeated in
the world in which he lived that it could only survive in the
intellectual products of critical individuals such as himself. Were he
alive, Adorno might see the contemporary rise of post-modernism and the
New Right as confirmation of his position. (Such 'leftist monasticism'
would, however, if taken too far, remove the left from a real
engagement with social problems into the sort of Left-Hegelianism
opposed by Marx in The Holy Family). Unfortunately because of Adorno's
co-directorship his later philosophical (pessimistic) work is often
used by critics as evidence of problems with the Frankfurt School,
while the School's more optimistic (praxis-oriented) work of Marcuse
and Habermas is marginalized.
Adorno's concern with philosophy and music stamped itself on the
School's character, and much of his early work on mass culture, in the
era of monopoly capitalism, is of real interest for ees. Adorno saw
the contemporary world as dominated by a bureaucratized technological
order ('instrumental reason') -- an order founded by the bourgeoisie at
the time of the Renaissance (during which time,the bourgeoisies were a
progressive force). He traced this 'progressiveness' into his reading
of bourgeois music of that era. However, subsequently the bourgeois
order became conservative and indeed according to Adorno (in Arato &
Gebhardt, 1978:26-48) -- destructive of that which the Enlightenment
had originally stood for, i.e. critical individualism and personal
fre~dom. In the contemporary technocratic, planned and bureaucratized
order, Adorno saw critical thinking as having been destroyed and/or
'reified' (i.e. the 'dialectic' had been 'killed' -- Adorno &
Horkheimer, 1979). The notion that the dialectic could be 'stilled' by
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cultural co-option was an important theme in Frankfurt School work,
reaching a highpoint in Marcuse's One dimensional Man. This notion may
not initially seem to be particularly relevant in contemporary South
Africa. However, this might change given the attempts by Western/local
capital and the South African state to tame the struggle (and/or co-opt
certain sectors of the struggle). If this process succeeds (and it
may) then this Adorno-derived notion of a stilled dialectic may well
prove useful.
At any rate, Adorno's 1973) twist in dialectical thinking (which
underpinned much Frankfurt School thinking), represents an important
epistemological moment in the development of this concept. However,
whereas in Adorno's work this perception resulted in a deep pessimism
(see Adorno, 1973, 1978), others in the School especially Marcuse
and Habermas -- sought instead to find ways of 'reactivating' the
'dialectic' in an aufhebung of 'instrumental reason'. Adorno's
pessimism aside (which is a problem for a praxis-oriented CCS
approach), his work on culture and especially on aesthetics (to which
he finally retreated) remain a .challenging 'totality' interpretation
for those in CCS to grapple with.
* WALTER BENJAMIN was never fully integrated into the Frankfurt School
although he was engaged on a commission basis in a number of the
School's projects before its exile. (He died in 1940 trying to escape
from Nazi-ruled Europe). Benjamin, however, represents a prime
example of how the School's work at the subjective-objective interface
can .be developed in a (optimistic) praxis-oriented direction. It is
thus hardly surprising that Benjamin's work exercised an enormous
influence over Enzensberger when he attempted to formulate a (neo-
Marxist) praxis-approach to the Information Age.
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From a CCS perspective it is Benjamin's (1973) 'The work of art in
an age of mechanical reproduction' which represents a key text. He
develops the classical realist notion of the inseparability of
superstructural products (culture, knowledge, etc) from their material
context, for example class relations and technology. Although working
within the Frankfurt School's conceptual approach to culture, Benjamin
developed a key innovation within the School's reading, namely an
explicitly optimistic note. So whereas Adorno perhaps represents the
extreme statement of Frankfurt School pessimism about the 'cult' of
technocracy, Benjamin attempts to find the contradictions within
technological society. Benjamin's key recognition was that there was
no need to be uniformly pess imistic about the culture industry being
developed by capitalism. As a Frankfurt School member he did recognize
the culture i nd u s t r y as a force for conservatism, and as an anti-
revolutionary tool (ie. its use as a mechanism of co-opting the working
class and/or undermining its revolutionary potential); and as centrally
implicated in the development of reactionary ideology and fascism in
the era in which he lived. However, Benjamin also saw the potentially
positive side of the culture industry: this industry produced
technological innovations (at the superstructural level) which lent
themselves to counter-co-option by a creative Left.
Benjamin recognized that the very MASS -- ie. anti-elitist nature
of the modern media held the potential for giving recipients (the
aud~ence) power (Benjamin, 1977:391-2), and for transforming 'common
people' into mass communicative .producers (Benjamin, 1977:398).
Herein lay the basis for Benjamin's optimistic interpretation: if
capitalism created the preconditions for socialism; so too did the mass
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media/mass culture create the preconditions for participative popular
culture by creating the technological conditions to facilitate this.
Film was offered as a classic example (Benjamin, 1977: 401): film might
serve as an excellent Nazi propaganda medium; however. the left were
equally able to make use of this medium. (This is even more true in the
video age -- See Media Development, Vol 36. No 4/1989). Benjamin's
voluntaristic leftism (a leftism which stresses getting involved in
'seeking out' and 'generating' contradictions rather than passively
waiting for 'history ' to deliver the revolution) is an important
epistemological moment within the Frankfurt School's work. Further,
Benjamin's optimism represents a crucial insight for a CCS concerned
with the development of a leftist media. Benjamin's insight was, in
fact, developed further by Enzensberger and Habermas (discussed in
Chapter 3). If we read Benjamin's insights into the contemporary
context it is possible to use his ideas to construct the conception of
a producers' democracy within the Information Age.
Benjamin's notion of technik (see Roberts, 1982:157-162), in
particular, foreshadows Habermas' notions of 'purposive rational
action', 'communicative action' and of superstructural . praxis
(Habermas, 1976, 1979, 1984), especially in so far as both Benjamin and
Habermas engage in a sort of 'marriage' of historical materialism and
hermeneutics -- the superstructural activity (practice) of
intellectuals was seen to be potentially revolutionary at the interface
of historical material analysis and a hermeneutic-type reconstruction
of reality. What was required was that intellectuals needed to be
organized in an interventionist way to make use of the contradictions
thrown up by capitalism. Benjamin rejected any LUddite-type hostility
towards technology. (In this respect Benjamin differs from other
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Frankfurt School members, and the contemporary "Greens", who the
Frankfurt School gave rise to). The Greens ' Luddite-like 'in-principle'
opposition to technology! industrialization stands in stark contrast to
the Benjamin-position, because for Benjamin, technology was something
to be mastered and used for leftist ends. As he said: "the adjustment
of reality to the masses and the masses to reality is a process of
unlimited scope " (Benjamin, 1977:389 ). Furthermore, this ' adjus tme nt '
required intellectual (ie. superstructural) practice: intellectuals
would be required to develop strategies for t ur n i ng exist ing (material
and subjective) conditions to leftist advantage.
* HERBERT MARCUSE joined the School in 1933 (t he year it fled the
ascendance of Naziism). As a result of his early Frankfurt School
experience co-inciding with the School 's USA-period, Marcuse imbued
more of the Anglo-Saxon intellectual tradition than did the other
Frankfurt School members . (Marcuse, in fact became an American, never
returning to Germany, like the other School members).
Habermas and Marcuse represent the most important contributors to
the School's later period. Marcuse 's enormously impacted the American
New Left during the 1960s. His One Dimensional Man is the clearest
application of the School's critique of ideology and their notion of
the 'culture industry' to the U.S.A.-dominated post-Second World War
world. (A dominance also found in South Africa) .
A central feature of the Frankfurt School from Horkheimer through to
Habermas has been the concern with the fate of the socialist revolution
as a form of human emancipation in the rationalist mould (ie. deriving
in large measure from the rationalism of European Romanticism). But in
Marcuse's work this concern is especially evident. For a South African
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CCS concerned with the role of the superstructures within a leftist
struggle the potential value of this work needs to be addressed.
Marcuse, as a New Leftist, was concerned with a voluntaristic approach,
par excellance, to revolution. If the Frankfurt School as a whole
emphasized the early work of Marx (ie. the Marx 'abandoned' by
Althusser), Marcuse places a particularly heavy emphasis on this early
(Hegelian) analysis (Marcuse, 1955). Marcuse is centrally concerned
with an interpretation of revolution aimed at 'emancipation' and de-
alienation (Marcuse, 1969). As such he draws heavily on Marx & Engel's
1844 Manuscripts. This he then links to Freudian structuralism (which
as with Marx's structuralism is a 'rationalist' structuralism -- ie.
must not be confused with the anti-rationalist structuralism of the
Althusserians and post-structuralists). Marcuse uses this Marx-Freud
couplet to examine the culture industry as a 'machinery' of
'pyschological' manipulation which serves the interests of technocracy
(whether in its First World capitalist form, or its Second World state
'socialist' form). But Marcuse goes further than cri~ique -- he seeks
psychological (and leftist) emancipation from this technocratic
repression. This results in the Marcusian notion of a self-
emancipation derived from a 'Freudian Marxism' (1969a). It is work
that is highly compatible with the culturalism of E.P. Thompson and
Raymond Williams with their stress on an 'active subjective' engagement
from the subaltern class.
It is of significance to note that of all the Frankfurt School work,
it was Marcuse's that most influenced any form of praxis -- ie. the
1960s New Left Movement was centrally influenced by Marcuse . Given the
impact of the New Left -- via Perry Anderson -- on the early history of
CCS (see Punter, 1986: 78-81) it is surprising to find so few
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references to the Frankfurt School in general and Marcuse in particular
in CCS work. More surprising still is the failure of the Birmingham
School to fully examine the tension between the rationalism of the
Frankfurt School/Marcuse (and hence of the New Left) on the one hand,
and the anti-rationalism of Althusserian structuralism (incorporated
into CCS) on the other hand.
A centrally important aspect of Marcuse's work for contemporary
South African CCS is his understanding of how the Americanized culture
industry is able to 'co-opt' oppositional practices and 'nullify' them.
It is surprising that the Birmingham School (a School that has
centrally influenced South African CCS) has paid so little attention to
this work by Marcuse. For Marcuse the culture industry is anti-
dialectical and results in a one dimensional world of technocratic
rationality (Marcuse, 1968). Marcuse goes a long way to explaining
the conservative technocracy and slick media image-building of, for
example, Thatcherism in Britain.
Further, Marcuse's work on 'Repressive Tolerance' (in Wolff et aI,
1965:81-123) is especially valuable in explaining how the liberal
culture industry nullifies dialectical conflict through. a 'tolerant'
co-optation of opposition into itself. This refusal to 'engage'
substantive opposition becomes an extremely effective form of
repression that is quite totalitarian in its implications. (This is,
in one sense, an extension of Adorno's ideas on the dialectic within a
con~emporary context).
In South African terms, Marcuse's ideas demonstrate the potential
'danger' (to South African Leftists) of a 'reformed' Right which has
learned the art of liberal 'tolerance', and which has tried to develop
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and co-opt, for example, a black middle class sector. The NP's 1990
reforms, if successfully carried through, hold the potential for
removing much of the 'revolutionary potential' (the 'dialectic') in the
South African situation. The likelihood of this is increased given the
world balance of power in the 1990s. In such a co-optation the
superstructures of the Information Age will play a prominent role.
(It should be noted that MNC succeeded in these sort of moves in the
Philippines by installing the liberal Acquino government). As it is,
Marcuse's work already goes some way towards explaining the
'liberalization' of sectors of South Afr ican leftist praxis (eg. the
UDF and its organic intellectuals). Leftists in some South African
ego BCM, AZAPO, CAL, WOSA -- have called this liberalization 'co-
option'. Liberalization occurred because throughout the 1960s, 1970s
and 1980s the English-liberal universities and the 'liberal' churches
offered some of the only 'spaces' from which the Left could operate.
The academic 'islands', in particular, played a prominent role in the
growth of South African leftist praxis. But they remained solidly
liberal institutions. It was not possible for the Left protected by
these institutions to remain untouched by this liberalism. From this
point of view alone, Marcuse's 'warnings' about possible 'co-option'
need to be taken seriously. In other words, a CCS reading of South
African Marxist epistemology needs to seriously examine the possibility
that a 'liberalism' has been read into historical materialism (a form
of co-optation?) because of the nature of the space provided.
Marcuse's work on the culture industry, technochratic ideology and
on a Hegelian (anti-Stalinist) reinterpretation of the Marxist method
(dialectical totality) represents a significant moment in the
reconstruction of historical materialism in the direction of a New
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Leftist praxis-oriented 'totality ' approach to culture. His theories
form an interesting extrapolation into the 1960s of the approach
developed by the Frankfurt School in the 1930s-1950s. As such it forms
a bridge between the Frankfurt School of the 1930s and 1940s and
Habermas ' work in the 1970s-1980s. Certainly Habermas ' proposal to
' r e cons t r uct' historical materialism can be seen to have its
epistemological roots in Marcuse 's work.
* JURGEN HABERMAS became an assistant to Adorno in the late 1950s. (The
School had returned to Frankfurt in 1950). This association introduced
Habermas to the Frankfurt School oeuvre. But Habermas bursts out of
the framework set by the School 's earlier theorists. The School's work
as leftists dealing with the subject-object interface -- ie. their
exploratory work in dealing with the interface between the realist and
interpret ive paradigms -- was developed by Habermas (1979, 1980, 1984)
into a systematic attempt to ' r e cons t r uct' historical materialism such
that ' commun i ca t i on' and the subject-ob ject interface are made a
central feature of leftist praxis. If South Africa is seen as a
developing sub-metropole of MNC (see Innes, 1984) then, by extension, a
South African praxis-oriented CCS will derive value from Habermas's
ideas. While authoritarian and coercive methods underpin the South
African hegemony, any application of Habermas 's view of praxis to South
African conditions will necessitate modifications to his ideas (see
Louw, 1982). However, as reforms proceed, so his ideas will become
more and more applicable.
Further, Habermas ' work has moved away from the earlier work of .the
School because he had to deal with a changed context: there have been
significant shifts in academic debate occasioned by the increasingly
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apparent 'collapse of the Marxist dream', the rise of post-modern and
post-structural ('discourse') thinking, and the resultant challenge to
rationalism and the realist paradigm in particular.
In answering these challenges, Habermas insists on making a
'totality' reading of Marx central to historical material analysis. He
develops this 'totality' approach to the realist paradigm (Habermas,
1979, 1984) through spelling out and expanding on the Frankfurt
School's work on 'Critical Theory'. Habermas thereby explicitly
reformulates the historical material reading of history. His
interpretation moves away from explaining social developments
exclusively, or even primarily, in terms of economics, and toward an
interpretation which accords equal prominence to the role played by the
superstructures, such as communication and knowledge (Habermas, 1979).
Clearly, Lukacs, Gramsci and the earlier Frankfurt School members had
all worked in this same area of concern. However, Habermas insisted on
a methodological rigour unmatched by the others, necessitated no doubt
by the challenge posed by post-modernist debates, and the growing
opposition to the historical material paradigm in the context within
which he worked. In the process Habermas produced an important
('totality') 'reformulation' of Marx without abandoning the essence of
the realist paradigm.
Significantly, Habermas' work has led to the production of an
approach to superstructural products -- ie. culture, knowledge and the
media -- located at the interface of the realist and interpretive
paradigms, but which remains rigorously 'realist' in essence. This
method is best illustrated in Habermas' work on examining the
epistemology of Western knowledge, science and technology (Habermas,
1978) -- an important part of Habermas' critique of technocratic
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ideology. In this work he combines an historical materialist with a
hermeneutic reading of the texts. He does this in order to
'reconstruct' their meaning within the framework of an (reconstructed)
historical materialist understanding of the context of their
production.
Given CCS's concern with 'problematizing' 'traditional' academic
practices (which stems from the incorporation of the Hoggart and Leavis
tradition into CCS), Habermas' method of (an historical material-
hermeneutic) re-reading/reconstruction of texts represents an important
tool. What is especially important is that Habermas' approach to
cultural texts is 'reconstructive' rather than 'de-constructive' (eg.
Derrida) or 'constructive' (eg. Gadamer's hermeneutics or the Russian
Formalists). 'Reconstruction' differs from the 'construction' in so
far as Habermas explicitly reads the text he is 'reconstructing'
through an historical material interpretation -- ie. he contextualizes
the text. A 'constructive' reading merely tries to capture the 'truth'
as seemingly intended by the author. Habermas' approach is therefore a
leftist (historical materialist) 'hermeneutics' -- ie. the interpretive
paradigm is re-read through the realist paradigm (see Habermas, 1979).
More important, however, is that Habermas' 'reconstructive' method
offers CCS a 'means of access' to culture that is explicitly not part
of the de-constructive and/or post-structural/post modernist mould. If
Adorno represents the one Frankfurt School member who drifted in this
pos~-modernist direction (when he reached the pessimistic conclusion
Adorno, 1973:361-2 -- that in a post-Auschwitz world the foundations
for ultimate knowledge had been removed), Habermas represents a
leftist who explicitly rejects this de-constructive pessimism.
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Habermas'(1979:1-68) position is that we can still achieve a systematic
rational philosophy, which he terms 'universal pragmatics'. Habermas'
'universal pragmatics' represents an attempt to 'recapture' the main
thrust of the realist paradigm and build this into a rationalist answer
to post-modernism -- but an answer that does not shrink from dealing
with 'the subjective' (in the way many Marxists have done). This, of
course, places Habermas' work on communication in opposition to the
Althusserian (anti-rationalist) 'discourse' work on the
superstructures. For a CCS leaning towards the humanism of the
culturalist approach -- concerned with developing an approach to
communication that sees itself as working within a New Leftist
framework -- Habermas' work is an important source upon which to draw.
However, a CCS that leans towards the anti-rationalism of Althusserian-
structuralism would be less inclined towards Habermas' position. Stuart
Hall's critique of Habermas (see Grossberg, 1986: 45-46) needs to be
seen in this light.
Important too is that Habermas' work attempts to go beyond analysis
and critique -- his is not a passive reflection on the problem (ie.
Habermas does not fall prey to the critical passivity that has
inflicted, for example, Lukacs, Adorno & Horkheimer, and the
Althusserians). Habermas does not stop at a critique of technocratic
ideology (Habermas, 1980). Rather, he attempts to find a 'way out' in
the form of a 'theory of action' ('praxis') which ignores neither the
objective nor subjective dimensions of domination (Habermas, 1979,
1984). This action theory has much in common with Benjamin's theory of
Technik. The theory of communicative action seeks to develop the
'emancipatory interest' which underpins the critical sciences
(Habermas, 1978:370-371). Habermas' core assumption is that the goal
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of the human rationalist project is that emancipation equals a
socialist democracy, an assumption of central importance in this
thesis. (Habermas regards this rationalist project as worthy of
'defence' against post-modernist skepticism and de-construction).
Habermas' reconstruction of historical materialism is geared toward
facilitating the realization of a socialist democracy through an
'action theory' which is concerned with liberation in terms of both
objective (economic) and subjective (democratic) rationality. It
represents a valuable notion for a CCS geared toward the production of
a knowledge of culture and the superstructures with a 'praxis-intent'
ie. CCS in South Africa (see Tomaselli et aI, 1988a:11-22).
Habermas' (1976) work on 'superstructural crises' is crucial. He
identifies a 'new form' of crisis in capitalist society, namely
'legitimation crises'. Habermas' argument is that, whereas economic
contradictions may have been important within the Victorian capitalism
analyzed by Harx, within the advanced technocracies -- whether HNC or
state socialism -- it is legitimation (superstructural) crises, rather
than economic crises that represent the central dialectical
contradictions. The revolutions in Eastern Europe produced by
legitimation crises in the late 1980s appear to have confirmed
Habermas' position. For Habermas, 'democracy' has been proclaimed by
advanced technocracies. But this democracy is de facto at odds with
the 'needs' of the technocratic rationality underpinning both monopoly
cap.italism and state socialism. For Habermas this creates an enormous
potential crisis for these societies -- if Leftists can get the
citizens of technocratic societies to demand to exercise their
(proclaimed, but not as yet, 'realized') democratic rights. Habermas'
106
argument in this regard bears a remarkable similarity to Enzensberger's
(1974) ideas on superstructural crises and praxis. However, unlike
Enzensberger, Habermas grounds his ideas more firmly with a
'materialist' (or at least 'totality') approach, such that his work
does not drift as close to 'idealism' (ie. an over-emphasis of the
superstructural dimension) as does Enzensberger's.
Of definite value to South Africa is Habermas' (1974) work on a
'public sphere'. ( Habermas' writing incorporates a relationship
between the notion of a public sphere and of superstructural praxis).
A public sphere represents an 'ideal dialogue' (democracy) or an
institutionalized reason. Within Habermasian logic such a social
dialogue is incompatible with either First World MNC or Second World
state socialism. The realization of democracy (a public sphere) would
represent a superstructural crisis for technocratic society because it
would de-objectify -- ie. de-alienate (see Marx, 1981:70-7) -- society.
More recently, Habermas (1990) extended his ideas on democratic
communication in an attempt to provide the European Left with a
'answer' to the implications of the collapse of state socialism in
Eastern Europe. He argues that "socialism will disappear only when it
no longer has an object of criticism" -- ie. "the hope that humanity
can emancipate itself from self-imposed tutelage and degrading living
conditions has not lost its power" (Habermas, 1990: 21). Habermas'
thesis is that the Left's goal needs to be seen as wider than merely a·
redistribution of wealth. Rather, the goal is a "redistribution of
power" (Habermas, 1990:19). This requires a shift way from the narrow
leftist concern with 'economics' towards a concern with "generating
ferment" in the public sphere (1990: 21); as well as an on-going
critique of skewed power relationships (1990: 19) and of capitalism
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(1990:21). For Habermas (1990:13) communication under capitalism is a
top-down "controlled process of legitimation", and hence fails to
measure up to his notion of democratic communication. It is up to the
Left to challenge this so as to build democracy, and thereby help to
redistribute social power more equitably.
Habermas has thus extended 'critical theory' beyond theory -- there
are clear political implications in this work of a similar nature to
those being developed by the Birmingham School (see Johnson, 1986:277).
Of special significance is the importance of Habermas' work when
considering the role of media/communication: (a) in the creation of
democracy; and (b) in empowering the masses to challenge skewed power
relationships. The importance of these ideas for developing a South
African leftist hegemony (that avoids the errors of Eastern Europe)
cannot be over-estimated.
The above summaries indicate that, as Held (1980) has noted, a
considerable degree of theoretical coherence can be traced from
Horkheimer through to Habermas. Despite difficulties with defining the
'Frankfurt School' exactly, for the purposes of this thesis, Held's
contention that the School is synonymous with "critical. theory" (see
also Horkheimer, 1972), will be adopted. This 'theory' can easily be
identified as early stirrings in the direction of a ees, with the later
work being highly useful within a praxis-oriented ees. The important .
elements of this theory are:
(a) . An Hegelian-Marxist concern with 'totality' (the subject-object
dialectic), similar to Lukacs;
(b) A move away from economism toward a concern with the
superstructures (especially the media), in a way that they are examined
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in the context of being in dialectical unity with an historical-
material base;
(c) A concern with ideology from within a rationalist perspective (see
Sayer, 1979). Their work in this area is important in the contemporary
context as it provides a rationalist alternative to post-modernism and
post-structuralism.
(d) A leftist alternative to Leninist state socialism which none-the-
less retains a number of Marxist features, such as: the central role of
commodity production within capitalism, and the reifiqation resulting
from this; the contradictions within capital (over-production and over-
capitalization); and the notion that human liberation requires de-
alienation, which in turn requires the abolition of capitalist
relations of production. These concerns they carried over into the
School's concern with the superstructures. In so doing the School
produced the first significant leftist analysis of the emerging
capitalist relations of production associated with information
technology. How important this would become only became apparent from
the 1960s onwards. The Frankfurt School's theoretical work in this
area of superstructural analysis offers a valuable leftist theoretical
adjunct to Gramsci's more practically-oriented work.
Since this thesis is concerned with developing a reconstructed
historical materialist approach to CCS, and not with the Frankfurt
School per se, it is impossible to examine the School's vast body of
work in any depth. Rather, an attempt will be made to generalize a
'core' out of their large body of work. This will necessitate glossing
over some of the differences internal to the School, although those
differences of relevance to this thesis will be examined. What follows
is a selective appropriation of aspects of their work, especially
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relating to the 'culture industry'. The School's work on authority,
Nazism, psychology and their critique of Enlightenment ideology will
only be alluded to when it is required for the primary purpose of this
thesis: the development of a New Leftist approach to communication for
contemporary South African conditions.
The Frankfurt School's method
What lay at the heart of all Frankfurt School work was the attempt
by its members to examine 'culture' as Marxists. To do this they
transferred Marx's realist method from his concern with the economy
(and commodity fetishism) to an examination of the superstructures:
they attempted to unpack the 'hidden essence' of the capitalist culture
industry much as Marx had sought to unpack the workings of the
capitalist economic process. Some of the key texts in this unpacking
of the 'culture industry' are: Adorno & Horkheimer's Dialectic of
Enlightenment; Benjamin's Illuminations; Adorno's Prisms; and Marcuse'
One dimensional man. (See also Arato & Gebhardt, 1978). Throughout
they insisted on the 'totality' of the process being examined -- the
economic and the cultural were part of the same dialectical process.
For the Frankfurt School, revealing the hidden essence of capitalism
meant explicitly studying the total process (of the dialectically
related subject and object). Hence they paid much more explicit
attention to the subject-object interface than CCS has done to date and
about an importan~ revision of Marxism (taken to its logical conclusion
by Habermas' call for a 'reconstruction' of historical materialism).
It is a revision/reconstruction that matches the 'revision' of
capitalism away from heavy industry towards 'information'. Instead of
branding their revision as 'passive' and 'unrevolutionary', the
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Frankfurt School should rather be characterized as the LEAST
conservative historical materialists: ie. they managed to keep up with
the mutations of capitalism.
Another significant aspect of Frankfurt School's method was their
attempt to examine the compatibility of Marxist structuralism and
Freudian structuralism, a project that reached its zenith with
Marcuse's Eros and Civilization (one of the optimistic moments of the
School's work). Freud served the same purpose in the Frankfurt
School's studies as Althusserian structuralism served in the Birmingham
School's work ie. if Marx was concerned with 'extracting' the
structures of the capitalist economy (ie. the material); so Freud tried
to 'extract' the structures of the mind (ie. the subjective). These
two structural isms (of the 'material' and the 'subjective') could be
read together. This represented an 'application' of Lukacs' totality
method -- applied by the Frankfurt School to an analysis of Nazism and
authority (Adorno et aI, 1982; Arato & Gebhardt, 1978); and to the
culture industry (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1979; Arato & Gebhardt, 1978;
and Marcuse 1968). For a South African left that is confronted by (the
subjectivisms of) racism, nationalism and tribalism, this marriage of
Marx and Freud offers certain interesting analytical possibilities.
Further, the incorporation of Freudian 'superstructural' structuralism
has clearly helped the School's heir, Habermas, to deal with the
superstructuralism of post-modernism and post-structuralism more
eff~ctively than other historical materialists.
The Frankfurt School's structuralism is based on the rationalism of
the realist paradigm, unlike Althusser's anti-rationalist
structuralism. This is highly significant given the context within
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which the Frankfurt School worked -- ie. a era of fascism, anti-
rationalism and Auschwitz (which the School saw as an outgrowth of the
Enlightenment/capitalist project). That the post-Auschwitz world has
seen a growing abandonment of belief in rationalism and modernism poses
a real threat to the rationalist interpretation of the Leftist project.
The School's members were pioneers in considering the distortions of
Enlightenment~rationalism, but (outside of Adorno) the School did not
sink into a post-modernist pessimism. Instead they developed a realist
method in which the original rationalist project could be revived and
turned in the direction of a socialist democracy.
Habermas, in particular, develops this Frankfurt School concern with
rationalism. He defends rationalism against the post-modern critique
-- the rationalist project was not be to abandoned, but rather
'completed' (see Habermas, 1979, 1980, 1983, 1987, 1990). Stuart Hall
states of this: "I think Habermas' defense of the Enlightenment/
modernist project is worthy and courageous, but I think it's not
sufficiently exposed to some of the deeply contradictory tendencies in
modern culture to which the postmodernist theories quite correctly draw
our attention" (in Grossberg, 1986:45). Hall adds "the traditional
Habermasian defence won't do" (in Grossberg, 1986: 47). " Hall's
argument ignores the fact that to abandon rationalism is to abandon the
leftist project. Hall cannot, on the one hand, claim that "I still
operate somewhere within what I understand to be the discursive limits
of a marxist position" (in Grossberg, 1986: 58), and on the other hand
abandon the rationalist project. This constitutes a non-sequitor (see
Sayer, 1979). Habermas understands that the crucial assumption
underpinning the leftist project is that the human world can be made
more reasonable (rational) by human action. It is this assumption that
112
t b d 't' to 'adm1't defeat' andHabermas will not forgo, because 0 a an on 1 1S
close down the leftist project.
In defending this rationalism, Habermas' is not (as claimed by Hall)
operating from a lack of "exposure" to arguments of the post-modernist
theorists. Neither does Habermas see it as a single-dimensional
b 1986 46} Rathe r , Habermas recognizes thatproject (Hall in Gross erg, :.
to accept the post-modernist argument/critique is to open the door to
an anti-rationalism that contradicts the very essence of the leftist
project. (From Habermas' perspective, it is no accident that the post-
modern era is associated with a revival of fascism, Nazism, chauvinist
nationalism, and Reagan-Thatcher-Kohl's calls for unbridled 'free-
enterprise' and a curtailment of 'social welfare', and the growth of
char ismat ic religions and fundamentalism (see Shariati, 1980).
Habermas, like the rest of the Frankfurt School, explicitly recognizes
that the modernist/rationalist project has taken some wrong turns (in
both its capitalist and state socialist forms). As leftists, however,
the School (and Habermas) are more concerned with the wrong-turn of
Marxist-Leninism. But the Habermasian argument would be that even if
Marxist-Leninism was a wrong turn, this is no reason to abandon the
whole Leftist-project of social rationality.
This realist rationalism is an important consideration for a South
African CCS faced with the choice of developing either in the directi~n
of a theoreticism and superstructuralism (Harland, 1987) or cultural
pr~xis aimed at challenging apartheid and its after-effects. In making
the choice, it needs to be noted that the Frankfurt School's
appropriation of Freu~ian structuralism leads to Habermas'
reconstruction of historical materialism (still firmly within the
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torealist tradition), while Althusser's structuralism leads ultimately
the anti-realist (post-structuralist and post-modernist) 'discourse'
d It l' S Habermas' Frankfurt School-derivedwork of Lacan and Derri a.
work which offers a contemporary leftist answer to the challenge posed
to the realist paradigm by post-modernist neo-conservatism (Habermas,
1987). Habermas' notion that 'modernity' is a project still awaiting
completion (see Habermas in Foster, 1983:3-15) is more in accord with
the principles of a leftist optimism. This optimism offers an important
theoretical underpinning upon which to build leftist media work within
HNC.
Habermas' work, as well as the work of the earlier Frankfurt School,
represents, in general, a significant theoretical moment in the
development of a leftist media/communication praxis. Their analyses,
in fact represent important moments within historical materialist media
analysis. As Hoffman (1983:10) has noted, Adorno and Horkheimer's
Dialectic of Enlightenment (1979) is certainly "one theoretical root of
a materialist theory of mass communication". Their pioneering work as
leftist theorists concerned with the media and the 'culture industry'
can hardly be over-estimated when tracing out the epistemology leading
toward a reconstructed historical materialism (wherein one can examine
the 'subjective'/superstructures from within the historical material
paradigm). Adorno and Horkheimer -- (for the sake of the
generalization required in this chapter) -- produced the seminal
Frankfurt School work. Certainly from a media perspective, Horkheimer
& Adorno's Dialectic of Enlightenment can be taken as giving us the
core of the School's method, namely a totality interpretation of the
realist paradigm.
This subject-object totality is of central concern for the
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reconstruction of historical materialism proposed by Habermas -- a
reconstruction seen to be potentially valuable for CCS. The School's
totality concern emerged in a critique of ideology -- i.e. a critique
of the dichotomization of Western knowledge into objectivism
(positivist-science) and subjectivism (idealist-philosophy); and in an
attempt to 'transcend' this dichotomy in their own work. The attempt
to 'bridge' the subject-object 'divide' has manifested itself in three
forms in the FFankfurt School:
(a) The existential-Marxism (ie. existential: subjective/Marxism:
objective) of Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse;
(b) The attempt to integrate hermeneutics (the subjective) into
historical materialism as undertaken by Habermas. Benjamin made some
tentative moves in this direction much earlier on; and
(c) The attempts to integrate psycho-analysis (the subjective) into
historical materialism (objective) by Erich Fromm and Herbert Marcuse
and Adorno et aI's Authoritarian Personality.
The first two (ie. linking the realist paradigm with existentialism
and hermeneutics) are especially useful for a South African CCS
concerned with cultural and media analysis and praxis. The third (ie.
Marx-Freud interface) is possibly useful in so far as it can help to
explain something of the authoritarianism underpinning Afrikaner
nationalism. It may also assist leftist analysts of racism and
tribalism.
·Th e School's work may, like Lukacs' appear overly esoteric and
theoretical in the context of the practical 'struggle' in South Africa.
However, their concern with 'totality' is of more than 'philosophical'
or theoretical interest. It is significant because the School (and
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Lukacs) have helped lay the foundations for a methodological rigour in
terms of which historical materialists can move into a (theoretical and
practical) concern with the 'subjective', media and communication but
without 'abandoning' or downplaying the 'material' in historical
materialism. (It could be argued that the Althusserian notion of
'autonomous' superstructures amounts to such an 'abandonment' of the
material which the Frankfurt School avoid). Epistemologically, the
Frankfurt School members were certainly the pioneers of a Marxist
communication and media theory. (Lenin was arguably a practical
pioneer in certain aspects of media}. But the School's theory can be
more easily operationalized than Lukacs' because the School dealt less
in 'philosophy' and more with 'communication studies'.
The Frankfurt School's contribution to a reconstructed historical
materialism, however, went beyond a philosophical (existential-
Marxist) concern with the 'subjective'. (It is in this regard that the
Frankfurt School differs from Lukacs, in so far as the School's work
goes beyond 'philosophy'). Its members' interest with the subject-
object totality led them into a specific concern with the media, and
what they -- following Horkheimer & Adorno (1979) -- called 'the
culture industry.' and 'mass culture' (aesthetics). In so doing, the
Frankfurt School's members became the first historical materialist
theorists to explicitly analyze the media. It must be conceded that
the School's work was theoretical, rather than practical, which has led
to much Marxist criticism of Frankfurt School work. However, as will
be argued -- (in Chapter 3) when Korsch's work is referred to a
leftist communicology is in need of both theory and practice. For a
Left confronted by the Information Age, a (leftist) theory of media and
communication is as crucial as is practice. What is more, since South
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Africa is a (peripheral) player .i n the MNC/Information Age relations
of production, South African leftists are also in need of a
communication/media theory.
Frankfurt School as pioneers of an historical materialist media
analysis
The seminal Frankfurt school work on media was Adorno and
Horkheimer's Dialectic of Enlightenment (1979) (first published in
1947). Adorno and Horkheimer were clearly sensitive to changes in the
historical material conditions about them, and thereby came to perceive
the growing influence of the mass media in society (ie. simultaneously
in Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union and the USA). This work directly
reflects the impact of the Nazi-Germany and USA contexts within which
they had worked. It was, in particular, their sensitivity to the early
changes taking place within capitalism, in a direction that would
eventually produce the Information Age, that led the School's members,
(as historical materialists) into a concern with studying the media.
The key terms in their media analyses were those of 'the culture
industry' and 'affirmative culture'. The seminal notion of 'culture
industry' had its origins in Adorno and Horkheimer's (1979:120-167)
essay ~The Culture Industry: enlightenment as mass deception", first
published in 1947). Marcuse (1972:88-133) extended this notion in his
work on "The Affirmative Character of Culture". The notion of 'culture
industry' was subs~quently considerably expanded by Marcuse (1968), and
more importantly, for leftist praxis, developed in a direction that
sought out liberatory possibilities and/or ways of challenging such
cultural domination.
For anyone concerned with the relationship between the capitalist
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relations of production and the media, the Frankfurt School work on the
'culture industry' is important (despite problems with a certain
'reification' of the term). The 'culture industry' was defined as a
'(super)structure' where culture is commoditized (ie. is produced and
distributed) in accordance with the 'needs' of the (monopoly)
capitalist relations of production. By reading Marx and Freud
together the School's members arrived at the notion of a culture
industry in which the distorted relations of production of capitalism
(Marx) were matched by 'psychological distortions' manufactured by a
commodified culture 'machinery'. This represents something of a
Marxified reading of Freud. It is significant that the notion of a
'culture industry' was developed by Adorno and Horkheimer living in the
USA in the 1930s and 1940s. That this 'industry' (which was being
'pioneered' in the USA contemporaneously with the Frankfurt School's
stay there) has subsequently served as a media 'model' for much of the
rest of the world (see Tunstall, 1977) -- as the Information Age spread
across the globe -- has dramatically increased the relevance of their
work. For example, Irwin Manoim's work on the South African black
press reveals that this Americanized culture industry began penetrating
the South African black media during the 1940s (Manoim, 1983:26-28,
32). It was a process pioneered by Paver's Zonk publication (Manoim,
1983: 40, 62-63, 66, 69), further developed by Dagbreekpers' Bona
magazine (Manoim, 1983:73), and by Bailey's Drum (Manoim, 1983:79-88).
Re~ding these developments through an application of the Frankfurt
School's theory provides a valuable explanation of the processes taking
place.
Adorno and Horkheimer's (1979:167) seminal essay in this area ends
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with a harsh condemnation of this Americanized reification
(objectification/ commodification) of culture in which they say that
this 'industry' may grant freedom of choice:
But freedom to choose an ideology -- since ideology always
reflects economic coercion -- everywhere proves to be freedom to
choose what is always the same ... The most intimate reactions
of human beings have been so thoroughly reified that the idea of
anything specific to themselv~s now persists as an utterly
abstract notion: personality scarcely signifies anything more than
shining white teeth and freedom from body odor and emotions.
The School's members were horrified by this 'mass culture' precisely
because they saw it as unparticipative ('undemocratic') and
psychologically manipulative -- ie. it represents the opposite of
'popular culture'. In this scenario humans are reduced to cheerful
robots, condemned to live out their lives in the second-hand reality
given to them by the culture industry (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1979:126).
Significantly, this process is uni-directional -- from the communicator
(employed by the technocrats) to the recipients (Adorno & Horkheimer,
1979:122). The recipients are not treated as rational human beings,
but rather as 'things' to be manipulated (Adorno & Horkheimer,
1979:38). Far from facilitating democracy, such a culture industry
destroys the possibility of democracy. Ideas such as these need to be
taken seriously during any attempt at constructing a left-wing media --
for example, if the South African left ever gain any influence over the
SA Broadcasting Corporation. A Frankfurt School understanding of the
media would be usefully incorporated into left-wing media training as a
touchstone for what left-wing media do NOT want to be -- ie. uni-
directional, top-down ('undemocratic') communication which de-activates
people. The building of democratic participative media {see Nigg &
Wade, 1980; Mattelart, 1986; Louw, 1989a; Stuart, 1989; Criticos, 1989;
Tomaselli & Prinsloo, 1990; White, 1990; as well as the special issues
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of Media Development, Vol 34, 4/1987, and Vol 36, No 4/1989, and Vol
37, 4/1990) which aim to 'activate' people and help to generate popular
culture, can only benefit by staffers being aware of their antithesis
the culture industry.
Through the culture industry the masses imbue the dominant values of
their society, or as Adorno & Horkheimer (1979:127) say, "the might of
industrial society is lodged in men's minds". (This is an area where
Volosinov's work on how signs implant 'objective' domination into
people's minds (the subjective) is important ancillary reading to the
Frankfurt School). Once integrated into this mass culture, people are
'passified' (and become their own controllers). This spells the
destruction of popular culture. Within South Africa one could arrive
at the conclusion that the School's work has explanatory power within
this context in so far as South Africa is integrated into MNC/
Information Age relations of production. An application of the
Frankfurt School argument reveals that some sectors have been absorbed
into the culture industry (eg. the majority of whites and Indians);
some are in the process of being absorbed (eg. many of the emerging
petit bourgeoisie amongst the black and coloured sectors); while others
are, as yet, unintegrated (eg. rural blacks and coloureds; the
significant numbers of the black and coloured working class). It is
this latter category who retain the capacity to produce their own
popular culture, and who represent the most radical sectors in society.
BU~ if the reformed Right and HNC-interests succeed in 'passifying' the
struggle, it is conceivable that a post-apartheid culture industry
could create a generalized mass culture in South Africa. What is clear
is that this Frankfurt School work is seminally important in the
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development of a realist paradigm understanding the Information Age,
and the effects of media on the contemporary culture of any contexts
where MNC relations of production have been implanted.
Capitalism, culture and co-option
The reason why the Frankfurt School originally turned to a study of
the media was the . same as that of other Leftists of their era (eg.
Gramsci, and Lukacs). The School was concerned with trying to explain
why leftist revolutions had not broken out throughout Europe (ie. why
the Russian Revolution was isolated). To answer this their attention
was drawn to media and ideology. They saw media and ideology as having
the power to co-opt and 'de-revolutionize' the working class. Where
they came to differ from Gramsci, however, was in their eventual
conclusion that capitalism's ideological success represented a
permanent defeat for European socialism. They may have over-stated the
'defeat' scenario. Yet, given the subsequent history of Europe and
North America (one of a Keynesian 'co-option' and 'deflection' of
socialism; Thatcher's, Reagan's and Kohl's 'maulling' of socialism
during the 1980s; and the collapse of East European state socialism),
perhaps neither can their ideas be that easily dismissed.
Furthermore, where capitalism has strong vested interests (ie. where
'capital' will offer real resistance), the Frankfurt School 'concerns'
do need to be taken seriously by leftists. South Africa is one such
instance. There is, in other words, a substantive difference between
a Zimbabwe and a South Africa: South Africa is not marginal to MNC, and
so real resistance (often in the form of 'co-option', 'deflection' and
other ideological manipulation) is more likely to be encountered by the
Left. This is what the reforms of 1990 represent. The Right is
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confronted by a radicalized black working class which needs to be
, . '/ t''tamed'. South Africa has experienced such a tam1ng co-op 1ng process
before.
The Frankfurt School's work goes a fair way toward explaining the
co-optation of the white working class into racial-capitalism. This
white (mostly Afrikaner) working class was a revolutionary anti-
capitalist class in the early 1920s (the Communist Manifesto had even
been translated into Afrikaans). In 1922 the Red flag was raised over
Johannesburg by white miners, and the Smuts government had to mobilize
the army and the air force to smash this Rand Revolt. Afrikaner
Christian-Nationalist ideology was developed during the 1930s, in part,
by the NP in response to the radicalization of Afrikaner workers by a
socialist message (see Q'Meara, 1983). At the time, the NP's
leadership represented petit-bourgeoi~ and agrarian capitalist
interests with a deep-seated fear of a radical working class. The NP
invested considerable energy into an ideological battle with the Left,
using culture and media to 'win back' Afrikaner workers into the fold
of 'the Volk' ('the People'). The NP waged this ideological struggle
successfully: socialism was transformed into a national-socialism (with
a strong resemblance to Nazism) (see Q'Meara, 1983). Throughout the
1930s and 1940s sufficient Afrikaner workers were co-opted by the NP's
culture industry to enable the NP to win the 1948 General Elections.
The NP consolidated its co-option of the white working class during the
1950s and 1960s by· creating an patronage network which economically
'rewarded' this working class for it support of racial-capitalism.
The School also helps us explain the direction the South African
'mainstream' media have taken, especially since the 1950s, in the
122
direction of a culture industry producing uncontroversial mass culture
-- a process equally true of the black media (see Manoim, 1983;
Tomaselli 1989:53-82; Tomaselli RE et al 1989:153-176).
, h ' , f' b.i 't i ,The culture industry is seen as a mec an1sm 0 su Jec 1ve
control, where control is understood as a process of building
legitimacy, alliances, making compromises, and using violence; all
within specific objective conditions. In this way the School's work is
transformed from something seemingly 'passive' into something of
practical value. (This is especially the case with Marcuse's work,
which is considerably easier to operationalize in South Africa).
Because the Frankfurt School's work is something of a half-way house
between Lukacs' pure theory and Gramsci's engagement with practical
issues, their work offers a way to engage with practical cultural
issues in a way that is theoretically sound (within a realist paradigm
context) --ie. it offers a means to 'link' a reading and application of
Lukacs to Gramsci. Lukacs' 'theoretical' and 'methodological' concerns
remain apparent within the Frankfurt Schools' work on ideology.
However, the School's work on the 'culture industry' and co-option
points to a means of stepping beyond Lukacs' highly theoreticized
concern with ideology, reification, etc. into a more 'nuts-and-bolts'
unpicking of the workings of how culture and ideology have been
'industrialized'. Such an unpicking process offers a route into an
unravelling of the how the 'culture industry' assists in the building
of hegemony.
This 'realist' turn to a consideration of the culture industry in
such a way that the material and subjective are understood as an
interpenetrating 'totality' (process) is significant when considering
the leftist struggle against apartheid, and since 1990s a reforming-
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Right. It is a struggle that has to take account of capitalist
(objective) and racist (subjective) domination, as well as repression
in the form of violence, ideology, media manipulation, co-optive and
compromise strategies, economic patronage, cross-class and/or-racial
alliances, etc. A matter of concern is that decades of apartheid have
created a subservience amongst certain sectors of the black population
-- these sectors now regard themselves as 'lesser beings' to whites.
(One might say they have been interpellated as 'kaffirs'). Overcoming
this will require a leftist 'subjective' intervention in the future.
What the Frankfurt School 'totality' approach to the culture
industry facilitates is thinking of resistance (and domination) in
terms of a wide array of areas -- such as economics, politics,
ideology, the media, co-option and alliances, etc. The School's
approach, for example, offers an excellent theoretical starting point
for an analysis of the South African state's WHAM approach. From the
late 1970s until the end of 1989, the apartheid regime placed an
amazing amount of energy into using the superstructures and ideology
as indicated by both its WHAM and 'oil spots' strategies (Louw &
Tomaselli, 1989; and Tomaselli & Louw, 1989c). WHAM was part of a
generic Western cold war approach to co-opting 'troublesome' sectors of
the population, but WHAM required a 'saleable' political message if co-
option was to work. Until the 1990 reforms, the South African Right
had no such message. The reforms create the possibility of the Right
cr~ating co-optive ' messages.
The School also offers a useful theoretical route of access for
those seeking to understand the South African English-liberal and
Afrikaans presses. These presses are centrally placed ideological
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machines for the Right and HNC; a position they are likely to retain
even after the first one-person-one-vote elections. But the School is
of more than theoretical concern -- such understanding would be useful
for anyone wishing to engage in public relations work for those leftist
organizations wishing to counter the Right's ideological efforts.
So, although the notion of a culture industry may be seen as an
overly-reified structuralism, it does have considerable explanatory
(heuristic) power, which can be helpful in developing democratic
challenges to HNC media. This is testified to by the continuing
influence of the Frankfurt School over even those who have been
critical of either the over-theoreticism or pessimism (or both) of the
School's members. Examples would be: Enzensberger (1974), Hoffman
(1983), Hund & Kirchhoff-Hund (1983) and Kreimeier (1983). Each has
been unmistakably influenced by the School's notion of a 'culture
industry' despite the fact that each of the above has, at some point,
been critical of aspects of the Frankfurt School's work. There has
also been a growing influence of this notion amongst leftist media
analysts in the USA (See 'Ferment in the Field' special issue of
Journal of Communication, Vol 33, No 3, 1983).
The School's influence amongst South African leftists (especially in
the communication field) has been less pronounced, although their work
has been taught at the CCSU/CCHS since 1986 (Tomaselli & Louw, 1989a).
However, the more the South African Right learns to use the
superstructural co-optive mechanisms associated with the 'liberal
media' of HNC (a trend likely to be associated with the post-reform
era), the greater will be the relevance of Frankfurt School work in the
South African context.
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The Frankfurt School's contribution to the notion of Ideology
The Frankfurt School notion of ideology is, in a sense, an
'extension' of Lukacs' Hegelian-Marxist interpretation. It derives
from the same dialectical-totality interpretation of society that
informed Lukacs. However, the School's work on ideology differs from
Lukacs' in two significant ways. Firstly, whereas Lukacs' formulation
was exclusively theoretical, the School's was more concretized -- ie.
they examined the actual operaton of the American commercial media of
the 1930s and 1940s: (A media which set the tone for the Information
Age throughout the capitalist world in subsequent years). Secondly,
Lukacs ultimately remained within the fold of Stalinist state socialism
(and its associated technocratic logic) and retained a faith in the
working class as being the only revolutionary agents. The Frankfurt
School stepped outside of this narrow conception of opposing
capitalism. In so doing they extended the conceptual range of a
leftist understanding of ideology. It was an extension that made it
possible for the left to also deal with fascism and Stalinism in a way
that did not necessitate falling back on the narrow base-superstructure
'false consciousness' approach, or resorting to 'leadership cult'
explanations. In a contemporary era the Frankfurt School could be
useful in analyzing the swing to the Right in Eastern European
societies.
From Horkheimer through to Habermas, 'ideology' is taken to mean the
'mystification' that results from a non-dialectical process. In this
they, in effect, read the Platonic notion of dialectical argument
(dialogue) into Marx's reading of Hegel's notion of dialectic -- ie.
they accept Marx's idea of material dialectical contradictions in
capitalism, which they extend to 'technocracy'(Adorno & Horkheimer,
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979 4} However, the School 're-appropriates' something of Hegel's1 : .
notion of a 'subjective' dialectic. But they do this (in their
totality method) without thereby 'losing' the materialist dialectic
theirs is not a return to an unbridled Hegelian subjectivism. By
retaining Marx's materialism, the School retains a historical
specificity to their notion of a 'totality' dialectical process
their's is not a universal dialectic (as in Hegel or Engels). This
reading of Marx's, Hegel's and Plato's dialectic together ultimately
produces a fascinating notion of communication/media in Habermas's idea
of 'public sphere' -- which is a conception of a socialist (material)
democratic (subjective) dialectical process within the specific
historical material conjuncture of MNC technocracy. In short, it
represents a recipe for building a leftist media able to assist in re-
engaging the dialectic, and hence challenging the (exploitative and
undemocratic) MNC technocratic ordering of society.
For the Frankfurt School, technocracy is a social process governed
by the 'objective' (capital): the subjective has been overwhelmed by
the objective -- ie. dialectical totality has been destroyed and
replaced with technocratic ideology. The School members were pioneers
in seeing the 'subjective' products of the capitalist mass media as 'a
commodity' subject to the same 'objectifying' processes found in
capitalism's material relations of production. The School concluded ·
that the human condition has consequently been objectified and that
this is the cause of human alienation. In expressing these ideas the
School's members did not move substantially away fro~ the core ideas
formulated in the early Marx (1981) or Lukacs (1971).
The importance of the Frankfurt School notion of dialectical
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totality is twofold. Firstly, they placed the (subjective) notion of
democracy (as dialectical dialogue), and its relationship to the media,
into leftist discourse. (Their work in this area is highly compatible
with Gramsci's work on 'Councils' and with the "Culturalist's concern
with facilitating popular expression). It is to the discredit of those
managing East European state socialism that they failed to respond to
this leftist work. Had they done so, they might not have brought
socialism into so much disrepute through their failure to pay attention
to democratic practices. Secondly, they 'concretized' their
(theoretical) notion of ideology by 'tying' it to material (ie. media)
structures and practices (in a way that Lukacs never did). In this way
they offered a 'bridge between Lukacs' theoretical approach to ideology
and Gramsci's practical approach to ideology). By explicitly drawing
out the links between the capitalist relations of production and the
media the School added to the Hegelian-Marxist notion of ideology
ie. they 'concretized' the notion and 'grounded' it in a specific
examination of the capitalist mass media of the United States.
Certainly reading together the work on ideology of the Frankfurt
School, Lukacs and Gramsci provides a valuable means of developing a
New Leftist approach to democratic socialist cultural production and to
leftist media practice.
The Frankfurt School recognized that the nature of capitalism had
changed between Marx's era and their own. A core feature of the
capitalism they faced was the existence of the mass media. Tpey saw
these media as the instruments of capitalist ideology: this media
disseminated the "false totality" (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1979:136)
manufactured by the ideologies hired by capitalism. This was not a
dialectical totality (ie. 'opposites within unity'), but an
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undialectical and reified totality in which human subjectivity was
'deactivated'. These ideologues 'represented' an objectified (reified)
totality -- ie. a totality dominated by capital (the objective) (see
Marcuse, 1972:108). However, the media presented a view of society
that disguised (mystified) the objectively-reified nature of
capitalism: ie. the media presented a view of society in which 'the
subjective' was seen as not being overwhelmed by 'the objective'. A
subject-object totality was, in other words, manufactured by the media:
a 'false totality' was constructed and promoted through the media. The
media, hence, served to disguise (mystify) the objectifying and
alienating (ie. de-subjectifying/de-humanizing) nature of capitalism.
In the South African racial-capitalist model, the success of such
culture industry mystification has in part assumed a racial character:
whites are more likely to ·' a c c e p t ' the 'false totality' presented to
them in the media than are blacks. This is hardly surprising given
that the 'de-humanization' of black South Africans by racial-capitalism
has been largely 'hidden' from whites through Group Areas segregation.
The media has presented a 'second-hand' reality for whites (generally
located in the comfort of their technocratic suburbia) which has
effectively shielded them from having to confront the 'objectifying'
nature of racial-capitalism. However, despite this, one should not
underestimate the extent to which an 'Americanized' South African media
(culture industry) has moved South African urban blacks in a 'mass
culture' direction. This is apparent in: music (Coplan, 1985)j the
print media -- ego Zonk, Drum, Bona (see Manoim, 1983); the circulation
of 'B-grade' American films as the staple fare on the black cinema
circuitj three SABC-TV channels, namely TV2, TV3 and TV4j
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Bophuthatswana TV; and the SABe's 'Radio Metro'.
On the negative side, there is a potential problem with th~
Lukacian-Frankfurt School notion of defining ideology as 'false
totality'. The problem is that this could be taken to imply that an
'absolute' truth (ie. non-false totality) exists. Such a 'truth' could
then be 'absolutised', reified and universalized, and worse still,
imposed onto society by force. Both Merleau-Ponty (1973) and
Ko I akowski (1981) see Stalinist totalitarianism as having its origins
in exactly such a Lukacs-type reification of dialectical truth.
However, this writer 's reading of the Frankfurt School is that they
avoided the reification of the notion of totality found, for example,
in Lukacs. For the Frankfurt School, ' t ot a l i t y ' was a method of
understanding a process in which the media were centrally implicated,
but where totality was not seen as a (reified) ' t h i ng ' . The School
clearly understood the potential problem with the Lukacsian dialectic.
Adorno (1978), for example, explicitly recognized the problem of
reifying totality and eventually even refused to try and 'capture' an
'understanding' of totality . He preferred instead to concern himself
with 'capturing ' " f r agme nt s" from out of the 'potentially'
contradictory totality that he saw as having now been overwhelmed by
the 'existing' non-contradictory totality. Habermas' (1984) notion of
'totality ' -- as something arrived at in a dialogical process --
specifically avoids any such reification. Habermas ' work is, in fact,
seminal with regard to developing a non-reified notion of totality as
applied to the media. His work on the notion of a 'public sphere' is a
direct outgrowth (with practical intent) of his particular
interpretation of the dialectic. A progressive alternative media built
in accordance with a Habermasian (dialectical) totality would
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facilitate the process of 'democratic dialogue/dialectic' rather than
facilitate an excuse for imposing a 'dialectical truth'. It is hence
Habermas', rather than the Lukacs' dialectic, which, it is proposed, is
most suitable as an underpinning for a South African leftist media (see
Louw, 1990a).
Linked to their ideas on ideology, Frankfurt School formulated a
critique of 'mass culture', also called "affirmative culture" (see
Marcuse, 1972:88-133). The culture industry produced an affirmative
culture by separating the mental from the manual (subject from object);
(an idea which also formed the basis of Marx's notion of alienation).
This separation makes possible the subjective critique of issues
without having to deal with objective conditions. The resultant
'idealist' industry provides technocracy with a way of co-opting even
the most critical of ideas without having to engage in any
transformations 'on the ground' (see Marcuse, 1972:95). The result is
a culture which affirms technocracy, and thereby blocks the process of
change. This idea is not unlike Gramsci's notion of superstructural
'trenches' defending the objective relations of production. For the
School, the 'mechanism' of change is blocked because the culture
industry 'kills' the process of dialectical-totality -- ie. according
to the School's members culture as a dialectical (ie. 'active' and
'contradictory') totality of subject and object had ceased to exist
within the capitalist society which they found in the United States.
Instead, the Frankfurt School identified a 'second-hand' culture (ie.
mediated through the media) which was manipulated and undialectical:
the subject-object link was destroyed, and in the place of totality was
a one-sided 'objectified' culture (Marcuse, 1968). (Here we can see a
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parallel to Lukacs' ideas on " r eification"). These ideas echo in South
Africa: one need only look at the operation of the South African public
relations and advertising industry as well as at what Pinnock (1991)
calls the 'guild press' for an illustration of the extent to which the
(Americanized) culture industry has penetrated into South Africa.
(Although it must be recognized that the penetration/influence of this
industry into different sectors of the South African population varies
from virtually total penetration amongst whites to very low penetration
amongst the rural black sector). The Frankfurt School's ideas on this
'industry' and Gramsci's ideas on the role of traditional intellectuals
overlap in this area.
For the School, the Americanized mass media was seen to operate
according to the logic of capital (the objective). Culture was
consequently 'objectified' -- or at any rate confirmed the technocratic
(objective) ordering of society. Habermas (1980) saw this
objectification as having been defused throughout the whole of Western
society in the form of technocratic (or 'instrumental') ideology. Under
P.W. Botha's regime this instrumental logic permeated deeply into NP
thinking, and so began to significantly influence state planning. In
terms of this thinking even 'civil unrest' could be 'managed'
(technocratically) out of existence -- ie. the logic underpinning the
'oil spots' strategy of the NSHS (see Boraine, 1988; Jochelson, 1988;
and Phillip, 1988).
Within the School's thinking the 'subjective' was seen to have been
overwhelmed by the 'objective' and all that was left were pseudo
individuals 'manufactured' by the (objectified) mass media. The
diffusion of HNC/Information Age relations of production around the
globe since the mid 1950s has served to incorporate greater and greater
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numbers of people into this (Americanized) mass culture. Within this
interpretation, the mass media serve merely to 'affirm' the uni-
dimensional -- ie. objectified -- society. Human alienation as
understood within Marxism (see Marx, 1981) was complete. Since they
were dialecticians the Frankfurt School members regarded this 'death'
of the dialectic as the death of civilization in the 'rationalist'
sense of the word.
The Frankfurt School and South Africa-- --
For South Africans during periods of intense struggle (eg. 1976-
1989), the notion of a stilled dialectic may have seemed a little out
of place. However, there is no reason to reject the Frankfurt School as
a result. Their work does have explanatory power within the South
African context if it is selectively 'appropriated':
Firstly, the School's method needs to be placed within a dialectical
framework: ie. the notion of inertia and revolutionary breaks can be
foregrounded within such a dialectical interpretation. In this way one
can recognize that the dialectic can be stilled during some (historical .
material) periods and contexts and then re-activated again in other
periods and contexts. For example, in 1990, in one part of the world-
wide MNC system (eg. Spain) the dialectical process is presently
'stilled' (ironically by co-opting local socialists), while in another
(eg. El Salvador) the dialectical process is 'active'. The reverse
might be true in twenty years time. Such an interpretation points to
the possibility that the Right and MNC-interests may still successfully
'still' the dialectic in South Africa through co-opting the struggle.
Secondly, the dialectic can be stilled for some sectors in society and
not for others. For example, the School's ideas are potentially
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valuable in explaining the world of the South African white petit
bourgeoisie (an important group given their role as the pivotal support
base for the Right). This class fraction has and does 'live' within an
affirmative culture produced by a culture industry. In other words, it
is a group confined within a narrow second-hand reality provided by the
'mainstream' media. (See, for example, the way in which broadcasting
has generated 'consensus' in Tomaselli, R.E., 1989). This partly
explains the extraordinary shift in this fraction's thinking from 1989
to 1990: in 1989 the ANC/SACP were the 'enemy'; in 1990 they were
rehabilitated to the extent that Joe Slovo of the SACP could appear on
an SABC religious talk show. The white petit bourgeoisie generally
simply followed the lead of the media. For this class fraction the
dialectic is 'killed', and a conservative inertia is the result.
Further, if white attitudes are, in part, the outcome of being
'trapped' within a narrowed-down second-hand 'reality' created by the
culture industry, then the Frankfurt School conclusions have profound
implications for the South African left. It means one of the keys to
defeating the Right may be to " b r e a k through' the 'ideological prison'
of the (white) culture industry so as to present to this sector another
vision of their society. This is a role the Institute for a Democratic
Alternative in South Africa (Idasa) set itself. As long as one does
not universalize a Frankfurt School reading of this white petit
bourgeois phenomenon to cover the South African situation in toto, the
School's work has value to a leftist praxis, especially if read with
Gramsci's work on organic intellectuals.
Habermas (1979; 1984), as the heir to the Frankfurt School, has
developed most coherently (at least in theoretical terms) the
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dialectical notion of communication as the basis for a democratic and
socialist social order. It now remains for leftist media workers to
translate this theory into practice. From a Frankfurt School
perspective a media built to facilitate a social dialogue (i.e. a
'public sphere') would activate popular culture -- 'popular culture'
being the antithesis of 'mass culture'. This is the area where the
School's work overlaps with that of culturalists such as Raymond
Williams and E.P. Thompson.
From the Frankfurt School's dialectical interpretation of culture,
in fact, sprang a definition of 'high' and 'low' culture. Modern
(Western) 'mass culture' was defined as low culture. It was a culture
which was 'undynamic' (undialectical). The 'masses' were passive
recipients: they received a manipulated 'culture' through the mass
media. Adorno saw the production of this 'mass culture' as due to the
fact that although the bourgeoisie controlled the culture industry,
they no longer represented a progressive force in history. Adorno
identified 'high culture' with the culture produced when the
bourgeoisie were still a progressive (revolutionary) social force. At
that time (the late 18th and 19th Century) bourgeois culture was
dialectical (i.e. organically active). For Adorno, the bourgeoisie had
however, become a moribund status quo: it was now in their interests to
block any further revolutionary (dialectical) change in society since
this would overthrow bourgeois civilization. The bourgeoisie's mass
media (radio, films, music, advertising and newspapers) was seen to
bear testimony to their cultural decay: modern 'low culture' is
defined as undialectical (i.e. objectified; uni-directional (coming
from the bourgeois ruling elite); manipulative; and possessing a
'sameness' (a standardized average uniformity). The 'masses' are seen
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as being kept inactive through being 'distracted' by this laid-on
'culture' and leisure, which then manufactures a pseudo-individuality
and pseudo-choice.
This Adorno-derived interpretation of culture is not as incompatible
with the culturalist's view on popular culture as it may at first
appear. This can be demonstrated by applying a Frankfurt School-type
definition of high and low culture to South Africa.
In the South African context one could interpret the local culture
industry as consisting of the 'guild press' (and associated magazines);
SABC; SABC-TV; Ster-Kinekor and Nu Metro; the video-network; and the
Performing Arts Councils (PACs). This is an industry which is primarily
targeted at the white petit bourgeoisies a class who represent a
moribund and conservatively-defensive culture within the South African
context. Not surprisingly therefore from a Frankfurt School
perspective -- this group 'lives' within a second-hand reality
frequently imported from 'Hollywood', or comprised of Hollywood-
imitations (Tomaselli, 1988a:83). Hence the culture industry serving
this group in no way reflects the 'cutting edge' of contemporary South
African culture (see Louw, 1989b). As an industry serving an
undialectical (and moribund) culture it conforms to the School's
definition of 'mass' or 'affirmative' culture. In South African terms,
this 'mass culture' is not universal. (Indeed, a fault with the
Frankfurt School members is that they generalized 'mass culture',
whereas it seems unlikely that it was never a universal phenomenon even
in the United States). However, their notion of 'mass culture' does
seem to have explanatory value in explaining the 'conservatism' of some
sectors in South Africa, such as the white and Indian middle and
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working c lasses. In general, these sectors do appear to have been
'pulled into' Western 'mass culture'. What is more, the South African
Right; and HNC Powers (UK, USA and Germany) are clearly interested in
applying a co-optive programme to South Africa -- a programme aimed at
incorporating further sectors (eg. the black middle class and the
coloured middle and working class) into this mass technocratic culture.
The Western powers and internal Right (and the media serving this
sector) will clearly aim to try and maneuver a post-apartheid South
Africa in this direction.
Knowledge of Frankfurt School theory can serve as a 'theoretical'
bulwark against the co-option of a post-apartheid media tied into
HNC/Information Age mass culture. It also benefits leftist media
workers because: firstly, it would, enable them to recognize any co-
optive pressures pushing the leftist media in a 'mass' (as opposed to
popular) direction; and secondly, enable them to act as 'early-warning
systems' of co-option strategies within the Left.
However, care needs to be taken when applying the Frankfurt School
to South Africa. Certainly South Africa has a 'culture industry'. But
this society also has, PARALLEL to this undialectical and conservative
'culture industry', an active (dialectical) popular culture. The
notion of 'parallel' cultures allows one to read the Frankfurt School
and the Culturalists simultaneously into the South African situation).
It is the popular culture (largely a black South African phenomenon)
which potentially .r e p r e s e n t s the cutting edge of any leftist hegemony
-- ie. black South Africans are (at present) less 'massified', and from
a popular ('organic') point of view, more active. (In fact, given the
substantial poverty amongst blacks, the popular cultural 'activity'
amongst this sector is surprisingly high). Using Adorno's logic, this
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popular culture in no ways represents a mass culture. Rather, as an
outgrowth of those forces representing dialectical transformation in
South Africa. This black popular culture parallels (in the South
African context) the culture of the bourgeoisie in late 18th and 19th
century Europe/America: ie. it is a progressive force.
Application of the above (Adorno-derived) understanding could serve
to direct the leftist media into yet another role -- that of
facilitating a quickened pace of popular cultural development. In such
media work a knowledge of Frankfurt School theory would be valuable.
The School, in other words provides a theoretical 'touchstone' -- an
understanding of what an 'anti-progressive' culture looks like; and
therefore what kind of culture/communication should be consciously
avoided.
Problems with the Frankfurt School
For a New Leftist communicology concerned with practical
emancipatory possibilities, the most serious problem with the Frankfurt
School is that (like Lukacs) much of their work remains at the level of
passive reflection. This criticism, however, does not devalue the
importance of this theory as a foundation (together with Lukacs) for
developing a realist approach to communication, the (commercial) media,
and co-optation.
A key concern is that the pessimism of the Frankfurt School
undermines the School's own dialectical radical premises (see Chasin &
Chasin, 1974). Adorno, for example, seemed to give up all hope that
the dialectic could ever be 're-awakened'. In terms of media analysis,
we can now trace the origins of this 'problem' in the Frankfurt School
to:
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(a) their over-estimation of the power of the media. (This is
especially problematical in a Third World context); and
(b) their over-emphasis of the importance of the media
(superstructures) within the total social process. (Also problematic in
many Third World contexts) ;
(c) their ignoring of the possibility of 'resistance' surviving within
the 'gaps', 'cracks' and 'contradictions' of society;
(d) they ignored the fact that popular culture had survived; and
(e) their assumption that the 'culture industry' was a monolithic
'entity'; ie. this view is only possible if contradictions internal to
the media industry are ignored.
Both theoretical and empirical objections have been raised to the
Frankfurt School. The political-economist media analyst Freiberg
(1981: 15) objected to their notion of a "general ·c r e t i n i z a t i on of the
population". Freiberg's analysis of the situation in France
contradicted the School's ideas by revealing a 'dual' media system, in
which the ruling elite provides for itself a 'non-cretinized' media,
while the 'mass' media (with its 'culture industry' type
'cretinization' and 'massification' format) were reserved for the rest
of society. Amongst the ways the masses are excluded from the 'non-
cretinized' media are: (a) financial limitations; and (b) they are not
'taught' (for example at working class schools) to 'appreciate' the
arts etc. In South Africa, the way in which education (and to a lesser
extent, media) has been provided for different racial and class sectors
on a differential basis is a striking example of this.
Corrigan & Willis went even further in their criticism of the
Frankfurt School. They objected to the very idea of a cretinized
"acted upon and passive" (Corrigan & Willis, 1980:304) mass:
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"Controllers know that the controlled are not a passive mass;
ideologists can make the society only from their greater distance"
(Corrigan & Willis, 1980:305).
From an historical material perspective the Frankfurt School made
one unforgivable error: they generalized an historically a"nd materially
specific (synchronic) set of conditions, when they treated the USA's
mass media as a universal system rather than as a transitory
historical-material condition. It is true that this US mass media has
had remarkable 'staying' power (indeed 'expansionary' power). However,
that is still no reason to assume the system is not finite. This is an
area where Gramsci differs from the School -- Gramsci provides a more
complex understanding because he deals in depth with a particular
historical material instance (Italy between the World Wars). Gramsci
did not make the 'error' of generalizing his work into a 'universal'-
type theory in the way the Frankfurt School and Lukacs attempted to do.
A generalizing theory can be useful, but only within limits. The
School's work needs to be read with Gramsci's to counterbalance the
tendency toward developing overly-universalized models and theories.
Nicholas Garnham (1979:131) states in this regard: "The real weakness
of the Frankfurt School's original position was ... insufficiently to
take account of the economically contradictory nature of the process
they observed and thus to see industrialization as unproblematic and
irresistible". This problem becomes particularly acute when applied to
situations where contradictions, and a fluidity (including in the
superstructures) are apparent (eg. contemporary Central America). The
failure to consider the possibility of future contradictions led the
Frankfurt School (with the possible exception of Benjamin) into a
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theoretical passivity: they offered only critique, with no glimpse of
praxis. They offered no practical alternative (no alternative outside
of intellectualizing) to the culture industry. From the perspective of
trying to create a leftist media in South Africa this position becomes
too limiting. Ironically then, the Frankfurt School members, by
ignoring their own dialectical premises and through not seeking out
potential media contradictions, violated the one valuable contribution
they could make to a leftist communication; namely their dialectical
(Hegelian) theory of communication. In fact, they went so far as to
(in conservative fashion) implicitly criticize the new forms of media
and culture then being developed, instead of seeking out the
potentially progressive features of such media. Enzensberger (1974:14
says of this particular failure: "Criticism of the mind industry which
fails to recognize its central ambiguities is either idle or
dangerous". However, despite Enzensberger's criticism, it must be noted
that his work has been strongly influenced by the Frankfurt School.
Enzensberger's 'consciousness industry' is merely an extension of the
School's 'culture industry'. The fact that Enzensberger is able to
develop essentially Frankfurt School ideas into a 'praxis' direction is
a clear indication that the School's work should not be entirely
dismissed due to its apparent over-theoretical nature.
The view of the masses as absolutely passive and manipulable
contradicts and undermines a core feature of the leftist project. If
the Frankfurt School's pessimism is accepted then the whole basis for
attempting to construct a leftist media is negated. Hence, even if the
School is acknowledged as having made a seminal contribution to a
leftist communicology (both theoretically and through their turn to
media analysis), there is a definite need to move beyond their
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pessimism , under-estimation of the possibilities of resistance, and
over-theoretic ism. This is especially true for those attempting to
build a South African leftist media.
Ironically though, the Frankfurt School's 'errors' in this regard
are part of their potential value: their work demonstrates a potential
'wrong turn' which is so easy to make. To avoid this 'wrong turn' CCS
could read into the School's theory a deeper concern with seeking out
contradictions (eg. Lukacs' dialectical method and Benjamin/
Enzensberger's approach), as well as developing a Gramscian reading of
the notion of 'culture industry'. In the South African context this
would entail moving beyond the conception of a monolithic (Frankfurt
School-type) notion of culture industry into a recognition of
contradictions within the 'industry', and of 'culture' outside of this
culture industry. At the same time, this is no reason to abandon the
notion of a culture industry -- it too exists. What is more, in the
post-1990 reforms era it could well expand its influence in South
Africa. It therefore seems useful to see the School's work as having
much explanatory power, but not a universal explanatory power.
Salvaging aspects of the Frankfurt School's work
The School's view that the dialectic was 'dead' and their pessimism
about (undialectical) 'mass culture' needs to be seen against the
historical materialist backdrop of Nazi Germany, Stalinist Russia and
the Frankfurt School's encounter with the United States'
'unrevolutionary' proletariat. The School tried to understand these
phenomena from a Marxist perspective. Their pessimism resulted from
the fact that they were (humanist) Marxists, who had seen (a) fascism
triumph over socialism in Germany; (b) the deformation of socialism in
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the Soviet Union; and (c) the working class in the USA largely
'passified' by the mass media/mass culture. For leftists faced with
these conditions, optimism could well be seen as inappropriate. The
School encountered these phenomena and found economistic historical
materialism unable to explain them satisfactorily. It was for this
reason that they turned to an analysis of the superstructures and
culture to seek out a reason for what they perceived to be the
'stabilization' of 'objectified' (undialectical) society.
Further, the School's over-estimation of the media's power is
something they shared with positivist media theory contemporaries (eg.
Blumler, 1939). The problem with such a view is that it assumes a uni-
directional communication flow in which the communicator/medium have
all the power -- ie. it sees the recipients ('masses') as wholly
'manipulable' and passive: they are not understood as active
participants or active co-creators of meaning. It should be noted
that even positivist media analysts have subsequently dropped this
notion that the media possess overwhelming power (see Blumler & Katz,
1974). The point is that members of the Frankfurt School were amongst
the earliest media analysts, and it is easy to criticize them with
hindsight, and on the basis of our contemporary understanding of the
communication process, just as one can criticize the early positivists.
Ironically, to dismiss the Frankfurt school in toto would be to fall---
prey to the same sort of 'universalizing' error this School's members
made. Would it not be more useful to recognize that perhaps their
understanding of the media is both correct and incorrect depending on
the historical material context? In other words, periods of passivity
(inertia?) do occur when the dialectic is stilled; and in certain of
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these periods the culture industry does play a significant anti-
dialectical role. Further, perhaps it is necessary to concede that the
Frankfurt School's ideas may be valuable with regard to understanding
how the media can 'passify' and 'co-opt' the middle classes as a
specific ( a n d demographically important) sector within capitalism
(including within South Africa's racial capitalism); but may be less
successful when applied to other sectors of society. So, within the
South African context, for example, it is useful to read the Frankfurt
School's ideas into the situation both in terms of (a) periodization,
and (b) class analysis. In this regard it may prove useful to know
which sectors of South African society (classes, class fractions, etc)
have, or have not been, 'co-opted' or 'passified' or even 'cretinized'
in any particular period. This could help the left strategize more
effectively.
Despite all the problems with the Frankfurt School, the notion of
co-option, which derives from their work on the culture industry, is
particularly important. This is not least in South Africa, where co-
option has been, and is, a problem in certain sectors; and in the post-
reform period will, in all probability become a much bigger problem.
The media can, and do, play a hegemonic role in:
(a) assisting in the co-option of certain strata into the service of
the status quo. The NP government (and its Namibian allies), for
example, waged an especially effective Namibian campaign in 1989,
thereby helping r~ghtist parties to win over 40% of the of the vote in
the elections for a constituent assembly.
(b) 'deflecting' and 'nullifying' (or even incorporating in 'modified'
format) potentially oppositional 'ideas'. For example, the terms 'non-
racial' and 'community' are being increasingly co-opted by the South
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African Right. It is certain that HNC-interests will pour funds into
South Africa to assist such 'deflection' and 'co-option' programmes;
(c) creating 'pseudo choice' and 'pseudo individuality' (hence helping
to legitimate a so-called 'democracy' and consumerism). Within South
Africa, American television programmes in particular are having an
influence in this regard in the expanding (cross-racial) middle class
sector;
(d) helping to 'counter' contradictions that emerge within the total
social process. For example, between 1976 and 1989 the media was
frequently used to deflect the white sector's attention away from poor
economic performance and their resultant declining income, because this
would have undermined their support for the NP government; and
(e) possibly even helping to pacify potential opposition. For example,
if one appears unbeatable, resistance is discouraged.
Hore importantly, when appraising the value of the Frankfurt School,
is that at least three major theorists -- namely Benjamin, Marcuse and
Habermas -- cannot be classified as having fallen prey to the same
pessimistic and theoretically 'passive' approach. If the rest (and
especially Adorno) are problematic for a leftist communicology, the
same cannot necessarily be said of these three. So even if doubts
exist about the usefulness of the rest of the School for praxis-
oriented media workers, there can be no doubt that these three can be ·
useful in the development of a leftist communication theory and
practice.
WaIter Benjamin (1977), for example, considered the potential value
of the new media technology for praxis. His examination of how the
modern media facilitation of mass 'reproducability' (Benjamin,
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1977:388-392) has 'liberatory' potential (from a democratic socialist
perspective) is a seminal insight for leftist media studies. Benjamin
was also amongst the first media analysts to stress the importance of
the recipients as co-producers of meaning (Benjamin, 1977:394, 398).
He also stressed the way in which modern mass media make this possible
(i.e are potentially anti-elitist) -- key insights for the development
of a democratic socialist 'public sphere'. It is hardly surprising
then that the radical media theorist, Enzensberger, chose Benjamin as a
key source of ideas. Such notions, as developed by Benjamin (and
Enzensberger), have already shown their usefulness in South Africa
where the leftist media have successfully sought out and used the
latest media technology (see Pinnocki and CECS Manuals, n/d).
Further, Benjamin refused to sink into pessimism because of an
ascendant petit bourgeoisie (who largely staff the culture industry)
and a simultaneous decline of working class influence in Europe/
America. Here Benjamin differed significantly from his other Frankfurt
contemporaries: instead of bemoaning the failures of the working class,
Benjamin instead sought the revolutionary possibilities inherent in
this changing situation. Benjamin developed an idea of intellectual
(petit bourgeois) 'interventionism' (based upon critical theory seen as
a sort of hermeneutic/interpretive activity) as one potential sort of
radical praxis (Roberts, 1982:153-225). This particular notion has a
great deal of potential value in South Africa where skills are
overwhelmingly concentrated in 'non-black' middle class hands. In this
area Benjamin provides a useful conceptual framework within which
leftist media workers can move beyond an exclusivist working class
understanding of 'the struggle', and so work out and develop precisely
what their own white collar/middle class contribution to 'the struggle'
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could be. Developing an understanding of the role of the petit
bourgeoisie in 'the struggle' requires attention -- one need only refer
to the positive influence of petit bourgeois-initiated projects like
Work in Progress and South African Labour Bulletin to realize the
potential value of such a Benjamin-type praxis. A rigorous
consideration (based on Benjamin's approach) of the radical petit
bourgeois contribution to the struggle is important for both leftist
media work and for the wider Left.
Herbert Marcuse's work represents an important link between the
Frankfurt School's approach and the praxis-oriented CCS approach being
sought in this thesis. While Marcuse's contemporaries within the
School sank ever deeper into pessimism during the 1950s and 1960s,
Marcuse turned the School's approach toward the search for praxis and
revolutionary optimism. In this role Marcuse became an important
'organic intellectual'/spokesperson of the 1960s-1970s New Left
Movement. In this role he made an especially interesting contribution
to the search for a way to 'unfreeze the dialectic' (Marcuse, 1968,
1969 and 1972).
Marcuse's approach to praxis involved breaking out of the confines
of workerist struggle and seeking instead a way to 'activate' ALL those
alienated by technocratic capitalism (including, for example, students
from the middle classes). This involved, in part, communicative/
cultural work -- a sort of social psychotherapy, in which subjects were
forced 'to confront their alienation and its causes (capitalist-
technocracy). It is the sort of work in which a progressive-
alternative media will have a central role to play. Marcuse re-
awakened the 'utopian' possibility of a de-alienated and de-
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technocratized world (of democracy, individual freedom and human-nature
harmony) . Habermas has picked up on these Marcusian ideas in a
theoretical sense, while the Greens Movement developed them in a more
practical sense during the 1980s. Although, at first glance, this
approach may appear out of place in South Africa, it should be noted
that it is potentially valuable in at least one (not insignificant)
sector of the local struggle -- namely, the student population of the
liberal campuses. In the process of examining the Freudian-Marxist
interface, Marcuse directed the dialectical method in the direction of
a notion of liberation and praxis (Rauche, 1977), although primarily in
an Euro-American context. However, Marcuse's notion that it would be
those not integrated into capitalist structures who would be most
'free' to act against this system has shown itself to have some
validity in South Africa: it is worth noting that the unemployed and
the youth took the lead in opposing apartheid between 1976 and 1989;
while employed black people (ie. the parents of the youth) often 'held
themselves back' for fear of losing their jobs .
For leftist media workers this Marcusian observation has certain
implications -- it means developing media targeted specifically at
these 'non-integrated' sectors (youth, students, unemployed) [3]. But
that presents certain economic problems because it is precisely these
sectors for whom media needs to be provided free - - and that means
finding funding. It also presents a problem of style -- these sectors
have very specific interests and world views which 'outsiders' may have
difficulty in expressing . This means that ideally these groups need to
produce their own media -- a position the culturalists would endorse.
However, this requires that they be trained to do so . What Marcuse
draws attention to is the realization that a counter to the culture
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industry needs to be developed -- a leftist communicative/ culture
apparatus which can serve to mobilize alienated sectors on their own
terms. Such a mobilization, through what Habermas would term a 'public
sphere', could represent a serious challenge to technocratic-capitalism
in South Africa and elsewhere.
Habermas, has in fact, developed Marcuse's ideas on a 'communication
praxis' (Louw, 1983). In so doing, Habermas moved the Frankfurt
approach still further away from the pessimism of the later Adorno. In
many respects Habermas' theoretical work represents a marriage of the
sort of concepts found in Gramsci and Marcuse. The result is a notion
of actively building a counter-hegemony using communicative
(superstruct~ral) action to do so. His work on the 'public sphere' and
a 'reconstructed historical materialism' is central in this regard. It
is work which, because it has been de-pessimized, facilitates the
integration of the School's method into a praxis-oriented leftist
communicology. His notion of the 'public sphere', and his proposal for
a 'reconstructed historical materialism' are especially significant
he draws attention to the important role of communication (public
sphere) within praxis; and develops a theoretical/methodological
fulcrum (reconstructed historical materialism) for a leftist turn to
media work.
What is useful for a leftist media is Habermas' work on the 'public
sphere'/social dialogue. Currently, not all the South African
alternative press is constructed as a democratic 'public sphere'. Were
this to be consciously done the long-term prospects for developing a
democratic post-apartheid South Africa would be improved. Habermas, in
fact, offers a theoretical model upon which to construct a popular-
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democratic leftist media system: a system which could serve to generate
a participative and democratic culture.
This is not to say that Habermas has not reproduced some of the
problems (that I have already discussed) that are found in the other
Frankfurt School writer. There are some problems with his work,
especially from a South African perspective, as discussed elsewhere by
this author (Louw, 1982:126-130). However, despite these, it has to be
noted that Habermas has not replicated the School's pessimism and
theoretical passivity. Further, Habermas has been in the forefront of
defending historical materialism (and its rationalist and socialist
project) from the contemporary post-modernist and post-structuralist
attacks on i t. This has, in a sense, served to demonstrate the
continued importance of the Frankfurt School as a source of historical
materialist communication theory. In fact, it is significant that it
is Habermas (working out of the Frankfurt School tradition) who made
the important challenge that historical materialism be 'reconstructed'
(Habermas, 1979: Chapter 3), such that this paradigm is more adequately
able to deal with the contemporary Information Age.
Gramsci's practically-oriented concern with the superstructures
Unlike the Frankfurt School theorists, Antonio Gramsci was never a
Marxist 'dissident'. Explicitly a Marxist-Leninist, he argued for a
vanguardism instead of 'waiting' for the revolution. (He argued against
Second International Marxists who believed that capitalism would
co~lapse because of its own contradictions). Despite his Leninism, he
significantly reconstructed historical materialism in a way which makes
his work valuable in the contemporary Information Age, as well as being
highly compatible with a New Leftist interpretation of praxis. The
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'inherent' New Leftism in his ideas is apparent in the clear influence
he had on Eurocommunism in the 1970s. (It is perhaps not surprising to
find that the Italian Communist Party -- which Gramsci helped to found
-- was a key pioneering force in the Eurocommunist revision of leftist
praxis). Because of his practical political work Gramsci recognized
the need for: (a) the working class to develop alliances and coalitions
with other classes (for Gramsci the peasantry was especially
important), and (b) for socialist politicans to look after interests of
both the working class AND those of other classes.
What is interesting is that Gramsci actually engaged in his de facto
reconstruction and revision of historical materialism at the height of
the Stalinist period. It seems probable that the only reason his work
was not branded as 'anti-Marxist' and henceforth purged from Marxist
discourse was because he was in a fascist prison while engaged in this
revisionist work! This made him a ,ma r t y r , and so placed his work beyond
the reach of Stalinist orthodoxy's tendency of attempting to obliterate
creative revisions to the paradigm.
Before being imprisoned by Mussolini's government Gramsci was a
member of the Italian Parliament and leader of the Italian Communist
Party. He had been concerned with developing a factory council
movement to establish a mass base for Italian socialism (Gramsci, 1971:
xxxviii). His work in this area made Gramsci sensitive to the notion
of grassroots democracy (eg. each factory as a democratic unit). This
non top-down. (vanguardist) approach made Gramsci recognize the role of
'superstructural labour' in the task of building a hegemony from the
grassroots up. One can see Gramsci's 'theoretical hand' in the work of
South Africa's Cosatu. (In fact, since Bozzoli (1981) introduced
Gramsci's work to South Africa, the impact of his work has grown
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increasingly apparent}.
In prison {from 1926 to 1937} Gramsci turned his hand to leftist
theoretical work. The result was his Prison Notebooks {1971} {parts of
which only began to be published after the Second World War}. Because
these take the form of notes written in prison conditions, it is
difficult to provide a coherent summary from this work. But at heart
it was concerned with an examination of the role intellectuals have
within political struggle, and in constructing civil society. The
outcome was a series of seminal leftist insights into superstructural
labour. What is more, as capitalism has mutated in the direction of
increasingly 'superstructural' relations of production, so have
Gramsci's insights become increasingly relevant to leftist praxis
within an Information Age.
Gramsci's work has influenced attempts to move historical
materialism away from economism and toward a concern with the
superstructure{s}. However, because he was a Marxist practitioner,
rather than a Marxist theorist, Gramsci's approach to 'reconstructing'
historical materialism took a form different to that associated with
the other theoretical reconstructions discussed in this thesis. Gramsci
directs historical materialists to use the superstructures for
practical hegemonic competition between the Left and Right.
But Gramsci's work does have certain similarities to the Frankfurt
School. This is not really surprising since both he and the School's
me~bers were living in contexts in which the Far-Right {ie. fascists
and Nazis} were gaining ascendancy. The similarities between Gramsci
and the Frankfurt School were: firstly, a concern with explaining why
the contradictions in capital {as identified by Marx} had not produced
152
the expected revolution in Europe. Gramsci described how "passive
revolutions" co-opted the working class into Rightist social
arrangements. (An example was the fascist passive revolution in Italy
and the Nazi passive revolution in Germany, which co-opted significant
sections of the working class). This work has potential explanatory
power for the analysis of certain Third World comprador relationships.
Secondly, both Gramsci and the Frankfurt School theorists turned to the
superstructures (and away from economism) to try and explain the above
problem. Thirdly, neither the Frankfurt School theorists, nor
Gramsci's turn to the superstructures (the subjective) caused them to
abandon h istorical material (objective) premises.
Gramsci's revision of historical materialism integrated a concern
with the superstructures by 'intuitively' using a 'totality' approach.
Unlike the Frankfurt School members and Lukacs, however, Gramsci did
not really delve theoretically into the intricacies of the subject-
object problematic. But his work exhibits the same humanist-leftist
(subject-object dialectic) premises: Gramsci is clearly an historical
materialist concerned with the subjective. Hence in Gramsci (1971:3-4)
we find references to the class (objective) - intellectual (subjective)
.r e l a t i o n s h i p ; the class (objective) - politics (subjective)
relationship (Gramsci, 1971:227-8); and reference to class and hegemony
(Gramsci, 1971:210): i.e. the subject-object (superstructure-base)
problematic is being dealt with.
In Gramsci the above issues are examined through concrete Italian
examples, rather than through a 'theoretical' investigation. That
Gramsci uses Italian examples has, in itself, a certain added value for
South African leftists. This is ' because there are some rather
remarkable similarities between Gramsci's Italian context and South
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African conditions; ego clear 'developed' and 'underdeveloped' sectors;
and extremes of 'interests' which results in a plethora of organized
political interest groups ranging from extreme right to extreme left.
Such a situation lends the edge to those most successful at managing
'alliance-type' politics. It is not surprising therefore that
Gramsci's ideas have found particular application in situations
requiring the building of leftist-alliances (eg. the Italian, French
and Spanish Eurocommunists of of the 1970s; Chile during both the
Allende era, and again i n the late 1980s; Nicaragua during the
Sandanista struggle; and South Africa in the 1980s).
The Prison Notebooks exudes Gramsci's intuitive 'feel' for practical
leftist politics. Hence although there are many similarities between
Gramsci's 'superstructural revision' of historical materialism and the
'revisions' of Lukacs, Adorno, Habermas and Althusser, Gramsci's work
has a more 'concrete' texture than the rather 'distant' academicism of
the others.
Gramsci's 'unacademic' approach is both a strength and a weakness.
From a praxis point of view it is a strength, and so it is hardly
surprising to find that South African 'left' political practitioners
find Gramsci especially appealing. From an analytical point of view,
however, Gramsci failed to 'spell out' his methodology. In itself
this is not necessarily serious. Further, since we can identify both .
he and Lukacs as applying the 'totality method' we can always refer to
Lukacs for guidance on methodological rigour in this approach if we so
wish. (Lukacs and Gramsci share many similarities: both were Leninist-
Marxists, working between the two world wars, who recognized the
limitations of the Marxist orthodoxy of their day. Like Gramsci, Lukacs
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attempted to shift Marxism beyond this narrow orthodoxy while remaining
a Leninist). However, Gramsci's 'intuitive' rather than 'rigorous'
approach to the totality method did result in him concentrating almost
exclusively on the superstructures such that he did not deal with the
way in which the superstruct~res are 'connected' to the economic-base.
Lukacs left no such methodological holes.
Specifically, Gramsci concentrated on two superstructures: (a) the
ideological, and (b) the political and legal. Gramsci's work is thus
valuable in situations of political (superstructural) struggle. (The
South African struggle has been such an overtly 'political' engagement
because apartheid has been such an 'apparently' political, legal and
ideological phenomenon).
Gramsci explicitly directs the Left towards political/ideological
engagement with the Right, which represents a significant shift away
from the economistic historical materialist interpretation of struggle.
It is a shift that directs the Left towards a concern for communicative
engagement -- the implication of Gramsci's ideas is that building
hegemony is communicative work par excellance.
---- - --
So it is a little
surprising that, unlike the Frankfurt School, Gramsci does not deal
specifically with the media as a communication phenomenon. This is-
made more surprising given that Gramsci had a hand in founding an
Italian socialist newspaper to create a voice for the factory council
movement. Its founding was, in fact, a prelude to the establishment of
the Italian Commu~ist Party. But even if he does not deal with the
media ~ se, the implications of his ideas for leftist media workers
is clear: for Gramsci media workers are but one category of
intellectual.
In the Italian context, Gramsci turned to the superstructures out of
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his concern with intellectuals and their role in either helping to
generate a leftist revolution, or in aiding the status gyQ to prevent a
revolution. For leftist communicology this work is extremely
important: in much the way that the Frankfurt School theorists were
pioneers of a leftist approach to the media ('culture industry'), so
Gramsci was a pioneer of a leftist approach to intellectuals.-- -
Gramsci saw the superstructures as a site of struggle: as an area
where the contradictions of capitalism could be either (a) manifested,
or (b) 'papered over'. Through linking superstructural workers
(intellectuals) to the notion of struggle Gramsci made his seminal
contribution to the reconstruction of historical materialism. In the
Gramscian approach, part of the task of a Left revolutionary party
(which Gramsci called "the Modern Prince") is to help make social
contradictions manifest. For Gramsci this would specifically include
superstructural labour. The work of Rightist intellectuals on the
other hand is to try and 'paper over', 'camouflage' or 'deflect' these
contradictions. The latter would, in part, co-incide with the labour
of those in what the Frankfurt School called the culture industry.
Thus according to Gramsci, intellectuals (such as journalists,
teachers, academics, etc) were thus centrally implicated as playing an
important part in the direction society took. To apply Lukacsian-
Frankfurt School logic to the Gramscian approach: Rightist
intellectuals would be trying to either 'still' "t h e dialectic, or at
le~st 'deflect' it in favour of a maintenance of the status quo; while
leftist intellectuals would be trying to 'encourage' dialectical
contradictions.
For Gramsci, intellectuals organized the beliefs of society. These
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ideas had a material force in history (ie. ideas are part of the
dialectical totality). Gramsci identified two types of intellectual
in Italy: "organic" and " t r a d i t i ona l " [4]. Traditional intellectuals
were those who held themselves aloof from contemporary struggles,
remaining detached and merely pontificating on 'ideals' (ie. the
traditional 'ivory tower' approach). Organic intellectuals, on the
other hand, grew 'organically' from the ranks of the different classes
in society. (For Gramsci, only the peasants produced no organic
intellectuals of their own). Because these intellectuals were
organically a part of these different classes, they automatically
became implicated (involved) in any struggles between them -- ie
intellectuals produced ideas and knowledge which helped to further the
interests of the class to which they belonged.
Because of the nature of capitalist society, the Right could rely on
the services of large numbers of organic intellectuals -- ie. the
'establishment' would clearly have the necessary resources to employ
intellectuals (eg. advertising, public relations, journalists,
researchers, academics, teachers, etc). Such employment co-incides
with the Frankfurt School's notion of 'culture industry'. It was the
role of these (Rightist) intellectuals (ie. within the culture
industry) to organize "civil society " -- ie. to 'produce' consent
and/or legitimate the status quo. There is some overlap between
Gramsci's work on intellectuals and Althusser's work on Ideological
State Apparatuses (ISAs). However, in Gramsci's writing intellectuals
are 'freer agents' -- ie. able to choose to act for a particular class
interest (ie. not imprisoned within a 'linguistic' structure as in the
Althusserian model). Clearly Gramsci saw 'choice' as available,
otherwise he would not have seen the possibility of the Left co-opting
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Rightist intellectuals and visa versa. Gramsci noted that one of the
tasks of organic intellectuals working for the established order was to
attempt to co-opt oppositional forces. The way in which the petit
------ .bourgeois-dominated fascist movements co-opted the working class In
I t a l y and Germany between the two World Wars was a case in point. (The
Afrikaans petit bourgeoisie co-opted the South African white working
class in a similar way during the 1940s and 1950s)(see Q'Meara, 1983).
Gramsci described the successful Rightist co-optation of
oppositional forces as a " p a s s i v e revolution" or reformism. His ideas
are l ikely to prove useful for leftist analysis in the post-1990 South
Afr ican context where Rightist intellectuals will attempt to co-opt
sections of the Left.
Gramsci argued that the working class needed to develop its own
"organic intellectuals". The Left in Gramsci's Italy would have had a
similar problem to the Left in contemporary South Africa, namely: the
ruling hegemony would have an abundant supply of intellectual
'material' (through its control of resources and the sites of
intellectual production), while the Left would face a paucity of such
'material'. In both Grarnsci's Italy and contemporary South Africa the
challenge for the Left becomes an attempt to accumulate intellectual
'capital'. This requires creating intellectual sites, training
intellectuals and trying to co-opt former rightist intellectuals into ·
leftist structures. South African examples of such work have been: the
cr~ation of a left-wing media (see Chapter 5); media training schemes
(see Mackay & Louw, 1990); and the 'capturing' of the University of the
Western Cape. Within Gramscian logic such an accumulation of
intellectual capital was needed to meet the challenge of the ruling
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hegemony's 'culture industry'. The task of the (accumulated) leftist
organic intellectuals would be to counter the work of the Right's
intellectuals, and to organize a 'counter' set of beliefs, and/or
counter-civil society.
Some of the earliest accumulation of leftist intellectual capital in
South Africa was achieved by the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM)
during the 1970s. BC was a process which acted as a sort of 'primitive
accumulation' of 'intellectual capital' (which gradually shifted
towards a working class position). Significantly, it was during this
BC-phase that the foundations were consciously laid for a counter-
hegemony in the form of a progressive-alternative media and
'alternative journalism' in South Africa. Certainly the 'Charterists'
(ANC and UDF) and the workerists (COSATU) were much slower than BCM in
recognizing the importance of 'intellectual' and 'cultural' struggle.
These were also slow to set up 'cultural departments' to 'counter' the
appeal of BC ideology. However, during the 1980s, once the importance
of 'culture' was recognized, the MDM was able to 'appropriate' some of
the 'intellectual capital' provided by BCM (see Raubenheimer, 1991:
Chapter 5). In this regard BCM ironically provided the foundation upon
which (non-BC) popular MDM 'mass action' was mobilized in the first
half of the 1980s.
Gramsci also argued that the Left needed to try and 'co-opt' some of
the Right's intellectuals. Although the BCM-phase rejected this
approach (largely because of the Franz Fanon influence), the 1980s saw
a shift (largely mediated by the UDF and Cosatu) towards the active
'recruitment of white intellectuals into what came to be called the
'democratic camp' (UDF/Cosatu/MDM). The 1980s in fact saw some
significant successes both with regard to the recruitment of white
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petit bourgeois intellectuals into the leftist camp, and with regard to
the spread of socialist discourse in South Africa.
Further , Gramscian logic directs the Left towards recognizing the
need for leftist intellectuals to develop an understanding of the way
Rightist intellectuals organize the ruling hegemony/civil society. In
South Africa, the 1980s saw a proliferation of historical material
analysis of apartheid and its history. as well as the dissemination of
this knowledge by Ravan Press. Work in Progress. Africa Perspective.
Critical Health . Critical Arts. Transformation. Sached, etc.
Fourth ly. leftist intellectuals need to be 'bonded ' with non-
i nt e l l e c t ua l forces i n the leftist camp . Gramsci (1971 :15. 129) argued
that this welding process was the task of the "Moder n Prince " (the
revolutionary political party). Such a ' bond i ng process ' will, of
necessity, be tied to a communicative process and the superstructural-
intellectual work associated with develop ing communication-bonds. This
' bond i ng ' process can be a tense and difficult one because there is
often a working class and lumpenproletariat distrust of intellectuals.
This is (ironically) extended into an anti-intellectualism on the part
of sections of the leftist petit-bourgeois intellegensia -- ego leftist
journalists themselves (as they attempt to deny their intellectual
status) !
In the South African context this 'bonding' process has
(necessarily) taken a different form to the model as originally
intended by Gramsci. The 'modern prince ' in South Africa is more
complex than in Gramsci's formulation wherein the ' moder n prince' meant
a communist party. This is not the case in South Africa where most
Marxists have opted to throw in their lot with the ANC popular
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alliance, and where the SACP went as far as to formally 'join' the ANC.
From these actions it would appear that South African Marxists have
decided that (rather than their own 'purist' Communist party) it is the
ANC (in alliance with the SACP and Cosatu) instead who represent the
most significant potential 'modern prince'. What is significant in
this arrangement is that the ANC does not espouse Marxism (or even
'socialism'), and the SACP has de facto subsumed itself into the ANC
such that 'communism' (and 'socialism') has been backgrounded in favour
of the ANC's popular-leftist multi-class position. Hence, Marxists are
not even attempting to provide a 'modern prince', but are rather (in
terms of their 'two-stage' model) 'riding with' non-Marxists during
what they term 'phase one'. The ANC-SACP-Cosatu alliance is hence a
'mechanism' for welding together leftist intellectuals (Marxist and
non-Marxist) and the masses (working class and non-working class). The
SACP says it will only consider establishing a Marxist 'modern prince'
in stage two. This, of course, represents a significant 'revision' of
Marxist theory. What is interesting is how much a reading of Gramsci
serves to 'justify' such a pragmatic 'revisionism'.
A Gramscian-Poulantzian approach (ie. Eurocommunism) would, in fact
explicitly direct the left into multi-class alliance building, and an
associated attention to superstructural/ideological work (as the basis
for 'recruitment', intra-alliance communication, and the building of a
leftist civil society). This theme is developed in Chapter 4. The
reading of Gramsc~ and Poulantzas together is valuable because:
Gramsci's notion of hegemony is based on a 'dialectical-totality'
interpretation of historical materialism, and yet can complement the
'discourse' ideas of Poulantzas on ideology production. In this way
Gramsci's dialectical approach can 'correct' Poulantzas' tendency
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toward functionalism, and his over-concern for the capitalist hegemony
which virtually 'excludes' any considerations of the counter-hegemony.
For Gramsci, both rightist and leftist intellectuals can be engaged
in (a) generating consent/legitimacy; (b) organizing alliances and
compromises; and (c) helping to direct the political (coercive)
'force'. Gramsci might also have noted the role intellectuals have in
generating (d) technocratic knowledge (ie. they help to organize the
economic base as well). Central to Gramsci's reconstruction of
historical materialism is the idea that the capitalist order protects
itself with the superstructures, and not merely with coercion (ie. the
political-legal system) (Gramsci, 1971:246-247). Superstructurally
capitalism defends itself by: (i) generating consent organized in
"civil society" (Gramsci, 1971:242); and (ii) using political
compromise and alliances (Gramsci, 1971:267-268). Gramsci's concept
of hegemony consists of three elements (a triptych) within a unified
process -- namely, consent/legitimacy; political alliances/compromises;
and violence/force (see Showstack-Sassoon, 1982). Consequently,
hegemony is not equal to legitimacy or ruling by 'cultural leadership'
or 'ideological domination'. Obviously, each of these factors are
parts of hegemony, but they are not the whole of it. This triptych
idea is a central factor in CCS's understanding of power. Hall has
expressed concern at the way in which Gramsci has been misinterpreted ·
(and 'hegemony' collapsed into 'id y') by some of those working in
CC~ in the USA (in Grossberg, 1986:59)
This triptych idea of hegemony is particularly valuable when
analyzing South Africa, where certainly under the P.W. Botha-regime,
the NP tried (though not too successfully) to move toward the creation
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of a real hegemony - ie. where 'legitimacy' and 'alliances' were as
important as 'violence'. (Previously the NP tended to 'ignore' all but
violence). Under Botha the mix of coercion, alliance-building and
legitimacy was continually in flux: the particular mix being a good
indicator of the balance of forces within South Africa at any time.
Only when F.W. de Klerk came to power in 1989 did one see the NP
successfully shift itself in a direction in any way likely to
eventually result in the building of a Rightist alliance with
considerable legitimacy within South African society.
Gramsci's view that leftist intellectuals (and hence, in a sense,
the 'modern prince' of which they are a part) 'organize the beliefs' of
society, raises some interesting questions for historical materialists
concerning the notion of 'ideology'. Whereas Lukacs and the Frankfurt
School imply that historical materialism is not an ideology, Gramsci
shifts the emphasis such that historical materialism can be interpreted
as just another ideology. What is more significant, he makes this
change within the same leftist-humanist (dialectical-totality)
perspective used by Lukacs and the Frankfurt School. For Gramsci, X
leftist intellectuals are engaged in 'counter-hegemonic' work, which
entails organizing 'counter-beliefs' to those that rightist
intellectuals are busy organizing. Such a view slides easily into the
notion of historical materialism as an ideology. In this respect
Gramsci represents a shift within the 'totality' approach. His ideas
on ideology are, in this instance, actually closer to those of
Althusser the and post-Althusserian 'discourse' approach than to those
of Lukacs and the Frankfurt School. For the development of a
reconstructed historical materialism this represents a potentially
significant shift because Gramsci thence becomes a useful 'link'
163
between the explicitly dialectical-totality (leftist-humanist) ideas of
Lukacs and the Frankfurt School, and 'discourse' (anti-humanist) ideas
of the Althusserians. It is also an important shift in so far as it
distances leftist theory (and thereby practice) from the notion of
historical materialism as automatic 'truth'. Instead, within the
Gramscian view, the Left have to work for social acceptance to build a
leftist civil society (i.e. not 'impose' a leftist social order, such
as occurred in Eastern Europe). Within a Gramscian-Poulantzian
conception of building a civil society, the importance of intellectuals
i n c r e a s e s dramatically. Furthermore, in the Information Age, such a
conception increases the importance of a leftist media.
A crucial theme to emerge from Gramsci is that the superstructures
and communication should be of central importance to leftist
practitioners. This, of course, is a theme which gives Gramsci his
importance for any New Leftist advocacy of a 'reconstruction' of
historical materialism in a more 'superstructural' direction. This
derives from Gramsci's contention that Europe's economically-driven
revolution, predicted by Marx, had not come about because the
superstructure acted like a series of 'trenches' (Gramsci, 1971:234-
235) around the economic base, 'protecting' it from attack. This led
to Gramsci's explanation of the Soviet Revolution as an outcome of the
backwardness of Russia -- ie. Russia had not yet developed its
(superstructural) trenche$ and so was more vulnerable to attack
(G~amsci, 1971:238).
In South Africa, the protective superstructural trenches have been
poorly developed with regard to the black sector of society. However,
the NP clearly recognized this gap in its defences and both WHAM and
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the National Security Management System's (NSMS) 'oil spot' strategy
bore early testimony to their recognition of the need to construct
rightist superstructural trenches. The 1990 reforms carried this
recognition even further. The South African Right and their MNC allies
are now clearly intent upon constructing such trenches in South Africa
(and the reforms create at least the possibility of success). The
resources the Right have to back up their reforms (together with the
weakened leftist position on a world-wide basis), in fact, give them a
considerable chance of being successful. The South African Right, for
example, has a virtual monopoly of education and media resources [5].
Gramsci's view was that leftists faced with such 'superstructural
trenches', had to lay siege to the system (Gramsci, 1971:239). In this
way Gramsci shifted the emphasis away from economism and towards a
reconstructed historical materialism in which the subjective, or
superstructures, also play a significant part. And if the 1990 reforms
serve to speed up South African integration in the MNC/Information Age
(which seem highly possible), the South African left may well find
itself in need of 'laying siege' to such a superstructural trench
system (staffed by a local comprador group). This would seek to take
advantage of the still poor development of superstructural trenches in
the black sector; and try and prevent and/or slow the reformed Right's
attempts to develop such superstructural trenches amongst this group.
As a first step this would require an analysis of the existing
superstructural trenchwork developed by the Right.
What Gramsci directs us to is a totality approach to praxis; ie.
contradictions may inherently exist in capitalism (and in its racial-
capitalist form in South Africa), but these can be either 'blocked' or
'encouraged' to manifest themselves. So whereas Marx's work
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specifically concentrated on economic contradictions, Gramsci was more
concerned with the way the superstructures can serve to 'block' any
economically-derived contradictions. The struggle between the Right
and Left should not only be thought of as taking place at the economic
level. Rather, a struggle at the superstructural level (Gramsci,
1971:229,239) is part of the total leftist struggle. This represents a
significant de facto reconstruction of historical materialism. By
extension then, leftists need to look beyond purely economic
contradictions as a source of social change, and so develop a leftist
communicology. If the superstructures can be used (in a hegemonic
fashion) by rightist intellectuals to bolster and protect capitalism,
then they can also be used (in a counter-hegemonic fashion) by leftist
intellectuals' to: (a) counteract the work of the rightist
intellectuals; (b) help make manifest the economic contradictions; and
(c) develop specifically superstructural contradictions (within the
'totality' of capitalist relations of production). Further, Gramsci
notes how different historical material conditions necessitate
different types of hegemonic struggle; ie. the intellectuals who
'organize' the beliefs in the superstructures need to be sensitive to
the changing historical material circumstances if they wish to be
successful. Hence, Gramsci serves as a valuable bridge between the
(theoretical) 'totality' approach of Lukacs and the Frankfurt School
and the praxis orientation of leftists like Enzensberger, Mattelart,
Le~in, etc. (who will be dealt with in Chapter 3).
There are several problems with Gramsci's approach. Like the
Frankfurt School theorists, he tended to over-estimate the potential
power of the superstructures, and the intellectuals who staff these,
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while under-estimating the role of the recipients (the masses) to re-
interpret , use, or even ignore superstructural products. Gramsci made
the same mistake that the NP (following the likes of Clutterbuck, 1981)
made when they reduced 'insurrection' to the work of a few
'instigators'. The culturalist emphasis on the masses and recipients
as active participants is an important 'corrective' to this
Gramsci/Frankfurt School (or, indeed Clutterbuck) tendency to over-
estimate the power of cultural workers.
An area that Gramsci does not develop fully is his concern with the
need to try and co-opt some rightist intellectuals onto the leftist
'side'. To a limited extent such co-option has occurred in South
Africa -- ie. the left-commercial press is often staffed by journalists
from the rightist 'guild press'. However, those wishing to develop
Gramsci's ideas in this regard will ne~d to consider some of the
potential practical problems that arise. Examples of this are: (a)
anti-intellectualism and mistrust of petit bourgeois intellectuals by
the Left; and (b) the tendency toward intellectual elitism and the
potential control of any 'Modern Prince' by the intellectuals (see
Louw, 1986:12). (Perhaps aspects of the 'iron law of oligarchy' theory
-- ie. that there exists a natural tendency towards a small in-group
always ultimately gaining control of political organizations (see
Michels, 1962) -- needs to be taken seriously by leftists}. In other
words, the role of intellectuals (especially ex-rightist intellectuals)
within the 'modern prince' is not as unproblematical as a simplistic
reading of Gramsci might suggest. This is particularly true in
contemporary South Africa where such a strategy would be complicated
even further by the problems of the racial skewing in access to
education, and by a legacy of Bantu Education and Christian National
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Education.
Volosinov: language and historical materialism
Volosinov's Marxism and the Philosophy of Language (1973) (first
published in 1929) is another seminal text for the development of a
leftist communicology. The other theorists referred to in this chapter
deal with 'macro' superstructural issues such as the media, ideology,
intellectuals etc. Volosinov (a pseudonym for Bakhtin), however,
turned his attention in another direction -- he examined the 'micro'
issue of the smallest units of language itself, namely signs and codes.
These are the very building blocks of the superstructural dimension of
human e xistence.
Like the Frankfurt School theorists and Gramsci, Volosinov
attempted a reconstruction and widening of historical materialism such
that the paradigm could deal with the subjective dimension of human
existence. Volosinov, however, attempted his reconstruction while
resident inside the Stalinist USSR. For this reason he was not, like
Gramsci, 'lucky' enough to be shielded from Stalin's wrath by a prison
wall. As a result Volosinov 'disappeared' during one of Stalin's
purges.
From a contemporary perspective it might appear self-evident that
developing a knowledge of ideology requires the analysis of language.
Yet before Volosinov, the 'subjective' phenomenon of language had not
been on the histo~ical materialist agenda. In stating that he viewed
the base-superstructure problematic as a fundamental issue, Volosinov
(1973:17) placed the 'subjective' squarely onto the Soviet-Marxist
agenda. More significantly ; he was the first to attempt to deal with
language and semiotics from an historical materialist perspective
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(giving him a significance beyond Soviet-Marxism).
Volosinov's approach to language is a rigorous application of a
(dialectical) 'totality' method. Although his concern is with language
and the subjective, he never allows this to become a 'subjectivism' (in
which the 'material' is forgotten). This makes Volosinov's work
exceptional, since other semiology and semiotics remains
'subjectivist'. The concern with language from the position of reified,
synchronic and de-contextualized (subjective) structures (eg. Saussure,
1974) is highly problematic. Likewise, a materialist (economistic)
structuralist approach to communication (eg. de la Haye, 1980) is just
as problematic to a reconstructed historical materialism. A 'totality'
approach would further question methodologies claiming the existence of
purely autonomous ('free floating') 'subjectivities' (eg. as found in
some forms of phenomenology, hermeneutics and post-structuralism).
Such 'idealisic' interpretations are facilitated by the 'apparently'
subjective and 'fluid' appearance of language and consciousness. Both
the pure subjective ('free' consciousness) and pure objective (orthodox
materialist) interpretations are an abstraction, which is why the
totality perspective has difficulty accepting both economistic
materialism and those phenomenologists, hermeneuticians and
semioticians who ignore the material. Volosinov 'transcends' both
materialism and subjectivism. Instead, in his study, language
(specifically signs) is the 'site' where subject and object meet
(Volosinov, 1973:39-41). So for Volosinov the sign is where the social
world and the psyche (consciousness/subjective) meet. Further,
Volosinov's interpretation of the social world is an historical
material one -- ie. contextualization is central to the Volosinovian
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method. Hence, for Volosinov (1973:25-26), the sign is subjective, but
it is also objective: the sign is where the objective and subjective
interpenetrate. Hence semiotics becomes a site at which one can study
the subjective from a materialist perspective: through studying the
sign it becomes possible to initiate a materialist study of ideology.
Volosinov's method is, however, of more than theoretical interest.
From a South African perspective, his (semiotic-based) reconstruction
of historical materialism gives us an excellent tool for the analysis
of apartheid as both an ideological and a material phenomenon.
Apartheid as ideology has been a subjective process 'inhabiting' the
superstructures: it has been a racist belief and language system which
is processed and reproduced in superstructural institutions like
schools, universities, the courts and the media. If this ideology has
been a language (system of signs), it is a language which has always
has been dialectically intertwined with the objective base: apartheid
has never been 'pure' subjectivity or belief. Apartheid has also had a
material base in so far as many white South Africans perceived their
economic interests to be threatened by a one-person-one-vote system
(since such a system would result in a material redistribution of
wealth to the black majority, hence relatively impoverishing whites.
This subjective perception has historical material roots: in 1949
apartheid ideology (as subjectivity) served the (material) interests of
the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie, working class and rural land-owners
(O'Meara, 1983) . . By the late 1980s apartheid ideology, linguistically
'reformed' into the notion of 'separate group identities' and the
'defence of law and order'), served the material interests of state
bureaucrats (who were increasingly militarized) and the white suburban
petit bourgeoisie. Apartheid was not an irrational subjective
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imposition onto South Africa as liberal analysis contends: apartheid
was a material and subjective 'totality', in which the rhetoric of
apartheid served deeper material interests. Only once apartheid was no
longer materially viable would i t become 'irrational' -- the late 1980s
saw that development. The costs of the Angolan/ Namibian 'wa r by 1987,
as well as the costs of sanctions from 1986 to 1989, meant that
apartheid was no longer materially advantageous. It had become a
mate rial liability for those (whites) it had been intended to benefit.
The year 1990, therefore, saw the first attempts to implement a real
reform of aparthe id.
Certainly in any conflict with the NP, especially in a 'negotiation-
phase' (or later 'parliamentary-phase'?), there will be a need to take
heed of both the rhetoric and the deeper material interests of
aparthe id. Only in t h i s way will maximal advantage be won over from
the NP. In a post-apartheid situation (if the Left comes to power),
leftist intellectuals will need to work out a programme for altering
in (Volosinovian) tandem both the material and ideological
'components' of apartheid (racial-capitalism). Only in this way will
the NP's constituency be made a part of a leftist-led post-apartheid
hegemony which uses 'legitimacy', political-alliances', and 'language'
- ie. which does not repeat the mistakes of either NP-ruled South
Africa, or Soviet-ruled Eastern Europe which relied too greatly on
violence .
. Volosinov's semiotics, in other words, does not locate ideology
purely in consciousness (the subjective). Rather, 'ideology' is
interpreted as the way in which 'society' enters the 'mind' through
signs (Volosinov, 1973:11, 39). In South Africa, for example, the
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material interests of one sector (ie. in the 1950s: the Afrikaner petit
bourgeoisie, workers and land-owners) required that society be re-
ordered in accordance with their economic interests. This re-ordering
took the form of 'concrete' changes (re-settlements and group areas;
job segregation; and the transfer of wealth from the English-speaking
capitalist sector to the Afrikaner-dominated state/bureaucratic
sector). But this material re-ordering was accompanied by a
'subjective' re-ordering: ie. (a) an ideological-rhetorical
rationalization for this materialist exploitation, plus (b) the
'perceptual' changes occurring as a matter of course due to the new
material re-ordering (eg. the perception of living in a 'white' world
where blacks only 'entered' as servants). Hence, apartheid as a social
order entered into the minds of South Africans as a (subjective) sign
system. Signs thus have a 'material' basis (Volosinov, 1973:11) and
are produced within an historical material context (Volosinov,
1973:21). Semiotics then becomes the study of the interpenetration of
the psyche (subject), the material (object) and the (historical
material) context. This represents a tremendous advance on Saussure's
(1974) semiology because Volosinov's signs are contextualized
historically and materially and incorporate the notion of the
dialectic. Saussure's signs are reified subjective abstractions, ie.
generalized into 'universals'. It is because Volosinov steers clear of
such universalized abstractions that his work assumes a value to
leftists engaged in superstructural struggle. Traditional Saussurian
semiology fits into the conception of a practical-oriented "struggle
for the sign" (Tomaselli, 1986:14) only with difficulty. There is no
such difficulty with Volosinov's work.
Most significant though, from the perspective of a 'totality'
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reconstruction of historical materialism, is the fact that Volosinov
adopts an explicitly dialectical view of ideology and semiotics
(Volosinov, 1973:31-40). He assumes that the dialectical contradiction
is inherent in the very nature of the sign. The sign is dynamic, and
meaning is not fixed: signs and meaning are inherently dialectically
(dialogically) fluid. In South Africa, for example, we see how signs
are continually shifting their meaning; sometimes: (a) as a result of
willful manipulation (eg. the South African government's use of the
term 'peoples'. This was done in order to 'naturalize' the idea that
there could never be a single South African citizenship -- ie. one
'people'); (b) due to willful co-option (eg. the South African
government and capital's attempts to use UDF terms like 'non-racial'
and 'community' for its own purposes. These terms were re-read through
conservative, and even racial eyes in the co-opted form. The result
was a a multi-racial, and hence racially-defined understanding of what
a community was); and (c) due to a 'natural mutation' as historical
material conditions change (eg. the concept 'Nationalist' moved from
meaning an Afrikaner-exclusive phenomenon into a White-inclusive
phenomenon. It could now mutate into a South African inclusive
phenomenon). Monitoring shifts in signification in all the sectors of
the population provides a valuable source of 'intelligence' concerning
moves within the NP, as well as 'signals' indicating when the left
should 'advance', 'withdraw', or even seek to 'co-opt' and possibly
'assimilate' former sectors of the Right.
When Volosinov (1973:23) speaks of the sign as "an arena of class
struggle" he is not talking in terms of a materialist (economistic)
reductionism in which language (sign systems) is reduced to a one-on-
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one relationship with 'class'. For example, apartheid is not an
exclusively economic-class phenomenon; it also contains a (subjective)
racist 'belief', which may have had its origins in economics, but has
now taken on a 'life of its own'. So materialist interests then take
on subjective properties inside the mind. Volosinov (1973:23)
explicitly states in this regard that class struggle takes place
Uwithin one and the same sign community". A materialist (class)
struggle is also a subjective (semiotic or communication) struggle.
Social contradictions can manifest themselves in a sign system as
surely as they then manifest themselves in the economic system. In
South Africa, the sign 'apartheid' itself became such a contradiction
for its inventors, the NP, because it served to mobilize considerable
(internal and external) opposition to the NP. As a result, the NP
engaged in a process of trying to kill this sign, while their opponents
trying to retain and use the term for mobilization. The NP's 1990
reforms may have finally enabled them to successfully kill this sign.
The core of Volosinov's work is concerned with the same
(dialectical) 'totality' method as Lukacs, but he reads this approach
into a concern with semiotics and language. Unlike Sausserian
semiology, Volosinov's semiotics is a dialectical and materialist
structuralism. There can be no generalized 'given' sign in Volosinov's
system. Rather, each sign is (historically and materiallY) fluid, and
actively 'struggled' over within the totality of its social context.
One might add that whole sign systems can also be struggled over. An
example would be moves during the second half of the 1980s towards
'claiming' Afrikaans as a language not of the Afrikaner-nationalist
suppressors, but a sign-system actually derived from the 'kitchen-
Dutch' (kombuis Hollands) of the Cape slaves. This would enable
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Afrikaans to be 're-claimed as a language of the leftist struggle
again~t apartheid (Willemse, 1987; Roberge, 1990). What is then
central to Volosinovian semiotics is that the study of the sign
(dialectically) 'connects' the (fluid) 'interface' (ie. 'totality') of
subject and object; the individual psyche; and the social context (and
class struggle). Ideology is seen to be 'born' within this dialectical
totality of subject and object, although Volosinov recognizes that the
"dominant ideology " will try and "stabilize" itself (Volosinov,
1973:24). This ties up with the Gramscian notion of the work done by
rightist intellectuals who will be attempting to stabilize the ideology
that underpins their hegemony. In South Africa the work of those
academics and journalists trying to create and popularize a reformed-
Right discourse falls into this category.
But to say that those working within the dominant ideology (sign
system) will attempt to stabilize this sign-system is clearly not the
same as Saussurian semiology wherein signs are assumed to be 'stable'
(ie. a synchronic view of signs). Sausserian structuralism in fact
assumes that a reified structure exists. Whereas Volosinov's
structuralism assumes a diachronic (and contradictorY} 'process,
Saussure's ideas tend towards a deterministic interpretation of
structure in which the mind is 'imprisoned' in the structures of
language. This view is hence the 'subjective' equivalent to
deterministic materialism. From a 'totality' reconstructed historical
materialism such a deterministic subjectivism is as unacceptable as
deterministic economism.
Volosinov's semiotic structuralism would be a reconstruction based
on (i) a (dialectical) 'totality' interpretation of a humanist-leftism',
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(ii) in which contradictions and praxis were foregrounded. In other
words:
(a) Volosinov's method is the same (dialectical) totality approach of
subject and object found in Lukacs, the Frankfurt School and Gramsci.
It is grounded in the same logic that informed Habermas' challenge to
historical materialistsj but
(b) Volosinov's approach does not assume totality to be (reified)
'truth' as in Lukacs (ie. it is a 'method' for Volosinov), nor does it
assume the superstructures are all-powerful (as in the Frankfurt School
and Gramsci). Volosinov's approach can accommodate the idea of the
masses as active co-creators of meaning (a theme to be picked up next
when we look at the culturalists)j
(c) Volosinov's semiotics is not of the same subjectivist or
undialectical type as Saussure's, but is rather explicitly oriented
toward a 'totality' (subjective and objective) social 'struggle'.
Hence it is a semiotics that complements Enzensberger's (1974)
challenge to historical materialists.
discussed in Chapter 3)j and
(This challenge will be
(d) because Volosinov's semiotics represents an explicit 'totality'
(of subject and object), it has an in-built 'break' against the
tendency of moving towards the sort of 'subjectivism' that has
developed in the 'discourse' approach associated with certain post-
Althusserians/post-structuralists.
Volosinov consequently pioneered a theoretical route to a
reconstructed (ie~ 'totality') historical materialism which offered a
way of 'penetrating' into the less 'tangible' mind or 'consciousness'
dimension of the superstructures. Whereas the Frankfurt School
approach the superstructures via the more 'tangible' media or 'culture
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industry' j and Gramsci studied the superstructures via 'intellectuals'
(also a more 'concrete'/material phenomena), Volosinov's route was via
language and signs themselves. This, from a materialist perspective,
is a particularly difficult route to adopt. For historical
materialists interested in this 'inner' dimension of ideology and its
relationship to the 'material', Volosinov's method represents a means
of access. In opening this dimension his work has enriched the
superstructure debate within historical materialism, and offered
leftists a tool for the non-reductionistic (in either its subjectivist
or object ivist forms) analysis of ideological forms such as apartheid.
Such analysis is not merely theoretically interesting -- it is
practically necessary if the Left is to find ways of countering
rightist ideologies. As humans increasingly 'live' the second hand
realities of media-disseminated sign systems in the contemporary
Information Age, so it becomes ever more important for leftists to
challenge these sign systems.
However, Volosinov's work itself remains purely theoretical and
unconnected to a sense of practical struggle. In this respect his work
has certain similarities to the Frankfurt School; similarities which
make many in the practically-oriented Left shun such work as irrelevant
to leftist struggle. In one sense, an unconnectedness to practical
struggle allows for a 'specialization of effort' which results in a
theoretical sophistication. The sort of sophistication found in
Volosinov is equally valuable to 'practice' for historical materialism
and for 'the struggle'. If Habermas' challenge is to be met, and a
reconstructed historical materialism (ie. a method to deal with the
subjective/ superstructures) is to be built upon a 'solid foundation',
then the work of historical materialist theoreticans is, as Korsch
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(1970) noted, just as sorely needed as the work of practitioners. So
to criticize or ignore Volosinov for his theoreticism would be
inappropriate. Rather, the Left would be advised to attempt to
translate and operationalize his ideas into a practical struggle for
the sign; a notion to be picked up again in Chapter 3.
Williams' culturalist critique of reified theory
The work of Raymond Williams is of particular significance for a New
Leftist reconstruction of historical materialism, because he critiques
reified Marxist theories, including the reification of the 'totality'
approach of, for example, Lukacs. Williams shares many similarities
with Korsch's (1970) critique of Marxism (examined in the next
chapter). However, far from invalidating the 'totality' approach,
Williams' critique, in fact, holds the possibility of helping improve
it. Williams explicitly introduces an 'active subjectivity' into
Marxist communication studies. His work, along with Habermas, is a
good example of a contemporary attempt to explicitly hybridize the
idealist and realist paradigms. He develops the idea of a 'collective
subjectivity' and in the process opens up a new direction for
historical materialist (and socialist) cultural studies (and/or
aesthetics) to explore.
In opening up this direction, culturalists (like Williams, Richard
Hoggart and Edward Thompson) were, in the British context, concerned ·
with restoring a sense of an active working class cultural creation and
resistance into leftist debate. In the South African context, the
active features, and/or resistance, of the subaltern groups (eg. the
black working class, African peasants, etc) has been suppressed by
white historiography (see Boyce, 1970; Green, '1958; Kane, 1954; Kruger,
178
1969; Muller, 1968; and Van Jaarsveld, 1971). Reclaiming a sense of
subaltern resistance (through culturalist analysis) is important for
generating a 'pride' amongst the suppressed (see Fanon, 1967).
However, such an 'historical' use of cultural ism is matched in South
Africa by an equally (if not more) important task of the active
creation of the future. In South Africa there is a 'fluidity' not
immediately apparent in Britain. This 'fluidity', together with an
emergence of social contradictions can, if exploited, lead to the
subaltern groups (demographically dominated by the black working class)
seizing the initiative and winning power. The culturalists offer a
theoretical route to such an active search for and seizing of available
contradictions.
Williams is aware of the ease with which leftists slip into over-
simplifications, such as economic determinism, reification, utopianism
or totalitarianism. In the South African context, such a self-
conscious avoidance of reductionism is particularly crucial if the
racial, tribal and nationalist issues are to be faced. William's
(1973) concern with such methodological issues, and in particular, his
discussion of the base-superstructure problematic, is seen as all-
important methodologically in the development of a non-reductionistic
theory able to deal with the subjective, communication, etc.
Williams' culturalism steers a course between the economistic poli~ic~l
economy approach and Lukacs' reification of theory. He also avoids the
tendency of both the Frankfurt School and Althusser to reify active
subjectivity into a 'culture industry' or 'ISA' ('prison house of
language').
Williams (1973:3) recognizes the central importance of the base-
superstructure (subject-object) metaphor in the development of a
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reconstructed historical materialist communication. He also
acknowledges the inherent problems of using this theoretical metaphor,
since as a metaphor it is reductionist and unable to help us 'grasp'
the complexity it supposedly addresses (Williams, 1973:5).
Furthermore, there has been a tendency to collapse the superstructure~
into the notion superstructure (Williams, 1973:4). The inherent
structuralism of the base-superstructure metaphor tends to become
reified (Williams, 1983:303-5), while in its 'totality' format the
metaphor encompasses 'too much' and so 'empties of its content'
(Williams, 1973:7). Finally, it 'violates' Williams' conception of
socialism as 'democratic', because it implies a determining structure
and so perceives of the subject not as 'active', but rather as
manipulable (passive) masses (Williams, 1963:292; 1983:306). This
notion is especially important for any leftists concerned with the
development of a South African democracy built upon a real grassroots
participative culture (within local-level 'public spheres'). Such an
active grassroots culture could serve as a real bulwark against either
an undemocratic Left (eg. Eastern Europe) seizing power, and/or against
the co-option of sections of the leftist leadership by HNC.
In the South African context, the reductionisms Williams is
concerned with could result in the following sorts of 'errors':
(i) refusing to acknowledge the complex interactions between race (as
subjective/ideological phenomenon) and class (as objective). This can
take the form of either reducing the South African problem (and hence
solution) to either a purely class problem, or a purely race problem;
(ii) refusing to differentiate between different components (and even
sub-components) of the superstructures in South Africa. The
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·d' ,superstructures always prOV1 e gaps, 'cracks' and contradictions.
This results in a failure to recognize that even at the height of the
apartheid order, some elements of the superstructure were not being
'controlled' by and/or 'subservient' to the racial-capitalist order.
Rather, there are qualitative differences between sections of the
media; parts of the judicial system; parts of the education system; and
even sect ions of the 'establishment' political structures.
'Differentiation' between these provides a possible way of grasping
tactical advantages by exploiting such differences within and between
the superstructures;
(iii) a reified structuralism resulting in the two extremes of
vanguardism or of passively 'waiting' for economic contradictions to
'deliver' a revolution. Both violate the notion of socialism as active
popular democracy. If the intention is to actively build a democratic
socialism in South Africa then the notion of determining structures
(whether objective ' o r subjective) cannot be countenanced.
As important as Williams' critique is; just as important is the way
in which Williams also offers a means of 'salvaging' the base-
superstructure(s) idea for use by reconstructed historical materialist
communication studies. Williams recognizes that the structural
approach can be used heuristically rather than in a formalist way
(Williams, 1983:306). Further, Williams (1983:294) has noted the val~e
of heuristic simplifications when studying society; ie. presumably it
is valuable as long as one remembers that one is using a metaphor (to
help explain complexity) and not using a reified 'model' (which becomes
a substitute for complexity).
When Williams (1961:65) uses the notion of structure, it is an
'active', not 'reified', structure. Hence Williams' use of the notion
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of base and superstructure is explicitly process-oriented. His value
lies in the way that he explicitly challenges structural determinacy in
favour of a New Leftist notion of an active subjectivity; but a
subjectivity within (contextual) constraints (Williams, 1977: Part 11).
So for Williams the values, experiences, intentions and goals of
individuals need to be taken into account. However, these 'values'
and 'goals' are not 'free-floating' entities; rather they are 'located'
within specific classes or groups of people. This, of course, opens up
a possible new route to the understanding of class (and other forms of)
conflict: via the experiences (individual and collective) of subjective
actors operating within any historical material context. This forms
the basis for Williams' culturalist reading of historical materialism.
Williams argues in this regard:
The whole thrust of Marx's reading of history was then, first, to
insist that all cultural processes were initiated by humans
themselves, and second, to argue that none of them could be fully
understood unless they were seen in the context of human activities
as a whole (Williams, 1983a:23).
This quote, which gets to the heart of Williams' culturalist
interpr~tation of communication, not only acts as a 'corrective' for
reductionist materialism, but could also form (as recognized by the
Birmingham School) a valuable component within any leftist
communication theory. Williams hence: (a) rejects materialist
determinacy; and (b) recognizes the importance of active subjectivity;
yet (c) acknowledges the historical material view that the human
subject operates within 'parameters'. This opens the door to a leftist
search for superstructural praxis within the context of the Information
Age. If only for this reason alone Williams needs to be 'recognized as
offering an important theoretical tool to those wishing to actively
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build a South African leftist media. Tomaselli's (1988) work has
understood this and followed Stuart Hall, rather than Richard Hoggart
(Tomaselli, 1988:34). Hoggart's (1958:13) interpretation of cultural~sm
placed the working class onto the 'cultural' agenda and challenged the
'high-low' cultural dichotomy notion. However, Hoggart did not develop
this insight in a 'cultural praxis' direction as CCS and Tomaselli have
done.
So for Williams, totality as a 'process' includes both subject and
object, and hence the notion of an absolutely 'free' and 'autonomous'
subject is, for culturalism, as much a reified and formalist
abstraction as is absolute materialist determinism. It is, in fact,
significant that Williams' (1961:63) notion of "experience" (or active
consc iousness) is explicitly holistic: ie. it is subject and object
together (Williams, 1961:36), rather than a 'pure' subjectivity
(Williams, 1983:126-127). Hence, although Williams is concerned with
the 'active subject'
(Williams, 1983:310)
because of his concern with socialist-democracy
he none-the-less remains concerned with the
subjective from within an historical material perspective (Williams,
1961:61-68). Hence Williams' understanding of the subject/subjective
is not a subjectivism (see Williams, 1983:124). So when Williams
(1961:57) speaks of 'culture' as a "way of life", he is talking about
the complex process of subject-object totality (Williams, 1961:59, 63.):
ie an active human process of subject-object interaction.
The contemporary South African context d~mands a theory able to deal
with a society in which the dialectical contradictions (of a crisis-
ridden and reforming racial-capitalism) are fully 'visible' and
'active'. From a reconstructed historical materialist perspective
Williams' concern for 'process' and 'active subjectivity' becomes just
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as valuable in such a situation as any leftist concern with economic
, 't' It'contradictions. Williams' approach suggests an openness 0 a mu 1-
faceted' form of struggle(s). For the Left, confronting the shifting
conditions of a world re-aligning itself in the wake of the Second
World collapse, such 'openness' would seem a precondition for any
possibility of success.
Williams thus offers a critique of the 'totality' approach which
facilitates a linkage between a leftist 'totality' theory and the
notion of active (voluntarist?) human subjects engaged in struggle.
Williams hence offers a way to 'link' Lukacs and the Frankfurt School
on the one hand, and Enzensberger on the other. A critically important
aspect of Williams' work is that he offers a 'corrective' to the
Frankfurt School's pessimism from within an approach easily co-optable
into a 'totality' reconstruction of historical materialism. This is
because Williams sees 'totality' as a human process wherein the
subjective is not simply determined by the contradictory (capitalist)
totality, but is rather one of the 'agents' of the contradictory
process. But neither is human subjectivity autonomous of the economic
context. Recognizing the duality of this process is all-important in
the construction of a leftist communication theory. But Williams'
explicit inclusion of active subjects represents an important re-
interpretation of the the notion of dialectical totality because it
thereby becomes possible (a la Gramsci's ideas on 'organic
intellectuals') to consider 'encouraging' contradictions (within the
'total' process) within the superstructures. This is de facto what the
South African progressive-alternative press attempted to do during the
State of Emergency period (1986-1989). In Enzensberger's terms this
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would be called the search for 'gaps'. (This notion will be developed
further in Chapter 3).
The notion of active human subjects also produces a revised (ie.
culturalist) understanding of "mass culture" (see Williams, 1983:192-
7). From a culturalist perspective the masses are neither seen as
inherently 'prisoners' of a reified totality (passive and manipulated
by the mass media, in the way the Frankfurt School saw them), nor
'controlled' by (Althusser's) ISAs or RSAs. For Williams and the
culturalists, there is an optimism because resistance is not only seen
as possible but inevitable in the face of domination and attempts at
manipulation. The consciousness of the underclasses was, in fact,
precisely a product of such resistance and struggle against domination.
It was this struggle which gives rise to popular culture (see Clarke,
et aI, 1979).
Williams hence interprets the 'masses' as active co-creators (within
the subject-object totality) of culture (Williams, 1961:40, 44). For
culturalists, masses are no longer merely passive 'consumers'
(Williams, 1983:79) of culture. Rather, they now actively 'use' and
co-create it because they are seen to have "intention" (Williams,
1963:292). The South African black masses, for example, despite severe
repression, actively created their own 'popular' culture through an
appropriation of both Western and African forms. (This process has,
and is, being documented by the University of the Witwatersrand's
History Workshop ~- see Bozzoli, 1983). The South African left clearly
derives advantage from 'utilizing' the 'energy' being released in this
way.
This culturalist interpretation is facilitated by Williams'
recognition that the 'subject' is an (inter-)active part of the total
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dialectical process. In other words, it is not merely an 'acted upon'
part (of a reified determining whole). This culturalist innovation --
derived from Williams' Culture and Society (first published in 1958)
and Thompson's Making of the English Working Class (first published in
1963) -- offers these valuable methodological insights to a
reconstructed historical materialism. One way for a reconstructed
historical materialism to incorporate these culturalist insights is to
use the route of the Birmingham School (see Hall et aI, 1980) or the
CCSU/CCMS (see Tomaselli, 1988). Both of these Centres have already
applied culturalism within their construction of a New Leftist approach
to communication and the media.
The Birmingham School's merger of culturalism and structuralism
The challenge for the New Left is to find ways to accommodate (in
non-reductionist ways) the subjective and communication. This has been
comprehensively dealt with by the 'totality' approach to historical
materialism. However, other equally significant 'answers' to the
'challenge' have emerged. In the process of seeking to answer the
challenge they too have helped to lay the basis for a leftist
communication theory. Three such important contributions have been
made by the culturalist, the Althusserian-structuralists and the Centre
for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS), or Birmingham School, who
attempted to synthesize culturalism and structuralism.
Richard Johnson sums up the CCCS position within the various moves
to reconstruct historical materialism, with the seminal observation
that: "neither culturalism nor structuralism will do" (Johnson in
Barrett, et aI, 1979: 54). The Birmingham School recognized the
tension that existed between these two schools of leftist thoughtj ie.
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the emergence of a concern with communication and the subjective,
developed a tension between the culturalists (like Williams) and
structuralists (like Althusser). Culturalism stresses the way in which
humans actively make culture; while structuralism stresses the 'pre-
programming' of humans by structures. For orthodox Marxists these
structures were objective (economic). For semioticians arid linguists
--ego Chomsky, Saussure, Barthes, Althusser -- the structures are
subjective (language, signs and codes). CCS located itself at the
interface of structuralism and culturalism. This placed CCS across a
line of tension within Marxism that in many ways underpinned the rise
of the New Left in the 1970s. Johnson noted: "Many of the most
important questions in the theory and sociology of culture are now
posed not between Marxist and other accounts, but within Marxism
itself" (in Bennett, et aI, 1981:13). The Birmingham School was
interested in "the set of practices through which men and women
actively respond to the conditions of their social conditions,
creatively fashioning experienced social relationships into diverse and
structured patterns of living, thinking and feeling" (Bennett, et aI,
1981:10). So CCS recognized that humans are both 'structured'
(objectively and subjectively) and 'active' beings. With this
recognition CCS set itself the task of trying to synthesize the
structuralist and culturalist strands of leftist thought, using Gramsci
as a 'meeting place' (Bennett, et aI, 1981:12). In this way CCS opened
up ' one possible (New Leftist) route toward the reconstruction of
historical materialism.
Before specifically looking at the differences between a 'totality'-
structuralism and Althusserian-structuralism, let us first develop
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further the eees insight that culturalists (especially Williams) needs
to be incorporated into leftist communication theory. The eees, in
fact, produced an extremely valuable insight for communication theory
when they recognized that the need to explicitly incorporate a concern
with the active human subject (ie. culturalism). It is a recognition
that any attempt to meet the 'reconstruction' challenge needs to move
beyond 'totality' and incorporate an historical material concern with
the active subject. Therein lies a corrective for many of the problems
with the 'totality' approach, such as: a tendency toward theoretical
reification, pessimism, and a lack of practical engagement in 'getting
one's hands dirty' in active involvement and struggle. For those
concerned with developing a South African superstructural
interventionism (eg. a progressive-alternative press, or other forms of
cultural 'struggle') this is of central significance.
Williams' theoretical objections to reified Marxist theory
(including 'totality' theory) have been discussed above. Equally
important, however, is Williams' development of the idea of active
subjectivity. As the eees's Stuart Hall correctly realised, the
resultant culturalist theory needs to be explicitly incorporated into
any reconstructed historical materialism wishing to deal with
communication. Significantly, for such a 'reconstruction' Williams
builds his notion of the subjective into an explicitly socialist
definition: his concern is with the 'collective' subjectivity. An
important overlap ' thus exists between Williams and Habermas' notion of
the public sphere. It is an overlap that opens up an important area
for leftist praxis, because explicitly democratic leftist practices can
be built upon this notion (ie. a theoretical corrective for the errors
seen in East European leftist practice).
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Williams' culturalism democratizes the concept of culture (Bennett
et aI, 1981:40), or, as he says: culture is "ordinary" (Williams,
1961:54). For Williams, culture is not the property and/or creation ~f
a social elite alone. Of course, Williams recognizes that some (ie.
Gramsci's 'traditional intellectuals') will try to select and define
culture in such elitist terms (Williams, 1961:66-70). Rather, for
Williams, "everyone" (Will iams, 1961:40) in a society is a part of
(participant in) the subject-object totality, and so everyone is a co-
user/co-creator of the total (subject-object) culture. This view is
more than merely theoretically i n t e r e s t i n g for those in ees. It has
important implications for any media practice: a Williams-type
interpretation will strongly influence a media system built in its
i ma ge in the direction of democratic leftist ('public sphere')
practices. Also, Williams has an understanding of communication that
will produce a specifie interpretation, and hence practice, of art,
literature and 'textual' analysis:
(a) Williams' definition goes beyond the narrow confines of the
elitist definitions of culture, and so opens up new 'areas' of study
such as 'popular culture'. This has particular importance in South
Africa where the apartheid regime has nurtured a narrow, elitist and
uni-dimensional (white male) understanding of the South African social
process and its history. There is a need in South Africa to 'reclaim'
the suppressed history of the subaltern groups and to project this
forward into the construction of a new South Africanism (which
incorporates all South Africans, and not only the white male elite).
The Wits History Workshop has been working to recover some of this
history, while the New Nat ion newspaper has been publishing in its
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weekly "Learning Nation" supplement a history series that projects this
suppressed history.
, , " t.Lc e s " t '(b) Williams (1961:44) also sees texts as prac ~ces -- ac ~ve
subject-object totality. This means 'texts' are no longer seen as
reified objects. Hence the 'appreciation' of aesthetics, for example,
can no longer be approached in a way that assumes art, literature etc
are static objects to be studied as if they were unaffected by the
historical material context and by the interpretant/ recipients. The
apartheid regime reified cultural products in this way to serve its own
narrow conservatism and white nationalism. The cultural products they
sought to construct (through superstructures like the SABC, the
Performing Arts Councils, the Akademie vir Wetenskap en Kuns, and
museums) reflect this 'reified understanding of culture. (This view
can be found in the section on 'cultural life' in any Official Yearbook
of the Republic of South Africa). A reconstruction (and de-
apartheidizing) of a South African culture in which all participate
will require a process-oriented re-reading and re-constructing of South
African cultural texts, as part of the process of building a South
African culture in a non-apartheid form.
(c) Williams (1961:61-2), in fact, explicitly realizes that culture
needs to be understood in historical material terms -- ie. culture is
'dynamic' and so what is understood as (defined as) 'culture' needs to
be understood in context. Williams' Keywords (1983) represents, in
fact, the results ·~f an application of his method: he traces out how
cultural meanings have changed through a sequence of historical
material contexts. Culture is dynamic, fluid, and continually being
re-made. For Williams there is not a universal (static) culture or a
set of universal (static) definitions, as conservative interpretations
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of culture are apt to suggest. Such a notion of static culture has
underpinned white nationalist perceptions of South Africa. If this
group were simply taught to 're-read' South African cultural texts
using Williams' approach, this could in itself effect significant
changes in South Africa. Given the 1990 reforms, it is now possible to
see the opening up of superstructural spaces through which such 're-
reading' becomes possible, if the Left is creative enough to intervene
and make use of them.
(d) Williams (1961:64) recognizes both the active subjectivity and the
'constraining' structures within the 'totality' that is culture. His
definition of culture as a "structure of feeling". He encapsulates
these two 'features' of culture as a totality of both subject and
object; and of a process that is both active and constrained. Humans
therefore are seen to create culture through an encounter with their
objective and subjective context. One such 'encounter' would be the
struggle against the apartheid regime: ie. racial-capitalism both
constrains (objectively and subjectively) and challenges. Williams'
approach hence rejects both materialist and subjectivist determinism,
in favour of a more complex interpretation of 'culture' as a subject-
object process. Williams hence offers South Africans a valuable tool
for grasping the complex process in which racism and class exploitation
have simultaneously intermeshed into the 'structure of feeling' that
has constituted apartheid. Apartheid has been both structurally, and
subjectively 'made' (and 're-made' as circumstances changed).
Williams also offers a method that exudes an optimism missing in
both Lukacs and the Frankfurt School. This is because it can deal with
how humans created their own 'meaning' through resistance,
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In Britain the incorporation of Williams' active subject into ees is
theoretically interesting. In South Africa, however, the incorporation
of the active subject into ees is more than theoretically significant;
it directs leftists towards the theory and practice of an active
superstructural interventionism (see Tomaselli, 1986b; 1988:46). This
is, of course, a function of the contemporary South African context,
where social turmoil is so evident. It is hardly surprising then that
ees will need to be re-read and re-worked in a South African context, a
process set in motion by Tomaselli (1985a; 198Gb; 1988), eesu (1988),
Muller (1985), Muller et al (1985), Muller & Tomaselli (1989), Muller
and eloete (1991) but which needs much further development.
But ecs's value goes beyond the fact that it has pointed out the
importance of culturalism for a leftist communication theory. More
generally, Hall's proposals for a ees method (Hall, et aI, 1980; and
Bennett et aI, 1981) clearly complements the New Leftist concern to
meet Habermas' challenge to historical materialists. If the concern is
to build a leftist theory and practice able to deal with the subjective
and communication, then Hall's ees meets this criteria. Hall's
proposals are of value when considering how to go about constructing a
New leftist communicology using a reconstructed historical materialism.
For Hall, cultural studies is characterized by the fact that in the
first instance, it deploys a great variety of approaches and is inter~
disciplinary (Hall et aI, 1980:15). Hall's basic premise seems to be
that understanding culture requires 'ignoring' the academic
paradigmatic and disciplinary boundaries which currently segment
knowledge (Hall, et aI, 1980:21). This complements Habermas' method of
drawing upon both the realist (historical materialist) and idealist
(hermeneutics) paradigms. In the process, historical materialism is
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reconstructed in such a way that it can deal more adequately with
communication and the subjective. It can also deal with the
Information Age and post modernist age.
Further, CCS is an enterprise with a "tentative character" (Hall et
aI, 1980:16). This appeals in two senses: it would serve to prevent a
(Lukacian) reification of the approach produced; and it complements the
'tentative' and fluid conditions in both a world restructuring in the
wake of the collapse of the Second World, and in contemporary South
Africa.
Hall also viewed the CCS enterprise as a leftist 'response' to
specific contemporary historical material conditions -- a sort of
(cultural) 'interventionism' (Hall et aI, 1980:16). Thatcherism was
their challenge. In South Africa, the problem has been apartheid
(racial-capitalism) and, since 1990, the more sophisticated reforming-
Right. South African CCS has defined its task as identifying creative
ways to make superstructural interventions to challenge the Right.
Finally, Hall's notion of CCS recognizes the value of a 'totality'
approach when constructing cultural/communication studies (Hall et aI,
1980:21). In fact, Hall attempts to synthesize culturalism,
structuralism and Gramsci appears to have been premised upon this idea.
Hall's work as director of the CCCS consequently represents an
extremely significant epistemological moment in the development of a
leftist communicology. His work is characterized by being a New
Leftism, not reducable to a humanist-Marxist approach, but none-the-
less having certain similarities to the work of Lukacs, the Frankfurt
School and Volosinov. At the same time the Birmingham School sits at
the interface of the realist and idealist paradigms and so shares
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similar concerns to Habermas'. This body of work thus represents an
important component of the Left's attempts to move away from Marxist
orthodoxy, and towards some sort of 'synthesis' of the historical
materialist and idealist paradigms. Such work is crucial for
overcoming the constraints imposed on leftist practice by Marxist-
Leninism.
Hall's ees, however, also problematic because of his failure to: (a)
fully examine the difference between the realist and idealist paradigms
(see Wilson, 1983)j (b) examine the tensions within the Marxist
(realist) paradigm itself -- a paradigm that is central to his
approachj and (c) define what he understood by 'totality'. This writer
regards each of the above three issues as important in terms of the
project Hall has undertaken because his definition of ees was
essentially a call for New Leftist work at the realist-idealist
paradigmatic interface. Such work requires a theoretical understanding
of (a) what each paradigm entailsj (b) the paradigmatic differences
('compatibilities' and 'incompatabilities')j and (c) the theoretical
value and problems of inter-paradigmatic work. Yet Hall precisely
notes how the eees moved away from "theoreticism" (Hall et aI, 1980:25)
relatively early in its history. I will, like Hall, call for an
orientation that is not purely theoretical. However, this does not
mean theory can be prematurely 'abandoned'. In fact, if the above
criticisms are acknowledged, then the eees apparently prematurely
'turned away' from "theoreticism".
The most problematic feature of Hall's work is his failure to
theoretically delve deeply enough into the tensions within the Marxist
paradigm (see Gouldner, 1980j and Kolakowski, 1981). The eees approach
recognizes the tensions (Bennett, et aI, 1981:12), but then 'collapses'
194
the 'scientific' versus 'critical' Marxist tensions into the
'structuralism' versus 'culturalism~ dichotomy. Hall's proposal to
'overcome' this difference through using Gramsci's theory of hegemony
(Bennett, et aI, 1981:12 and 36) ignores the fact that Gramsci is part
of the humanist (i.e. critical) Marxism tradition. In other words,
Gramsci is more akin to Williams than to structuralism. The reason
that Gramsci is important is because he works within the 'totality'
(humanist-Marxist) approach. In other words, Gramsci (like Williams)
represents a 'corrective' for deterministic structuralism in either
its materialist (eg. Kautsky's orthodoxy) or subjectivist form (eg.
Althusserian-semiotics). Hall implicitly recognizes this, but does not
link it to the tension within the realist paradigm. Because of this
'omission ' he does not consider how Althusserianism represents a
'return' to a sort of deterministic Marxism that the 'totality'
approach has tried to move away from.
Further, Hall does not 'carry through' his idea of culture as
'totality'. He has recognized ('intuitively') the need to 'transcend'
the realist-idealist paradigm dichotomy (See Hall et aI, 1980:23-25),
but has not defined it as a cross-paradigmatic problem~ Furthermore,
he fails to recognize that humanist-Marxism (from Lukacs to Habermas)
was precisely an attempt from within historical materialism to cope
with the subjective (eg. communication, culture, etc.). In other
words, it represents pioneering work dealing with the very concerns
Hall proposes that CCS examine. It is Hall's criticism of the base-
superstructure metaphor (Bennett, et aI, 1981:36) that most clearly
reveals his failure to recognize how this metaphor potentially offers
CCS the theoretical route to contending with the problems of: (a) the
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subject-object interface (ie. contextualizing the subjective); and (b)
the intra-Marxist tension (ie. scientific versus critical; or
structuralism versus culturalism). These two problems are inter-
related, and both meet in the theoretical base-superstructure metaphor.
A 'totality' reconstructed historical materialism and the eees share
similar problems. Working from a 'totality' perspective, I hence have
difficulty in accepting the notion of reified structures (ie.
structuralism ); whereas theoretically-derived metaphorical structures
(a structural approach) are regarded as heuristically useful to a
leftist communicology. Metaphorical structures can be accommodated
within a New leftist approach (which emphasizes active subjectivity
within objective structures), but reified determining structures are
incompatible with the New Leftist project.
This is of more than merely theoretical concern because a 'totality'
approach is a form of insurance against idealism when dealing with
superstructural matters. Hall's failure to explicitly integrate the
theoretical humanist-Marxist work in this area into eees accounts for
the way he 'unproblematically' incorporated Althusser into ees. This
is a 'problem' that the early South African appropriations of ees have
reproduced (see Muller et aI, 1985; Tomaselli and Tomaselli, 1985).
Althusserian (subjectivist) structuralism can too easily lead the South
African Left into an (Eurocentic) idea~ism, and hence deflect attentipn
away from the task at hand, namely building a local leftist praxis (ie.
a theory and practice synthesis). Certainly, the approaches of both
Hall (Hall, et aI, 1980:27-35) and Tomaselli (1988:13-46) to a New
Leftist communicology tried to avoid the sort of subjectivism and
skepticism that Althusserianism can, and has, led to in the post-
structuralism of Derrida and Foucault {Bennett, et aI, 1981:34-35}.
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Hall has also tried to avoid the sort of objectivism implicit in the
political-economy approach to communication (Bennett et aI, 1981:35).
However, this can be avoided only by an explicit incorporation of, and
adherence to, the theoretical notion of 'totality'. Hall's use of
Williams and Gramsci represents an implicit move in this direction.
However, in the case of both Hall and Tomaselli, this move has not been
theoretic~lly explicit or self-conscious enough.
Although there is no problem with Hall's proposal to integrate the
structural approach into eees, there are, however, problems with ~he
way in which ees (uncritically) uses Althusser's (reified)
structuralism. From the perspective of the 'totality' approach: (a)
Althusser needs to be 'appropriated' by ees in a much more 'selective'
way; and (b) there is a need to look at Volosinov's structuralism
(which covers much of the ground Althusser does, yet does so in a way
that is more easily incorporable into a 'totality' reconstruction of
historical materialism).
Althusserian structuralism is based upon an explicit rejection of
the leftist-humanist notion of a subject-object totality. Althusser
(1979:229) , in fact, regards Marxism as an "anti-humanism". For
Althusser (1979:33), an "epistemological break" occurred in Marx's work
in 1845 which he terms a "rupture" (Althusser, 1979:227). He claims:
When Marx replaced the old couple individual/human essence in the
theory of history by new concepts (forces of production, relations
of production, etc), he was, in fact, simultaneously proposing a
new conception of 'philosophy' (Althusser, 1979: 229).
At the heart of this Althusserian interpretation of Marx is the idea
that Marx abandoned a concern with the subjective qua 'subject', and
hence simultaneously abandoned the concern with the subject-object
relationship. This is obviously a contention that those working from a
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New Leftist 'totality' perspective could not accept. For Althusser,
Marx "replaced" the concern with the human subject with a concern for
structures. As he says:
The young Marx of the 1844 Manuscripts read the human essence at
sight, immediately, in the transparency of its alienation.
Capital, on the contrary, exactly measures a distance and an
internal dislocation (Decalogue) in the real, inscribed in its
structure, a distance and a dislocation such as to make their own
effects themselves illegible, and the illusion of an immediate
reading of them the ultimate apex of their effects: fetishism. It
was essential to turn to history to track down this myth of reading
to its lair, ... by discovering that the truth of history cannot be
read in its manifest discourse, because the text of history is not
a text in which a voice (the Logos) speaks, but the inaudible and
illegible notation of the effects of a structure of structures. A
reading of some of our expositions will show that, far from making
metaphorical suggestions, I take the terms I am using literally . .
To break with the religious myth of reading: with Marx this
theoretical necessity took precisely the form of a rupture with the
Hegelian conception of the whole as a 'spiritual' totality, to be
precise, as an expressive totality" (Althusser, 1979a:17).
This text gets to the very heart of the Althusser's approach. The
assumption underlying his method is that historical materialists
concerned with 'culture' need to:
(a) 'distill' Marx's approach/method to the economic base;
(b) that 'method', for Althusser, is structuralism; and
(c) hence, 'structures' must now be sought, by histori~al materialists,
in the superstructures. This is a rather formalist interpretation of
Marx, and ironically makes the outcome of the Althusserian project
resemble in many resp~cts Chomsky's (non-materialist) structuralism. As
with Chomsky, Althusser does provide a useful method for the study of
(subjective) texts.
However, if the concern is for a (reconstructed) historical
materialist communicology, then Althusser represents a problematic
moment within this leftist project. This is especially so when his
work is applied to the South African context because although the
198
(leftist) pessimism underpinning his work may have been appropriate in
France in the 1970s, it is less so in post-1976 South Africa (Muller &
Tomaselli, 1989:311). This is not to deny the creativity of his
attempt to try and salvage the crumbling historical materialist
paradigm and/or halt the collapse of the Marxist dream. Althusser
clearly identified a core problem with historical materialism -- the
paradigm's incapacity to adequately deal with the subjective and
communication. But, the result of Althusser's logic is problematic for
the leftist project because he: (a) reifies the notion of 'structure'
into a variety of structuralist formalism; (b) turns 'structuralism'
into an end in itself (ie. the notion of structure as merely an
heuristic 'tool' is lost, and is replaced by the idea of a determining,
and universal structuralism; (c) makes the (unjustified by himself)
assumption that the method Marx developed for use in analyzing the
economic base can simply be transferred to analyzing the
superstructures; and (d) 'breaks' the subject-object dialectic, thereby
'granting' the superstructures an "autonomy". In this way Althusser
opens the door to the very 'idealism' that Marx (1980) criticized,
because he de facto suspends any real concern with the economic
context. This idealism shifts the emphasis from context to text, and
hence represents a serious methodological violation of the historical
material method. Althusserianism hence lays the foundation for an
idealism that is without an active 'subject' (See Larrain, 1982:154).
In -this respect Althusser ironically marries a variant of KautskY's
materialist determinism (ie. assuming objective 'laws' applied to the
subjective) with a variant of Young Hegelian idealism (ie. by arguing
against the subject-object totality). Althusser thereby produced the
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, f b.i t' "t "anti-historical materialist not10n 0 su Jec 1ve au onomy .
Consequently, he combined the worst of both the 'extremes' of
subjectivism and materialism. Althusser may have been trying to steer
a middle course between economic reductionism and voluntarism, but in
so doing he produced a determining structuralism (in base and
superstructure) and a non-voluntaristic subjectivism. So in trying to
salvage Marxism he only exacerbated the crisis, and Althusserian-
structuralism ultimately only served to help speed up the shift of the
Francophone intellectual debate towards post-structuralism.
From a 'totality' perspective, Althusserian structuralism represents
a 'wrong turn' in the attempt to deal with the crisis of Marxism,
and/or deal with the Superstructural Age. However, although Althusser
is 'out of step' with the New Left solution to the problem favoured by
this thesis, his work none-the-Iess represents an extremely significant
epistemological moment in both the collapse of the Marxist dream (and
the resultant Marxist pessimism -- Muller & Tomaselli, 1989:310) and in
the development of a leftist communicology. There is thus a need to
come to terms with Althusser's ideas, because he did develop or
introduce a number of concepts which are useful for a .leftist
communicology. In so doing, he has clearly exerted significant
influence on many in the communication field of study. In terms of
this thesis, important examples would include Coward & Ellis (1977),
Hall and Johnson (Hall, et aI, 1980), Tomaselli (1988), Ruth Tomaselli
et at, (1989), and Addison (1980) (although Addison mis-interprets
Althusser). Further, his work illustrates a number of pitfalls and
errors which it is easy for a leftist communication and media studies
to slip into.
For the purposes of this thesis, Althusser needs to be examined with
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regard to his ideas on the following:
(a) the base and superstructure, especially his ideas on
"overdetermination"; and
(b) his ideas on ideology. Here his work on "interpellation" (the
structuring of of the 'subject'/language), and on Ideological State
Apparatus' (ISAs), are the most important.
In his essay "Contradiction & Overdetermination", Althusser (1979)
would seem to have found a potential 'solution' to the base-
superstructure problematic. Ironically, however, instead of
recognizing the compatibility of his ideas on "contradiction" with
humanist-Marxism, Althusser chose to attack this approach instead, and
to develop his ideas into a deterministic subjectivist structuralism.
Althusser's anti-humanist view that "as soon as the dialectic is
removed from its idealistic shell by Marx, it becomes the direct
opposite of the Hegelian dialectic" (Althusser, 1978:90). This
interpretation is highly problematic. An alternative interpretation
could be: in Marx the dialectic remains the same method, but is merely
applied in a different 'area'. So whereas Hegel was concerned with
contradictions in the 'subjective', Marx was concerned .with
contradictions in the 'objective'. A 'totality' approach would be
concerned with contradictions in 'both' -- ie. the 'total' (subject-
object) process.
However, when Althusser (1979:101 said "a Hegelian contradiction is
neyer really overdetermined", he raised an extremely important point,
namely the need to recognize complexity; ie. a number of 'factors' must
come together to produce the result. However, what Althusser failed to
note is that a materialist Marxist contradiction is also never really
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overdetermined. The point is that the notion of "overdetermination"
can imply a dialectical totality in the sense understood by Marxist-
humanism -- ie. subject and object in (complex) dialectical unity. If
an Hegelian (subjective) contradiction is a "simple contradiction"
(Althusser, 1979: 103), then so too is a materialist (vulgar Marxist)
contradiction 'simple'. But a New Leftist understanding of
contradictions (in base and superstructure) is precisely not simple
because it is concerned with contradictions in the base, and the
superstructure and the 'total' process. Althusser's problem lies in
his reading of the dialectical totality method as a structure -- i.e.
Althusser sees 'totality' as a 'thing' (structure), rather than a
process. What is more, he sees that structure as determined by "one
principle of internal unity" (Althusser, 1979:103). From such an
Althusserian perspective the idea of dialectical totality does indeed
become reductionistic and simplistic (Althusser, 1979:103). However,
one can read 'totality' in a different way, namely:
(a) totality consists of a process of subject (superstructures) and
object (base);
(b) these 'sub-processes' are in interaction within a 'larger'
process;
(c) contradictions can occur anywhere in the total process, ie. in
base, and superstructure, and between base and superstructure;
(d) the 'whole' is necessarily dynamic because of contradictions;
(e) the contradictions arise and fuse in different complex ways (in
different historical material circumstances) -- ie. the notion of
"overdetermination".
The problem with Althusser, from a 'totality' perspective, is that
he did not carry through the implications of his ideas in the above way
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because he seems to have been opposed to leftist-humanism in principle.
Consequently, he did not try to see the potential compatibility between
his ideas and the leftist-humanist work within the communication/media
studies field.
Althusser's work on the concept of ideology is a derivative of his
structuralist and 'subjectivist' reading of Marx (as discussed above).
However, whereas Althusser's work on the notion of base and
superstructure was both valuable and problematic, more substantive
problems can be raised regarding Althusser's notion of ideology.
Althusser's work on 'ideology' went in two (inter-related) directions:
(i) the development of the notion of the "interpellation" of
'subjects'i and (ii) the development of the concepts "ISAs" and "RSAs".
In both cases this writer would argue that other theorists (namely,
Volosinov and Gramsci) have worked in these areas, and have produced
work that is more easily incorporable into a 'totality' approach to
Marxist communication. However, Althusser's work does need to be
examined because it represents an important epistemological moment in
the development of the concept 'ideology', and he has certainly
influenced the work of many leftist communicologists, including CCS.
At the heart of Althusser's work on ideology is the notion
"interpellation" (Althusser, 1971:162-163). The concept of
interpellation is premised on the idea that just as Marx sought the
'deep structures' within the capitalist economy -- ie. the "essence"
(S~yer, 1979:110} '-- so too can one seek out the 'deep structures' of
human consciousness. For Althusser, the 'deep structures' are to be
found in the language through which individuals are integrated into
society. In other words, for Althusser, ideology is a system or
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structure of "representations" of signs and codes (ie. semiology).
Through this system of representations the individual is 'placed into'
an "imaginary relationship" with "their real conditions of existence"
(Althusser, 1971:152). Althusser attempts to 'materialize' his
semiology by 'placing' the 'manufacture' of the 'imaginary
relationships" into concrete ideological state apparatuses (ISAs).
However, this attempt to claw his way back into historical materialism
fails. Instead Althusser produces a subjectivist reductionism because:
(a) human consciousness is now reduced to 'pre-given' structures
'outside' of human control (ie. a 'prison house' of language); and (b)
the subjective is seen as 'autonomous' (i.e. unrelated to the material
base). So Althusser resurrected the notion of 'subject' qua 'subject'
(Althusser, 1971:159-161). This means that despite Althusser's claim
to see ideology in "materialist" terms (Althusser, 1984:39-40), his
work does no such thing. He develops a ·concern much closer to that of
Chomsky, or Saussure or Barthes, than anything resembling an historical
materialist communicology. Consequently, when Althusser's ideas are
'co-opted' into a reconstructed historical materialism this needs to be
done with just as much (methodological) care as when 'co-opting' other
work out of the idealist paradigm (eg. hermeneutics, semiology, etc.).
The problem with Althusser's structuralist notion of
"representations" (ideology) can perhaps best be illustrated by
comparing it to the more rigorously historical materialist ideas of
Volosinov (1973) which have already been discussed in this chapter.
For Volosinov, 'signs' are seen as a 'site' where subject and object
'meet' and 'interpenetrate' each other. This notion excludes both
subjecti~ist and materialist reductionism, and yet represents a
" t '1' t'" f h "ma er1a 1S V1ew 0 t e system of representations".
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Volosinov does
not understand signs as 'existing' within a reified (and determining)
structure in the way that Althusser does: ie. Volosinov's structures
are more metaphorical (and hence more 'flexible', and less
'reductionistic') than are Althusser's. So where Volosinov's
historical materialism tries to understand (by using the 'totality'
approach) the process in which the subjective (consciousness) and
objective (economy) inter-penetrate and influence each other;
Althusser's historical materialism means directly reading materialist
(objective) structures into the consciousness (subjective) dimension
(Althusser, 1971:156; and 1984:40). From such a reified notion of a
structured consciousness it is easy to understand how Althusser could
progress to the idea that "Man is an ideological animal by nature"
(Althusser, 1984:45) -- ie. "ideology has no history" (Althusser,
1971:150). Here Althusser is closer to being a Freudian than a Marxist
since he transforms Freud's (structuralist) proposition that the
"unconsciousness is eternal" is transformed into the proposition that
"ideology is eternal. .. Le . omnipresent" (Althusser, 1984:35).
Althusser seems to have derived his notion of "overdetermination" from
Freud (Freud & Breuer, 1974: 346). In terms of Althusser's
interpretation, ideology exists (already formed in an 'apparatus' or
'structure') before the individual and before class. The notion of
"interpellation" hence becomes a general (universal) 'law' of the
transcendental/subjective. Thus even when Althusser turns to "class
st~uggle" (Althusser, 1971:171-173) the notion is 'tagged' onto that of
", t 11 t' "l 'ln erpe a 10n , a most as an afterthought'. For Althusser class
struggle is not integrated into the idea of ideological struggle in the
way that, say, Volosinov integrated class struggle into his notion of a
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"struggle for the sign". Because Volosinov's notion of ideology is
based on a totality (subject-object) view, historical material struggle
was a part of 'totality' (including the consciousness dimension).
Volosinov's notion of ideology and 'the sign' is hence clearly an
historical and material one; whereas Althusser's notion of ideology and
'the sign' is non-historical, and hence violates Althusser's own claim
to be operating within the premises of .historical materialism. It is
possible t o re-read Althusser so as to 'historicize' his ideas (see
Tomaselli, 1988: 18); but such a re-reading must not be conflated with
Althusser's own work.
Althusser's work on ideology goes beyond his notion of
"interpel lation" (ie. 'pure' semiology) as a result of his attempts to
'material ize' his semiology. This took the form of a search for the
superstructural structures (ie. apparatuses) within which
"interpellation" (ie. the 'semiological' process) took place; ie. the
Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs). The Althusserian notion of ISAs:
(a) 'collapsed' the political and ideological dimensions into one
another; and (b) placed tremendous emphasis onto 'State' political
dimension (Althusser, 1971:134). In this respect Althusser's work
overlaps with that of Lukacs, the Frankfurt School and Gramsci. This
work has been centrally concerned with the way in which the liberal-
pluralist political structures have served to 'legitimate' liberal-
capitalism and have apparently 'defused' the 'revolutionary potential'
of the European w~rking classes (See Althusser, 1971:141).
Althusser's work on Ideological State Apparatus-Repressive State
Apparatus (ISA-RSA) (Althusser, 1971:141-142) bears certain strong
resemblance to Gramsci's notion of "hegemony". Althusser's work on
these political-ideological superstructures parallel the Gramscian
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, . , f' I . t' , d' f rce'notion of "hegemony" as a fus~on 0 eg~ ~macy an 0
(Gramsci, 1971:238 and 247). Althusser, in fact, even uses the term
"hegemony" in Gramsci's sense when discussing his ISAs (Althusser,
1971:138-139). CertainlY when Althusser is re-read 'through' Gramsci
(ie. as done by the CCCS and Tomaselli) it is possible to use his ideas
(on ISAs and RSAs) within a leftist praxis concerned with communicative
'struggle' .
Such readings should not obscure the significant differences between
Althusser and Gramsci. After all, Gramsci worked from within the
humanist-Marxist 'totality' tradition, whereas Althusser explicitly
rejected i t (Althusser, 1971:129). For Althusser, the political-
ideological superstructure is "relatively autonomous" of the base
(Althusser, 1971:130), whereas Gramsci assumed the close 'inter-
penetration' of base and superstructure.
Despite the differences, Althusser's ideas on ISA/RSA are the one
aspect of his work that can be 'integrated' with a Gramscian 'totality'
view. This aspect of his work can be used by a reconstructed
historical materialism if Althusser is seen as having 'specialized' in
one aspect of totality (i.e. the political ideological
superstructures). Althusser's structural approach is seen to have
caused him to generate a 'specialist' understanding of, and terminology
for, grasping the political-ideological superstructures. So, in the
same way that the political economy approach can serve a 'totality'
reconstructed historical materialism, so too can Althusser's work on
the ISAsj ie. he points to the media as important (concrete) 'sites'
where ideology -- as 'interpellation' - is produced. These 'sites'
need to be analyzed, and Althusser has some interesting insights to
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offer in this regard. Tomaselli, Tomaselli & Muller (1987: chapters 1
and 2) have demonstrated Althusser's potential value through their
application of his theory of 'interpellation' to the ideological
discourse of South African journalists.
'Concrete' structures do exist, both economically and
superstructurally. Althusser's notion of ISAs as superstructures has
value in directing attention towards these, and his ideas in this
regard are not necessarily incompatible with the (leftist-humanist)
notion of 'totality':
(a) as long as ISA/RSAs are understood as a 'partial' study of one
'physical part' of the process that is 'totality'. In a sense
Althusser's work on 'material ideological apparatus' (Althusser,
1971:158) complements the political economy approach to communication;
(b) Althusser's notion of "relative autonomy" is modified so as to
stress the "relative" rather than (as in the case of Althusser) the
"autonomy"; and
(c) the implicit functionalism in Althusser's understanding of
structures needs to be removed.
For this writer the above can be achieved by interpreting 'totality'
metaphorically and diachronically dialectical; but the 'physical parts'
(eg. ISAs) of the 'total' process are interpreted synchronically as
sometimes 'contradictory' and sometimes 'functional'.
What is being proposed then is that Althusser's idea of 'structure'
as "apparatus" need not be seen as necessarily incompatible with
Gramsci's 'totality' understanding of hegemony. Gramsci could, in
fact, be used to put the 'active subject' back into the superstructural
structures identified by Althusser, and at the same time re-insert the
dialectic into Althusser (and so remove the 'necessary' functionalism
208
in Althusser's concepts of 'structures'/ISAs). In other words,
Althusser 's structuralism can be used to help 'disentangle' aspects of
the complexity of 'totality'. However, his structuralism will need to
be used with care if it is not to clash with the leftist-humanism
which, it has been proposed, should underpin the reconstruction of
historica l materialism. So Althusser's structuralism can be
heuristically useful within Marxist communication studies through: (i)
its ident ification of a 'plurality' of ISAs (Althusser, 1971:137);
wi th (i i) eech of these ISAs conta ining a (separate) "pract i ce"
(Althusser, 1971:156). Althusser's list of ISAs (Althusser, 1971:137)
is not unusable by a reconstructed historical materialism. However,
by interpreting Althusser as useful for 'disentangling ' totality, his
ideas are modified into an ' a na l y t i ca l tool' (ie. a structural
approach) rather than a reified ' pr i nc i p l e ' (ie. structuralism).
Poulantzas' (1979, 1982) ideas can also be integrated, along similar
lines, into a reconstructed historical materialism. As a Post-
Althusserian, he perpetuates many of the problems that have been
identified with Althusser's approach . But at the same time Poulantzas
develops Althusser's ideas on the political-ideological superstructures
in a direction that is partially compatible with Gramsci's approach.
Poulantzas developed an understanding of the sub-structures (ie. "class
fractions") within the larger structures (ie. classes). This is
especially useful in South Africa where both the ruling bloc and its
main opposition (ANC-SACP-Cosatu) consist of a wide array of shifting
alliances, groupings, class interests, sub-class interests, etc.
Poulantzian analysis will become especially useful when the conflict
between the NP and ANC reaches the 'negotiation-phase'. This will
necessitate a close 'reading ' of subtle shifts within the alliances
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that are a party to the conflict. It could be said that Poulantzas has
paid too much attention to the ruling classes instead of the suppressed
classes. However, his concentration on the ruling classes does not
invalidate Poulantzas's approach. It merely means his ideas on class
fractions need to be extended to the suppressed classes. (In this
regard see Louw, 1989c).
However, just as in the case of Althusser, Poulantzas' structuralism
needs to be modified to interpret the structures he identifies as
'setting parameters' (ie. a structural approach) rather than as being
able to determine behaviour (structuralism). In this regard, I will
argue for a re-reading of Poulantzas' "class fractions" idea through
Gramsci's totality approach . In other words, Gramsci can be used to
re-introduce the notion of an active sub,ject, while Poulantzas provides
the structural 'categories' which set the 'parameters' within which the
subjective operates. In this way both voluntarist subjectivism and
(determining) structuralism are avoided.
From a 'totality' approach to the reconstruction of historical
materialism there are problems with the Althusserian interpretation.
However, in trying to reconstruct this paradigm so that it is in a
stronger position to deal with communication, Althusser's theory has to
be engaged with. This is because it contains valuable insights and
because it breaks ground for leftist communicology. It experimented
(not always successfully) with theoretical innovation, and delved into
areas that should in future be taken as read (though not necessarily
emulated or repeated). It has strongly influenced the eees and
eCSU/CCMS and thereby represents a significant part of the development
curve of learning required in the creation of an historical materialist
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approach to the media and communication.
The Birmingham School, and through it, culturalism and Althusserian-
structuralism, have certainly been seminal influences in the
introduction of a leftist communicology to South Africa. An important
reason for this was the establishment of the CCSU where the CCCS was
taken as a 'model'. But now there is a need to .mov e beyond the CCCS's
concern to merge culturalism and structuralism. A South Africa leftist
communicology needs to include: (i) a more explicitly 'praxis'
orientation, and (ii) engage 'totality' ideas (as discussed above).
Towards ~ Leftist Communicology: searching for ~ way forward
As we enter the 1990s the Left is in crisis. Even the prospect of
some leftist gains in South Africa (and Chile) is not enough to cancel
out the legacy of Eastern Europe where 'socialism' has been so
discredited. A Harxist-Leninist interpretation of leftist praxis has
proved to be a highly limiting interpretation of capitalism in the
Information Age. This interpretation was incapable of adequately
dealing with the superstructural age because of its tendency towards
crude materialism. If the left is to seriously meet the challenge of
HNC (and its ~nc reas i ng l y superstructural relations of · production) ,
then leftists will need to move beyond narrow materialism and learn to
deal with the superstructures and subjective. Historical materialism
needs to be reconstructed in such a way that it not only deals with the
material world, but also the subjective world (of communication, media,
culture, etc). This calls for the construction of a leftist
communicology.
What is more, in an era where there is no longer Soviet support for
leftist forces (ie. the implications of glasnost), the left has to
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become more creative in finding ways to challenge MNC. For the Left ir
the margins of MNC (eg. the South African left) who had become
complacent in relying on Soviet assistance, this calls for an openness
to new approaches to praxis. A Left binding itself to orthodoxy --
Marxist-Leninist, or any other variety -- will become a conservative
force, and hence less able to bring about social change. This is
especially true given that contemporary capitalist relations of
production in the Information Age appear to require a less materialist
approach to praxis. The Left needs to construct a theory capable of
dealing with communicative (superstructural) domination, resistance and
struggle. It is no longer enough to stress the material character of
capitalism. The Left now has to deal with "cultural or psychological
exploitation as the new ground of conflict" (Clarke et aI, 1979:28).
And it must deal with these not as derivatives of the economic base,
but rather as sites of struggle in their own right.
Re-orientating the Left will, no doubt, reopen some old debates and
create new ones. A major struggle for hegemony over the Left may well
emerge once more. Only after Marx's interpretation was victorious over
Bakunin (Kolakowski, 1981, Vol I: 244-258},following which then the
Marxist-Leninist interpretation defeated the Marxist-Bernstein
interpretation (Kolakowski, 1981, Vol 11: 347-353), did so many on the
Left grow theoretically orthodox/conservative, self-satisfied and
complacent. The voices of the likes of the Frankfurt School, Korsch
and the New Left ~ere seemingly unable to redirect much of the Left's
thinking for 70 years. But the events of 1989/90 have changed all
that. These events reopened the struggle over what direction the Left
should take. What is clear is that the old orthodoxies are no longer
tenable. The Left now needs to break with the intellectual habits born
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of orthodoxy. There is a need for theoretical experimentation and ever
eclecticism. The task of reconstructing leftist praxis and/or
constructing a leftist approach to communication/culture will,
initially, be an overwhelmingly theoretical exercise. Leftist theory
(including Harxist and Harxist-Leninist) will need to be reappraised,
'reshuffled' and reworked.
But any reconstruction of leftist theory and practice will, of
necessity, be rooted in a particular context. The questions raised
will reflect the problems and challenges of a particular society. This
thesis i s rooted in the realigning and restructuring Southern Africa of
the 1990s. Leftist struggle in Southern Africa has been successful in
forcing concessions from the Right. But the Left has not developed
sufficient strength to defeat the Right. What is more, given the weak
position of the Left in a world wide context, there is little
likelihood of it defeating the local (reforming) Right. This
'reforming Right' will be in a position to call on a world-wide
HNC/Information Age network of alliances and resources. Unless the
Left organizes itself more successfully than was the case during 1990,
it faces the prospects of losing its present gains, and of declining
fortunes in the medium to long term. The Left even faces the prospect
of the co-option by a 'reformed Right'/HNC of significant sectors of
those formerly associated with the struggle.
These are the practical and theoretical challenges. Heeting them
requires a theory able to grasp the context, the gains and the losses,
and able to give direction to leftist praxis appropriate to the times.
For the South African Left that means developing a theory able to deal
with the position of South Africa as a sub-metropole of HNC (a world-
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hegemonic MNC since the collapse of Soviet power); being tied into the
'superstructural~ relations of production of the MNC/Information Age,
as well as having to overcome the legacy of a now discredited Leninist-
Marxist interpretation of leftist praxis (which for many is synonymous
with 'the Left').
This thesis proposes, therefore, that the New Left, and its
derivative CCS, provide a good starting place for a leftist theoretical
reconstruction based upon experimentation and eclecticism. The New
Left/CCS already has a record of: (a) pointing out the limitations of
the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the Leftist project and/or
warning of the impending collapse of the Marxist dream (that it was
predicted would flow from these limitations); (b) drawing upon and
synthesizing a wide range of work so as to construct a leftist praxis
not limited by orthodoxy, nor tainted by the legacy of East European
practices ; and (c) dealing with communication, media and the
superstructures -- ie. reorienting the Left into a concern with the
context of the Information Age.
The Birmingham School's merger of culturalism, structuralism and the
work on hegemony provides us with a rudimentary framework and/or method
for re-orientating the Left towards communication, culture and the
media. However, the selection of theorists utilized by the Birmingham
School needs to be widened to incorporate the work of Lukacs, the
Frankfurt School (and their heirs), Volosinov and Korsch. By so doing,
the pull towards the (anti-rationalist) 'discourse' approach would be
lessened, while the influence of the 'totality' approach of a
(rationalist) leftist-humanism would be increased.
The theorists dealt with in Chapter 2 of this thesis are, in other
words, proposed as one possible reshuffling, evaluative and
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reconstructive exercise of leftist theory. However, these theorists
only provide us with the basis for a leftist analysis. For a leftist
practice another dimension is required. This added dimension will be





Marx's development away from Young Hegelianism (McLellan, 1978) was
to have a profound impact on the future development of Leftist
praxis. Marx's rejection of leftist subjective "criticism" in
favour of deal.ing with "real" (material) conditions on the ground
(see Marx & Engels, 1980:192) was, on the one hand, an advantageous
insight for the Left since it directed leftists into "real" praxis
as opposed to abstract intellectual critique. However, once Marx's
interpretation of socialism became hegemonic within the left, his
critique of Young Hegelian 'subjectivism' was extended into
something of a general injunction against a leftist dealing with
the subjective (eg. superstructure). The anti-subjectivism of Marx
& Engels (1980) hence NARROWED the left into an almost exclusive
concern with the material or objective world. This was eventually
collapsed into a crude base-superstructure model in which the
subjective/superstructure (eg communication, media, etc) were seen
as simply derivative of the material/objective base. This was to
ultimately prove very limiting for leftist analysis, and as a
result, limiting for praxis based upon such analysis. This
limitation became especially problematic once capitalism mutated in
such a way that the superstructures became increasingly central to
MNC relations of production. At this point (from the 1960s onwards)
leftist analysis -- derived from a crude interpretation of Marx &
Engels -- was increasingly crisis-ridden because its stock of
concepts for dealing with the objective/material context had only a
limited explanatory power when turned upon the
subjective/superstructure. It was a crisis that the likes of
Althusser and Habermas attempted to confront during the 1970s by
developing a leftist conceptualization of the subjective.
The Frankfurt School grew within the Institute of Social Research
in Frankfurt (1923-1933). It was exiled to the USA (1933-1950)
because of the German Nazi period, and returned to Frankfurt in
1950 (Jay, 1973). Many people were associated with the Institute ~t
one time or another -- ego Horkheimer, Adorno, Lowenthal, Pollock,
Fromm, Marcuse, Benjamin, Neumann, Kirschheimer, Grossman, Gurland,
etc. However, the 'School' is really only taken to mean the first
six names of this above list. During its heyday (1930s and 1940s)
the 'School' never really had a coherence, in fact only after 1950
was the earlier work 'recognized' as a 'School'(see Jay, 1973).
Those who carried the School's tradition into the contemporary era
(although not a 'part' of the School) are Jurgen Habermas, Claus
Offe and Albrecht Wellmer.
The 'unintegrated' sectors are, however, important to the Left for
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another reason, namely, they are not necessarily 'revolutionary'.
The lumpenproletariat, for example, can be extremely reactionary if
the left fails to mobilize them. Examples of this are: between
1986 and 1989 the apartheid state employed (for minimal wages) the
lumpenproletariat as 'kitskonstables', 'municipal policemen', and
(fascist) vigilante forces. (CIIR, 1988). Further, Inkatha has
been successful in mobilizing the lumpenproletariat into its
structures during 1989 and 1990. These 'unintegrated' se~tors,
are, in fact, highly susceptible to populist rhetoric.
[4] Tomaselli (1985) has d iscussed the differences between leftist and
rightist intellectuals in the field of South African communication
studies.
[5] The degree to which the Right monopolizes the South African media
can be seen by comparing the sales of the rightist versus Leftist
press in 1990 -- ie. total weekly sales of all the leftist-
commercial press amounts to just over 200-thousand. This low
penetration of the leftist press should be a matter for a major
crit ical self-appraisal on the part of South African media workers.
Total sales of what Pinnock calls the 'guild press' (excluding
regionals and rural press) = Dailies sell 6-million copies per
week, and Sunday newspapers sell l,2-million copies per week.
Further the Right monopolizes both radio and television
broadcasting. What is worse is that this low leftist media
penetration may become still lower once foreign funding of the
'alternative press' is ended. (The 1990 reforms have made such
termination of financ ial support very likely).
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Chapter 3. THE SUPERSTRUCTURE AND LEFTIST STRUGGLE:
CONSIDERATIONS ON THE "SUBJECTIVE AND PRAXIS"
The accumulation of leftist theory, and of leftist theoretical
cadres, is well advanced in South Africa. The theory already
'accumulated' includes, for example: the SACP's 'two-stage' theory of
revolution (which probably arose as a South Africanization of
Plekanov's Russian 'two-stage' model); and the work of Wolpe (1972);
Legassick (1974); Davies et al (1976); Bienfeld & Innes (1976); Innes &
Plaut (1979); Lambert (1980); Erwin (1985); Alexander (1985); as well
as the innovations forged by 'activists' in each of the three main
leftist 'camps', ie. 'popular' (eg. ANC, UDF/MDM); 'populist' (eg.
AZAPO, PAC, NEUM/WOSA) and 'workerist' (eg. COSATU) [1].
Despite the 'accumulation' already achieved, more work is still
required in the area of reconstructing historical materialism so as to
accommodate the following three themes: (1) the subjective and the
superstructures as a potential 'site of struggle' within South Africa
(as a peripheral player in the MNC/Information Age); (2) the operation
of a South African leftist alliance (built on New Leftist rather than
'vanguardist' principles). These above two themes merge, in the sense
that 'managing' an alliance requires that attention be paid to
'internal' communication, 'constituency expansion', 'compromise' and
the development of 'appropriate' ('public sphere'?) superstructures;
and (3) reconceptualizing the notion of leftist struggle to include the
'hegemonic art' of 'negotiation', such that praxis in South Africa is
understood as an unpredictable mixture of 'violence', 'negotiation'
and 'compromise'. The latter links back to points one and two above,
and brings to the fore once again the importance of communication and
the superstructures for praxis.
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The previous chapter suggested that it would be helpful to give more
prominence to historical materialist theorists who had moved away from
a narrow economism, and toward a 'totality' approach (ie. the
'material' AND the 'subjective') of leftist struggle. In the South
African context this is especially important because the local leftist
struggle i s more than a struggle against capitalism. It is a struggle
against racial-capitalism. This is the basis for the requirement that
Leftists pay attention to matters BEYOND a 'material' struggle [2].
The Left needs to pay specific theoretical attention to the
superstructures and the relationship between base and superstructure.
With this in mind the last chapter tried to formalize and 'South
Africanize' the 'recognition' located in the Frankfurt School, Lukacs,
Gramsci, Volosinov and CCS that the Left needs to move beyond economism
(ie. 'put' the subjective and/or 'totality' into leftist theory).
However, the post-1976 crisis in South Africa demands both theory
AND practice. According to Korsch (1970), this couplet requires a
symbiotic relationship. There is a need to move beyond both (1) a
'reconstructed' historical materialist concern with the subjective (ie.
subject-object debate), and (2) the praxis (theory-practice) debate.
The two debates should be linked. Such a linkage would advance the
Left's capacity for dealing with (theoretically and practically) the
South African context. This requires explicitly developing the notion
of a 'totality praxis' -- ie. a praxis that deals with both the
subjective and the objective.
Such a 'totality praxis' would accommodate the complexity of leftist
struggle in South Africa in which various differing, yet inter-related
'components' to the 'struggle' need attention. Examples of this are:
(1) a materialist 'theory' of struggle (eg. Marx, 1974); (2) a
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materialist 'practical' struggle (eg. workerist shop floor
organization); and (3) the theory-practice 'problematic'. The above
three .c on c e r n s together represent the Marxist interpretation of leftist
praxis. A New Leftist 'totality' praxis would, however, go much
further (though without 'abandoning' the above three concerns) to
develop: (4) a leftist theory of 'the subjective' (ie. Chapter 2) ; (5)
a superstructural (or subjective) 'practice'; (6) an understanding of
the subject-object 'problematic'. A 'totalitY 'praxis' would entail (7)
dealing with all the above six in 'unison'.
This chapter is specifically concerned with those aspects of the
above 'totality' which, to date, have received scant attention from
Leftists, namely: the concern with a 'subjective praxis' -- ie. the
above concerns (5) and (6). This will be termed the Korsch-
Enzensberger challenge to historical materialism. This includes the
theory and practice coupletj while Enzensberger directs attention to
the superstructures (subjective) as a site of contradiction and
struggle.
That this chapter will concern itself with only (5) and (6) of the
above 'complexity' should not be interpreted as a suggestion that
concerns (1), (2) and (3) are unimportant. They are vital 'elements'
within the 'totality praxis' proposed, but in this chapter they will be
taken as 'read'. In other words, the proposed 'totality praxis' is not
an exclusive leftist concern with pure 'superstructural' intervention.
Su~h a 'superstructuralism' would represent the same 'idealist' (ie.
unmaterialist) view of struggle as that found in Beaufre's (1965)
'total strategy' misunderstanding of 'Marxist struggle'. (A
misinterpretation which ironically strongly influenced the NP's anti-
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Leftist strategy). Further, it should be noted that concerns (5) and
(6) are seen as 'extensions' of concern (4).
At the root of the above proposal then, is the notion that if South
African Leftists ignore the 'subjective' then any change produced,
and/or leftist hegemony constructed, will probably not result in a
'complete' liberation. (A 'complete' liberation means an 'objective'
redistribution of wealth AND the 'subjective' elimination of racism.
There is, in other words, a necessity to pay specific attention to
challenging and destroying the subjective constructions of racial-
capitalism as a fundamental part of liberating South Africa. With the
collapse of Soviet power and the subsequent world-hegemony status of
HNC, there is now no likelihood of South Africa shaking itself free of
HNC hegemony in the foreseeable future (even if a leftist government
was voted into power). South Africa will be located on the margins of
the HNC/Information Age either as part of the dependent 'South' or as
the key sub-metropole of HNC in Africa. In either role, a leftist
struggle in South Africa will not be over even with a 'leftist'
government in power.
The Korsch-Enzensberger challenge: the search for superstructural
praxis
Korsch offers some useful philosophical insights for any New Leftist
attempt to 'reconstruct' historical materialism such that this paradigm
can more adequately deal both with the subjective AND with praxis.
This is because his Harxism ~ Philosophy (1971) (first published in
1923) sits astride two central themes in such a 'reconstruction': the
concern with the leftist-humanist notion of 'totalitY'i and the concern
with praxis (theory and practice). In some ways, Korsch represents a
key t ? the sort of reconstruction of leftist praxis proposed in this
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thesis. Korsch's revisionist reading of Marxism is, in fact, a valuable
theoretical adjunct to Gramsci's notion of hegemony as a 'multi-
dimensional' leftist struggle.
Hall used Gramsci to link the culturalist and structuralist
perspectives. Korsch can be used in a similar fashion to construct a
. .
New Leftist politics of subjectivist intervention with a materialist
intent. As a humanist-Marxist, Korch sees human existence as a unity
of active subjectivity within structural (objective and subjective)
constraints. This 'activeness 'within structural-constraints' takes
place in two 'realms' for Korsch: theoretically and practically. The
basis of Korsch's argument is that Marxism should be concerned with
th is 'totality' of subject-object-theory-practice. If this totality is
'broken', he argues, a 'warped' Marxism results. He criticized the
Marxist-Leninist interpretation of leftist praxis on these grounds (for
which he was attacked at the Third International and subsequently
expelled from the German Communist Party).
Korsch's work in the 1920s represented yet another early warning
signal predicting the eventual collapse of the Marxist dream unless
Leftists revised their programme. For Korsch (1970:43), Marxism should
concern itself with the relationship between a subjective "philosophy
of revolution", and "real [objective] historical developments". It is
neither a theoretical 'belief in socialism' (Korsch, 1970:61) nor a
practical intervention in reality (Korsch, 1970:74). Rather it is both
in. unity. Capitalist society "must be criticized in theory and
overthrown in practice" (Korch, 1970:96). He predicted a 'decline' of
Marxism as resulting from the granting of autonomy to theory and
practice (Korsch, 1970:65). Such a split resulted in: (a) on the one
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hand, a theoretical dogmatism (i.e. subjectivist belief) (Korsch,
1970:65); and (b) on the other hand a practically-oriented Party
(Korsch, 1970:74) which was so concerned with intervening and changing
the objective-world that it lost its contact with its original
theoretical premises. Once theory and practice were granted autonomy
from one another, the theoreticians were denied access to reality .
This reduced their theoretical work to a form of dogmatic-idealism,
which. because it no longer dealt with concrete problems, ceased to
have practical revolutionary significance. On the other hand, the
' Mar x i s t' practitioners became so engrossed with solving practical-
objective problems that t hey ' f or got' and often violated their origina l
theoretical ' i dea l s' . A Korschian analysis would trace the origins of
Stalinism to this trend (See Korsch, 1970:130-136) . The crisis and then
collapse of Second World ' s t a t e socialism ' not even seven decades after
Korsch 's predictions. goes a long way towards vindicating his work.
If Korsch's ideas are applied to a reconstructed historical
materialism concerned with developing a South African approach to






Both theory and practice are required; such that
('reconstructed ') theory informs practice; and
practice informs theory.
Over-theoreticism (where theoreticans work in isolation from
leftist activists) is avoided. Both those following the
Frankfurt School and the Althusserians tend in this
' i s o l a t i on i s t' direction) ; and an overly-practical approach (eg.
where activists do not concern themselves with theory) is
avoided; yet
a degree of 'functional ' specialization in theory (eg. at the
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CCSU/CCMS) and practice (ego at Grassroots, New Nation, etc) is
accepted and even encouraged; but that
* both the theory and the practice produced need to be 'linked' in
a mutually re-inforcing programme of leftist praxis.
If we apply these ideas to leftist communication/media work the
following scenario emerges. A Korschian praxis would require, amongst
other things, that structured relationships be developed between
leftist media workers and academics; that theoreticians should 'get
their hands dirty'; that media workers provided with training in
'theory'; and that any 'insights' developed in the course of leftist
media production be systematically 'recorded', 'theoretized' and
disseminated through a national 'training' network.
However, to make full use of Korsch within a superstructurally-
oriented leftist praxis, it is valuable to link Korsch's theory-
practice notion to Enzensberger's more explicitly media-centric work.
Enzensberger (1974) has explicitly argued for an explicitly praxis-
oriented approach to the media and culture industry.
Enzensberger's (somewhat Maoist) challenge to historical
materialists (See Louw, 1985) was built around the theme that "so far
there is no Marxist theory of the media" (Enzensberger, 1974:96).
Although somewhat over-stated, this observation represents an important
recognition of the expanding 'superstructural nature' of capitalist
relations of production within the Information Age. By the 1970s --
wh~n Enzensberger 'produced his 'c ha l l e nge -- the growing
superstructuralism of capitalism in the First World was becoming
apparent. It was a phenomenon, as Enzensberger noted, to which
Marxist-Leninist 'practitioners' paid too little attention.
223
Enzensberger thus made a call to Leftists to engage in cultural
struggle . It represents in particular a concern specifically tied up
with counter-hegemonic work. Further, one sees in the call an attemp1
to challenge a leftist-theoretical tendency within his own historical
material context -- ie. West Germany and the USA-- towards a 'passive'
radical theoreticism derived form the Frankfurt School's influence on
media-scholarship. Enzensberger, in fact, serves as a useful 'link'
between the work of the Frankfurt School and the culturalists. This is
because his notion of a 'consciousness industry' is strongly derived
from the Frankfurt School's work (on the 'culture industry').
Enzensberger's 'voluntaristic' approach, however, sits more easily with
culturalist 'activism' of the Tomaselli (198Gb) variety.
South Africa entered the Information Age relations of production
much later than the USA or West Germany. The 1980s have seen South
Africa begin to be integrated in a peripheral way (Tomaselli, R.,
1989). However, there is no doubt that the South African left will
need to increasingly learn to deal with Information Age relations of
production and its associated ideological manipulation. Even a
government in South Africa using leftist rhetoric would not in reality
be able to shake itself free of HNC/Information Age relations of
production, given the contemporary balance of forces in the world.
Consequently, Enzensberger's ideas have resonance in a contemporary
South Africa where the need is for theoretically-guided 'action'
against: the ideo~ogical machinery of the reforming-Right (and their
world-wide HNC allies); as well as against the 'subjective' legacy of
decades of apartheid ideology.
Enzensberger's communicative praxis is derived from his notion that
Harx's method, developed viz-a-viz the 'economic system', can be
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'transferred' to the study of the media and other superstructures. But
this 'transference' does not take the form of the Althusserian attempt
to read 'structure' into the subjective. Rather, it is a less
pretentious search for 'media' contradictions. As Bennett (in
Gurevitch, 1983:149) notes, such a leftist inquiry into communication
and media would be:
motivated by the need to furnish a knowledge of their workings
that can be put to use in the production of subversive signifying
systems which might offset the effects of dominant ideology and
contribute to the formation of a revolutionary consciousness within
oppressed social groups and classes . .
Or, as Enzensberger (1974:96) puts it:
Monopoly capitalism develops the consciousness-shaping industry
more quickly and more extensively than other sectors of production:
it must at the same time fetter it. A socialist media theory has
to work at this contradiction, demonstrate that it cannot be sold
within the given productive relationships -- rapidly increasing
discrepancies, potential destructive forces.
A number of points need to be highlighted in Enzensberger's suggested
'praxis' approach to the media:
Firstly, his suggested praxis requires locating through analysis,
contradictions within capitalism, and 'using' these (see Enzensberger,
1974:99-100). This approach to communication would consist of: (a)
(reconstructed) historical material analysis; which (b) aims to
understand the workings, weaknesses and contradictions within the
rightist hegemony; in order that (c) such analysis helps in weakening
of the rightist hegemony; and (d) helps in finding ways to establish a
leftist-hegemony.
Secondly, Enzensberger does not see capitalism as an 'evil' that must
be avoided for fear of contamination (an attitude which certain
Frankfurt School members adopted). An Enzensbergian communicology
would consequently not be content with critique in a passive sense.
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Rather, it proposes that Leftists 'get their hands dirty' by
participating in the MNC/Information Age media system. By extension
into the South African context, a 'purist' argument for a 'boycott' of
racial-capitalist infrastructures (eg. SABC/SABC-TV) and 'dirty'
(capitalist) money, is naive. Hence Enzensberger proposes a
'voluntarism' in which an attempt must be made to try and find a
realistic method of acting so as to oppose the rightist order from
within. Instead of seeing MNC as entirely evil, Enzensberger sees it
as a potentially 'progressive' force that has helped create the
'opportunities for creating a leftist hegemony.
Applying these notions specifically to the media, Enzensberger
(1974:97) says:
For the first time in history, the media are making possible mass
participation in a social and socialized productive process, the
practical means of which are in the hands of the masses themselves.
This is clearly evident in South Africa, where developments in the
electronic media (eg. word processors; laser printers; computer
networking; tape recorders; photostat machines; video; etc) have opened
up possibilities for constructing democratic leftist communication, ego
in the form of local-level participative democracy (see Nigg & Wade,
1980). Some of these possibilities have already been exploited by
South African leftists (see Pinnock, 1991; Gorfinkel, 1989), despite
right-wing counter-action; others require to be exploited. All can be
used to a greater extent than is the case at present .
. Enzensberger notes how many of the 'possibilities' inherent in the
new Information technologies have been blocked by both MNC and (Soviet)
state socialist ruling elites because of their own self-interest
(Enzensberger, 1974:97, 105). The blockage in the Second World was
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especially acute, resulting in the Soviet bloc's incapacity to keep up
with MNC. Enzensberger criticizes Leftists like the Frankfurt School
who merely criticize this state of affairs but do "n o t h i ng to actually
'engage' the problem. He states:
The liberal superstition that in political and social questions
there is such a thing as pure, unmanipulated truth seems to enjoy
remarkable currency among the socialist Left. It is the unspoken
basic premise of the manipulation thesis. This thesis provides no
incentive to push ahead ... To cast the enemy in the role of the
devil is to conceal the weakness and lack of perspective in one's
own agitation. If the latter leads to self isolation instead of
mobilizing the masses, then its failure is attributed holus-bolus
to the overwhelming power of the media" (1974:101) ... [and] ...
These resistances and fears are strengthened by a series of
cultural factors which, for the most part, operate unconsciously,
and which are to be explained by the social history of the
participants in today's Left movement -- namely their bourgeois
class background. It often seems as if it were precisely because
of their progressive potential that the media are felt to be an
immense threatening power: because for the first time they present
a basic challenge to bourgeois culture and thereby to the
privileges of the bourgeois intelligensia -- a challenge far more
radical than any self-doubt this social group can display. In the
New Left's opposition to the media, old bourgeois fears such as the
fear of "the masses'l seem to be re-appearing along with the equally
old bourgeois longings for pre-industrial times dressed up in
progressive clothing" (Enzensberger, 1974:102).
Enzensberger instead calls for 'practice'; and if necessary
Machiavellian 'activism'. He makes the point that, "there is no such
thing as unmanipulated writing, filming, or broadcasting. The
question is not thereafter whether the media are manipulated, but who
manipulates them" (1974:104). Leftists should 'recognize' this point
and seek to 'use' it to advance leftist praxis. In other words, "a
revolutionary plan should not require the manipulators to disappear:
the contrary, it must make everyone a manipulator" (Enzensberger,
1974:104). This position represents a key leftist insight in the
Information Age: information technology is able to provide creative
Leftists with the potential basis upon which to construct a leftist
civil society based upon a participative grassroots democracy (ie. a
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practical implementation of a 'public sphere'). This point will be
developed in Chapter 6. To some extent the South African based
Grassroots model is an example of how media technology can be used by
Leftists to activate a mass grassroots leftist democracy (see Louw,
1989a; and Johnson, 1991; and Pinnock 1991). So for Enzensberger, the
information technology created by MNC needs to be democratically
appropriated and adapted by Leftists. However, Enzensberger's
(1974:116) contention is that:
With a single great exception, that of WaIter Benjamin (and in his
footsteps, Brecht,), Marxists have not understood · the consciousness
industry and have been aware only of its bourgeois-capitalist dark
side and not of its socialist possibilities.
That Enzensberger pointed to a serious gap in leftist praxis there is
no doubt. However, he did overstate his case because examples can be
found of attempts to utilize the media and communication for leftist
practice -- ego in Europe (see Nigg & Wade, 1980); Chile (Mattelart &
Siegelaub, 1983); South Korea (Kim, 1988); Philippines {Dionisio,
1986; Cruz, 1986j and Murphy, 1986)j Nicaragua {Mattelart, 1986j and
Broadbent , 1988)j and South Africa (Patel, 1985j Tomaselli 1986;
Tomaselli & Louw, 1988j and Louw, 1989aj and Mackay & Louw, 1990).
None-the-Iess, more can certainly be done, and Enzensberger's work
points to the fact that communication remains an under-developed area
in leftist praxis. What is certainly noteworthy is that more has been
done on a world-wide basis to promote the type of communication
advocated by Enzensberger by radical-liberals and progressive
Christians (see Media Development; and Group Media Journalj especially
White, 1980j and White 1983) than by Marxists. This only serves to
verify Enzensberger's critique.
For Enzensberger (1974:15), Leftists who 'opt out' of participating
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in the "Mind Industryll are de facto adopting a II r e a c t i on a r y course
ll.
For Enzensberger, the materialist 'theoretical purity' of Marxism is
unacceptable. Ironically such theoretical purity was the reason Marx
attacked the left Hegelians. He felt that their " r a d i c a l critique'
remained at the level of 'theory', and was consequently meaningless in
terms of altering the real world. How ironic then that after the
Marxist interpretation became hegemonic within the left, this approach
should itself fail to keep pace with the altering real world of a•
HNC/Information Age.
An Enzensbergian 'praxis' adopts the Machiavellian view that if the
Right 'plays dirty', the answer is to 'play dirty' right back, using
whatever means were available. In South African terms, such logic
leads to the conclusion that a 'purist-based' boycott of racial-
capitalist superstructures (eg. SABCj state educational and cultural
bodiesj etc}j theoretical purity (theoreticism) and 'critique'j or even
exile and/or emigration, may well be reactionary courses to adopt.
The answer is engaging instead with the 'consciousness industry' and
trying to co-opt even the 'dirtiest' of infrastructures.
Hence an Enzensbergian communicology will look at each new
'development' for the 'possibilities' it offers. It does not adopt a
Luddite mentality: it refuses a 'return' to past forms of culture.
Rather, existing communication and cultural forms would be examined for
their Leftist possibilities within a process of leftist aufhebung (see
Av~neri, 1968:37); Enzensberger's specific 'innovation' in this regard
was to seek out superstructural contradictions internal to
MNC/Information Age relations of production (Enzensberger, 1974:97-
lOO), as opposed to the traditional historical materialist concerns
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with material (economic) contradictions.
Enzensberger directs attention to the need to try and
'theoretically' and 'analytically' locate a whole new range of
potential MNC/Information Age 'contradiction-areas' ignored by
historical materialists. I will mention merely six of these.
(i) As Enzensberger notes, capitalism, in terms of its own inner
logic, has to keep expanding. In its MNC form it is 'compelled' to
create new superstructural innovation (eg., satellite-communication,
videotext, photostat machines; computers; tape recorders; videos,
etc.). All these new developments can be used by Leftists. It is
difficult for the Right to control this without damaging the economy
(Enzensberger, 1974:98-99). (In fact, were they to try it would
presumably lead to economic contradictions with MNC). During the 1980s
these sorts of gaps were, in fact, exploited by some South African
leftists (see Pinnock, 1989).
(ii) These superstructural 'gaps' can be used to 'expose' people to
leftist ideas. An example would be the way in which Marx's theory
(developed in Victorian England) has been superstructurally
'transferred' to Russia, and South Africa, where these ideas have had
enormous social impacts. Ironically, the existing order closes these
'gaps' (ie. 'censorship') at its own peril, because by such action it
blinds itself.
(iii) The 'gaps' can be used for leftist rhetoric. To do this,
Leftists would benefit by 'familiarizing' themselves with the culture
industry 'techniques' of advertising and public relations. In South
Africa the Left has generally given insufficient attention to
developing activists familiar with the practices of the 'mainstream'
media and/or public relations. This does not mean uncritically
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adopting the media practices of the mainstream capitalist media (which
Mattelart warns against); rather it means a pragmatic recognition that
competing with the Right may mean having to 'get one's hands dirty'.
This has been one of the reasons the ANC, for example, has acquired
such a poor media profile during 1990 [3] -- ie. the media has been
poorly used. (Organizations like DMTG have been (unsuccessfully)
attempting to redress this problem (see DMTG's 1990 Annual Report).
During a 'negotiation-based' struggle the failure to develop a good
media profile (while the NP invests considerable energy in this
direction) places the Left at a real disadvantage.
Of course, only seeking to use the South African 'mainstream' media
would never be sufficient for the Left. It also needs to develop an
explicitly leftist media parallel to the mainstream media. This
requires exploiting all available information technology to develop
leftist 'gaps'. During the 1980s the South African left did make moves
in this direction with the establishment of various forms of leftist
press (see Chapter 5); leftist audio-visual production units (eg. Audio
Visual Alternatives and cassette tapes (see Gorfinkel, 1989); leftist
media training projects (Grassroots 1984, 1984a, and 1986; CECS, n/d;
Pinnock, 1990; and Mackay & Louw, 1990); and leftist media unions such
as FAwo , NOVAW, ADJ, MWASA (Raubenheimer, 1991). However, in general
such activities have remained 'small' and 'marginal' in relation to
general leftist praxis .
. Developing such 'gaps' also serves to tie down rightist resources
within the Left-Right struggle. If the Right wants to shut down these
gaps it will require some investment of resources (eg. people-power,
and finance) to create and maintain a censorship mechanism. In any
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'attrition-type' war this would, as Enzensberger might predict, exact a
toll on a hegemony both in terms of wasted resources and lost
legitimacy. In South Africa, in fact, such attempts at censorship,
especially during the 1980s, did serve to damage the legitimacy of the
NP with its overseas (liberal-capitalist) backers and elements of the
internal liberal-bourgeoisies and petit bourgeoisie. This loss of
legitimacy did contribute to the application of sanctions, and hence
contributed to forcing the NP to the negotiating table.
(iv) The 'gaps' could also be used to create the sort of social
dialogue (or 'public sphere') proposed by Habermas. In certain
specific historical material circumstances, such a ' pub l i ~ sphere' may
assist in furthering social change. An example would be the period
1982 to 1985 in South Africa when, in an attempt to set up its
Tricameral system, the NP had to 'open up' society. This created the
'space' for the growth of the UDF and to set up leftist media projects.
The resultant 'public sphere' produced by such projects as Grassroots
did serve to 'politicize' and 'radicalize' many people. Attempts from
1986 to 1989 to shut down or narrow such gaps: (1) harmed the (already
bad) overseas image of the NP; (2) served to alienate potential
internal NP allies (eg. the liberal bourgeoisies and petit
bourgeoisies); and (3) could not, in any event, undo the politicization
and 'democratization' of consciousness already achieved.
(v) A Korsch-Enzensberger approach can also explain how, in certain
specific historical material circumstances, even capitalist advertising
could (inadvertently) help a leftist counter-hegemony. For example,
capitalism requires the selling of products to an ever widening market.
This leads to a superstructural phenomenon called advertising .
Advertising can create 'expectations' which the capitalist base then
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cannot fulfill. This, in turn, can lead to social conflict and change.
This very contradiction has turned into a real problem for the NP,
because their attempts since the early 1980s to create a black middle
class as a 'buffer', served to create expectations wider than the
'target' group which racial-capitalism did not have the resources to
fulfill. But once implementation of the strategy was underway the NP
could not abandon it without catalyzing even more 'unrest'.
(vi) The NP set up a political police network to gather intelligence,
create mis-information and repress its leftist opposition. This NSMS
information-gathering network (of the SP, NIS and DCI), however, opened
up the possibility of deliberate leftist manipulation through the
introduction of misinformation into the network -- ie. a mixture of
'truths', half-truths' and 'untruths'. (For example, when phones were
'bugged' left-activists were able to feed mis-information to those
monitoring the phones).
In addition to such 'superstructural opportunities', there is a
problem with Enzensberger's position -- namely it can lend itself to an
interpretation wherein the superstructures are seen as the only site
for leftist practice. This would violate the 'totality' approach to
reconstructing historical materialism proposed by this thesis.
Enzensberger 1974: 67) moves too close to a superstructuralist position
when he argues:
The mind industry is growing faster than any other, not excluding
armaments. It has become the key industry in the twentieth
century. Those who are concerned in the power game of today,
political leaders, intelligence men, and revolutionaries, have well
grasped this crucial fact. When an industrially developed country
is occupied or liberated today, whenever there is a coup d'etat a
I . 'revo ut1on, or a counterrevolution, the crack police units,
paratroopers, and guerilla fighters do not any longer descend on
the main squares of the city or seize the centres of heavy
industry, as in the nineteenth century, or symbolic sites like the
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royal palacej the new regime will instead take over, first of all,
the radio and television stations, the telephone and telex
exchanges, and the printing presses. And after having entrenched
itself, it will, by and large, leave alone those who manage the
public services and the manufacturing industries, at least in the
beginning, while all the functionaries who run t~e mi~d industry
will be immediately replaced. In such extreme s1tuat10ns the
industry's key position becomes quite clear.
Enzensberger has certainly recognized the shift of capitalism into
Information Age relations of production. However, the problem is
Enzensberger then goes on to over-privilege the superstructures. MNC is
not exclusively a superstructural mode of production -- ie. objective
material conditions (and contradictions) have not disappeared.
Enzensberger can be read as an abandonment of the material world. It
is this same sort of superstructuralism which, for example, leads to
his over-estimating the importance of media within a revolution or a
coup d'etat (Enzensberger, 1974:7). Communication cannot cause a
revolution on its own, no matter how effective it is. By extension,
neither can communication prevent a revolution, as the NP's WHAM-
strategists at one stage seemed to believe (see Louw & Tomaselli,
1990c).
This is where Korsch's ideas come in. Korsch offers a way to
'correct' Enzensberger's over-emphasis on the subjective. A 'balanced'
(Korschian) praxis would be undertaken as a 'whole' (subjective and
objective). In other words, from a Korschian perspective, even if
communication (rhetoric and dialogue) can potentially assist social
changej a praxis based on the subjective intervention is not enough on
its own. Communication can assist in bringing about social change, but
must never be mistaken for a 'full' praxis. Praxis requires that the
role of material-objective struggle also be accorded its place in the
'total' struggle. A Korschian approach would seek praxis in both
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(subjective and objective) terms simultaneously: it would consciously
avoid creating two 'sets' of praxis -- one 'voluntaristic' and
'subjective' (such as the stru~gle proposed by Lukacs, Gramsci,
Habermas, Enzensberger); and one economically-determined (such as the
struggle proposed by orthodox economistic-Marxists.
A meshing of Korsch and Enzensberger into a leftist-humanist
approach to communication would:
Firstly, explicitly incorporate the historical material premise that
one needs to understand the superstructure{s) [4] within the context of
a relationship with the objective-base. A Korschian-Enzensbergian
praxis would be based on a 'totalistic' view of existence that
incorporates both the subjective and objective, but which avoids
subjectivism and objectivism.
Secondly, the approach would seek to accommodate historical materialist
studies concerned with how humans 'make' their world materially, and
are 'made by' this world in the same process.
Thirdly, the approach could accommodate studies of economic
contradictions (such as those discussed by Marx).
Fourthly, by directing attention to the study of how humans also
construct (and are constructed by) their world in the superstructures,
the approach would thereby open up the possibilities of identifying
superstructural contradictions. A superstructural praxis could take
the form of either creating leftist media, and/or 'infiltrating' and
'exploiting' the 'gaps' and 'contradiction' within rightist media.
In' the fifth place, the approach offers an alternative to pure
superstructuralist approaches (either in the form of a leftist 'pure'
EnzensbergianisID, or a rightest WHAM approach). Such
superstructuralist approaches are at best 'partial' because of their
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underemphasis (or ignoring) of objective conditions.
However, in the sixth place, the combined theories direct attention
to both superstructural contradictions and communication as another
site of leftist action. In other words, the HNC superstructure(s} are
recognized as being potentially useful to the Left.
Such a 'turn to the superstructure' as a 'site' of practical
struggle opens up, for Leftists, a multitude of potential communicative
concerns, ranging from satellites to signs [5]. Undoubtedly, however,
the key practical concern for contemporary Leftists is to come to terms
with the Information (superstructural) Age; and to learn to use every
available superstructural 'gap' as a potential site of struggle.
What the combined theory does not address, however, is the 'nature'
of the communicative practice within such a struggle. To be more
specific, the superstructure could be 'used' either as (l) a leftist
'rhetorical tool', or (2) as a fulcrum for 'democratic action' in
leftist hegemony construction. The former would lend itself more
towards a valuable adjunct for a Leninist vanguardist approach, while
the latter would neatly complement a New leftist approach to leftist
struggle. (The latter can be seen in the work of Mattelart and
Habermas). Of course, in reality, the above two 'options' do not
present leftist activists with such a clear-cut (zero-sum) choice.
Rather, in the real South African leftist struggle, there will be a
'blurring' between the 'rhetorical' and 'dialogical' options. However,
for the purposes of discussion, this writer will proceed to deal with
the various (epistemological) contributions to 'media practice' in term
of this dichotomy.
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The Leninist Option: the superstructure, struggle and rhetoric
Lenin's ideas sit rather uneasily within a New Leftist (ie.
democratic leftist) interpretation of praxis. However, his work cannot
be ignored because his interpretation of leftist praxis does represent
a central part of the leftist legacy. Lenin is significant in any
consideration of the value of a rhetorical approach to leftist
superstructural action.
The media formed an important -- almost central (CCL, nd:27) --
component of Lenin's revolutionary strategy. His work is an excellent
example of what can be achieved by applying an alertness to
'possibilities' (Enzensberger's idea of 'gaps') available within the
'totality' of base and superstructure(s). But Lenin's was an astute
practical 'political' alertness rather than an explicitly
theoretically-derived alertness. It was his over-emphasis on practice,
and under-emphasis on theory which Korsch would argue led to the
(Stalinist) deformation of socialism. Despite this problem, however,
in the development of 'Marxist communication', Lenin did produce work
of value to any rhetorical 'superstructural praxis' (albeit work that
can be appropriated by either rightist or Leftist rhetoriticians).
From a communication theory perspective, Lenin's ideas on the media
are rather under-developed. This is hardly surprising considering: (a)
Lenin was concerned with (revolutionary) political organization and not
with communication per se; and (b) a specific concern with
communication theory had still to be developed in any form (Leftist,
or" otherwise). Lenin, in fact, adopted a Machiavellian attitude to the
media. It was mainly to be used for organization of a vanguardist
revolutionary party; and secondarily as a rhetorical device. Although
this writer would argue that Leftists need to go beyond vanguardism and
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rhetoric (ie. a concern for 'democracy' is also called for), the
Machiavellian approach to communication also has a role to play in
leftist struggle. This is perhaps especially true when Leftists face
Far~Rightist hegemonies (eg. South Africa prior to 1990; and Tsarist
Russia). However, that Lenin's ideas on communication were so
underdeveloped was a contributory factor in the 1980s crisis of Marxisu
in Eastern Europe because it led to an institutionalized form of
communicat ion that served to undermine democratic socialist ideals.
Lenin's work on the media has to be understood in the context of his
trying to organize a revolutionary party in the face of Tsarist
security police action. In other words, it was to be used as a means
to an end (CCL, nd: 21 and 23). That end was building an organization
and generating rhetoric. For Lenin, running a newspaper offered a
means of achieving a number of different organizational goals through
one particular practice. Firstly, he saw newspapers as a means of
propaganda. Secondly, newspapers were a means of organizing a Party
infrastructure. These two (propaganda and organization) were, however,






A "gathering" process (CCL, nd:l07) of revolutionary forces; and
A training of those who had been 'gathered' in collective and
organizing work. Propaganda, in its turn, could be used to create a
'sense of belonging'; (ie. an organizational requirement), and to
educate those gathered:
a diffusion throughout the organization of (Lenin's interpretation
of) Marxist theory; and
that all should be trained to be continually on the look-out for
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social contradictions and be prepared to take advantage of such
contradictions.
In other words, for Lenin the 'propaganda' and 'educational' functions
of newspapers served organizational endsj while organizing a newspaper
itself served the purpose of (i) generating practical organizational
experience (i.e. an educational function)j and (ii) creating a nation-
wide revolutionary network. These Leninist ideas were of obvious
practical value in the development of an underground organization (eg.
the ANC or SACP during the years when they were banned).
The heart of the Leninist approach to communication is contained in
his statement in Where to Begin that:
The role of a newspaper is not limited solely to the dissemination
of ideas, to political education, and to the enlistment of
political allies. A newspaper is not only a collective
propagandist and a collective agitator, it is also a collective
organizer. In this last respect it may be likened to the
scaffolding round a building under construction, which marks the
contours of the structure and facilitates communication between the
builders, enabling them to distribute the work and to view the
common results achieved by their organized labour. With the aid of
the newspaper, and through it, a permanent organization will
naturally take shape that will engage, not only in local
activities, but in regular general work, and will train its members
to follow political events carefully, appraise their significance
and their effect on the various strata of the population, and
develop effective means for the revolutionary party to influence
those events. The mere technical task of regularly supplying the
newspaper with copy and of promoting regular distribution will
necessitate a network of local agents of the united party, who will
maintain constant contact with one another, know the general state
of affairs, get accustomed to performing regularly their detailed
functions in the All-Russia work, and test their strength in the .
organization of various revolutionary actions. This network of
agents will form the skeleton of precisely the kind of organization
we need -- one that is sufficiently large to embrace the whole
countrYj sufficiently broad and many sided to effect a strict and
detailed division of labourj sufficiently well tempered to be able
to conduct steadily its own work under any circumstances, at all
"sudden turns", and in the face of contingenciesj sufficiently
flexible to be able, on the one hand, to avoid an open battle
against an overwhelming enemy, when the enemy has concentrated all
its forces at one spot, and yet, on the other hand, to take
advantage of his unwieldiness and to attack him where he least's
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expects it" (CCL, nd: 39-40).
So Lenin approached the media from the perspective of an
organizational lie. Party) man concerned with revolutionary practice,
not revolutionary theory. His approach to the press was that of a
practical Marxist politician. This is reflected in his concern for thE
following sorts of practical issues:
* how newspaper work can help train Communist Party organizers
(CCL, nd: 101-102);
* how newspaper work can help identify and train Communist Party
leadership (CCL, nd: 102);
* how newspapers can be used to teach Leninist-Marxist theory (CCL,
nd: 21 and 60-61);
* how newspaper work can be used to train those involved to: think
'politically' (CCL,nd:103); learn to be organizationally flexible
(CCL, nd:118); learn to cope with security police pressures (CCL,
nd:91 and 120); and learn to solve practical organizational
problems;
* how newspaper work can be used to develop new (non-bourgeois)




how newspaper work can be used to develop a two-way flow of
information ie.: (a) the 'vanguard' leadership (in Lenin's case,
an exile leadership) can communicate with their supporters (CCL,
nd: 71); and (b) how local newspaper workers can collect local
information and so keep the leadership informed (CCL, nd:95);
how local Party organizations can best use the centrally produced
newspaper in terms of their local needs (CCL, nd:139);
how a centrally controlled (by the 'vanguard') newspaper can be
used as a Communist Party unifier (CCL,nd:8-9); through creating
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a 'sense of belonging' (CCL, nd:109-110) amongst the
revolutionary Party members constructed upon the basis of a
populism (CCL, nd:74-75);
* the idea of using the media for self-critique (CCL, nd: 142-143)
and to encourage a debate amongst the left alliance (CCL, nd: 20
and 25);
* the need to use limited resources in the most 'cost-effective'
way (CCL, nd: 96-97 and 112); which meant he favoured one
centralized press, not many (localized) presses (CCL, nd:90 and
94);
* he recognized the need to show sufficient flexibility to use the
legal media and conventional media practices where this was
possible and useful (CCL, nd: 98);
* the preparedness to use all methods -- including arms -- in an
integrated, or "entire system "of struggle" (CCL, nd:36) which
would include the media. In this regard, Lenin's practical
concern with how to centrally organize and plan the entire range
of methods used is of importance in understanding Lenin's work.
This is particularly important viz a viz his ideas on the media
because he saw the media-distribution network as central to his
planned 'integration mechanism' (CCL, nd:39);
* Lenin's own flexibility was displayed in his preparedness to
concede a certain amount of local 'autonomy' to Party workers
with regard "to leaflet production (CCL, nd:43 and 46 and 93), and
with regard with how they used the centrally produced newspaper
(CCL, nd: 139). His distinction between: (a) a newspaper as a
central organ of Communist Party unity and teacher of theory; and
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(b ) leaflets as a method of local exposure and agitation (CCL,
nd: 89-93) is an interesting example of Lenin's practical
approach to the media, wherein his own centralized power base is
retained, but not in so rigid a way that local issues cannot be
exploited.
The most important feature of Lenin's theory of the media is that it
is a conception of communication that favours rhetoric. From a
practical point of view (ie. in view of the Tsarist regime Lenin
proposed) this may make sense. However, from the perspective of a
democratic-socialism, it is a problematic of communication strategy,
especially if inertia sets in (ie. even if such a communication
strategy was acceptable while fighting the Tsarist regime, was it an
appropriate communication to institutionalize after the Left had
defeated the White Armies, and were solidly in power?). From a New
Leftist perspective, Leninist communication is problematic because it
violates the principles of democratic dialogue (see Habermas, 1974).
It is an inherently top-down communication which negates mass
democratic participation in social policy formation. Mattelart (1980)
has, of course, argued for a dialogical communication strategy to
complement the idea of a democratic socialism. One can, in fact, even
see a tension in Lenin's writing between his view that (i) a Leftist
all-class (populist) alliance be constructed based upon intra-Party
democratic dialogue; and (ii) his argument for a centralized rhetoric-
producing Party. Lenin was primarily concerned with practical
problems, and so was prepared to 'suspend' Marxist ideals when
practical considerations 'necessitated' this. The outcome, however,
was the development in Eastern Europe of a communication system that
only served to 'blind' the communist ruling elites about the actual
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conditions in their own societies. Instead of facilitating social
dialogue the communication infrastructures became de facto uni-
directional (and top-down). This served to: cut the ruling elite off
from grassroots feeling. For the East European Left this communication
infrastructure became a closed circuit within which self-confirming
ideas circulated. This ultimately discredited Leninist-socialism in
Eastern Europe due to the lack of opportunity the average person was
given to feel a sense of participation in a meaningful social
discourse.
The Leninist-rhetorical option 'violates' the democratic-socialist
interpretation of leftist praxis. However, it must be recognized that
this approach may be sound 'practical politics' in certain contexts.
(In fact, it constitutes the only practical leftist option in some
contexts other than accepting defeat). For example, under the
repression of the States of Emergency in South Africa between 1986 and
1989, operating an open democratic oppositional communication became
more and more difficult. As a result, the NP, in effect, compelled the
left to adopt a Machiavellian mode of communication and organization.
The danger of such situations is that undemocratic practices become
'ingrained'. An adjustment away from these practices becomes difficult
once they are no longer required. The USSR appears to have experienced
such inertia.
A possible key to prevent the 'permanent' abandoning of the 'ideal'
of democratic socialism would be for the theory-practice relationship
to be explicitly kept in mind at all times. In other words, when the
ideal (ie. in communication terms: democratic-leftist dialogue) is
being 'violated' due to practical conditions, this 'suspension' of
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theory should be (a) acknowledged; (b) recognized as 'temporarily'
necessary; and (c) the situation continually re-appraised in order
that, if conditions improve, the practically-necessitated deviation
from theory can be abandoned. One means of achieving this is to train
leftist media workers in: 'non-ideal' rhetorical (Machiavellian)
communication methods, as well as an 'ideal' (leftist-democratic)
communication theory. (This point will be developed further in Chapter
6). This should help prevent the retention (due to inertia) of any
Leninist-type practices beyond when these are practically required.
Beyond Rhetoric: constructing ~ leftist media for ~ mass participatory
democracy
Rhetoric will play a part in any struggle. However, there is no need
to stop there. If the aim is the production of a democratic socialism,
then rhetoric is not enough. For Leftists the key is to consider ways
of mobilizing communication and the media not as rhetorical tools, but
as as a form of democratic action (or social dialogue). This chapter
briefly examines the ideas of three theorists who have produced
important work in this area, namely:
i. Enzensberger's call to seek out and use all technological
opportunities produced by capitalism as both contradictions and/or
mechanisms to further the production of a mass participative
democracy.
ii. Mattelart's work on popular communication, and
iii. Habermas' work in the areas of the 'public sphere' and
'legitimation crisis'.
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Enzensberger's call for mass participation in the media
The question is not whether the media are manipulated, but who
manipulates them. A revolutionary plan should not require the
manipulators to disappear; on the contrary, it must make everyone
[my emphasis] a manipulator (Enzensberger, 1974:104).
In this statement Enzensberger throws out a number of challenges.
These include: (1) by insisting the "everyone" be made a manipulator,
Enzensberger, de facto rejects the Leninist vanguard rhetorical
approach (2). He offers an implicit rejection of Frankfurt School
critical passivity; (3) implies a hegemony-building process of the New
Leftist/Eurocommunist variety; and (4) specifically directs attention
to the media as a site of democratic leftist action. Yet Enzensberger
is also a 'bridge' between many different historical materialist
approaches to communication/media (ironically, these include some of
which he does not approve) because his approach 'overlaps' with a
number of different ideas. Examples of these are the Frankfurt
School's 'culture industry'; Gramsci's ideas on hegemony; the
culturalist theory of an active popular culture; Althusser's notion of
ISAs; Mattelart's idea of 'popular' communication; Habermas' arguments
on a legitimation crisis and a public sphere. In a way, he also draws
upon Lenin's radical media interventionism.
Enzensberger' challenge is primarily based upon his reading of
Benjamin (1973), who called for radicals to make full use of whatever
technological possibilities existed to further the cause of socialism·
and democracy -- ie. a rejection of 'boycotting' structures disapproved '
of. For Enzensberger (1974:116) this means that "the Marxist Left
should ... develop in depth all the liberatory factors" inherent in
contemporary media technology as developed by capitalism. According to
Enzensberger, it was to Benjamin's credit that he (as a Frankfurt
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School 'dissident') recognized in capitalist superstructural ('culture
industry') developments not merely another form of domination, but also
new sites of contradictions and 'possibilities' for Leftists to use
(Enzensberger, 1974: 119-121).
Three assumptions underpinning Enzensberger's work could be
profitably incorporated into a praxis-oriented New Leftist
reconstruction of historical materialism. These are:
i. The challenge to turn away from economism and to seek out and
exploit the 'revolutionary potential' of the superstructure.
Enzensberger (1974:9) attacks Marxists who have not attempted to
deal with the superstructure and its contradictions, for being
"inept". On~ could go further and suggest that this Marxist
ineptitude to keep up with developments in superstructural
relations of production ultimately proved to be a significant
factor leading to the collapse of Eastern European state socialism.
ii. His recognition that the media themselves are possible sites of
conflict is an important notion for a leftist communicology. At the
centre of Enzensberger's (1974:13) approach is the idea that "the
mind industry has a dynamic of its own which it cannot arrest ...
there are currents which run contrary to its present mission of
stabilizing the status quo". The contradictions generated include:
(1) the fact that the status quo media "depends on the very
substance it must fear most ... : the creative productivity of
people" (Enzensberger, 1974:5); (2) the tensions and conflicts
within society will be 'imported' into the media themselves (no
matter how hard the status quo attempts to exclude them). Hence
conflicts will emerge in the media (Enzensberger, 1974:96) which
radicals need to recognize as potential 'gaps' within MNC; (3)
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'growth' (ie. a driving force in capitalism) demands that an
element of 'choice' be granted and developed (Enzensberger, 1974:
12), hence again opening 'gaps'; and (4) the legitimation-industry
of liberal-capitalism 'proclaims' democracy. Yet, as Habermas has
also noted, this 'proclamation' in the absence of de facto
'implementation' poses a huge potential problem for the
technocratic-management 'needs' of monopoly capital if the
'proclamation' were ever to be taken seriously (Enzensberger, 1974:
11). It is the task of Leftists to use all available 'gaps' to
promote the idea that the 'promise' of democracy be realized.
iii the superstructures are themselves one of the sites of
contradictions produced by HNC in the Information Age. This is a
seminal insight (Enzensberger, 1974:14, 99). Enzensberger
(1974 :97) recognizes that electronic-information technology (eg.
PCs, satellites, fibre-optic cabling, computer networking, etc) now
make mass participatory democracy technically possible. It only
requires the lifting o~ existing status quo 'restrictions' and the
allocation of societal resources in this direction. A mass
participatory democracy based on electronic information technology
is equally possible in South Africa. Arguments that this country
is a developing Third World society without the necessary resources
to join the Information Age are patronizing and inept. Such
arguments cloak a racism which relegates the Third (or South) World
to automatic underdeveloped status (Tomaselli & Tomaselli, 1983).
Developing South Africa in this direction merely requires the
social decision to allocate the resources for the necessary
training and technology.
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This democratic 'possibility' is a potential 'Pandora's Box' of
problems for HNC. None-the-Iess, it is driven by its own internal
dynamic to develop this potentiality to make capitalist extraction
more efficient. HNC superstructural-technocracy is hence
developing its own potential 'grave-digger' in the form of
technology that makes mass democratic mobilization possible.
Enzensberger has, in effect, transferred Harx's notion of material
contradiction to the superstructure. Those controlling monopoly
capital can only stop the development of superstructural
contradictions at the cost of deliberate economic regression (ie.
an anathema to the laws of capital) (Enzensberger, 1974:98-100).
For Enzensberger (1974:103), this is a contradiction capitalism
cannot resolve.
Each of these assumptions has enormous implications for development
theory. In the reconstruction and development of Southern Africa (in
the wake of the apartheid-derived wars) consideration could profitably
be given to finding ways of reading Enzensberger's ideas into local
development projects. For example, in the 'Superstructural Age',
development needs to direct significant attention to 'communication'.
For the Left the challenge is to develop progressive communication
relations.
Enzensberger's ideas pose a particular set of challenges for a
leftist communicology:
* The need to re-think the role of the petit bourgeois intellectual
(ie. those who 'staff' the superstructures), such that Leftists find
ways to 'conceptualize' and 'develop' petit bourgeois information
workers as 'contradictions' for HNC (Enzensberger, 1974:5, 14-15).
This idea is an extension of Gramsci's work on intellectuals.
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* The need to identify and utilize the technological POSSIBILITIES
generated by capitalism to further leftist praxis. In this regard
Enzensberger's ideas are Benjamin-derived (Enzensberger, 1974:116,
119). For Enzensberger, electronic information technology holds
real possibilities for emancipation and democracy (Enzensberger,
1974:97, 124, 122). In other words, these media developments have
"progressive potential" (Enzensberger, 1974: 102). This particular
Enzensbergian notion becomes especially valuable when read together
with Mattelart's ideas on popular communication.
For Enzensberger, electronic information technology makes direct
feedback, and hence dialogical-interaction, a real possibility. As
he says: "the new media are egalitarian in structure" (Enzensberger,
1974:105). For Enzensberger, there is no longer any technological
reason for blocking the development of an interactive media network.
The technology developed by capitalism now makes possible an
activated 'audience', in which the media become FACILITATORS of
social dialogue, rather than mechanisms through which (one-
directional) information is disseminated. Enzensberger (1974:97) is
of the opinion that only class rule (ie. elitist vested interests)
prevents the utilization of this 'potentiality' and the consequent
'democratization' of the m~dia. In true Marxist fashion,
Enzensberger sees capitalism as simultaneously having created the
conditions for socialism and as responsible for blocking the
potentialities it has created. One could extend this argument to
include the way in which a Leninist vanguard nomenklatura (new
elitist 'class'?) also blocked the development of a leftist-democracy
in Eastern Europe.
* The need for collective organization to develop and use the
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democratic potentialities of the new media (Enzensberger, 1974:109-
110).
Ways of achieving a democratic socialist media strategy will be
explored further in this chapter through the work of Mattelart and
Habermas. A 'democratized' media, should provide: (1) the means to
organize the democratic opposition to capitalist domination; and (2)
the superstructural fulcrum for a democratic leftist ordering of
society (Enzensberger, 1974: 113). This 'ideal' can serve as a useful
theoretical 'introduction' to the work on democratic (socialist) media
done by both Mattelart and Habermas. Enzensberger's media strategy
entails:
(1) Making everyone a manipulator (Enzensberger, 1974:104-107), through
utilizing the 'egalitarian potential' available in contemporary media
technology (eg. the electronic media, word-processing, etc). This will
make everyone a 'producer' of media messages. Further, following
Habermas, Enzensberger proposed that West European and North American
Leftists take liberal-capitalism at its word and rather than "demolish
its promises ... take them literally" (Enzensberger, 1974:113). If
Habermas is correct this would generate a 'legitimation crisis' for
technocratic-MNC. At one stage this idea may have appeared less than
applicable in South Africa (see Louw, 1982:127-8). But the 1990
reforms seem set to integrate South Africa into the Western (MNC-
'liberal'?) mould (possibly even administered by a neo-leftist
compradors). For this reason such a suggestion should not be too easily
discounted in the post-1990 context.
(2) A rejection of the 'consumption model' of communication
(Enzensberger, 1974:106) which has informed liberal-capitalist,
rightist-authoritarian and Soviet vanguardist media. This uni-
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directional (top-down) communication pattern holds true for the South
African 'mainstream' media in both its commercial and state forms.
(3) An explicit attempt to utilize the media as a mass mobilizer for
the 'production of an active participatory population. This is the
basis for a democratic socialist ordering of society (Enzensberger,
1974:114). In South Africa it is the progressive-alternative media
which in particular has (with varying degrees of success), moved some
way towards attempting to build such 'mobilizing' media (see Chapter
6 ) .
(4) An explicit attempt to reformulate a role for petit bourgeois
information workers and intellectuals (eg. journalists). Enzensberger
is opposed to the (vanguardist) notion of the 'expert' who 'teaches'
the masses (ie. imposes ideas). For him, the radical journalist has to
act as an "agent of the masses" (1974:128) in such a fashion that
his/her objective is to develop the media's democratic potentialities.
For most petit bourgeois intellectuals this implies a de facto 'de-
expertizing' of themselves. So if one is a leftist journalist aiming
to 'empower' the masses, it necessarily implies 'dis-empowering'
oneself.
Enzensberger wants to get away from the middle class perception
(common amongst petit bourgeois journalists) that the middle
classes 'know' what the subaltern groups 'want', and certainly know
what is 'best for them' (ie. what they should want!). He goes so
far as to suggest that many leftist intellectuals carry the same .
fear of the masses as do their conservative colleagues. This is
the reason for their vanguardist approach (Enzensberger, 1974:102,
110-111). En~ensberger's demand is that subaltern groups
should be empowered so that they can speak for themselves. This
notion coincides Franz Fanon's (1968) conception of revolution
as a mass participative action, rather than a petit bourgeois led
insurrection. This notion also ties in well with Mattelart's work
on 'popular' social organization, and complements the New Leftist
notion of a popular hegemony where all groups and classes should be
given a voice. Such a popular and empowering communication system
fundamentally differs from the Leninist-vanguardist approach to
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leftist praxis. Chapter 6 will further develop the notion of such a
leftist-democratic communication system.
(5) A recognition of the need for collective organization as the basis
for emancipation from domination. Enzensberger's real interest in the
media springs from this concern. In other words, he recognizes the
immense potential of the mass media (if used dialogically) to activate
and empower the masses such that they can recognize their own
potential for self-emancipation if they collectively organize
themselves (Enzensberger, 1974:110). He also recognized the potential
of the media for ending isolation (anomie) (Enzensberger, 1974:109). A
leftist strategy using mass mobilization geared towards developing a
mass participative media network offers much potential for the
development of a real leftist democracy (see Chapter 6).
Enzensberger raises some interesting theoretical points for
consideration by those seeking to develop a democratic South African
praxis communication. However, it is really Mattelart who introduces
some practical Third World input into this field.
Towards democratic superstructural praxis: Mattelart's popular
communication
Mattelart -- a Belgian academic who worked in Chile ' from 1962 to
1973 -- developed a particularly valuable New-Left oriented
'theoretical' formulation of the media "as 'democracy-in-action'. It
complements both the Gramscian and Williams/culturalist dimensions of"
CCS. The value of Mattelart lies in the grounding of his theory in (I)
the concrete experience of attempts to construct democratic socialist
hegemonies in Chile and Nicaragua; (2) the fact that both Chile and
Nicaragua represented popular (multi-class) leftist struggles (similar
to the South African MDM experience); (3) the similarities between the
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Chilean and South African social formations; and (4) the fact that both
the Chilean and Nicaraguan struggles suffered severe setbacks.
An understanding of Mattelart's view of the media requires knowledge
about the nature of popular resistance. This Latin American phenomenon
can be traced back to the Allende democratic socialist experiment in
Chile from 1970 to 1973. An alliance of North American MNC and Chilean
fascism defeated this experiment in popular-alliance government
(Chanan, 1976). However, the lessons learned in Chile survived to
influence other Leftists. This ultimately led to the revival of a
successful left-popular Chilean alliance in 1989.
The popular lessons learned in Chile (1970-73) resurfaced in the
Nicaraguan revolution (in 1979) where a Sandanista popular (multi-
class) alliance emerged as a combination of revolutionary Marxist-
Leninist theory, nationalism and anti-imperialism (Mattelart, 1986:
48). The Sandanista alliance was concerned with both socialism and
- - - - - - -- ---
democracy. This resulted in a policy favouring a mixed economy and
political pluralism (Mattelart, 1986:9). This rep'~esented a
significant, and pragmatic, departure from orthodox Marxism's stres~ on
~-
the exclusive working class nature of leftist revolution. n the
Nicaraguan instance, constructing a leftist-hegemony was seen as
------
requiring a pluralist ( ~~!ti-c~~ss) eLfor-t-(Ma~te]8rt. 1986:17}. The
In Nicaragua, this 'project'
initially attempted to: "articulate different political and social
sectors around the construction of a civil society in a country where
it has always been stifled, as coercion and exclusion prevailed ove~
consensus" (Mattelart, 1986:17).
During the early years of Sandanista rule Nicaragua represented a
fascinating example of a Leftist attempt to construct a multi-class
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leftist pluralist alliance. However, the experiment went sour. The
rightist USA-backed Contras, together with direct USA military
intervention (mining harbours, attacking airfields and oil depots, etc)
placed an enormous strain on the Nicaraguan experiment. The
Sandanistas were placed under siege (a small-scale version of what the
USA did to the Soviet bloc). This siege effectively militarized the
Sandanistas. (Hilitarization means top-down 'commanderist'
communication patterns). In the process, the Sandanistas lost contact
with their original bottom-up popular approach, and hence with the
grassroots civil society. They lost touch to the extent that they were
seemingly unaware of the level of war-wariness in their society. As a
result, they lost an election they had clearly expected to win in 1990.
The parallels the Left has to deal with between the contexts of
Nicaragua and South Africa are clear. If the Left wanuto win
elections they cannot rely on 'automatic' support from 'the People'[6].
Support has to be won and retained. The most effective way for
achieving this is to build (and maintain) two-way communication
channels. During 1990 the ANC was not even successful in achieving such
communication within its own (Party) ranks, never mind on a wider
social scale. The ANC, in fact, was characterized during 1990 by a
top-down 'commanderist' style (WIP, No. 70/71, 1990).
The concept 'popular' is derived from "the idea of men and women ~
united, linked by objective situations and the consciousness of living
together, capable of developing solutions for their survival and
liberation" (Mattelart, 1983:18). Further, popular implies 'opposition'
to a specific type of 'situation', namely opposition to HNC
exploitation (Mattelart, 1983:24). However, popular opposition to
254
exploit~tion is explicitly mobilized on a 'multi-class', 'non-factory'
basis (Mattelart, 1983:65). (This does not mean that working class and
factory-based mobilization does not take place as well). It is this
form of mobilization which leads to the need to develop a form of
(pluralist) alliance-building. This then raises (within such an
alliance) issues of 'democracy' and 'freedom of expression' (see
Mattelart, 1983: 55). This approach represents a Third-Worldization of
Poulantzian-Eurocommunist ideas. One could also see the hand of
Gramsci in early Sandanista ruled Nicaragua. The organization of the
resistance resulting therefrom is, as a result, pushed in the direction
of a 'grassroots' (bottom-up/ popular) mobilization based on the open
articulation of differences in interests. By extension the
organization of resistance is pushed away from the top-down (ie
populist) approach of mobilization. (See Honawana's (1983:37)
discussion of this in the Mocambiquan context.
A successful popular resistance should result in popular culture.
This is culture created in the process of joint active resistance by
ALL subaltern groups (ie. in terms of class, culture, ethnicity, sex,
etc) (Mattelart, 1983: 33). During the first half of the 1980s,
Nicaragua represented such an innovation in resistance. In other
words:
The Nicaraguan revolution is original in that it is a site where
people of many nationalities converge, a site where people
belonging to different currents of thought and ways of seeing the
world have had little occasion in the past to come together and now
find each other face to face with differences (Mattelart, 1986:26).
The resultant mode of resistance requires and develops methods of joint
action in which subaltern 'partnership' replaces domination by anyone
interest group. In other words, "the necessity of constructing social
alliances prevails over the 'dictatorship of the proletariat"
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(Mattelart, 1986:17). As Mattelart (1983:31) notes~ "a false
conception would be to envisage it [popular struggle] as the working
class' colonization of the other groups and classes". Mattelart
(1983:34), in fact, notes that Leftists need to come to terms with the
dl ' . ,fact that the working class can often be profoun y unprogress1ve .
In the place of a single-minded 'workerism', a popular resistance
rather mobilizes a new 'joint' culture of resistance: a culture
produced in the course of the collective (multi-class, multi-group)
struggle.
A similar approach developed in South Africa during the 1980s. A
leftist (MDM) alliance developed, drawing support from many sectors:
'black' workers; professionals, students, and the petit bourgeoisie
(drawn from the whole spectrum of 'ethnic' groups); African peasants;
lumpen-proletariat; and even sections of the business class (see UDF,
nd: 17-25; and Swilling, 1987).
Out of this dynamic comes a new energy that needs to be organized.
In fact, popular energy is precisely the result of collective
organization (Mattelart, 1983:30). This necessitates popular
(democratic) structures of resistance (Mattelart, 1986:24), and
increases the importance of the media. This is because the media are
required" to help constitute a political subject which substitutes a
collective subject ('people') for subject "public opinion.'! This non~
mythical 'people' is composed of artisans and peasants, working
class, liberal professions, and also businessmen" (Mattelart, 1986:17).
Out of this diversity (and without suppressing differences) can be
created a joint (national) popular culture. In this sense, Mattelart
replicates Fanon's (1968:233) forward-looking concept of national
256
culture made in the process of struggle [7]. However, if such a
(national) popular culture is to be actively produced it will require a
creative Leftist use of the media to facilitate its generation. It
further requires that the Left does not fall into the (leftist) trap of
proclaiming a (mythological) 'People' (and then 'imposing' this myth
onto everyone).
In deeply pluralistic and/or divided societies the development of a
unified national culture will be a difficult task. South Africa is one
such society. In such societies a unified popular culture is hence not
the result of spontaneity. It is the result of concerted organization
(Mattelart, 1986:24). This is not necessarily the antithesis of
Williams' culturalist ideas, as it may at first appear. Rather it is a
recognition that in some societies (eg. apartheid South Africa)
cultural deformity is a fact. Some forms of popular culture may even
be tied to separation, and hence a violation of a national unity. For
example, a 'black township' culture (even a leftist resistance black
township culture) must not be mistaken for a unified South African
popular culture. Rather, it is the culture of only one section of 'the
People'. A unified (ie. national) popular culture is likely to
require the intervention of cultural workers in order to bring it to
fruition. As Mattelart (1983:29) says: "Popular culture is
indissociable from the collective forms of organization used by
subaltern groups to translate their resistance into a strategy
overthrowing the system and changing established structures."
This approach was developed during the early years of Sandanista-
ruled Nicaragua. According to Mattelart 1986:17), "for the first time
in the history of young revolutions, Gramsci's concept of hegemony had
made its appearance, not only in discourse and programmes but also in
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practice". Mattelart was only partially correct in this assessment
because South Africans traversed similar organizational ground during
the 1980s in the form of the MDM.
Such organized resistance has as it~ aim the mobilization of
grassroots activity through the stimulation of "popular initiative and
participation" (Mattelart, 1983: 25). It represents an explicit
refusal of top-down manipulation -- ie. 'revolution by decree'
(Mattelart, 1980: 84) -- in favour of bottom-up (ie democratic) control
over the direction of change. In South African terms it was this
bottom-up democratic approach that most clearly separated the MDM from
both the NP's top-down approach to 'reform' in the 1980s, and to the
top-down populism of organizations like Inkatha.
Popular organization is opposed to the 'passivity' implicit in the
idea of being 'led' into a new mode of social organization (Mattelart,
1983: 27). Mattelart (1986:18) notes that the Nicaraguan popular
revolution explicitly rejected the Leninist vanguardist model.
(Although Mattelart has recognized (1986:12-15) that in certain
'hostile' historical material contexts a Leninist approach may be
'needed'). Certainly a popular approach sees democracy as of central
importance in constructing a popular culture (Mattelart, 1986: 24).
Democracy also necessitates an active grassroots organization, where
all citizens need to speak for themselves. However, this often
presents some problems. These include how to (1) generate such
activity amongst subaltern groups socialized into passivity, and
expecting to be 'led'; (2) generate a 'co-operative consciousness'
(Mattelart, 1983: 26) as the basis for popular-alliance resistance; (3)
prevent a consequent collapse of decision-making capacity (i.e. a
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democratic anarchy); and (4) prevent the development of de facto
vanguardist leadership -- as an outcome of frustration of the 'anarchy'
(mentioned in point three, and/or due to the emergence of a group of
leaders who know how to manipulate popular democratic sentiments).
Activating and maintaining grassroots democracy is a difficult task
requiring new forms of organization and communication (Mattelart,
1983:30). Once the Sandanistas turned their primary attention to
militarily defeating the USA-backed Contrast they paid too little
attention to maintaining the communication channels with the Nicaraguan
grassroots. The Sandanistas eventually violated their own popular
approach. Instead of engaging in popular hegemonic labour to win and
maintain support, they fell into the trap of assuming they had the
(automatic) support of 'the People'. It is a trap the Left (including
the South African Left) needs to pay serious attention to, because
leftist rhetoric concerning the (mythological) 'People' easily leads to
such complacency.
Given that this popular approach is difficult, and even
'controversial' within leftist circles (since it requires a significant
revision of historical materialist principles), the question could be
asked: why adopt this approach? The answer is that the nature of
domination and suppression has not stood still. It is not only the
proletariat which now faces exploitation and domination from MNC.
In the Information Age there are "new forms of social control, new
sources of inequality, and new forms of confrontation based on the
mastery of knowledge and know-how" (Mattelart, 1983:57). Many
different sectors now all face same basic challenge from what Mattelart
(1983:17) calls this new "creeping system of domination". This system
is based upon a 're-making' of world capitalist relations of production
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(Mattelart, 1983:62-3). Given the plurality of modes of domination
within the MNC/Informations Age ego in terms of class, race, nation,
gender, religion, etc. -- it is hardly surprising that a plurality of
(new) responses to domination are emerging (Mattelart, 1983: 17).
These changes pose a challenge to Leftists to adapt and to seek new
contradictions and new allies, and in particular to recognize the
potential importance of communication and the 'culture industry' within
the leftist struggle (Mattelart, 1980 : xviii). What is now required
is to weld these new multi-faceted (multi-class) responses into a
popular alliance. Amongst the sectors whose interests may now co-
incide with the workers' opposition to MNC are: peasants, the lumpen-
proletariat, and information workers (academics, teachers, journalists,
and computer programmers). Mattelart 1983:62} argues that many workers
organizations in the capitalist metropoles have failed to match up to
the challenge of welding all these sectors into an alliance (Mattelart,
1983: 62). He might have added that the Marxists of Eastern Europe
fared even worse in adjusting to this challenge. Their failure led to
the anti-Marxist revolutions of 1989/90. Further, there is a need to
recognize that Leftists cannot expect a 'necessary' uniform progressj
ie. 'the dialectic' is not necessarily 'progressive'. Rather, 'the
struggle' will be characterized by advances and withdrawals (Mattelart,
1983:18). It is up to Leftists to work at maximizing the periods of .
advance and minimizing the periods of withdrawal, and not to await some
hidden hand ('the dialectic') to 'deliver' progress towards leftist
hegemony.
For Mattelart (1983:17) the 're-making' of capitalism demands that
all those "who t ggl . t ths ru e aga~ns e power apparatus, who refuse the
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exploitation of 'human beings by human beings', certain classes by
other classes, certain races by other races, certain nations by other
nations, certain peoples by other peoples", now need to 're-make' their
struggle in the form of a popular (pluralistic) opposition. Building
pluralistic leftist hegemonies is required. This approach will be
learned by 'doing' it in each specific historical material context (ie.
no two 'alliances' are going to be the same). However, Mattelart does
offer some basic guidelines for such popular hegemonic work:
(1) His approach amounts to a New Leftist rejection of the old reified
and ossified Marxist 'models' (Mattelart, 1983:60). It represents a
break with a reified Leninist model of a 'centralized' (Mattelart,
1983:38) and 'decreed' revolution (Mattelart, 1980:84).
(2) New forms of domination (derived from the 're-ordering' of world
capital into the MNC/Information Age) have opened up new
'possibilities' for radical opposition (Mattelart, 1983:58). However,
this requires an 'openness' to new forms of resistance, and to the
mobilization of pluralist alliances (Mattelart, 1986:14) and popular
communication (Mattelart, 1980:46). One of the key new features of
contemporary domination identified by Mattelart is the fact that
"capitalism today finds it impossible to allow the existence of a
critical petit bourgeoisie" (Mattelart, 1983: 66). This need to
'tighten up 'is related to the crisis world capitalism has faced since
the 1970s (Innes, 1984:190) [8]. This crisis has also produced the 'New
Right' (Thatcher-Reagan-Kohl). If one adds to this 'tightening up' the
increasing 'proleterianization' of intellectual functions (ie. income
levels of academics and journalists are dropping relative to other
economic sectors, and a de-skilling/'clerkifying' of journalism is
apparent), then one can expect to find a widening gap between
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intellectual (information worker) interests and the interests of the
capitalist bourgeoisie. Intellectuals thus increasingly become likely
partners in a leftist popular alliance. However, coping with such
developments requires a 'reconstruction' of historical materialism in
order that it can 'deal' with these phenomena (Mattelart, 1983: 48).
In this respect there is a clear overlap between the ideas of
Mattelart, Enzensberger and Habermas.
(3) A popular alliance capitalizes upon the fact that in certain
contexts -- ego Nicaragua in the late 1970s (Mattelart, 1986: 11), and
South Africa in the late 1980s -- the Right appears to be unable to
solve the social crisis. Some solution is demanded. However,
Mattelart's contention (albeit implicit) is that, in certain social
formations (possibly: Nicaragua, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Chile, etc?),
neither can the working class solve the crisis on its own. In such
contexts, a solution to the crises faced would seem to require a
leftist popular alliance -- ie. a pluralist hegemony -- (Mattelart,
1983:66-7). Such an alliance-based resistance strategy will require
compromises and hence result in a mixed economy and pluralism
(Mattelart, 1986:9, 17). Clearly such a strategy is closer to the
Poulantzian (and Gramsician) idea rather than Leninism.
(4) A need for theoretical reflection on past errors. Amongst such
errors, for Mattelart, has been the 'reading as catechism' of certain·
'models' developed in other contexts. (This is especially true of the
Leninist model, which has all too frequently been uncritically applied
to contexts bearing none of the problems Lenin had to contend with).
Further, Mattelart recognizes the need to learn from errors made during
previous attempts to implement the popular approach. There is a clear
262
need to learn from the defeat of the Chilean popular experiment in 1973
(Mattelart, 1983:67) and the electoral defeat of the Sandanistas in
1990.
Mattelart's work on developing the concept of a 'popular' hegemony
has enormous implications for any praxis-communication built thereupon.
His popular communication strategy represents in effect a New Leftist
democratic (dialogical) alternative to the Leninist rhetorical option.
Mattelart represents something of a 'Third Worldized' and more
practically-grounded version of Habermas's (1974) 'public sphere'
theory of a democratic (or dialogical) superstructural praxis (ie.
where the superstructures become sites of struggle). A Mattelart-type
popular (democratic) communicative-praxis proposes the following media
strategy:
i. An explicit attempt to get away from a media/communication model
based upon the idea of passive recipients -- ie. 'consumption'
communication (Mattelart, 1983:17). Its passivity makes possible
the perpetuation of undemocratic and exploitative social
conditions. An 'activated' population constitutes a profound
challenge for contemporary forms of domination. (This point will
be developed later when Habermas' notion of 'legitimation crisis'
is dealt with).
ii. An attempt to develop media operating as 'dialogue' or two-way
communication. This "gives priority to the receivers
participation" (Mattelart, 1986:24) in a total process of
interaction which refuses to 'privilege' journalists/media
workers. In such a 'model' journalists are moved from being
sources of information to facilitators of communication
(Mattelart, 1983:360). This means re-thinking the notion of
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'audience' such that the popular masses become co-producers of
messages (Mattelart, 1983:360-1, 363); and re-thinking the notion
of 'journalist' (and 'information worker') (Mattelart, 1983:361-
2). Both Mattelart and Enzensberger develop their notion of
praxis on the assumption that such a dialogical communication
system would constitute a profound threat to contemporary forms of
social domination.
iii An important aim is to teach subaltern groups to become active
(Mattelart, 1980:68) (and organized), self-confident (ie. there is
a need to develop self-esteem), and to de-mystify themselves and
their conditions (Mattelart, 1983: 360, 363-4). Here we can see a
clear overlap with the ideas of Franz Fanon (1968);
iv. Yet Mattelart envisages this 'conscientization' of the subaltern
groups in a different way to Lenin's vanguardist approach. For
Mattelart the conscientization process needs to be a two-way
(Mattelart, 1980:79) teaching and learning experience in which the
subaltern groups (workers, peasants, lumpenproletariat,
ethnically-suppressed groups, gays, etc) and petit bourgeois
intellectuals 'discover' each othe~, and learn from each other
(Mattelart, 1983:361, 363-4). The CCSU has attempted to implement
such 'learning experiences' in the South African context
(Tomaselli, et aI, 1988a). The resulting synthesis should result
in the desired popular-leftist culture (a culture that is based on
a democratically activated population). It is an understanding of
conscientization and culture based upon a popular-alliance
conception of struggle (Mattelart, 1983: 63-65), in which
conscientization (or education) takes place through participation
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in a popular struggle (Mattelart, 1980:139).
iv. Develop an autonomous leftist media network (ie. parallel to the
rightist media) which serves to mobilize popular counter-hegemonic
, . t' "t r i I "ngroups and which can act as experlmen s or rla runs 1
democratic-leftist organization. This requires the development of
new forms of "collective organization" (Mattelart, 1983:30), in
order to 'release' the energy of existing resistance (often found
in the 'cracks' and 'gaps' of the the MNC order). This will
generate popular culture.
v. Further, the rightist media themselves need to be understood as
potential sites of contradiction, confrontation and the mediation
of class conflict in capitalist society (Mattelart, 1983:49, 51,
53). This notion, of course, overlaps with Enzensberger's (1974)
view of 'contradiction', and with this thesis' proposal that
historical materialism be reconstructed such that all
contradictions, including superstructural contradictions be 'used'
by radicals. Once class conflict is sought within the rightist
media themselves a new challenge is opened up for a left-popular
alliance -- the need to develop a (popular) trade union for media
workers in order to develop and channel such contradictions
(Mattelart, 1983:28).
An important point to note about this communicative praxis is that
it developed within the extremely repressive conditions of the
Nicaraguan dictatorship. By 1977, the Somoza regime had a blanket of
censorship in operation, effectively closing all legal forms of
communication for those opposed to Somoza. The result of this was the
emergence of a counter-hegemonic communication network in the form of
the 'Journalism of the Catacombs" (Mattelart, 1986: 32); the 'Pintas'
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(or wall graffiti) (Mattelart, 1986:34); leaflets, flyers and the
seizure of radio stations (Mattelart, 1986:34); and of 'cultural
resistance' (Mattelart, 1986:35).
The term 'journalism of the catacombs was "derived from two
circumstances: firstly, from the fact that journalism began to be
almost clandestinely practiced and, secondly, that the journalists
found refuge in Catholic churches, where they could bring people
together to inform them ... participating in this experience were
journalism students, editors, photographers, and heads of the different
media" (Mattelart, 1986:32). As important, this mode of communication
took the form of a dialogue which was "a lively, flexible and dynamic
journalism. It managed to create a 'circuit' of language; transmitter
and receiver intimately united, interchangeable". It also rejected the
notion of 'objectivity' (Mattelart, 1986: 32). In some respects the
Nicaraguan experience parallels the development in Zimbabwe -- between
1976 and 1980 -- of 'pungwes', or mass conscientization meetings at
night (Frederikse, 1982:60, 314). During the States of Emergency in
South Africa (1986-1989), people were forced into a similar mode of
communication, of which the toyi-toyi and libe~ation songs were the
most apparent (Strelitz, 1990). The South African popular struggle of
that period, in fact, bore many similarities to the Nicaraguan
experience, of which resistance-communication was but one mode of
expression .
. Perhaps more significant is that much of Mattelart's work is based
on societies already controlled by popular-socialist governments (ie.
Chile and Nicaragua). Mattelart refocussed leftist communicology away
from only the Machiavellian needs of a popular-socialist counter
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hegemony, into a concern with a ruling hegemony wanting to create
democratic media (ie. a 'public sphere'). This would complement a
leftist-democratic society. Mattelart's work focuses attention upon
the need to draw a clear distinction between the needs of 'counter' and
'ruling' leftist hegemonies. It is a distinction the Soviets, for
example, failed to draw -- a failure which produced an undemocratic
media system (when measured in terms of Mattelart's (or Habermas')
criteria. As an outcome of Mattelart's distinction he produced
particularly valuable work on the nature of 'journalist practices':
i. A rejection of the genre of journalism developed within capitalist
relations of production (Mattelart, 1980:60-3; and Mattelart,
1980:xix), with its notions of 'markets', 'audience-targeting',
and a 'passive audience'. Mattelart (1983:362) 're-thinks' the
mode of media production such that the 'audience' is empowered by
being explicitly organized so that it can speak for itself. For
Mattelart such an activated 'audience' within a dialogical
communicative network provides the best basis for a post-
revolutionary leftist-democratic society where the population
become active participants in the democracy being built. This
idea is, of course, derivative of the idea of activating the
masses during the counter-hegemonic phase. This is done through a
media which views the masses as also being producers of messages,
and which reconceptualizes journalists as facilitators rather than
sources of information. It is a rejection (i) of uni-directional
communication (Mattelart, 1980: 52; 1983: 362); (ii) of populist
(top-down) journalism (Mattelart, 1980: 55); and (iii) an
explicit attempt to 'democratize reception' (Mattelart, 1980:
109).
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Hattelart's point is that this mass activity and participatory
approach to communication needs to be maintained and expanded
once the counter-hegemony phase is over. Further, it is important
to note that he re-thinks the process of media production such
that all sectors of the popular masses are organized to give voice
to their own interests. This implicitly introduces into leftist
praxis the recognition of having to deal with different class
interests within the popular alliance (Hattelart, 1983: 363), or
'broad front' (Hattelart, 1980: 65). This can easily lead to a
left-pluralist conception of the media in terms of which each
interest group should be enabled to articulate (perhaps via its
own media) its own interests (see Louw, 1990). Belgium has such a
pluralist media (Hattelart & Piemme, 1983:413), as do Holland and
Sweden.
ii. A 'nationalization' of media (even by a popular government) is not
seen as sufficient in itself, because this will not necessarily
change the character of the media into a popular (dialogical)
communication structure (Hattelart, 1983:19). A local example of
the failure of the 'nationalization' option would be Zimbabwe
where the Rhodesian media were nationalized and white staffers
were replaced by blacks, but the Rhodesian media practices were
not changed. As Mattelart (1980:xxiv) notes: "the mass media
cannot be changed by a mere inversion of the signs of the messages
which they transmit". This is because media technology and media
'practices' are not necessarily neutral, but rather, actually
'impose' certain slants onto the meanings emanating therefrom.
Hence, "the bourgeoisie and imperialism have imposed on us forms
of communication which correspond to a particular mode of
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producing life" (Mattelart, 1980:xxv). At the heart of Mattelart's
critique is that the media technology and practices developed by
capitalism make no attempt to foster participative democracy
(dialogue) and active consciousness (Mattelart, 1980:136). If one
uncritically takes over capitalist media structures and practices
(ie. "form") the result will be to de facto re-produce an
undemocratic and anti-popular slant to media products (ie.
"content"). Such a media will retard the development of a popular
democratic society. Mattelart's basic argument is based on the
idea that the bourgeois genre of journalism has a "form and
content" appropriate for the reproduction of undemocratic and
exploitative relations of production. To take over (ie.
nationalize) the "form" will automatically 'import' with it a
"content" inappropriate for a popular-leftist ordering of society
(Mattelart, 1980:98-104).
iii. Mattelart argues that, rather than 'nationalizing' existing
"forms", new 'practices', new ways of using media technology, and
in some cases new media technology itself are needed (Mattelart,
1980:104-6). A popular democracy (wherein relations of production
are genuinely transformed) demands an autonomous popular and
democratically-structured media (Mattelart, 1980: 101). In South
African terms this leads to the conclusion that the existing'
mainstream' media should not be nationalized by any incoming
leftist government (see Louw, 1990).
iv. A need to consider ways of winning over new allies to the popular
alliance (Mattelart in Mattelart & Siegelaub, 1983:357). This,
in part requires taking seriously what people "like" (Mattelart,
1986:23). This, of course, is an implicit rejection of the
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Leninist notion that the vanguard 'knows' what people 'should
like'. Mattelart, for example, notes that in popular Nicaragua
'soap operas' (despite being expressions of USA 'cultural
imperialism') were retained (Mattelart, 1986:21).
The avoidance of sloganeering. Rather, the supporters of the
popular alliance need to be taken more seriously and not insulted
by merely being fed slogans (Mattelart & Siegelaub, 1983:359).
Slogans represent a de facto top-down rhetorical (manipulative)
form of communication. Sections of the South African Left have,
on occasion, slipped into such sloganeering such that the chanting
of 'viva! viva!' becomes the predominant tool of Left-
organizational practice.
The value of Mattelart's work on popular communication lies in his
theoretical 'systematization' of a phenomenon that manifested itself in
Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s. His work could transfer
practical and theoretical lessons learned in Chile and Nicaragua to
South African information workers in the contemporary context. If
South African media activists were able to implement Mattelart's
proposed popular communication, the chances of building a democratic
leftist post-apartheid South Africa would be greatly enhanced.
White's proposals for democratizing communication
Robert White's concern with the 'democratization of communication'
grew out of his work in Latin America where he was involved with the
Catholic Church's work facilitating the growth of a radio network
serving lower-status sectors of the population. Given the similarity
in their contextual backgrounds it is not surprising to find great
similarities between White and Mattelart on popular communication, with
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White consolidating many of the themes found in Mattelart. White,
however, has a stronger orientation towards the rural-peasant sector
than does Mattelart's. More importantly, White ultimately goes further
and draws the wider 'democratic' implications out of the Latin American
communication experience.
As with Mattelart, White stresses the importance of popular
participation in communication processes: to be democratic,
communication must facilitate people speaking for themselves. Hence, a
central component of White's definition of popular communication is:
"the beginning of comunicacion popular is the decision [by lower-status
groups] not to rely on traditional authority figures or others with
powerful resources to speak for them" (White, 1980:4). In other words,
popular communication represents the establishment of "channels
independent of a hierarchy of intermediaries" (White, 1980:3). Instead,
the lower status groups develop their own "independent leadership" and
invent their own "self-reliant and defiant language" (White, 1980:4).
In Gramscian terms, these groups develop their own organic
intellectuals.
For White, "Comunicacion popular arises within a lower-status
movement for social change, often in opposition to the stable structure
of small communities and to the established local media" (White,
1980:4). Through learning to speak to themselves about matters
affecting their lives, they come to recognize their condition and that
they can do something to improve their position. "C .. 1omunlcaClon popu ar
generates a new vision of the social world and a new understanding of
the real causes of lower status dependency and exploitation. It also
generates a new view of history and new forms of artistic expression in
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music and folk drama" (White, 1980:8). This is an extension, into
media terms, of Paulo Freire's notion of 'conscientization' (White,
1980:5).
An important distinction drawn by White is the difference between
two forms of popular communication, namely: group communication versus
people's communication. This distinction, not raised by Mattelart, is
a valuable analytical tool when appraising popular communication
projects. Group communication is more 'top-down': "sympathetic allies
[of the lower status groups] with more educational, technical and
managerial backgrounds" (White, 1980:8) set up communication centres
with a view to encouraging the conscientization process. The people's
communication approach is more bottom-up: "the poor are themselves
setting up their own community organizations in response to pressing
social issues. These organizations then seek out technical help from
the resource centres" (White, 1989:17). Applying this to South Africa,
the left-wing press of the 1980s was generally of the 'group
communication' genre, although many of those working on this press
often (incorrectly, in terms of White's definition) referred to
themselves as the 'people's press' (see Chapter 5).
White, however, went beyond examining popular communication and
extended the lessons learned in Latin America into a formulation of
what 'democratic communication' should be at a wider level (White,
1982, 1984). White provides a number of criteria required for the
democratization of communication:
1. Equality of access to information should be a basic right (White,
1982:3) in order to overcome a social skewing into information-rich
and information-poor sections of the population.
2. All citizens should be in a position to participate in the input of
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material into the communication infrastructures of society -- ie.
communication-input should not be restricted to media professionals
alone (White, 1982:4). Further, such input should represent a
pluralistic body of social actors (White 1984:22). This conception
of media would be premised upon a philosophy of participatory
communication (White 1984:22). In this way it represents an
extension of the popular communication genre into a wider social
communication principle.
3. Audiences should have an automatic right of reply in the form of the
opportunity to collectively criticize, analyze and participate in
the communication process as different groups who want to organize
themselves (White, 1982:4).
4. Mechanisms whereby all sectors of the population have access to
media policy decision-making should be available(White, 1982:4).
This requires an administrative structure that preserves direct
popular control (White, 1984:22), for example, in the form of
permanent co-ordinating councils (White, 1982:4).
5. Communication infrastructures in society must be made accountable to
the citizens of that society (White, 1982:5). White (1982:5)
proposes a number of measures to achieve this:
(a) Representative decision-making structures (see above point 4);
(b) Representative property structures;
(c) The development of new concepts in Public Law governing
information and communication which protect every citizen's
right to access. In other words, legal status needs to be given
to participatory communication (White, 1984:22).
(d) The development of forms of public financing that overcome the
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skewing resulting from media monopoly interests.
6. The recognition that libertarian media principles are inadequate in
the contemporary context (White, 1982:5) because they only grant a
'paper right' to access (Louw, 1990).
7. In order to equip citizens for participation, media education
(White, 1982:5) and media training (White, 1984:22) programmes are
needed.
8. A stable means of financing of participative communication
infrastructures that avoids dependence on commercial income is
required (White, 1984:22).
9. Any proposal for the democratization of communication in a society
has to work from the actual conditions in that society -- ie. media
democratization must be organically linked to wider social, economic
and political processes (White, 1982:2). White (1982:2) notes that
if this is not done, democratizing communication is unlikely to be
successful. Hence a democratization process requires initially
dealing with the problems certain social contexts might present for
the emergence of democratic communication (White, 1984:10).
White's work offers some valuable clues as to how experiences gained
during 'popular communication' struggles can be extended to develop a
wider notion of the 'democratization' of social communication. Given
that the popular struggle phase appears to be at an end in South
Africa, White's ideas could be used as one point of departure in any
move towards building a democratized post-apartheid media
infrastructure.
Habermas' 'Public Sphere' as the site for leftist praxis
Jurgen Habermas' notion of the "public sphere", like Mattelart's
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notion of "popular communication", is concerned with active two-way
(dialogical) communication. Both Habermas and Mattelart recognize that
'communication' holds the key for constructing mass participative
democracy. This requires a critique of: (1) one directional
(communicator-to-receiver) communication; (2) rhetorical (ie.
manipulative, one-directional) communication, which inherently under-
values the worth of the recipients; and (3) the way in which mass
communication has been constructed (within both HNC and 'state
socialism'). It does not facilitate mass participation, but rather
facilitates the control and manipulation of the masses. It also
requires conceptualizing ways of 're-working' existing communication
infrastructures. This is necessary in order to 'liberate' the
potential for mass participative democracy currently locked up within
the existing information technology.
If Habermas' totality (subject-object) ideas (see Chapter 2) are
used to develop a leftist theory of change, the results are a
conception of praxis different to those of Harx. For Habermas,
Leftists concerned with praxis have to look not only at the material
mode of production as a site of struggle, but also at other sites
located in the superstructures, or what Habermas calls "structures of
linguistically produced intersubjectivity" (1976:10). As he says: "a
social-scientifically appropriate crisis concept must grasp the
connection between system integration and social integration"
(Habermas, 1976:4). "System integration" is equivalent to the material
relations of production, while "social integration" represents the
superstructures. Habermas differentiates between three levels of
social integration:
(a) general structures of action, (b) structures of world views,
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in so far as they are determinate for morality and law, and (c)
structures of institutionalized law and of binding moral
representations" (Habermas, 1979: 157).
Social change comes about through developments in these structures such
that the structures become progressively more developed (Habermas,
1979:140). In this Habermas works explicitly within the structural-
rationalist (and realist) paradigm.
These superstructural structures now serve to stabilize (integrate)
society through "staged and manipulative publicity" (Habermas, 1989:
232). The public is, in effect superstructurally managed within a
modern Information Age society. These ideas are an extension of the
Frankfurt School's work on the 'culture industry'. This
superstructural management takes place in the 'public sphere'. This has
gradually developed into a manipulative tool of technocratic
rationality within HNC relations of production. Because HNC constitutes
a world-wide network (now even extending to the former Second World),
Habermas' ideas have a currency beyond the First World. Certainly
'public sphere' manipulation is more profound in the USA or Europe.
However, its range reaches deeply into HNC dependences as well. In
South Africa one should not underestimate the penetration of
Information Age technology -- ie. even the most 'marginal' social
groups (rural peasants and the lumpenproletariat) are now part of a
world penetrated by radio, cassette tape recorders, and hence American
'pop culture'. What is more, the re-distribution of wealth that will
take place in a post-apartheid South Africa will presumably increase
the diffusion of information technology throughout society. This will
only serve_to-increase t-he-integration-of. e:ver greater numbers of South
. --~
Africans more firmly into the (now 'Americanized' world-wide)
- - ._- -----
Information Age 'public sphere'. This-wi~ happen unless the South
276
African Left can develop a 'Media Policy' able to successfully counter
this (world-wide) trend without impeding South Africa's economic
growth.
Habermas notes that the public sphere was not always a realm of uni-
directional manipulation. At one stage the 'public sphere' was the
site of a real democratic interaction. This occurred at the height of
the liberal free enterprise era in Europe and the USA (Habermas, 1989:
73-9). However, the later development of capitalism destroyed this
democratic public sphere:
In the hundred years following the heyday of liberalism, during
which capitalism gradualli became "organized", the original
relationship of public and private sphere in fact dissolvedj the
contours of the bourgeois public sphere eroded ..... While it
penetrated more spheres of society, it simultaneously lost its
political function, namely: that of subjecting the affairs that
it made · public to the control of a critical public" (Habermas,
1989: 140).
The logic of capital destroyed 'free enterprise' and concentrated
capital in fewer and fewer hands -- ie. MNCs -- a trend Marx had
predicted (Marx, 1974:690-1). With the concentration of capital into
huge capitalist bureaucracies (i.e mncs), came the ideology to underpin
such capitalism -- the ideology of technocratic efficiency and
'scientifically' managed advancement [9]. This ideology was diffused
(uni-directionally) through the machinery of the culture industry. The
needs of a technocratic (capitalist) rationalization are necessarily
authoritarian (Habermas, 1976:123). Technocracy requires efficient
'labour units', not critical human beings. Hence, Habermas (1979:196)
notes that there exists a line of cleavage between "technocracy" and
democratic "participative models" of social organization. The reason
that the destruction of 'free enterprise' coincided with the
destruction of the 'public sphere' [10] is because for technocracy to
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run efficiently people must be made to fulfill 'system needs',
preferably as uncritical 'cheerful robots'. In this respect Habermas
is merely following the pessimistic line of thought originally
developed by Horkheimer and Adorno (1979).
However, this line of reasoning results in an intri~uing non-
pessimistic twist -- ie. a new understanding of leftist praxis. This
understanding of Leftist struggle slides easily into either a CCS
and/or Hattelart conception of using the superstructures for leftist
praxis. Habermas' notion of praxis is tied up with his work on the
potential 'legitimation crisis' he identifies within (capitalist)
technocratic society (Habermas, 1976). Habermas's work on legitimation
crises bears some remarkable similarities with Enzensberger's ~ork on
superstructural praxis. Both recognize that capitalism has mutated
into a superstructural mode of production in the Information Age.
Because of this mutation Leftists need to become aware of potential
contradictions and crises within the superstructures instead of only
confining themselves to the material base.
Habermas builds on the insight we find in the Frankfurt School and
Gramsci that capitalism uses superstructures (as 'trenches') to deflect
and co-opt revolutionary forces. (Up to 1989 it was, in part, possible
to argue that such superstructural deflection was not a factor in South
Africa. However, the effects of the 1990 reforms will increasingly put
paid to such a view. The reforming-Right and their HNC-allies will now
be . in a position to use superstructural trenches to deflect and co-opt
in their efforts to retain the (reformed) status quo).
In the very act of using the superstructures to 'paper over' the
contradictions of capitalism, HNC may well be creating another set of
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contradictions. Habermas identifies four possible sites of
contradictions in advanced capitalism (1976:49-50), namely: (1)
economic; (2) political-administrative ("rationality crisis"); (3)
political-legitimation; and (4) socio-cultural 'action-motivation'. It
is noteworthy that three of these are contradictions in the
superstructures. As he says:
I do not exclude the possibility that economic crises can be
permanently averted, although only in such a way that
contradictory steering imperatives that assert themselves in the
pressure for capital realization would produce a series of other
crisis tendencies ..... 1 am of the opinion that the contradiction
of socialized production for particular ends thereby takes on
again a political form (Habermas, 1976, 40).
For Habermas, a central feature of modern capitalism is its need for
fine-tuned efficiency. Advanced capitalism is a highly planned system
-- the planning taking place within the huge MNC bureaucracies. Such
efficient planning is incompatible with human beings as critical 'free
agents'. For the system to work behaviour has to be 'controlled'
and/or manipulated so that people behave as effective workers and
consumers (se Habermas, 1980: Chapter 5). But this creates an enormous
potential problem for MNC because liberal-capitalist societies are
premised upon the very notion of democracy, free choice and free
enterprise -- ie. the notion of a 'public sphere' in the sense of the
liberal ideal model. It is this very 'ideal model' which the
reforming-Right wishes to implement in South Africa. (See statement on
NP's policy made by the Deputy Minister of Constitutional Affairs,
Roelf Meyer at Idasa's "Issues in Transition" debate -- Democracy in
Action, February/March 1991, p.10).
So a line of contradiction has been built into MNC -- ie. a
contradiction between the 'theoretical ideal' . and de facto system
functioning. In order to function, capitalism has to plan, manipulate
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and macro-manage the system (ego the role of Central Banks). But
because of the ideology of 'free enterprise', and 'liberal-democracy'
it cannot be seen to be doing this (Habermas, 1976:66). 'Democracy' is
supposed to be more important than 'efficiency' within liberal-
capitalism. Habermas says in reality it is the other way around. It
is one of the tasks of the culture industry to simultaneously propagate
the ideology and disguise the fact that the ideal of 'freedom' is not
being fulfilled in reality.
The gap between 'ideal' and 'reality' creates a potential site of
contradictions for Leftists to exploit. Exploiting the gap requires
Leftists to get to grips with the operation of the superstructures and
liberal-capitalist ideology in order to use these to reactivate the
critical spirit associated with the original 'public sphere'. The idea
would be to 'superstructurally activate' people -- ie. get people {who
have been taught -- in schools for example -- that they are 'free' and
'equal' (Habermas, 1979:185) to critically question the de facto
situation; to compare the 'ideal' promised to them with the reality.
The 'ideal-reality' contradiction is especially acute precisely because
capitalism remains an inequitable class-based exploitative system
(Habermas, 1976:73). As Habermas says, "the 'fundamental
contradiction' can break out in a questioning, rich in practical
consequences" (1976:69). This is a contradiction not limited to the ·
First World -- ie. it is as potentially valuable to Leftists
challenging Africa's comprador-rulers.
Such Habermasian leftist work is, of course, inherently
superstructural. Gramsci's 'superstructural trenches' would be
attacked superstructurally. This approach to praxis is thus
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fundamentally different to the original Marxist conception (see
Habermas, 1989:234). Because capitalism has changed and Leftists now
have to confront a 'new' sort of social system. The original
formulation of historical materialism will no longer do. The changes
mean seeking out a new set of contradictions (Habermas, 1979:160-167).
It means reconstructing historical materialism in a superstructural
direction. Yet Habermas' reconstruction remains based on the original
Marxist insight -- if people realize they are exploited they will
become angry. So the key to Habermas' notion of praxis is to get
citizens of the liberal-democracies (or, in fact ANY society claiming
to be 'democratic') to take their societies ISAs at their word'. If
they are promised democratic rights they must insist on using them to
the full -- by demanding the right of "participation" (Habermas, 1976:
138).
The building of a full participatory mass democracy can "no longer
be disqualified as simply utopian" (Habermas, 1989:235). In this
respect we can see an overlap between Habermas' and Enzensberger's
ideas. The information technology of the contemporary era DOES provide
the basis for ~ mass participatory 'public sphere'. This idea also
forms the central premise of this thesis. The notion that such
information technology (and information based societies) is a 'First
World' luxury needs to be contested. Such a view is racist (ie.
'natives' are not able to run sophisticated societies and technology)
and would complement the needs of MNC to prevent the development of
full democracies in the 'South' (where they will presumably relocate
their 'dirty' and 'problematic' heavy industry). Furthermore, Leftists
must persuade people to expect the functioning of a mass participatory
democracy (based on the available information-technology) as a basic
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right. Habermas (1976:74) says such expectations could not be
fulfilled without causing a collapse of exploitative social
arrangements (based on manipulation)j or as he says:
The definitive limits to procuring legitimation are inflexible
normative structures that no longer provide the economic-
political system with ideological resources, but instead confront
it with exorbitant demands (Habermas, 1976:93).
The point is, according to Habermas, advanced capitalism destroys real
democracy (1976:123). The technocratic demands for fine-tuned
efficiency could not tolerate the existence of a real functioning
'public sphere'. In other words, a participative social dialogue, in
which all cit izens really exercised their 'democratic right' would
interfere with the needs of administrative (technocratic) rationality.
Yet the legitimacy of advanced capitalism depends upon the myth of
having free choice and democratic rights. Habermas says Leftists must
get people to insist on exercising the rights that they told they have.
They should be encouraged to demand to exercise their democratic rights
and their access to a 'public sphere' that is supposed to exist. In
this way, 'dem9cracy' becomes the new contradiction for HNC. It is a
'totality' contradiction -- ie. if superstructural 'rights' were really
exercised it would 'disrupt the material base, causing system crisis.
This call to activate the public sphere is more-or-less equivalent to
Mattelart's call to Leftists to build a participatory democracy based
upon a popular communication.
The Left needs ·to re-direct attention towards the superstructures as
a possible site of struggle. And "democracy" (a superstructural
contradiction) rather than "economic exploitation" (a material
contradiction) is the mobilizing tool. Specifically, the Left should
be working to develop fully functioning 'public spheres' using the
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information technology available. The unequal and exploitative social
relationships of MNC would be hard pressed to survive such functioning
public spheres.
For the South African Left the ideas discussed in this section
(especially when read with Mattelart) are of potential value in two
ways. Firstly , in the event of the South African struggle being co-
opted and/or deflected by the reformed-Right and their MNC-allies, the
leftist struggle will need to continue. In this case Habermas ' ideas
become of immediate relevance. Secondly, the South African left might
succeed in manoeuvring themselves into the position where they are
called upon to build a leftist hegemony. In that case Habermas and
Mattelart provide valuable insights on how to construct a leftist
participatory democracy based upon the full ut i l i za t i on of contemporary
media/informat ion-technol ogy . (In that way the errors of Eastern Europe
can be avoided ).
FOOTNOTES
[1] This list, of necessity, represents only a limited view of key
contributions to South African leftist political theory .
Including a comprehensive list would be very difficult given the
extensive leftist theoretical work done by South Africans. Hence
this list 'excludes the work of important theorists like:
Callinicos; Kaplan ; Bunting; Slovo; Sitas; Webster; Foster;
Hemson; and O'Meara (and others of the 'Sussex School').
[2] The importance of leftist ' s ub j e c t i ve ' work in the South African
context is perhaps reinforced by a general recognition by probabfY
the majority of South African leftists that, 'socialism ' is not
really on the agenda in the foreseeable future. It is a
recognition that has deep roots, and was felt even at the height
of the 1980s ·popular uprising. (The collapse of Eastern Europe has
only served to reinforce this percepti.on). This recognition is
widely reflected within the 'popular' ANC-SACP (and UDF) where the
influe~ce.o~ the SACP's 'two stagism' is widely felt. Perhaps,
more slgnlflcantly, COSATU too has recognized this (see Sitas,
~988:13). Such leftist pragmatism has been rejected by socialists
ln NEUM/WOSA, AZAPO and by the Marxist Workers Tendency.






course also play a significant part in the 'bad press' the Left
receiv~s in South Africa. However, this has served to become an
excuse in leftist circles for not making any attempt to develop
techniques to exploit whatever 'gaps' might exist in the
'mainstream media'. In addition, the South African Left generally
have few activists able to deal with the media in a
'professional' manner. This has only served to further alienate
'guild press' journalists from the Left, and so has compounded
the problem of a bad press.
In this respect 'superstructure(s)' can be seen as having two
possible meanings: either as a 'metaphor'; and/or as a series of
'concrete' apparatuses, in the Althusserian sense.
Both Volosinov (1973:23) and Tomaselli (1986b:13) have drawn
attention to the latter form of micro-superstructural struggle
which they called a 'struggle for the sign'. The suggestion to
engage in a 'struggle for the sign' would direct Leftists into a
concern with the smallest unit of meaning -- the sign. Such a
struggle would require the development of a leftist semiotics
('science of signs'). Such a semiotics offers an analytical tool
for the decoding of rightist rhetoric and ideology. In addition,
such a semiotics should improve the capacity for the construction
of a maximally-impactful leftist rhetoric within a wider
superstructural battle.
SWAPO made the error of 'assuming' support of 'the People'. As a
consequence, SWAPO's election campaign was poorly thought out. No
attempt was made to identify and target 'the not-yet converted'.
On the other hand the Rightist DTA put together a very
sophisticated electoral campaign precisely aimed at expanding its
support base. The result was that the Rightist parties won over
40% of the vote. During 1990 evidence suggested that the ANC was
making the same mistake of assuming the support of 'the People'
instead of working to ensure that support.
Regarding the construction of a 'National Culture', it should be
noted that two diametrically opposite interpretations of what
this means have influenced African-'Leftists'. These are the
interpretations of Franz Fanon (1968) and Amilcar Cabral (1980).
Fanon's interpretation is 'forward looking' -- Fanon understands
national culture as the outcome of social struggle. The struggle
dynamically creates a new context within which subjective and
objective forces interact in new ways. Out of this dynamic
emerges something new -- the new unified national culture.
Cabral, on the other hand -- despite his (rather unrigorous) use
of Marxist terminology -- produces an essentially 'backward-
looking' nationalist interpretation of national culture. Cabral's
is a culture of conserving and then returning to the past ways --
ie. of "return", "re-Africanization", "reconversion", one's "own
history" and "conservation" (see Cabral, 1980:143-147). Cabral
therefore does not conceive of culture as something new and
emerging, but rather as something to be regained. Cabral's is
hence a conservative-nationalist interpretation of culture, while
Fanon's is a progressive interpretation.
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[8 ]
Paulin Hountondji (1983) has pointed out the problematics of the
conservative-nationalist interpretations. The conservative
(backward looking) interpretations are able to serve comprador
nationalist groups in their (top down) populist manipulation of
the masses. From a popular-leftist perspective Fanon's
interpretation is greatly preferable since it complements the
bottom-up organic growth (culturalist) understanding of culture.
The crisis of state socialism in the second half of the 1980s,
especially the severe crisis of 1989/90, tended to boost the
confidence of the Right, free marketeers/capitalists, etc. This
served to obscure the remaining deep (if not deepening)
structural crisis within capitalism. (Of course, post-modernists
would suggest that BOTH capitalism and state socialism suffer
from the same terminal illness -- they are premised upon now
discredited 'structural' assum~tions).
Certainly 1990 sees capitalism in crisis. Could it be that
Marx's long-predicted crisis of capitalism may be upon us at
last? But this crisis has come just after 'Marxism' has been
severely discredited by the excesses of Leninist vanguardism.
This would be a profoundly ironic turn of events.
[9] The ideology of technocracy (see Habermas, 1980: Chapter 6) and
of 'scientifically' managed social advancement was, of course,
not confined to capitalism. East European state socialism
adopted the same ideological discourse. For heirs of the
Frankfurt School, like Habermas, this is not really that
surprising, because the School had seen it as an outcome of
Stalin's attempt to catch up with the capitalist West.
Post-modernists would also not be surprised at finding
technocratic ideology in both capitalism and state socialism
since they would see both as premised upon the same underlying
structuralist discourse.
[10] Habermas' 'public sphere' is a Eurocentric concept, describing a
social form historically and materially specific to a particular
stage of capitalist development in Europe and North America.
Consequently, care is needed when importing the concept into
Southern Africa (although this writer believes that this concept
is NOW applicable in South Africa because South Africa HAS been
integrated into MNC).
Despite the Eurocentric specificity of the concept as used by
Habermas, it .is also possible to find a clear analogy of the
destruction of the 'public sphere' by capitalist technocracy in
South Africa. As capitalist relations of production penetrated
Southern Africa, following the discovery of diamonds and gold, it
destroyed the democratic 'public spheres' then existing in
traditional African society, eg the kgotla (or 'village
councils').
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Chapter 4. BUILDING A DEMOCRATIC LEFTIST HEGEMONY UPON THE LEGACY OF
A POPULARIST COUNTER-HEGEMONY
Rethinking leftist praxis in South Africa will require more than
theoretical reconstruction (as per Chapters 2 and 3). If leftist
praxis is to be 'reconstructed' in the South African context, then
local leftist practice, and related theory, will also need to be taken
account of. In this regard South African leftists leave a rich legacy
upon which any South African-based New Leftist 'reconstruction' can
draw. Callinicos (1986) provides an overview of this work from 1912 to
1986. See also Deacon (1988).
South Africa is well placed for any attempt to build a pluralist-
democratic leftist hegemony because of the legacy of the popularist
alliance politics of the 1980s counter-hegemony phase. It is a legacy
that penetrated deep into the grassroots struggle against apartheid
during the 1980s. During this decade millions of South Africans were
'democratized' through their engagement with the popularist structures
of resistance. So ingrained did democratic practice become amongst
those sectors of the South African Left organized by the MDM that it
became an organizational 'problem' after the unbanning of the ANC. The
year 1990 saw the ANC struggling to adjust its organizational practices
(away from clandestine-militarized hierarchical structures) to cope with
the grassroots demand for participative democracy coming from the
former MDM constituency (WIP, No 69, 1990).
Even the Leninist-vanguardists have not been unaffected by these
democratic practices. So whereas the European New Left constructed
their ideas in opposition to a Leninist interpretation of leftist
praxis, in the South African context it is possible to envisage
Leninists sliding relatively easily into a pluralist leftist hegemony
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because of the counter-hegemonic legacy. Because of decades of working
with non Leninists within a popularist alliance, South Africa's
Leninists came to 'adopt' aspects of this style (Louw, 1989cj and SACP,
1990:41-6).
The (Leninist-Marxist) SACP adopted the 'two-stage' theory of
revolution in 1928, as well as the tactic of working within a broader
counter-hegemonic (ANC) alliance since the 1950s (Callinicos, 1986:8-
13). Both represented de facto 'reconstructions' of leftist praxis.
These policies represent some of the earliest de facto moves by any
Communist Party in the world away from a narrow 'workerism', and a
narrow 'materialist' historical materialism. Hence despite the
Stalinism of the SACP (in terms of its internal organization and
'rhetoric'), the SACP has ironically been a part of the
'reconstructive' process of leftist praxis in a democratic-socialist
direction. (The SACP has in fact been criticized by South African
'ultra-leftists' -- outside of the ANC-SACP alliance for its
'collaborationist' stance) (see the position of WOSA in WIP, No 72
1991:16 and in SAHA, 1990:25-6).
The SACP 'reconstruction' was not based upon the work of the "anti-
Stalinist Marxists and Communists" (Jordan, 1990:88), of the sort
discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis. In fact Pallo Jordan
(1990:88) called upon the SACP to pay attention to this work. Rather,
the 'two stage' theory represented a Marxist-Leninist 'concession' to
'realpolitik'. In other words, it represented an offer to help and
work alongside non-Leninists in order to create a 'bourgeois
democracy'. It was hoped that this would later lead to conditions
which would favour the creation of a 'full' socialist state. Since the
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1950s the SACP worked with nationalists, social democrats and left-
liberals with NO real guarantee that their work would help them achieve
their goal of a Leninist-Harxist society. It is precisely this
pluralist-based collaborative work that has characterized the South
African struggle. Of course, the ·SACP's assumption is that there will
be a continuous 'flow' from stage one to stage two. As Slovo of the
SACP said:
(Since) the liberation struggle should bring to power a
revolutionary democratic alliance dominated by the proletariat and
peasantry the post-revolutionary phase can surely become the first
stage in a continuous process along the road to socialism: a road
that ultimately can only be charted by the proletariat and its
natural allies (Slovo in Davidson, 1976).
In fact, this particular (two stage) policy is unlikely to lead to the
achievement of a 'full' socialist society because of inertia. See
Erwin (1985:67-8) and Lambert (1980). The reality is that the South
African struggle is more likely to end up in one of two other hegemonic
patterns (especially given the world balance of power following the
collapse of Soviet power). These are a nationalist (Rightist)
comprador arrangement with HNC, or a Left-leaning pluralist hegemony of
a socialist-democratic nature. Marxist-Leninists would be dissatisfied
with both these arrangements. New Leftists would, however, only be
dissatisfied with the first option.
However, both Marxist Leninists and New Leftists would share a
similar concern at the possibility of the mutation of a socialist-
democratic hegemony into nationalist (Rightist) comprador hegemony.
Such a concern would be that 'stage one' (ie. the first government
voted in on a one-person-one-vote basis) would most likely be a
socialist-democratic society. It would be based on an 'inclusivist'
(non-racial) nationalism and presumably dominated by a 'non-racial',
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but primarily black petit bourgeoisie. However, once such a stage is
achieved, a 'working arrangement' (alliance?) between this new petit
bourgeois ruling group and HNC (and even possibly including the
'reformed-Right) would become quite likely. Sections of the Left would
be co-opted [1]. Such a Right-leaning alliance would de facto set the
stage for transforming South Africa into another African comprador
state [2] (albeit that South Africa would probably be the African sub-
metropole of HNC).
In the face of such co-option of 'the struggle' three options would
be open to the Left: firstly, the workerist route would be a
(withdrawal into?) trade unionist defence of labour rights (a possible
Cosatu option). Secondly, some might opt to return to 'armed
struggle'. This is a possible PAC route (WIP, No 72, 1991:14-15). And
thirdly, engagement in a (pluralistic) competition for support amongst
the diverse interest groups of society. The latter would represent the
New Leftist route.
For New Leftists the possibility of the co-option of 'the struggle'
would require engagements in hegemonic labour to prevent the mutation
of a socialist-democratic hegemony into a nationalist (Rightist)
comprador hegemony. Or, if co-option occurs, to win back hegemonic
influence by winning support for leftist policies from as many people
in society as possible. It is in this regard that a reconstructed
leftist praxis (based upon the work of Gramsci, the Frankfurt School,
Poulantzas, Hattelart, and Habermas) comes into its own. Such a
reconstruction precisely directs leftists into a concern with
political, cultural and hegemonic struggle. Socialism is not proclaimed
(or enforced), it is worked for hegemonically (within a pluralist
struggle). It is also work that requires a good understanding of
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'superstructural' struggle (and hence requires that attention be paid
to Enzensberger, Volosinov, Althusser, Tomaselli, Gramsci, and
Habermas) . Such New Leftist hegemonic labour would aim to produce a
(pluralist) leftist alliance th~t draws its support from a wide variety
of groups who suffer domination and exploitation at the hands of MNC.
(In other words, 'socialism' need not be confined to only a 'working
class' phenomenon). But such an alliance has to be premised upon the
guarantee of social pluralism, and free competition for support. (In
other words, there can be no freedom for leftists to build a leftist
hegemony apart from a wider freedom for all social forces and
interests) [3].
The development of a democratic ethos amongst those on the Left
would be assisted by encouraging the extension and strengthening of the
widest possible leftist alliance, or 'Patriotic Front' (ie. ranging
from left-liberals through to Leninists). Such an alliance would be
based on a recogn ition of diversity within the Left. Recognition of
diversity would require the development of mechanisms of compromise.
Learning to make such an alliance work would seem to be the most
effective way of learning how to operate a democratic system of
compromise and give and take of the Poulantzian/Gramscian variety
ie. building unity upon difference. There is a recognition that unity
has to be 'made' not 'proclaimed' [4].
Possible constituents of ~ leftist-alliance
' Ma n y of the possible constituents of a South African leftist bloc
('Patriotic Front') already exist. (Others may yet emerge). Building
and maintaining a leftist ruling hegemony will require developing
alliances and compromises of the sort discussed by Gramsci and
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Poulantzas. It will also require engaging in on-going ideological
competition with a rightist-bloc for support.
The possible building blocks of a leftist hegemony have emerged out
a complex interplay of forces and interests. Three main forms of
leftist opposition to apartheid emerged:
(a) A specifically 'black' left-populist politics, such as BCM, PAC,
and AZAPO. These groups have been influenced by, amongst others,
'Pan-Africanism' (see Nkrumah, in Mutiso & Rohio:341-46), Franz
Fanon (1968), Mao Tse Tung and aspects of USA 'black power' (see
Biko, 1988). There was some overlap between this category (a) and
category (b) below with the formation of the National Forum (NF) in
1983. The NF rejected the 'two stage' theory and opted instead for
a revolution leading directly to socialism. The "NF Manifesto" (of
1983) did represent something of a move away from populism, calling
for: (1) anti-racism and anti-imperialism; (2) non-collaboration;
(3) independent working class organizations; and (4) an opposition
to alliances with ruling-class parties. (The fourth clause
represents a direct opposition to the UDF policy of incorporating
white organizations like Nusas, Jodac, DDA, etc).
Since 1990 the PAC, despite their problems, emerged as the
victors of this political camp (WIP, No 72, 1991:14-15). AZAPO (and
BC ideology in general) have ceased to be a major political facto+
(WIP No 72, 1991:18).
(b) Another form has been the Worker's Organization for Socialist
Action (WOSA), Cape Action League (CAL), the Unity Movement (UM)
and/or New Unity Movement (NEUM), a largely (but not exclusively)
Western Cape phenomenon, which is sometimes labelled 'Trotskyist'.
291
This represents the smallest of the three sectors of 'leftist
politics', and has taken the form of a workerist populism. There
has been an alliance between NEUM and CAL and AZAPO through the
NF}. Both WOSA and NEUM oppose the SACP's · 'two stage' theory of
revolution {ie. they favour a 'one stage' approach and a 'hard-
line' non-collaborative approach}. This approach is strongly
associated with the work of Neville Alexander {see WIP, No 72,
1991:16-17}.
Cc} The largest of the three forms has been the non-racial popularist
leftist politics associated with the UDF, MDM and ANC {ie. the
'Congress' tradition}. Since 1990 this genre has been represented
by the ANC-SACP-Cosatu alliance {within which the ANC is de facto
the 'senior partner'}. It is a genre that sprang to prominence
during the 1980s following the formation of the UDF in Cape Town in
1983. From 1983 to 1989 the UDF was virtually the 'internal
political wing' of the {then banned} ANC. The UDF and Cosatu grew
together {under shared NP/State pressure} during the second half of
the 1980s. The result was the 'unofficial' and 'amorphous' MDM
alliance of the UDF and Cosatu. After the unbanning of the ANC in
1990 the need for the MDM disappeared. Because of the alliance
nature of this non-racial camp, it has produced a diversity of
'positions' (often in a 'tense' relationships with one another).
For example: popularistsj workeristsj SACPj Marxists outside the
SACPj the Marxist Workers Tendencyj the 'Cabal'j a neo-'Wosa'
groupi Izingwevui and a host of positions taken by Left-
intellectuals (see WIP, No 72, 1991: 19-21).
Ideally a (Poulantzian) Leftist-alliance would incorporate the
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full range of leftist opinions including Maoists, Leninists, Greens,
social democrats, liberals and even anti-comprador nationalists. The
legacy of the ANC's past creates a valuable precedent for South African
leftists. The ANC's policy has been that various different positions
(ranging from nationalist to Leninist) have been incorporated on the
basis of:
(a) each component party having to accept the alliance's common goal
(which was to remove apartheid); and
(b) the right of every party in the alliance to try and 'push' their
own particular strategy, approach and/or policy as long this is not
destructive to the broader goals of the alliance.
Perhaps more important for a New Leftist approach to hegemony
construction was the work done by the UDF during the 1980s (especially
the first half of the 1980s). The UDF was formed in Cape Town on 20
August 1983, following a call earlier in 1983 by Allan Boesak. It
represented the de facto hijacking by the 'Congress' tradition of the
AZAPO idea to form a 'National Forum Committee'. (The NF was in fact
also formed in 1983). The UDF was explicitly characterized by a
popular-democratic approach to political mobilization (UDF, n/d). The
UDF's approach overlapped with, for example, the popular approach of
the Nicaraguan Sandinistas (Mattelart, 1986) and Poland's Solidarity
Movement. This approach blends easily with positions articulated by
the likes of Poulantzas (Eurocommunism); Mattelart, and Habermas.
The UDF was precisely characterized by its attempt to incorporate as
wide a cross-section of the population into anti-apartheid action as
possible. It was organized as an alliance unified not so much by a
rigid hierarchy, or a single ideology, but by the common goal of trying
to shorten the life of the apartheid state. This led to conscious
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efforts to avoid being exclusively 'black' politics, and to incorporate
'non-black' members (See Jodac News, No.l, 1988:14-15; and Upfront, Vol
2 No 1, 1989:21-3). As the then-UDF publicity secretary stated: "We
are non-racial, which means that we embrace all races ... and all
classes" (Lekota, 1983:80). The non-racial UDF alliance sometimes took
the form of groups that transcended race, such as the National
Education Union of South Africa (NEUSA), and sometimes assumed a form
of mobilization 'using' (for 'non-racial ends) 'racial' mobilization
[5], such as the Natal Indian Congress (NIC); Johannesburg Democratic
Action Committee (JODAC); Cape Democrats; Durban Democratic Association
(DDA), and even an Afrikaans Congress Movement (Upfront, Vol 2 No 1,
1989:31-5). Further the UDF transcended class, incorporating on the one
hand workers (and even the lumpenproletariat) (eg. Inanda Youth
Congress), and on the other hand incorporating the middle class (eg.
TASA, UDUSA, Jodac, etc).
Building such a leftist cross-class alliance of this sort was not an
easy process. In the early 1980s there was very strong opposition to
such an alliance from left-trade unionists inside FOSATU because it was
believed this would lead to workers becoming subordinate to petit
bourgeois interests (see Lambert 1980). This led to tremendous
conflict between workerists and populists during the first half of the
1980s. (See the 'workerism-popularism' debate -- Erwin, 1985; Innes,
1985 & 1986; and Cronin, 1986). But the dynamics of the struggle in
the 1980s overwhelmed the workerist position; it simply proved
unrealistic to expect unionized workers to stay out of the UDF (petit
bourgeois, popularist)-led community-based struggles in the townships.
The November 1984 stay-away represented the 'overwhelming' of the
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workerist position by the momentum of the popularist struggle -- the
trade unions found themselves dragged into the stay-aways on the terms
of the popularists. The end of the 'purist' workerist position was
institutionalized in November 1985 when Cosatu was formed: Cosatu
representing the unionized alliance of workerists and popularists.
Cosatu refused to affiliate to either the UDF or NFC. But the situation
on the ground was too strong, and Cosatu quickly found itself pulled
into the UDF orbit, although it fought hard to keep some semblance of
'distance'. Ironically it was the rightist-State, during the
increasingly repressive State of Emergency period, which (through
simultaneous attacks on both organizations) finally sealed a de facto
'union' between the UDF and Cosatu. The result, the 'working alliance'
of the MDM, represented an alliance between the organized black working
class and elements of the leftist petit bourgeoisie. This arrangement
was fully sealed by the ANC-SACP-Cosatu alliance of 1990. But by 1991
Cosatu was again trying to distance itself from the 'politicans'.
The UDF itself consisted of a loose alliance of committees, each
mobilizing a different 'sector' -- ego youth, student, religious, trade
union, women, and community groups. The latter represented an
especially interesting 'public sphere'-type of mobilization, in which
membership was mobilized around local 'civic' issues like rents, rates,
education and public transport (See Grest & Hughes, 1984). This
alliance was held together by a network of communication rather than by
formalized central leadership. This allowed for maximum local autonomy
which improved the UDF's capacity to react to local issues, while the
communication network allowed for 'national' debate and 'policy
formulation' to take place. In the process the UDF created South
Africa's first mass-based participative democratic culture during the
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first half of the 1980s. It was a political genre that would have
pleased the culturalists (like Raymond Williams) because it gave
maximal space to the 'masses' to be 'active' on their own behalf.
The rightist-state invested considerable energy in trying to smash
this democratic culture during the State of Emergency (the second half
of the 1980s). The implementation of the States of Emergency all but
destroyed the effective functioning of the democratic communication
network the UDF had built up, and seriously weakened the local
committees themselves. This allowed the UDF affiliates to start
'drifting apart' from 1987, which increasingly threatened to transform
the UDF from an alliance into an anarchy. This 'organizational anarchy'
tended, in some instances, to produce atrophy in each of the component
parts over a period of time. In other instances, in the place of
democratic organization emerged an anarchistic youth who were generally
unemployed, alienated and militarized. In fact, by the end of the
1980s, this anarchistic-militarized youth bore much resemblance to the
Khmer Rouge of Cambodia. They were outside the effective control of any
'l e f t i s t structure, whether UDF or ANC. (In fact, the militant-anarchy
of the township youth has posed enormous problems for ANC organizers
since the ANC's unbanning). In the end the rightist state proved
unable to smash the leftist struggle. However, in the process the
Right did wreak considerable damage upon democratic popular practices;
It was the above state of affairs that led to the rise of
undemocratic practices such as those associated with the top-down
leadership style of 'the Cabal' in Natal (see New African, Vol 2 No 48:
1 and 7). Cabalistic practices violate the theoretical premises of New
Leftism. However, from a practical point of view, it is necessary to
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recognize that the Left will sometimes have to adopt undemocratic
strategies because these are the only methods that work when facing
massively repressive conditions. However, instead of seeing this as
necessarily ultimately producing an undemocratic political culture it
might be more useful to assume that leftists ~ able to differentiate
between short, medium and long term aims. Hence using a Leninist
(vanguard-clandestine) approach in the short-to-medium term may be
compatible with the long term creation of a democratic political
culture as long as leftists using such methods abandon them, when
possible, in favour of democratic methods. The real problem with the
Leninist approach is thus not the approach ~ se; rather it is the
danger of inertia. Those using Leninist methods during a counter-
hegemony phase may get 'used to' behaving in a clandestine and
vanguardist way. This means that an approach suitable for a counter-
hegemony era is carried over into an era when leftists constitute the
ruling hegemony, and no longer really need to use such methods. The
possibility of 'inertia' is, however, a real one, as seen all to
clearly in the case of the USSR.
In building a participative New Leftist democracy much will have to
be done to rebuild those counter-hegemonic structures and practices
that were destroyed by the Right, the anarchistic-youth and by
'cabalistic' practices. In doing this the New Left needs to carefully
examine the popularist legacy of the UDF/MDM's specific rejection of
populism. 'Populism' in South Africa has been seen in the form of
Inkatha on the Right (see Mare, 1987), or by Black Consciousness on the
Left. Populism represents a 'top-down' manipulation of popular
resentments which are then wielded into a political force for change
(usually, but not always, of a reformist nature -- ego Buthelezi's
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Inkatha). Popular practices, on the other hand, attempt to generate a
grassroots, and decentralized approach towards mobilizing popular
resentments. This approach specifically rejects the top-down
'leadership' style of populism (UDF, n/d:23-25). Because it is a
'diversified' power, popular political practice is an open-ended
process. It is also a political practice concerned with winning
grassroots support (ie. articulating grassroots interests), and/or
competing with other political groups for political support. This is a
'totality' struggle -- material interests will guide the battle; but
superstructural techniques will underpin any success achieved.
So to be successful in a popularist struggle (in both a counter
hegemony and hegemony phase) requires of leftists that they get to
grips with the superstructural techniques of hegemonic competition
and/or hegemony-building. In addition to Gramsci, the
('ideological/cultural struggle') theoretical work of Althusser,
Volosinov, Tomaselli and Enzensberger is useful in this regard. But,
more importantly, the Left needs to learn to use the superstructures
for the development of democratic social interaction and a democratic
ethos of the sort discussed by Habermas and Mattelart. However, in
undertaking this work leftists need not confine themselves to theory
because much useful practical 'superstructural' work has been
undertaken by leftists in Nicaragua (Mattelart, 1986), Britain (Nigg &
Wade, 1980) and South Africa (Tomaselli & Louw, 1991). The popularist
(UDF/MDM) camp, in particular, gave rise to much innovative leftist-




It is in this regard that the work of the Frankfurt School on the
culture industry and co-option becomes valuable -- ie. this work
would be valuable for any leftist analysis of Rightist/HNC attempts
to co-opt sections of the Left camp.
[2] This has, of course, been precisely the socialist critique of post-
1980 Zimbabwe (Astrow, 1983).
[3] In this regard it can be noted that the amazing South African
plurality of interests (ie. the existence of large constituencies
ranging from Left to Right) gives a ruling hegemony only two
options: (1) totalitarian control and/or suppression of diversity
(an option the NP tried and failed to implement)j or (2) building a
hegemony based upon the recognition of pluralist-diversity.
[4] From a New Leftist perspective, one of the unfortunate legacies of
the South African struggle is the term 'the People'. This term has
been extremely valuable from a rhetorical-mobilizing point of view.
However, it has become reified, and now serves as a vehicle for
'proclaiming' support. In other words, it serves to blind many on
the Left that South African Leftists do not have the support of
100% of the population (which is what 'The People' implies to
many). The term therefore now serves to blind leftists to the need
for major hegemonic labour in order to expand the percentage of the
population who do support the them. For any group seeking to build
a leftist popular-democracy the term can thus too easily become a
negative one.
[5] The 'racial' mobilization by the UDF was largely necessitated by
the 'success' of the NP's apartheid policies. By the 1980s South
Africans were, by in large, segregated into racial 'group areas'.
As a result, trying to work cross-racially was, for one thing,
geographically difficult to practically implement. Secondly,
trying to mobilize around 'community issues' tended to result in
what appeared to be 'racial' mobilization because communities were
racially segregated. Hence the different (and geographically
'isolated') racial communities the apartheid policies created came
to have different local community concerns/problems. These were
not strictly 'racial' issues, so much as 'local' issues. However,
in segregated South Africa, 'local' generally became 'racial'.
Examples of such community-issues related organizations have been:
the Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organisation (PEBCO)j and the Cape ·
Areas Housing Action Committee (CAHAC). An interesting development,
however, occurred when during 1988 the Durban Housing Action
Committee (DHAC) succeeded in undoing the 'usual' pattern and
briefly linked 'Indian', 'coloured' and 'white' residents together
to oppose rent increases.
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Chapter 5. COUNTER-HEGEMONY AND COMMUNICATION: THE SOUTH AFRICAN
LEFT-WING PRESS OF THE 1980s
The 1980s was a decade that saw, on the one hand, Right-wing power
seriously challenged for the first time; and on the other hand, the
Left-wing built up significant counter-hegemonic power. Of central
importance to the New Leftist theme of this thesis is the fact that
this counter-hegemonic power came to be exercised through a left-
popularist genre of resistance. This form of struggle represents a de
facto re-construction of leftist praxis in the direction of the New
Leftist multi-class alliance form of (counter) hegemony building. More
importantly, this popularist era also saw some significant moves
towards the use of the superstructures for praxis. In particular, the
1980s witnessed the development of a left-wing press: a press that was
often centrally tied to the construction of the popular counter-
hegemony.
This chapter will: (I) Provide a working definition of the left-wing
press{es) (within a wider categorization of the South African press);
(2) provide a breakdown of the left-wing press into a proposed sub-
categorization; (3) give a brief history of this press (including the
state's attempts to smash it); (4) pay particular attention to the
progressive-alternative press (a sub-category of the left-wing press),
especially as regards the development of a framework for generating a
'theory and practice' of the South African progressive- alternative
press; and (5) link the progressive-alternative press (and to a lesser
extent the social democrat press) to this thesig' concern for the
development of a (New) Left popular democratic hegemony. In other
words, this chapter will examine the relationship of the progressive
alternative press to the building of a left hegemonic alliance.
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Categorization of the Press
A short-hand classification of the whole spectrum of the Press in
South Africa will help to put the left-wing press into perspective. Ten
genres (see Tomaselli & Louw, 1989) can be identified:
(i) The Afrikaans press 'linked' to the NP. This Press (like the NP)
has shifted its position over the years from neo-fascist in the
1950s, through various shades of (pro-apartheid) conservativsm
in the 1960s-1980s, to being supportive of a 'reformed-Right'
position in the 1990s. (For a fuller discussion of this shift
see Louw, 1991). Examples of this category of Press would be
Beeld, Die Burger, Vaderland and Rapport. This Press represents
a hybrid of the social responsibility genre of journalism and
elements of the libertarian genre (although the libertarian
genre is read through a conservative framework). During the
1950s and 1960s this press served the NP -- which in turn served
a hegemonic alliance of Afrikaner capital (largely rural-Cape
based); the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie; and the Afrikaner
working class. During this period Adorno et aI's (1982) work on
the national socialist authoritarian personality would have had
much explanatory power within South Africa viz this sector. The
NP's success in transferring wealth into its constituency's
hands produced a growing Afrikaner urban middle class. This
modified the NP during the 1970s-1980s into a party serving a
primarily middle class constituency. Its press has consequently,
since the 1980s, produced material not unlike the technocratic
ideology described by Habermas (1980) -- ie. a (New Right)
'conservative technicism' and 'free enterprise' ideology, The
journalists working on this press serve as excellent examples of
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( i i)
'organic intellectuals' -- a role they played within the
Afrikaner nationalist hegemony;
The English conservative-liberal press linked to monopoly
mining-finance capital, ego The Star, Pretoria News, Daily News,
Sunday Times, The Argus and Business Day. This press can be
classified as falling into a social responsibility 'adaption' of
the libertarian genre of journalism. Following Pinnock (1991),
this category (together with the Afrikaans Press will be termed
the 'guild press'. This press strongly advocates a 'free
enterprise' ideology and was critical of apartheid when this
policy was seen to be hindering the interests of local mining-
finance capital and HNC. The Frankfurt School's work on the
culture industry (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1979; Harcuse, 1968) and
this industry's 'cult of technocracy' (Harcuse, 1968; Habermas,
1980) has great explanatory power for those seeking to explain
the workings of this press as the mobilizers of an ideology that
serves the interests of a capitalist-technocracy;
(iii) Newspapers owned by white capital and aimed at black readers,
ego City Press and the Sowetan. This press operates within the
libertarian/social responsibility model. It is clearly
integrated into the state/capital's policy of creating values
which 'encourage' the formation of a black middle class -- or
what Gramsci would have termed the superstructural 'trenches' of
the ruling hegemony. The Frankfurt School's work on the culture
industry as a mechanism of co-opting oppositional practices and
'stilling' the dialectic (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1979; Harcuse,
1968) is helpful in understanding the underpinning agendas on
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(iv)
these newspapers. The editorial policies of these papers are
inclined to draw upon a mixture of 'free enterprise' and Black
Consciousness ideologies (see Chetty, 1988:32);
Regional newspapers and free sheets (the latter are sometimes
called 'knock-&-drops') often tied to Guild Press groups (see
Louw, 1991), but which offer 'apolitical' local interest items,
together with a platform for the encouragement of a local
commercialism. Examples of this are: South Coast Sun, Kempton
Express, Southern Suburbs Tattler, Berea Mail, and Ezase Mlazi.
A sub-category of this press is the rural 'platteland' press.
Some of these publications are owned by the press groups, but
many are independent. Examples would be: Paarl Post and
Graaff-Reinet Advertiser. The 'knock-&-drop' press is an
especially good example of what the Frankfurt School termed the
culture industry. It serves to 'kill the dialectic' by serving
as the very opposite of Habermas' 'public sphere'. (This is
ironic, given that a local press is most able to generate a real
grassroots dialogue, and/or provide vehicles for the
articulation of (grassroots) popular culture;
(v) Social-democrat independent press, ego Weekly Mail, and Vrye
Weekblad. This press' pioneering work in co-opting Information
Age technology for leftist parallels the tactics proposed by
(vi)
Enzensberger and Benjamin;
Progressive alternative press, ego Grassroots, Saamstaan,
Ukusa, Izwe Lase Rhini, and The Eye. Grassroots, in the period
1980-1985 came the closest to a Habermasian public sphere in the
South African context. It is also a press that -conforms closely
to Mattelart's notion of popular communication;
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(vii) Left-commercial press ego South, New African and New Nation.
This press has operated as a vehicle of leftist rhetoric (ie.
the sort of communication model described by Lenin);
(viii) (Prior to 1990) an underground press tied to banned political
organizations ego Mayibuye (ANC) and Umsebenzi (SACP). This
press served as a rhetorical vehicle (in Leninist fashion) for
these political groups (Chimutengwende, 1978);
(ix) Neo-fascist (pro-apartheid) press representing those who broke
away from t h e NP i n 1969 (HNP) and 1982 (CP). Examples are : Die
Patriot linked to the CP, Die Afrikaner published by the HNP,
Die Stem put out by the AWB, and the South African Observer.
Th is press serves a constituency which Adorno et aI's
Authoritarian Personality goes a long way toward explaining;
and,
(x) Newspapers tied to the comprador-bantustan infrastructures, for
example, Ilanga (which the Argus Company sold to Buthelezi's
Inkatha in 1987).
This thesis is really only interested in categories (v), (vi) and
(vii), especially category (vi). What the above categorization does is
challenge the 'commonsensical' definition of a so-called 'alternative
press' that emerged in the 1980s. It is challenged because it is an
unrigorous 'definition' (see Groenewald et aI, 1988). It was
popularized by journalists, and eagerly latched onto by the NP because
the term served to justify their repression of media opposed to 'law
and order'. The vague use by the NP and the guild press, of the term
'alternative' to encompass a broad spectrum of publications ranging
from right-wing newspapers like Patriot, Die Afrikaner and Die Stem to
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left-wing newspapers like South, Grassroots and New Nation (Natal
Mercury, 26.8.87), indicates nothing more than the Right's use of a
simplistic binary opposition classification of the media. This can
then be used to justify suppressing any 'voices' the Right does not
like.
Unfortunately, some of those who pioneered the left-wing press in
South Africa contributed to establishing the currency of the
unfortunate term 'alternative press'. For example Spong (1985) and
Johnson (1982). Hence, in the feasibility study which led up to the
establishment of the New Nation, Shaun Johnson (1982:21.) presented a
working definition of the term "alternative publication":
In essence the requirements are that an alternative publication
must have claim to independence, in the sense that it is not
directly or indirectly controlled by ruling vested interest groups
such as the state or the commercial monopoly press groups in South
Africa. Secondly, it must have as its central purpose the
provision of some kind of alternative: political, social, economic,
cultural or ideological to the South African status quo.
The notion of 'alternative' is not particularly helpful when
attempting to analyze the media in South Africa. It is too all-
encompassing and diffuse -- it needs to be replaced. The term 'left-
wing' is suggested as having the necessary specificity.
The South African left-wing presses
Along with Pinnock (1989a), this thesis will use the term left-wing
press. The term 'left-wing' is narrow enough to include only those
media which were part of the South African leftist (counter-hegemonic)
alliance -- ie. categories (v) to (viii). It also allows for the
articulation of the differences between types of media that served this
counter-hegemony -- ego four different leftist press categories.
Three newspapers will be used in this chapter to illustrate the
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three types of left-wing press These are the Weekly Mail for the
social-democrat independent press; Grassroots for the progressive-
alternative press; and South for the left-commercial press. These
three presses are central to any understanding of the role of
communication to the building of a (New) leftist popular hegemony (or
counter-hegemony) [1]. These three forms of press were central to the
development during the 1980s, of an anti-apartheid leftist movement
organized as a popularist alliance. They used what amounted to
Poulantzian alliance-politics, and a Mattelart-type communication
policy. Sectors of this press operated for a time as de facto
grassroots 'public spheres' (Louw, 1989a). What characterized these
left-wing presses was that they were different from the approach, form
and particularly content of the other categories of press as listed
above. This is especially true of the 'progressive alternative' sub-
category, which is why this thesis will concentrate primarily on this
sub-category.
The progressive alternative press (category vi) offers New Leftist
popularists a potential model for building micro-level public spheres.
In other words, developing democratic dialogue at the grassroots
community level through using the media. In a future South Africa,
where the pressures for co-option will probably be great, such
grassroots public spheres may be invaluable for the left. They are
perhaps the best guarantee of generating a deep-penetrating grassroots
leftism able to prevent, or at least resist comprador co-option. A
functioning grassroots public sphere would make more difficult a
populist (rhetorical) manip~lation of the masses by any leadership
group that was co-opted. In addition, if MNC is successful at co-
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opting the South African struggle, then grassroots public spheres would
at least serve to keep leftist ideals alive at grassroots level. In
some contexts the Left perhaps needs to consider such a strategy as
more valuable than accepting national power. In other words, if
acceptance of power actually means being co-opted by MNC (such as has
happened in contemporary Spain, where there is a socialist 'form' and
rhetoric, but with no socialist 'content' to the existing government's
policy see Donaghy & Newton, 1989:154-5, 158-9).
The social democrat 'independent' media (category v) have also have
also had a significant role to play in helping to build a South African
popular left-alliance. Of all the left-wing presses this social
democrat press is similar to the pluralistic Eurocommunist position of
writers like Poulantzas (or perhaps even more so, to the leftism of
Laclau & Mouffe). This press has served to 'mobilize' one specific
sector of the wider leftist alliance -- primarily, but not exclusively,
the white professional 'Left'. In reaching this sector this press
served the valuable role of helping to mobilize leftist intellectuals .
.T~is is important for the realization of a Gramscian hegemony and
Benjamin's 'technik'. (During the 1980s the MDM tried to organize this
white professional sector through organizations like Jodac, DDA, Cape
Democrats, and FFF). The social democrat independent press had a
significant role to play in 'reaching' this sector of society. It
thereby helped to widen the terrain upon which a (leftist) Gramscian
hegemony could be constructed.
This independent press is also significant as it is a child of the
Information Age within the Southern African context. The Weekly Mail
co-opted the PC/desk-top ('superstructural era') technology of MNC, and
built out of it a leftist 'gap'. Such an Enzensberger (or WaIter
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Benjamin)-type superstructural praxis serves as an excellent
illustration of this thesis' pos ition that Information Age technology
need not only be considered a 'First World' plaything.
The social democrat press can be defined as being generally
supportive of the Left but remaining independent of any specific
political movement. It provided a platform for the expression of
'leftist' anti-apartheid messages, but adhered to 'objective'
journalistic practices of the libertarian genre. This genre has
generated a (liberal) 'public sphere'. This serves to call into
question the Right's simplistic lumping together of this press with the
'progressive alternative press' (Tomaselli and Louw, 1988:3).
Specifically this independent press adopted journalistic practices that
were characterized by:
* something of an 'intellectualized' re-reading of the South African
situation with an anti-apartheid 'liberatory' intent. This
approach is not unlike Benjamin's notion of Technik applied to the
journalistic sphere;
* falling outside the accepted journalistic practices of the South
African guild press (see Louw, 1983, 1984) -- ie. the
'independent' press defined itself as falling outside what the
Frankfurt School termed the culture industry (serving capitalist-
technocracy); but
* which was never as partisan or rhetorical (Leninist?) as the
practices of ·the other leftist media",
* which was never 'organically' linked to community and worker
groups in the same way as the progressive alternative press has
been; and
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* which has often used a 'legalistic strategy' (at least up until
when the WeeklY Mail was closed by the Minister for the month of
November 1988)~ As Anton Harber (1988) said: "we were journalists
acting as lawyers. We studied statutes; we spent a great deal of
time with lawyers ... we carved out a whole niche for ourselves
simply by re-interpreting the law in an aggressive and pro-active
way".
The 'independent' press adopted something of a hybrid of the
'conventional' libertarian media practices and of progressive
alternative media practices.
This particular 'independent' approach to journalism is not
unrelated to the sort of readership it attracts. This readership would
often respond negatively to the more openly partisan "advocacy"
('rhetorical') approach (Johnson, 1982:2.19) of the progressive
alternative press. But those reading this media would also see as
positive any attempts to 'distance' the media from the control of
'capital'. Hence this media -- such as the Weekly Mail and Vrye
Weekblad -- was characterized by specific attempts to resist being
controlled by capitalist interests. For example, the Weekly Mail
specifically excludes its non-staff investors from having any say in
policy/management decisions. However, this same press has operated
within the 'logic' of South Africa's capitalist economic system in so
far as it operates as registered capitalist enterprises, and, to a
considerable extent, apply 'marketing' practices. Weekly Mail, is
owned by WM Publications: a co-operative of journalists (who founded
and work on it) and local investors. Vrye Weekblad is controlled by a
company called Wending Publikasies Bpk. Both companies are
'independent' of (local or international) monopoly capital.
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The progressive alternative press and left-commercial press
(categories vi and vii) are different from the social democrat press in
so far as they are both explicitly partisan and not averse to using
rhetoric in order to 'mobilize' leftist forces. However, categories
(vi) and (vii) are different in so far as the left-commercial press
attempts to produce news as opposed to facilitating a community 'public
sphere'. I will examine this difference in more depth later when the
Cape media activist shift from Grassroots to South is discussed. For
this thesis the difference is a crucial one. The left-commercial genre
adopts something of a 'top-down' approach to communication and hence
violates the Habermasian notion of a dialogical (democratic) public
sphere. However, despite differences, both the progressive alternative
and left-commercial presses share certain characteristics. Both are a
form or genre, of journalism which:
* is staffed by journalists who would, in general, regard themselves as
'organic intellectuals'. As media activists they have worked in a
Mattelart -like fashion to build leftist hegemony;
* operates from "a Leftist theoretical position" (Tomaselli, 1986: 66),
and aims to assist in developing leftist symbols. This is a de facto
extension of Tomaselli and Volosinov's ideas on the istruggle for the
sign' .
* seeks to implement something of an Enzensberger-type praxis
communication;
* .f' 11' ".spec~ ~ca y a~ms to art~culate the views and aspirations of leftist
communities and workers" (Johnson, 1982:2.15). In other words, they
explicitly cultivate an empathy with the 'underdogs' (the working
class, peasants and lumpen-proletariat) and their plight. They also
aim to give a voice to the non-rich, non-famous and non-powerful in
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society, and to write in a way that relates to their daily 'lived
experiences'. In this way grassroots popular culture has been given
a space for growth in a fashion that conforms to the culturalist
logic of Raymond Williams et al;
* aims to make a direct contribution, through journalism, to the
strengthening, or even the initiation of, leftist organization
(Patel, 1985:12-13); the "building of alliances among the people"
(Johnson, 1982:2.15); building democracy (Johnson, 1982:2.30); the
co-ordination of community and worker interests (Johnson, 1982:
2.16); and facilitating the development of cultural struggle. This
amounts to a practical application of Gramsci's and Poulantzas'
theories. Much space has consequently been given over to
'organizational' stories. Further, a form of 'advocacy' journalism
has sometimes been practiced -- in which the publication itself
actively initiates the call for the establishment of say 'a civic'.
It does not wait for 'an event' or a 'newsworthy' individual to make
'the news', but rather activates the process itself. An example of
this is Grassroots, August 1980. Thus this leftist press not only
challenges the conventional libertarian journalism practices
inherited by South Africans from the United Kingdom but, more
importantly, strives to be organically linked to leftist community-
based religious, civic, student and women's organizations and trad~
unions (Tomaselli and Louw, 1988:2). 'Journalism', in fact, is of
secondary importance. Building community democracy takes first place
(Johnson, 1982:2.16). This is an interesting articulation of the
notion of 'public sphere'. This is especially true of the
progressive-alternative press. For the progressive alternative press
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communities are people within specific regions and neighbourhoods who
have organized themselves into a coherent whole through civic,
religious and other organizations and are united by a commonly
perceived oppression. This is the reason this thesis places such an
emphasis on the progressive alternative press. This press offers
some seminal insights into how to go about building up not merely a
media-operation, but more importantly, how to build up a democratic
popular counter-hegemonic network in which the media play a pivotal
role in generating democracy -- in the community and in the newspaper
itself (Tomaselli, 1986:65);
* strives to replace eventized reporting with an explanation of
context. In part, this is facilitated by the fact that the left-wing
press have been weeklies rather than dailies. Tomaselli (1985:17)
has stressed the importance of such contextualization in the leftist
media, in general, as a way of possibly preventing the co-option of
oppositional messages by the ruling hegemony. This is a genre of
journalism which has aimed to inform, educate and raise the general
level of critical awareness within the communities oppressed by
apartheid. In other words, it has aimed to provide those in the
counter-hegemony with basic information on education~ housing,
health, social services, and legal matters (Johnson, 1982:2.15).
* explicitly aims to expose social injustice;
* avoids the tendency to capitalize on events using sensationalism
(Traber, 1985:3).
* makes no attempt to maintain any image of 'neutrality'(Johnson, 1982:
2.19}. However, as Johnson notes, this does not necessarily mean a
crude propagandistic approach is adopted. In fact, much store is set
by factual accuracy (Johnson, 1982:2.30);
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* regard themselves as accountable to left-wing structures. The
progressive alternative press achieve this by way of direct community
representation on the General Body and in the production process.
With the left-commercial press, however, accountability is by way of
left-wing leaders sitting on the Boards of control. The de facto
level of accountability has varied from publication to publication;
* aims to avoid being sucked into the 'culture industry'. In the case
of the progressive-alternative press this takes the form of aiming to
be non-commercial, and avoiding reliance on advertising revenue.
This 'avoidance', of course, creates certain practical problems
regarding funding when working within a capitalist society. These
problems are compounded when it is realized that hardly any
commercial advertisers are interested in advertising in these
publications anyway (since they attract readers without much
'disposable income'). However, since all progressive alternative
presses in South Africa have been able to rely on one or other form
of subsidy (Johnson, 1982:2.25; and Pinnock & Tomaselli, 1984:9) they
have been able to develop relatively 'purist' advertising policies.
In other words, they are being selective as to whose advertisements
they accept. However, the left-commercial press have accepted the
constraints of working within a capitalist society and accept
advertising and the 'constraints' this implies. However, even here.,
there has been an attempt to guard against being co-opted by the
culture industry. But after 1990, as overseas subsidies have become
more difficult to secure, so the need for advertising has increased,
and hence 'purist' positions have had to be modified;
* have tried to make themselves (ie. content and layout) accessible to
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a readership with low levels of education (Patel, 1985:14; Tomaselli,
1986:64-5). As Johnson notes, the readership is assumed to have
about a standard six level of education (1982:2.20). They have not
always been successful (Louw, 1989d);
* in accordance with a long-standing leftist media tradition (see
Morley et aI, 1986; and Cadman, 1981), are greatly concerned with
feedback from readership; and
* have paid more attention to editorial content and structuring than to
administrative and financial concerns. (This is tied to a general
leftist negativity towards 'business' matters). As a consequence
organizational and financial problems have arisen which have, in
turn, served to undermine the editorial work.
A brief overview and history of the South African left-wing press
The growth and consolidation of an internally-based left-wing press
in South Africa took place in the 1980s. An important parallel
development -- especially evident during the first half of the 1980s
was the circulation of a wide range of other counter-hegemonic
publications. Examples of these are anti-conscription publications;
trade union publications; student and academic publications; ANC, SACP,
UDF and Black Consciousness publications; religious publications;
various ad hoc publications (like pamphlets); and print media 'forums'
for leftist in-house debate/dialogue. Of the latter, Work in Progress
(WIP) and the South African Labour Bulletin (SALB) have been of
enormous importance. (SALB, for example played a crucial part in the
development of the 'workerist' position during the 1970s and 1980s).
The ANC operated an externally-based 'Radio Freedom'. The
F
concentration on print is largely due to the rigid licensing-control
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the South African state has exercised over the air-waves (Tomaselli, R.
et aI, 1989). In South Africa - at least up until the June 1986
declaration of a State of Emergency - there had been less control over
internal publis~ing than over the air-waves.
The emergence of a left-wing press during the 1980s needs to be seen
in the context of the changing patterns of resistance to apartheid
since World War 11. Resistance has gone through four main phases since
the mid- 1950s. Briefly, these phases are:
* Phase One: during the 1950s the Congress of the People Movement was
organized by the African National Congress (before its banning). This
movement consisted of "a series of campaigns held in huge rallies,
small houses, flats, streets and factory meetings, gatherings in kraals
and on farms" (Suttner & Cronin, 1986:12). During 1954-5 'volunteers'
tramped the country visiting households, and places of work, to collect
the people's 'demands' for a 'constitution' for South Africa. Small
group and organized interpersonal communication had been mobilized to
build a grassroots counter-hegemony, through a countrywide activation
of 'discussion' of 'a better future', and to develop and train cadres.
This development was facilitated through the cadres having to learn to
interact directly with their potential cons~ituency.
The Congress movement attempted to create a social dialogue or
rudimentary 'public sphere'. The outcome was the Kliptown meeting in
1955 where the 'demands' were collated into the 'Freedom Charter'.
For the rest of phase one this Charter served as an anti-apartheid
focus, and hence as a mobilizer of discussion and support for
resistance. (This Charter was to resurface as a significant rallying
point in the third and fourth phases).
The use of mass media during phase one was limited. Anti-apartheid
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communication overwhelmingly occurred through word-of-mouth, small
groups, or mass rallies.
Between 1960 and 1963 the state clamped down on the resistance
movement. By the end of the Rivonia Treason Trial (1964) internal
opposition had been crushed. The ANC and PAC were banned; and leaders
who had not been jailed or killed, fled into exile. The media of the
emerging externally-based resistance · did not have a major impact inside
South Africa for the rest of the 1960s (see Chimutengwende, 1978).
* Phase Two: Black Consciousness (BC) and Populism emerged during the
1970s. This was associated with the re-awakening of leftist resistance
primarily amongst urbanized black petit bourgeois intellectuals. The
economic downturn in the 1970s set the scene for phase two, with its
two key moments being the Durban Strikes of 1973 and the Soweto
uprising of 1976. The central 'institutionalization' of this re-
awakening was the formation of the Black People's Convention in 1972.
This was a period of accumulating intellectual resources for
resistance as well as developing theoretical and journalistic skills.
Out of it emerged an indigenous theory of (black) resistance. This was
a form of accumulation of 'cadres and theory'. The phase was
characterized by a populist 'top-down' (i.e. intellectual leadership)
approach to resistance. It was also the first significant step in
using mass media (newspapers, pamphlets, books, etc) for mobilization
inside the country. For example, in 1970 the Black Consciousness
Movement (BCM) produced its first publication called SASO Newsletter
(Johnson, 1985:20). This was followed by Black Review in 1972, and
Biko's Black Viewpoint (Johnson, 1985:20). It was during this phase
that the left-wing press was conceived. The success of BC in re-
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awakening this spirit signalled its own decline [2]. The spread of the
1976 uprising across the country heralded the re-activation of mass
participation in resistance (despite the fact that the state suppressed
the uprising itself).
* Phase Three: From the late 1970s a shift became apparent in the
organizational style of those engaged in leftist resistance. They moved
away from the 'top-down' style of Populism to the 'bottom-up' style of
popular organization. This shift was apparent in both political
organizations (Louw, 1989) and in the independent trade union movement
(Maree, 1988:21-22). In the wake of the Soweto 'mobilization' of mass
participation, the populist style of BC was challenged by the embryonic
emergence of 'non-intellectual' popular participation in resistance.
This re-activated grassroots communication at community level. Between
1976 and 1983 the popular approach overtook and, for the most part,
superceded the populist approach. Within the resultant MDM a great
emphasis was subsequently placed upon democratic practices internal to
the organizations. These changes were accompanied by a decline of BC
ideology (ie. black exclusivism) and a re-emergence of the Freedom
Charter. This was used as a rallying document of a ('Charterist')
resistance built upon a multi-class, multi-race alliance. This phase
came of age with the formation of the UDF in 1983. Following this
event, the resistance, which became generally known as 'the struggle',
picked up speed. Open revolt .f i n a l l y burst out during the Vaal
Triangle Uprising of 1984; a revolt that grew out of the organization
of' an anti-Tricameral elections campaign by the UDF, NF and the
independent trade unions. From there the uprising quickly spread
countrywide. For the rest of the 1980s political violence was the order
of the day in South Africa.
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Phase three represents a style of resistance that has mastered the
urban environment and its technocratic possibilities; the means of
mobilizing and democratically organizing mass urban-based resistance;
and a method of activating and 'institutionalizing' resistance at the
community level and linking the resulting structures -- through
Information Age technology -- into a resistance network. Hence it was
phase three that saw the real birth of a left-wing press in South
Africa.
A sub-phase within phase three was the attempt from 1986 until
January 1990 to keep popular democracy alive under harsh State of
Emergency conditions. During this period state repression smashed many
of the the community groups built prior to 1986 (through detentions,
violence and assassinations). The State of Emergencies severely
damaged popular communication networks. Despite the damage done to the
democratic operation of the resistance structures, the struggle itself
was not subdued.
* Phase Four began with the unbanning of the ANC, PAC and SACP in 1990.
The unbanning changed the entire context of leftist struggle. The
change in the context was reinforced by the collapse 'o f Soviet power
which strengthened the hand of the South African right. During 1990
the Left experienced major difficulties with regard to reconstructing
smashed structures and re-orienting leftist strategy and tactics
towards the new context. Phase four has seen significant sectors of
the left-wing press experience difficulties due to a 're-oriented'
world situation. The formerly underground publications (of the ANC and
SACP) lost their East European printing sponsors; and Western overseas
subsidies for internally-based publications declined. The alternative
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press increasingly found that the 'gap' it had filled being removed by
the changed circumstances. As the editor of the Vrye Weekblad said
during an SABC interview on 12 March 1991: "It is yesterday's cause to
be an alternative newspaper".
Any consideration of the South African left-wing press (especially
the 'popularist' genre of this press) needs to be concerned with phase
three. However, if the conception-phase of this press is sought, it is
necessary to go back to phase two. If a 'source' for the left-wing
press is to be defined it seems reasonable to award this role to
Grassroots (Johnson, 1985:21). But to understand the emergence of
Grassroots in 1980 it is necessary to go back to the second phase -- to
1970 when BCM produced its first publication called SASO Newsletter
(Johnson, 1985:20). However, more direct roots to Grassroots came .f r om
the BCM's 'journalist wing'. In 1971 this was formalized into . the Union
of Black Journalists (UBJ). The UBJ represents a significant moment in
South African leftist journalism: it represents the moment when BC
ideology was first institutionalized within the media world. The UBJ
represented a renaissance of resistance to apartheid amongst media
workers.
The UBJ grew out of the South African Journalists Association
(SAJA). SAJA was developed in opposition to the liberal (and mainly
white) South African Society of Journalists (SASJ). SAJA, which
operated (in Johannesburg) in 1970-1971, was originally non-racial.
However, it soon became a black journalists body no longer prepared to
work within SASJ. By 1971 when SAJA changed its name to UBJ it was
heavily BC in orientation. The influence of Steve Biko and Franz Fanon
was strongly in evidence. In 1975 the UBJ launched a (BC-oriented)
publication called The Bulletin (banned in 1976). In one sense The
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Bulletin could be regarded as the 'pilot project' of what became the
left-wing press. This was because it was the same 'spirit' within the
UBJ of wanting to publish those 'black' views ignored by the
'mainstream' press which eventually motivated the formation of
Grassroots. Following the banning of The Bulletin the UBJ produced
another publication called Azizi Thula (in 1977) which was also banned.
(see Raubenheimer, 1991).
Throughout the 1970s the re-awakening of resistance steadily
developed and formed itself into a 'perceivable' BC/anti-apartheid
force in society. This finally exploded in the 1976 Soweto uprising and
then rapidly solidified into a counter-hegemony force on a national
basis. An example of this 'national' character in the journalistic
world was that the Western Cape 'coloured' branch of the SASJ resigned
from the SASJ and joined the UBJ in 1976. By 1977 it was clear that
the UBJ was going to be banned. (The UBJ's Bulletin had been banned in
1976). As a result the UBJ formed the Writers Association of South
Africa (WASA) in March 1977, and transferred UBJ's printing press to
WASA. (The UBJ was, in fact, banned in October 1977 together with 18
other BC organizations. This act set the tone for a state vs journalist
conflict over the next five years). WASA adopted a clear BC approach.
WASA further articulated what was essentially a New World Information
Order (NWIO) approach to journalism: the idea that black journalists
owed their first allegiance to their (black) community and the black
struggle, and only their second allegiance to 'journalism'; and an
approach which questioned 'objectivity' as articulated by the liberal
press for which its members worked. (This BC and New World Information
Order (NWIO) approach has continued to influence a significant sector
320
of black journalists right down to the present day in the form of the
Media Workers Association of South Africa (MWASA). This organization
replaced WASA in 1980 when WASA moved to transform itself into a trade
union-type organization}.
It was WASA -- under the presidency of Zwelakhe Sisulu -- which can
be attributed as the 'parent' of the South African left-wing press as
it was WASA that set up and funded Grassroots in 1979. The first issue
of Grassroots appeared in early 1980. Grassroots was originally
intended as a nationally-distributed newspaper. Although distributed
nationally, Grassroots was, from the outset, primarily a Cape Town
phenomenon (with some wider distribution in the Western Cape). Despite
this Cape regionalism which quickly set in, Grassroots became, in a
very real sense, the 'seminal' newspaper for the South African counter-
hegemony. It was the model others copied, and to whom others looked
for advice, training and assistance (Johnson, 1982:2.28).
From those early beginnings in 1980 the leftist press spread out to
the rest of South Africa over the next six years: to Johannesburg,
Grahamstown, Pretoria, Durban, Oudtshoorn, and the rural Western Cape.
This developing left-wing print media has, on the whole, as pointed out
by Patel (1985:14), fulfilled many different roles at ' different times.
It has also constantly re-defined its purpose to respond dynamically
to the changing needs at any given point in time. One such shift in
keeping with a broader shift within the South African left -- was a
move away from the early BC roots (of UBJ/WASA), and a general shift
towards the non-racialism of the UDF. A significant contribution in
the 'adaptation' away from BC within leftist journalist circles
occurred in 1979 --ie. just before the launch of Grassroots -- when, at
the Wilgerspruit WASA Congress, Quraish Patel delivered his paper 'In
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Search of an Ideology'. This marked a transition on the Left from the
dominance of BC during the 1970s to the non-racialism of the 1980s. One
of the outcomes of this shift was that although Grassroots was
conceptualized as a BC publication, it became the seminal publication
of the non-racial UDF era.
Of the left-wing newspapers some have been 'survivors'(such as
Grassroots and Weekly Mail)j others did not succeed in surviving for as
long (such as Ukusaj The Eye and the Daily Mail). However, as Patel
has noted: "even if its life span is short, its contribution cannot be
measured in the years of its existence, but in its quality and the
extent to which it has advanced our struggle" (Patel, 1985:14).
The growth of these left-wing publications can be linked to several
interconnected factors:
* The 1970s saw a resurgence (a 'renaissance' following the 'long
night' of the 1960s) of resistance in South Africa which re-emerged at
the Durban strikes of 1973 and the Soweto protests of 1976 (Patel,
1985:12). From a Frankfurt School perspective, one might say ~he
'dialectic' was 're-engaged' in the 1970s. This was not unrelated to a
mid-1970s decline in the South African economy (linked .to a more
general crisis in world capitalism), but was primarily characterized by
a 'subjective' interventionism. Further, Black Consciousness (BC)
ideology as articulated by Biko, had succeeded, during the 1970s, in
reawakening a pride within (especially) South Africa's growing urban
bl~ck population. · BC represented an important moment in the production
of what Tomaselli would call 'signs', with which the left would
mobilize and so engage in struggle with the Right. But the BC
, . , t frena1ssance was rans ormed by the Soweto protests and the subsequent
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state repression such that by the end of the 1970s a shift was apparent
in both the ruling-hegemony and counter-hegemony. One could say the
success of BC (as a mobilizer) was its own undoing. Within the
counter-hegemony a significant shift occurred away from BC's narrowly-
based populist 'top-down' ('intellectualized') structuring of
resistance. It was a shift towards a popular mass-based ('grassroots')
structuring of a leftist counter hegemony. This shift was best
characterized by the 1983 emergence of the UDF in Cape Town. For the
rest of the 1980s the left counter-hegemony was structured as a
Gramscian hegemonic alliance.
* An outburst of intellectual creativity after the 1976 Soweto
Upris ing man ifested itself wider than just the progressive
al ternative press ( Ra v a n staff, 1985:22). A mass outpouring of
township-based popular culture accompanied the re-awakening of
resistance. Further, an expanding leftist intelligentsia colonized
many academic institutions in South Africa. (They succeeded, for
example, in completely 'capturing' the University of the Western
Cape by the end of the 1980s). The left-wing press was only one
example of the subjective interventionism of the period.
* The growth of a progressive alternative press, from 1980 onwards,
was thus a development which parallelled the emergence of a new
'popular-grassroots' genre of counter-hegemonic organization, and an
intensification of the social struggle. It was a genre of media
bearing striking similarities to 'popular communication' projects in
other parts of the world, as described by Mattelart (1983); White
(1980); and Dionisio (1986). These media did not cause the social
struggle as certain conservativ~_ media analysts have suggested (see
Schlesinger et aI, 1983). As Tomaselli and Pinnock (1984) noted,
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the leftist media are rather communicative adjuncts arising out of
the complex dynamics that g i ve rise to social confl ict. This
parallells the experiences o~~other Third World societies, for
example: Nicaragua (Mattelart, 1986); Zimbabwe (see Frederikse,
1982); and Guinea-Bisau (see Cabral, 1980: 138-154).
* Pinnock and Tomaselli (1984:11), have also suggested that the shift
to 'community struggle' and 'community journalism' was a tactical
response to state repression; a phenomena Mattelart (1983, 1986) has
identified elsewhere. Johnson also notes how the community genre of
journalism was adopted because it was difficult for the state to
stamp it out (Johnson, 1985:21). This genre aimed at promoting
local community organization by being linked to a specific community
or organization; remaining small; using a bottom-up approach; and
consciously setting a limited political role for itself. In the
process, of course, these developments gave rise to 'public
spheres' on a micro scale.
* The white-owned media were unable to provide a systematic voice to
either the growing leftist counter-hegemony and/or the working class
communities in South Africa (Johnson, 1982:2.15). White (1982:10)
examined a similar process in Latin America whereby lower-status
views are excluded by the mainstream media. The resultant narrowed
world-view was due to both the structural constraints imposed by
market forces (Louw, 1984, 1990) and to media legislation. This
necessitated the development of alternative channels of
communication to serve this rapidly growing sector of the
population. To some extent this development can be used as proof of
the inadequacy of Frankfurt School pessimism: the South African
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culture industry did not 'passify' and de-revolutionize the masses
.
(although, of course, Marcuse's extension of the Frankfurt School
tradition would easily be abl~ to accommodate and explain the
emergence of leftist resistance in South Africa. The explosion of
resistance from the mid-1970s onwards can be used to justify the
optimism of culturalists like Raymond Williams and E.P Thompson.
* A structural shift in the economy to industry (1960s to mid-1970s),
meant that by the mid-1970s South Africa was primarily an urban-
based industrialized society (Innes, 1984; and Gelb, 1991:159-160).
South Africa was one of the peripheral regions in which MNC located
its heavy industry (while the First World was restructured into an
Information-driven economy). This industrialization of South Africa
led to the growth of a significant black proletariat and to the rise
of black trade unions. By the 1980s this proletarian community and
its allies had acquired the skills and organizational forms to run a
media which could voice its interests. The 'subjective' (media)
struggle was thus, on the one hand, an outgrowth of the material
context. But without the subjective interventionism of BC these
material conditions might have come to naught. This interplay of
objective and subjective conditions demonstrates the need for a
'totality' approach to analyzing this phenomenon.
* During the 1970s the liberal guild press had hired a few black
journalists; a trend started by the Rand Daily Mail. Many of these
black journalists soon found themselves in the same position as
their left-wing white colleagues -- alienated by the conservative
self-censorship of the guild press. Ironically then, the
journalistic skills learned by these black journalists (together
with skills made available by church and white leftist academics)
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were able to provide the basic skills needed for the early
progressive alternative media (Pinnock & Tomaselli, 1984:12). This
shift of skills represents an interesting Enzensbergian twist. it
also illustrates the value of utilizing all superstructural gaps as
they become available. However, certainly at the outset, this
narrow skills-base was, in one sense a weakness, because of the
undue reliance that was placed on the shoulders of relatively few
media activists (Johnson, 1982:2.31; and Patel, 1985:14; and Louw,
1989d).
* The establishment and running of left-wing presses was facilitated
by the availability of funding from churches and human rights
organizations. The ava ilability of overseas fund ing (and 'moral'
support) from foreign liberal and social democrat groups was a
significant factor in the development of a South African -left-wing
press. Other leftists (eg. in Latin America) have been unable to
rely on this factor to the same extent. This is, to some extent,
due to the fact that 'apartheid' had become a highly emotive issue
in Western Europe and America; an issue which anti-apartheid grou~s _
have been successful in capitalizing on. One of the ironies of the
1980s was therefore the extent to which the USA (largely due to
pressure from the USA black caucus) eagerly sought to give funding
to South African groups while fighting allied l e f t i s t groups
elsewhere in the world. (As a result of the wider world picture,
Leftists attached to the MDM, in general, shunned such USA advances
in the 1980s. This appeared to cause tremendous irritation to USA
officials). And -because South Africa is so closely tied to Western
-.
interests, the South African government found it difficult to stop
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the Western interest groups from providing such financial aid,
although obstacles were created to slow the process down (Sinclair,
1990:42-43). To a considerable extent, these donations were
motivated by a desire on the part of Western interests to gain a
toe-hold into what they saw as potentially the future ruling ·
hegemony in South Africa. Much of the funding was seemingly
motivated by the belief that the West would be able to influence the
direction of 'the struggle' by boosting those identified as the
'non-communist left' within this counter-hegemony. During the 1980s
the South African Left became increasingly skillful at mobilizing
such sources of funding (with all the duplicity and hidden agendas
-- on both sides -- which that necessarily entailed). However,
following the 1990 reforms the West came to see the reformed-Right
as a credible hegemonic influence in South Africa. As a result,
funding for the Left increasingly dried up .
* A significant development was the penetration of Information Age
technology into South Africa during the early 1980s. This
technology was easily accessible to undercapitalized communities in
the form of pes, Apple technology and desktop publishing and cheap
high-quality photocopying facilities (Pinnock, 1991). Leftist media
activists quickly learned to exploit the benefits and
superstructural 'gaps' that the Information Age introduced into the
South African context . The availability of desk top publishing
technology reinforced two factors already present in South Africa
. which directed those in the counter-hegemony toward print media: (1)
academics were often involved in the early stages of founding such
ventures, and they have a 'natural' tendency toward opting for the
printed word; and (2) the South African state blocked counter-
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hegemonic access to the airways (eg. radio and television). Given the
high levels of illiteracy amongst black South Africans, it was
important for the state to grant itself a monopoly of broadcast access
to these people. The state achieved this through internal licensing
arrangements and 'jamming' of external broadcasts.
Popular resistance and the building of democratic media practices
The popular democratic phase of leftist struggle (or phase three) is
of central importance because it was during this phase that all three
main forms of internally-based left-wing press emerged. But most
importantly, it was during this period that a popularist media (see
Hattelart & Siegelaub, 1983) developed in South Africa in the form of
the progressive alternative press. From a New Leftist perspective,
especially one giving prominence to a Habermas/Hattelart (dialogical/
democratic) view of communication, it is this progressive alternative
genre which deserves special attention.
The way communication flow is institutionalized in a community tells
us much about democratic practice in that community. At the one
extreme communication can be institutionalized in a top-down fashion
(best exemplified by a militaristic-commanderist style). The
communication associated with HNC is of this top-down genre. Firstly,
the citizens of the First World are spoken 'down to' by their own
culture industry. (Ironically the media of the Second World made the
same mistake as a result of their 'top-down' vanguardist approach).
Secondly, the First (North) World communicates 'down to' the Third
(South) World. The other extreme is fully-functioning interactive
dialogical communication as described by Habermas or Hattelart or
White. This latter approach complements popular (ie. mass
328
participative) political practice.
Top-down communication is inherently undemocratic. It facilitates
the manipulation of a population by a ruling elite because it is uni-
directional. For the Frankfurt School, the 'culture industry' operated
in this fashion. The top-down approach complements those political
practices (such as populism) which do not encourage mass participation.
The mainstream media in South Africa (the guild press, the state-run
and commercial broadcasting stations) operate such uni-directional
communication structures. This genre of communication was planted in
South Africa during the British Imperial era. Hence it complements the
rigid class-stratified society of British capitalism (Curran, 1988).
In this way these media have served the interests of the minority
(white) ruling class, and have in no way facilitated democratic debate
in South Africa. The managers of these media, in fact, have shown
little commitment to democratic practices.
The dialogical approach facilitates a bottom-up empowering of the
community. Ironically, during the 1970s and 1980s, because of its need
for rapid world-wide interactive communication, HNC produced
communication systems able to facilitate mass-dialogical communication.
This took the form of electronic-information technology. It was
Enzensberger who pointed to the need for the Left to utilize this
dialogical potential to empower the masses. In the dialogical approach
the community can articulate its own interests in a democratic debate.
The 1980s in South Africa saw the proliferation of this mode of
co~munity organization. Between 1976 and 1983 popular (grassroots)
communication overtook and, for the most part, superceded the populist
approach. Within the resultant structures of the MDH much emphasis was
placed on popular democratic practices internal to organizations. The
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resultant popular style of community organization of the 1980s
provides salient lessons for communicologists.
The Grassroots media project in Cape Town represented the first
attempt to institutionalize this popular-dialogical approach when it
adopted an interactive-dialogical communication structure. In setting
up and running Grassroots they seriously challenged mainstream (uni-
directional) media theory and practice. This challenge is centrally
important for this thesis because of the way the project demonstrates
how a grassroots participative democracy can be built so as to
potentially constitute the basis of a leftist 'public sphere'.
In top-down communication a one-way flow of information is
paralleled by an inadequate knowledge of local conditions, or what the
people themselves think, or want or do. The crux of the problem can be
seen in the oft used simplistic positivist-functional Communicator-
Medium-Recipient (C-M-R) model. This equation was inappropriately
adapted by communication scholars from telecommunications modeling
studies conducted by Bell Laboratories in the 1940s (Shannon and
Weaver, 1949). The concept is a deterministic one which cannot describe
situations where recipients resist, contest, reject or misunderstand
the information imposed upon them. The model explains nothing outside
the transmission of electric, electronic, frequency spectrums or
bandwidth signals. Developed by a host of researchers like Gerbner
(1956), Lasswell (1948), Newcomb (1953), Westley and MacLean (1957) and
others, they unsuccessfully sought to lessen the model's essential
determinism. The problem, however, started well before Shannon and
Weaver's experiments, was caused by the emergence of mass production
methods during the early years of the 20th Century, the consequent
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development of a consumer society, and the need to sell products as
fast as they were made. In communicological terms the result was the
culture industry, as de~cribed by the Frankfurt School.
Prior to interference by ruling elites who wanted to control . who
could speak to whom, the potential existed for feedback {ie. democratic
communication}. For this to occur every person with a crystal radio
transmitter could converse with all other transmitter/receiver owners.
This capacity was systematically curtailed and then restricted in terms
of military and commercial broadcasting imperatives during the 1920s
{Hayman and Tomaselli, 1989}. This restriction of communication
between people using the new technology formed the basis of the modern
communication and culture industries. Elites reserved themselves the
right to speak to whom about what and how (see White, 1983a:4). They
tried to turn recipients into passive consumers along the lines of the
C-M-R model. C-M-R assumptions underpin the commercial and state
media. A comparison of the media style of the commercial press and the
progressive-alternative press illustrates two different approaches to
community organization -- ie. 'top-down' (which may take on either an
authoritarian or a 'populist' form) versus 'bottom-up' (popular form).
The left-wing press in South Africa during the 1980s went against
the entire pattern of 'guild' media organization, as well as
established journalistic practices. The top-down approach of the
establishment media envisages a passive community, waiting for leaders
or 'experts' to expound on what is best. This communicative form
ch~racterized the 'mainstream media in South Africa during the 1980s as
well as the populist approach of, for example, Buthelezi's Inkatha. It
is an approach that parallels the uni-directional understanding of
communication which underpins the South African guild press, the SABC
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and Inkatha's Ilanga newspaper. This media is ancillary to the view of
community organization which aims to incorporate the 'underdeveloped'
sector of the population into the 'developed' consumerist economy.
This is an inherently undemocratic view of both community organization
and communication. It is a view of communication which, in the South
African context, has served to underpin the interests of racial-
capitalism (apartheid).
The Guild Press, SABC and Ilanga has proved incapable of providing a
voice to, or for, the huge left-wing constituency in the townships. It
has also failed to tap into the enormous energy of popular cultural
expression. This situation is not unique to South Africa (see Clarke,
et aI, 1979). This failure is typical of the top-down approach of
organizing media. Failure to understand the interests of the community
to be targeted results in failure to communicate. Hence, for example,
an important motivation for starting progressive alternative presses
was the perceived inability or 'unwillingness' of the white-owned media
to provide a systematic voice to either this growing left-wing sector
and/or working class communities in South Africa (Patel, 1985:13).
The guild press failed for three main reasons: firstly, this was
partly due to media legislation. A second cause was due to the fact
that its mainly white middle class journalists were isolated from, and
did not understand this (mainly township) sector. And thirdly, it was
partly due to structural constraints imposed by capitalist market
forces (Louw, 1984, 1990). The guild press is seen to be linked to
external (HNC) interests which seek to impose their definition of
social organization onto the community.
It is characteristic of the press under capitalism that 'serious
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journalism' aimed at the non-affluent (eg. working class,
lumpenproletariat, peasants, pensioners, etc) is eliminated by a
combination of advertising pressures, and the fact that neither capital
nor the state are prepared to subsidize this form of press (in the same
way that they subsidize 'objective journalism' aimed at middle and
upper class audiences). Advertisers will only use media that reach
audiences which have the desire and money to purchase the products they
are trying to promote. In other words, advertisers want to tap the
disposable income of the middle classes. They put 'pressure' on the
press to produce media which caters for the tastes of these middle
classes. Any 'serious' media aiming at the working class -- even if
such media has a large circulation -- runs into financial trouble
because advertisers shy away from it. The elimination of a working
class press due to market forces has been noted in Britain (Curran,
1978) and in France (Freiberg, 1981). Curran (1988:97) quotes the
example of a national Daily Herald in Britain whose loss of advertising
far exceeded its loss of circulation. This proved the more important
cause of its downfall. The paper found it difficult to attract
advertising because of its overwhelmingly working class readership
(Curran, 1988:96). Curran (1988:97) lists several other newspapers
which, despite substantial circulations, also folded because they
appealed to working class readerships. An example of this process in
South Africa was the Rand Daily Mail (Louw, 1984:33;' Tomaselli et al, -
1987:79-86).
This state of affairs is especially problematic in South Africa
where it is the 'poor sectors' which constitute the overwhelming
majority of the population. Not catering for these sectors, in the
sense of including them into society's communication net, becomes, in
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this context, profoundly anti-democratic. This marginalisation
necessitated the development of alternative (bottom-up) channels of
communication in the 1980s to serve the rapidly growing working class
sector of the population . This South African development paralleled a
similar growth in Latin American grassroots communication fro m the mid-
1970s (see White, 1980, 1989). The resultant l eft-wing media h ad a n
'organic link' to the populations they served and hence were able to be
part of the process of that community's resistance to racial-
capitalism. But such media, aiming at non-affluent readerships, have
difficulty in surviving under capitalist conditions, unless an
organization with huge resources -- trade union, po l i t i c a l movement ,
church, etc -- is prepared to subsidize it . In a few countrie s with
mixed economies -- Sweden, Holland, and Belgium -- the state fulfills
this role (see Hulten, 1984) . In South Africa, certain Churches (such
as the South African Catholic Bishops Conference) provided finance.
But this meant building a left-wing press on a foundation over which
the left-wing had little control. There wa s thus always the risk that
funding could be discontinued at any time ( a risk that became apparent
after the 1990 reforms).
The birth o f alternative bottom-up communication channels in Sou t h
Africa can be traced to the appearance of Grassroots in 1 980 .
Using the media to build popular democracy: the Grassroots experience .
Cape Town's Grassroots newspaper of the period 1 98 0-1 98 4 represents
a key phenomenon in the development of the left-wing press . This
newspaper demonstrated the potential of the media as a tool for popular
'superstructural' political activism in the Enzensbergian sense . More
importantly, it demonstrated how media could be used to further
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grassroots or popular democracy. In other words, the project moved a
cons iderable way to demonstrating that Habermas' ideal of a
(democratic-participative) public sphere was not necessarily utopian.
The Grassroots project proved (especially during its early phase, 1980
to 1983) that the mass media need not only be conceived of as uni-
directional top-down communication. Grassroots showed how the mass
media could also be used to facilitate dialogical participative (and
hence democratic) communication.
During the 1980s the subaltern groups in the Western Cape became
active in their self-mobilization around the nodal points of the UDF
and NEUM. These communities developed a style of popular (bottom-up)
commun ity organization. Taking the initiative themse lves, they moved to
shake off their passive acquiescence to dom i liation at the end of the
1970s. An organic development was catalyzed which no top-down outside
intervention could have achieved. Central to this development arose a
new mode of (popular) communication and organization. Grassroots, was
central to this self-learning and self-activation process.
Grassroots was set up in 1979 as the result of a WASA initiative and
funding. The first issue appeared in early 1980. Although the
original i n t e n t i on was to have a national distribution, Grassroots de
facto became a largely Cape Town phenomenon, although it was
distributed to other Western Cape areas as far afield as Worcester. (In
the early stages it did have some national distribution). The first
issue explained why WASA had decided to set up the paper under a
headline "A paper for you that fills the void":
This newsletter has been born out of the tremendous need for
community organizations in the Western Cape. Civil and community
news are increasingly being kept out of major newspapers •.. (and) we
know that these newspapers have never really shown an interest or
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concern for civic and community matters, especially in areas where
the disenfranchised live. When civic and community news items are
highlighted, these are in most cases restricted to separate 'extra'
editions. Even then preference is shown for sensational news or
the activities of ethnic bodies working within separate development
institutions ... we, therefore believe that a vacuum exists in the
publication of community news and hope that Grassroots can to a
certain extent fill the void.
At the outset, Cape Town's media activists knew of no model from
which to work, so a 'trial and error' approach, together with
'evaluation workshops' was adopted. (Grassroots Internal Assessment
paper, as quoted by Johnson, 1982:2.29). What transpired included
elements that had already emerged in the work of other leftist
theorists and practitioners. These included Enzensberger's views on
praxis communication; a Eurocommunist concern at leftist-pluralism;
Habermas' left-dialogical model; West European work on 'community
media' projects; progressive church media (see Hurphy, 1986); and
especially the 'popular communication' models developed in Latin
America (see Hattelart, 1980, 1983, 1986; and White, 1980, 1989). But
South Africans were, by and large, cut off from these developments.
The resultant lack of exposure to any theoretical or practical work on
democratic leftist media left a void. Only trial and error could fill
this, by, in may cases, 'reinventing the wheel'. What is interesting
is the extent to which Grassroots workers did independently replicate
so much of what had been done elsewhere. It was only after Grassroots
had been publishing for some time that Michael Traber (see Traber,
1985) visited Cape Town and thereby introduced an awareness of popular-
media as it had developed in Latin America.
"Th e media activists at Grassroots placed an explicit emphasis on
'community news'. This marked a new development in South African
journalism (Pinnock & Tomaselli, 1984:11). Grassroots developed from
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the premise that community issues were central to its raison d'etre.
From the very outset, community organizations were involved. In
December 1978 WASA approached 50 community organizations, civics and
worker groups in the Western Cape area to discuss the idea of starting
such a newspaper. Only once endorsement was granted was the project set
in motion during 1979. In so far as the Grassroots project began as a
media activist initiative it conformed more closely to 'group
communication' rather than 'peoples communication' as defined "by White
(1989:17-18). However, as the project developed it did, to some
extent, mutate so as to straddle the two categories. From the outset
the project was intentionally set up autonomously of WASA, and made
accountable to a Board of Trustees drawn from the local community.
This community involvement was further carried over into the actual
running of Grassroots. The publication was, (at least up until police
repression made this increasingly difficult), controlled by a Board of
Trustees. This Board consisted of representatives of the endorsing
organizations from the community. These Trustees -- comprised of
representatives of community organizations, journalists and academics
also constituted the Editorial Board of Grassroots.
Through this direct organic link to the organizations of the local
community (after 1983 almost all affiliated to the UDF) Grassroots
became de facto ~ part of the process of leftist resistance to
apartheid. 'Progressive alternative' journalism hence became an
important component (link) in the leftist counter-hegemonic network. It
al~o helped to shape the direction the leftist struggle took.
Grassroots hence became a seminal example of how the media can move
beyond a mere supplier of information, and become a central component
in the building of democratic-leftist counter-hegemonic organization.
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(This genre slides easily into both the New Leftist and Habermasian
organizational styles preferred in this thesis). Certainly, this is not
to deny the important role Grassroots fulfilled as a supplier of
information and an 'alternative' (leftist) analysis of South Africa.
Important was its role in supplying information that left-community and
worker organizations needed which the 'mainstream' media did not
provide. This included information on community (and worker) news,
views and aspirations; health; education; legal matters; and social
services (such as transport and housing).
Grassroots, however, clearly went beyond information provision. It
became a catalyst for: (1) the development of, at the 'psychological'
level, a sense of (a Fanon-type) community 'unity'; and (2) the
construction of, at the organizational level, a (local-tier) leftist
counter-hegemony. It did this through providing a channel for the co-
ordination of the various organizational initiatives (both community
and worker) . In this way Grassroots provided a practical illustration
of hegemony-construction in Gramsci's and also in Poulantzas' senses.
(In other words, it was superstructural labour to build alliances based
upon a conception of a social diversity). Just as importantly,
Grassroots became a catalyst for the development of skills within the
community it served. Through this involvement it helped to stimulate
and develop media and communication skills in the community. From both
a culturalist and Mattelart perspective this inclusion is an important
dimension of leftist hegemony building. But as significant has been
the influence of the project on raising -- through hands-on exposure,
and example -- general organizational skills within the Western Cape
'coloured' townships. (The fact that it remained restricted to
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'coloured' areas ie. did not succeed in breaking into the 'black'
townships -- was considered a problem by t~e Grassroots media
activists). Important with regard to skills development was the
example set by the very structuring of the Grassroots project itself.
This provided a practical example, and pool of skills, of how to build
democratic leftist organization. For example:
* Control of the project by a Board of Trustees, which consisted of
representatives of the community, set an important precedent for
democratic community organization and control of projects.
* Th e managing committee, or executive, was elected at an annual
general meeting, at least until police repression, under the States
of Emergency, severely curtailed these procedures. These AGMs had
comprised representatives of the community and worker organizations.
3 e t we e n 1985 and 1989 these were progressively decimated by police
repressive measures. The executive committee was where decision
making -- ego over policy, finance, etc -- was primarily centred.
During the repressive period the executive found itself taking on
more and more of the functions previously (democratically) delegated
to other sectors of the project.
* The executive was, in terms of the original 'ideal' model, made
accountable to the general body. Members of this GB were, in turn,
answerable to their (democratically constituted) organizations. At
the start of the project this GB met every five weeks: ie. just after
the publication of the previous Grassroots (Grassroots being produced
every five-weeks). This GB decided what would appear in the next
issue of the newspaper, with lists of stories for the next issue
being discussed and approved. The GB also allocated to sub-groups the
task of collecting the stories which had been approved for the up-
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coming edition. However, as repression mounted between 1985 and
1989 so these structures of accountability increasingly crumbled. The
executive assumed more and more of the responsibilities set out
above, which in a sense 'corrupted' the original project. This was a
matter of grave concern to those on the executive.
* No-one could remain editor of Grassroots for more than two years,
following which such a person had to step down. This served to
prevent the 'reification' of 'leadership' roles, and ensure the
spread of skills.
* They tried to avoid the concentration of skills, and hence
'technocratic' power in the hands of a few 'experts' . Instead, the
very running of the production process was deliberately 'opened up'
as far as possible through the creation of News-gath~ ~ ~ ng and
Production committees. This 'opening up' process represented an
especially important feature of the project; because it served to
demonstrate how a Habermasian left-democratic community can be
organized by using the media as a catalyst.
* The news-gathering committee was responsible for collecting and
writing the stories which the GB had decided upon, and for 'checking
up' on this collection process. This committee thereby encouraged
maximal grassroots participation from those involved in the process
of news production. (The news-gathering committee was assisted by an
Advisory Committee; a committee of 'experts' who could help with
legal matters, and stories on labour matters, health, etc.). Such
grassroots-community participation precisely facilitated the creation
of an active popular culture. It represented a community-hands-on
process which served to help generate the sort of self-worth Fanon
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(1968) called for; the de-alienation Marx (1981) demanded; and the
re-activation of the dialectic Marcuse (1968) desired.
* The Production committee came into operation on printing day. It
consisted of up to 50 representatives from community and worker
organizations. They helped to actually produce the newspaper (fold,
collate, stack, etc.). In this way the participating organizations
came to feel that the product 'belonged' to them (important from both
a Fanon and Mattelart point of view). It was also a way of cutting
production costs.
* The distribution of Grassroots was designed at the outset to help
strengthen counter-hegemonic 'bonding'. This process was undertaken
by a permanent distribution official together with a group of
volunteers. They distributed door-to-door and used the opportunity
to make face-to-face contact with the community. In this way they
assisted in the process of generating a (Habermas-type) social
dialogue and (Fanon-type) 'mobilization'. The distributors were also
encouraged to try and ascertain the reaction of the readers to the
previous issue. This was done to create a 'feedback' mechanism which
could serve as an important source of critique, so that improvements
-- and responsiveness to the community -- could be made. However,
under the States of Emergency, this process was hard hit (by, for
example, the widespread detention of distributors). As a result,
between 1985 and 1989 this ideal pattern was superceded by
distribution via selected 'drops' and 'pick-ups'.
"Gr a s s r o o t s pioneered a new style of print journalism in South Africa
which became a model for other progressive-alternative publications.
It was a style that paralleled, in many ways, the genre of broadcast
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journalism that emerged in Latin America in the 1970s (see White,
1983a:6-8). Grassroots also influenced various aspects of the other
forms of left-wing publications. This 'style' has become influential
because it was helpful in mobilizing a left-democratic counter-
hegemony; a Grassroots training programme served to spread this genre
of journalism throughout the Western and Southern Cape; and the
production by 'Grassroots Publications' of the "We Speak for Ourselves"
training booklets helped to spread this genre even wider. The
Grassroots collective was, in fact, probably at its most successful in
its role of catalyst. The actual nature of this '~rassroots"
journalistic 'style' will be examined in this chapter when the 'theory'
of 'progressive-alternative' media activism is discussed.
The changes to the Grassroots project due to ~ate repression
A crack-down on Grassroots activists began following the declaration
of a State of Emergency in July 1985 which init ially covered only
certain areas (including Cape Town). Grassroots was, in fact, one of
the first organizations to be hit by Right-wing repression. This was
presumably because, as a communication medium, it was highly visible.
Also in terms of state strategy (Louw & Tomaselli, 1989:38-9) the media
were believed to be central to the 'total onslaught'. The year 1985
was, in fact, one of the hardest times for Grassroots. The repression
took the form of banning key activists, continual raids and harassment
and even direct attacks such as the burning down of the Grassroots
offices. The state took particular pains to detain those who
distributed Grassroots in the community. Further, between 1986 and
1989, ever-tightening media regulations became a key feature of each
successive State of Emergency. The result was a form of
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'administrative repression' -- media activists, including those left on
Grassroots, were forced to 'police' themselves. Those working on left-
wing publications like Grassroots and the Weekly Mail pushed as far as
they could against the limits of the media regulations (unlike the
guild press which simply acquiesced in the face of state pressures. In
fact they often even went further than state restrictions required of
them). However, less and less was legally printable, between 1985 and
1989, as the struggle intensified (Tomaselli, R. 1987, 1988). All this
seriously altered the operating climate for the worse. And from July
1985 onwards the original democratic Grassroots model could no longer
operate.
By the end of 1985 the popular democratic communication model,
described above, had collapsed. By October 1985 only 3 people
connected with Grassroots itself were not in detention. In the face of
state action they took to avoiding the Grassroots offices. Instead,
they held their meetings in a car. There could be no question of
consulting with the community under these conditions. As with so many
other parts of the leftist counter-hegemony around the country, the
(democratic) communication networks painstakingly constructed in the
first half of the 1980s ceased operation. All that was left to do was
to try and survive and, in the case of Grassroots, try and get out some
form of newsletter.
The State of Emergency brought about six significant changes to the
Grassroots model ".
Firstly, the most serious effect was that the GB stopped
functioning. Hence the democratic popularist ideal of community
involvement and of project accountability to the community was lost.
It simply became impossible to put 100 representatives together i~ one
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room without attracting Security Police action. Further, the leftist
organizations which had previously sent representatives to the GBs were
themselves devastated by the detentions and bannings of their key
activists. Every leftist organization was in crisis. Its primary
concern became its own survival and merely trying to continue its own
work with fewer and fewer people available. As the State of Emergency
bit deeper daily, more and more effort had to be put into avoiding
detection and detention. As a result, the remaining activists were
compelled to withdraw from all but their own sector-specific
activities. Attending a Grassroots GB simply no longer featured very
highly on their list of priorities. The result was that the Grassroots
executive was cut loose from the very body set up to democratically
control their activities and ma~e them accountable to the community.
Secondly, with the collapse of the GB, the executive committee
henceforth became, by default, t he heart of the Grassroots operation.
So state repression had ironically forced Grassroots to operate like
the Right-wing state itself -- in an undemocratic fashion. The
executive tried to keep contact with the community, worker and student
organizations in their area. However, this contact was no longer
formal. The formal democratic structure representing community control
of the project was lost and replaced by ad hoc and rather random
consultation. Accountability was necessarily watered down as the
executive committee ended up with all the responsibility in its lap.
Thirdly, the production practices changed. In a sense, Grassroots
went full circle. It had started in 1980 as a small project run by a
handful of people. Between 1982 and 1983 it developed into a large
operation involving hundreds of community representatives. After the
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formation of the UDF this direct community-representation declined as
activists concentrated on their sector-specific work, and hence had
less time to be concerned with Grassroots. With the repression the
numbers shrank once more. Between 1986 and 1989 Grassroots became a
media activist project rather than a media project run by community
representatives. With the GB effectively inoperative the executive had
no choice but to turn to their own resources for writing and producing
Grassroots and the newsletter became the responsibility of a mere 9
media activists. However, they did succeed in involving some students
to help them with the production processes. The newsletter i ~self was
effectively put out by only . one co-ordinator, with the help of a few
volunteers. And although these volunteers came from leftist
organizations in the area, they were no longer mandated representatives
of these organizations.
Fourthly, Grassroots was seriously crippled by 'administrative
repression'. Ever tightening media regulations made it illegal to
publish what the government deemed 'subversive'. Virtually everything
the leftist Grassroots' constituency wanted to read about fell into
this category. The brilliance of the state's media regulations was
that they placed the onus of censorship onto media workers themselves.
The state did not have to place a censor in every newsroom. Instead,
it merely randomly checked publications. If the regulations were
transgressed, then the medium could be shut down, and the media
worker/s fined or detained. As a result media activists had to
administer their own repression. And they were compelled to waste a
great deal of time checking with lawyers just how far they could go.
This also meant it took longer to produce a newsletter. However, in
the" process, those at Grassroots learned to be highly creative in
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circumventing media restrictions. So, for example, instead of
publicizing the views of leftists opposed to 'puppet elections' (which
was illegal), they instead interviewed candidates who were standing for
the House of Representatives (the 'coloured' section of the apartheid-
Tricameral Parliament). In this way they got the candidates to show
themselves up as 'low calibre' or 'sellouts' in the eyes of readers.
Fifthly, it became impossible for those at Grassroots to make any
long term plans because no-one knew what the state's next move was
goir.g t o be. Th i s became highly disruptive. Amongst media activists
(and i ~ fact, activists generally), the result was the growth of a
'culture' of short term thinking. (This attitude became problematic
for ANC organization after 1990). More generally, an air of
unce~tainty, resulted in a great deal of wasted energy. Activists
would spend many hours strategising to counter a move they thought the
state wa s about to make. But nothing would happen, and the energy
expended would be wasted.
In the sixth place, during 1985 and 1986 the original distribution
system collapsed. This caused a financial headache for Grassroots,
because they could not sell their product. Instead, a series of drop-
off points was instituted (such as mosques, churches, shops, etc) where
people could simply pick up a copy. This necessitated an even greater
reliance on donors. It also meant Grassroots lost touch with who was
reading their product, and what their readers thought about Grassroots.
In other words, the original 'public sphere' notion was lost. Because
it had become a case of dumping piles of Grassroots and leaving the
scene quickly, they could not ascertain if this distribution method was
really effective. To compensate for their lack of readership
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information, they pushed up their print run from 20 000 to 40 000.
This was done to try and ensure that the target community still
received information, even in the face of the Emergency clampdown.
Eventually, however, as people got 'used to' the State of Emergency,
the participative method of distribution did return to some extent. By
1989 community organizations were once again taking responsibility for
distributing some copies of Grassroots door-to-door in some areas.
However, this distributive activity varied geographically and issue to
issue. But Grassroots was unable to rebuild the community-newsletter
model during the second half of the 1980s. Further, the development of
South had significantly impacted on the functioning of Grassroots.
Grassroots was no longer acting as the primary source of left-wing
'news'. Instead, the left-commercial weekly South had taken on that
role in the Western Cape. By 1989 it was clear that the Grassroots
newsletter project was in serious trouble. The last edition of
Grassroots was, in fact, published during the 1989 Defiance Campaign at
the request of the MDM. An era was over.
Despite the problems, however, it must be noted that the Grassroots
project had kept growing. Hence, 1980 had seen 6 editions of the
newsletter produced. This went up to 9 in 1981. After ·1982 Grassroots
appeared on the streets 10 times a year. By 1989, despite the worst
that the state could throw at the Grassroots media activists, the
project had grown into a five-pronged operation:
* the Grassroots 'newsletter' itself (last published in 1989);
* the "Learning R6ots" sub-project (which began in 1985);
* the "New Era" 'magazine' (which began i~ 1986);
* an education and training division; and
* a rural organizing division. This latter sub-project involved a team
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traveling around the Cape rural areas, training media activists. The
Saamstaan newsletter was an outgrowth of these efforts.
During the second half of the 1980s the Grassroots model was, in
fact, exported to at least one new area of South Africa, namely the
Karoo and the Southern Cape. There, as a result of a Grassroots rural
education project, a new community newsletter called Saamstaan was born
in 1984. Saamstaan was closely modelled on the Grassroots genre.
Despite years of state repression, Grassroots succeeded in
pioneering and establishing a new style of journalism in South Africa
-- a style that complemented the (phase three) popular model of
community mobilization and organization. The Grassroots collective has
probably been most successful as a catalyst. They assisted the
formation of other publications like Ukusa (Durban), Saamstaan
(Oudtshoorn), The Eye (Pretoria), Iswe Lase Rini (Grahamstown), and
South (Cape Town). Even those left-wing media without any direct links
to Grassroots (especially the social democrat genre) have not been
unaffected by this progressive-alternative project. Its influence has
been discernible in all the left-wing publications and left-wing news
agencies which emerged from 1985 to 1989. The popular communication
'ideal' and the brief years during which it worked, set an important
precedent upon which to build a left-democratic media policy. It
demonstrated that the notion of creating a participative (democratic) .
mass media is not merely a utopian ideal. It is this fact that makes
th~ Grassroots experience of 1980 to 1983 of central importance to this
thesis' considerations on a New Leftist communicology.
The 'Grassroots model' is now located in the 'collective memory' of
left-wing media activists across the country. It is a model of
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communication that is likely to have an important influence on South
Africa's future media structuring if the left has its way.
The shift from community newsletters to Left-Commercial newspapers
the example of South
State repression .was not the only serious challenge faced by left-
wing media activists in the second half of the 1980s. Throughout (even
the second half of the decade, when the State of Emergency had
inflicted massive damage to left-wing infrastructures), left-wing
political grassroots action kept proliferating, especially after the
formation of the UDF in 1983. A key factor in the success of the UDF
was that it succeeded in harnessing the popular energies of grassroots
community struggles. In a sense the UDF utilized a 'culturalist'
interpretation of leftist practice (not unlike the Solidarity Movement
in Poland). The UDF was a form of leftist organization that
represented the very antithesis of (centralized) Leninist-vanguardist
mobilization (despite accusations of 'cabalism' -- see New African, Vol
2 No 48, 1990 1 and 7 -- in some quarters). The UDF used what White
(1989) has called a 'networking' approach. It was this reliance on a
'bottom-up' popular-culture and grassroots activism that, in many ways,
accounted for the eclecticism found in South African leftist practice
during the 1980s. A top-down' (vanguardist) approach would no doubt
have been more theoretically 'coherent' (uni-directional). For this
reason it would have been easier for the Right to get to grips with and
destroy. It was the eclectic-democratic approach of the UDF that
proved un-monitorable and hence indestructible. Because it was based on
multiple little grassroots 'public spheres' it was in effect 'multi-
sourced' and 'mult1·-d1·rect1·onal'. Th· th1S was e source of the popular
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struggle's immense unstoppable energy during the 1980s.
This proliferation made the Grassroots model of information
distribution inadequate to cope with the level of activity/. Whereas
the Grassroots project was initially valuable for mobilizing left-wing
practices and structures (Louw, 1989:30), by the mid-1980s the
mobilization process had acquired a dynamic of its own. Further, after
the formation of the UDF, activists previously involved with the
Grassroots project moved off into other areas of work. This was one of
the reasons that the Grassroots' GB stopped functioning, and the
popular-communication organizational-model withered. If before 1983
Grassroots had been an important learning ground in the Cape where
activists could acquire the skills of mass democratic work, after 1983
the conditions were irrevocably altered. The original importance of
the Grassroots project as a means of diffusing the principles and
practices of mass participative community democracy hence faded.
As the left constituency grew, so greater and greater volumes of
leftist "news" was generated. It was news the guild press and SABC
simply ignored. The six-weekly production cycle of Grassroots could
not cope with the pace of events. It was a problem that would have
arisen even if the state had not been engaged in repression targeted at
Grassroots itself. In short, there was a gap in the South African
communication infrastructure. A need existed for someone to give more
frequent coverage to the proliferating left-wing ~.
As a result of these perceived shortfalls, in 1984 Cape Town's media
activists held a series of discussions. The result was the decision to
try a new communication project -- a left-wing newspaper that would
neither operate like the progressive alternative genre, nor like the
guild press. The new newspaper would be a hybrid of the two
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approaches. The result of these discussions was Cape Town's South.
Similar hybrid left-commercial newspapers were established in two other
South African centres, namely, Johannesburg (New Nation in 1986) and
Durban (New African in 1989). From 1987 onwards, the Durban-based
Catholic missionary newspaper UmAfrika transformed itself into this
genre as well. This followed the recommendations of a research
proposal to move in this direction (CCSU, 1986). For the purposes of
this thesis an examination of South will serve to illustrate the left-
commercial genre as a whole.
With South taking over the news function, media activists reasoned
that Grassroots could shift its function so that the two left-wing
media in Cape Town would complement each other. They would opt for
d ifferent, but complementary roles, with Grassroots shifting i t s
attention to printing features which 'filled in' the information which
South did not cover. Grassroots would also turn to more educative
work, covering, for example, advice on health and nutrition. In a
sense, the paIn was that Grassroots would revert to "grassroots"
community issues (as opposed to 'news' and 'politics'). It was,
however, a model that those at Grassroots never successfully
implemented before the last issue came out in 1989.
The creation of the left-commerc ial newspapers facilitated the move
from 'group communication' to grassroots 'networking' (White, 1989).
The second half of the 1980s, in fact, saw the development of a multi-
faceted communication infrastructure consisting of three 'levels':
Firstly, a news-production wing, consisting of the left-commercial
press and the 'alternative' news-agencies. This paralleled the Latin
American experience of 'networking' groups into national and
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international communication exchange systems (White, 1989:19).
Secondly, a 'peoples communication' or 'public sphere' level (eg.
Grassroots and Saamstaan, as well as the multitudes of grassroots
groups who activated themselves in local struggles against apartheid
infrastructures, using issues like housing, rents, evictions,
unemployment, education, etc. This paralleled the Latin American
experience described by White (1989:18-20). Thirdly, Media Resource
Centres (MRC, 1989) and Media Training Groups like The Other Press
Service (TOPS) and Durban Media Trainers Group (DMTG) (DMTG, 1990)
provided media resources and skills training to community and workers
groups on request. This parallels the development in Latin America
described by White (1989: 18).
From the start South was not seen as a popularist community medium.
In other words, it was never intended as a 'public sphere' or as
'peoples communication'. (For this reason this press genre is less
useful than say Grassroots as a model for those d~veloping a macro
'public sphere'/popular communication infrastructure for South Africa).
Rather, from the outset South was envisaged as a left-commercial
newspaper'. The intention was that South should become an economically
self-sufficient as soon as possible. In other words, with the left-
commercial genre, advertising and economic independence was seen as
important. None of the left-commercial press had achieved this goal in
1991. In fact, this genre faced the real prospect of closure before the
mid-1990s because its financial affairs are so unsound -- New African-- ,
fo~ example relied on overseas funding for 92% of its running costs
(Ntshakala & Emdon, 1991). This press was, in general, been the least
successful of all the left wing presses when measured against its own
founding-expectations. With the increasing threat of the phasing out
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of overseas grants following the 1990 reforms, the failure to become
self-sufficient became a real threat to the continued existence of this
genre of press.
The mere intention to opt for a commercialism was in stark contrast
to the Grassroots model. Hence from the outset South's staff included
a full-time employee responsible for advertising. Furthermore, the
advertising policy adopted was apolitical. Any advertisement would be
accepted. So although South defined itself as a left-wing newspaper it
would, for example, accept advertisements from a large company even
while that company was engaged in a labour dispute with the
constituency supporting South. This represented a complete change away
from the advertising policy of progressive alternative media like
Grassroots. In other words, it represented a radical shift towards
pragmatic thinking amongst leftist media activists.
Although South was not seen as a community newspaper, it was still
seen as left-wing. It saw itself as organically connected to the
leftist struggle, and aimed to promote the expansion of leftist ideals
in the community (albeit in a more top-down (populist?) rhetorical
fashion). Further, it was decided that the internal operations of
South would be structured in a democratic fashion. This meant that as
a media genre South fell between the progressive alternative genre and
the guild press. By trying to hybridize these two genres, the left-
commercial press failed to realize the potential of either the
libertarian or progressive media models. Trying to run South as a
democracy meant that the newsroom was non-hierarchically ordered: the
entire newspaper staff had a say in editorial decisions. In addition
there was a monthly staff meeting to discuss broader policy matters.
353
However, as with the New African, on-going problems concerning the
implement~tion of such democratic organizing principle~ were rife (see
Ntshakala & Emdon, 1991).
The 'Grassroots model' of printing and distribution was completely
dispensed with at South. A fully commercial operation was accepted as
the only workable option. South contracted out to commercial printers
and distributors. As with some other left-wing newspapers (ie. New
Nation, New African, UmAfrika, Weekly Mail, and Vrye Weekblad), South
found that they had to rely on Allied distributors because they have
the largest distribution network in the country. It was simply not
economically feasible to establish their own network. But this meant
relying on a distribution company tied to South Africa's biggest
newspaper group (ie. Argus Holdings). Such a company had no vested
interest in helping the left-wing press to sell more copies. In fact,
the more copies the left-wing press sold, the more this bit into sales
of the English conservative-liberal press. This is a problem for which
the left-wing press had no solution.
South developed an urban readership, with most copies being sold in
Cape Town. Although originally intended to serve the whole Western
Cape, South failed to make any real penetration of the rural areas
around Cape Town. Further, South, never attracted the numbers
originally expected. The first few issues sold well, but then a rapid
decline set in and, at one point, sales dropped to 6000. (The New
African experienced similar problems). This led to soul searching on
th~ part of the media activists involved. The left-commercial genre
failed to develop the strong points of either the progressive-
alternative or the guild presses. It had neither the 'community-
connectedness' of a Grassroots-type 'public sphere'; nor could it
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compete with the efficiency of the guild press' resources and news-
gathering capacity. Rather, the left-commercial genre inherited the
weakness of both genres, without the strengths.
South workers therefore began asking themselves should a
commercial-leftist newspaper be popular or political? In order to try
and answer this question South conducted a readership survey in 1988.
The survey showed that 'politics' was low on the list of what readers
wanted, especially in the 'coloured' areas. There was 80% support for
the UDF in the bl~ck areas, and a concomitant interest in 'politics'.
But in Mitchells Plain the UDF only registered 20% supportj the Labour
Party registered 2% supportj while 78% said they were not interested in
politics. The South workers concluded that this showed a need to re-
orientate away from 'politics' and towards a more 'entertainment'
approach. As a result, in 1989 large doses of sports, arts and culture
were included in South with the creation of an entertainment section
called "Southside". Simultaneously the percentage of politics was
reduced. A media activist said at the time, "We're going to give the
people what they want." This shift towards trying to attract young
upwardly mobile 'coloureds' seemed to work because sales went up to 20
000 in 1990. However, a readership survey in 1991 exposed an anomaly:
the new readers were mostly working class from the black townships and
not the 'yuppies' thought to be reading South. Further, South (like
the other left-commercial) press faced another problem: it did not have
the financial resources to compete with the guild press operating in
its area (eg. The Argus) in trying to produce a mass-popular newspaper.
Neither does this press have sufficient levels of managerial expertise
(see Ntshakala & Emdon, 1991).
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Further, in re-orienting itself towards a more commercial approach,
South faced a staffing problem. Working at such a left-commercial
newspaper did not generate a sense of being a media activist. The
feeling of 'organic connectedness' to the wider community was lost.
Instead of being a media activist one became a media worker. Such
people felt intuitively they were no longer helping to build a 'public
sphere' in the way progressive alternative press activists were.
Hence, working at a left-commercial newspaper produced the same sense
of alienation from one's product and from the community as a leftist
felt while working for the guild press. Many felt that if they were
going to work on a commercial newspaper then they might as well go
where they could earn the highest possible salary. South could pay
only half what the guild press paid its journalists. Further, South
could not guarantee that it would be able to afford salary increases to
match inflation. The result was staff demoralization and an attrition
of staff to the guild press (a reversal of the late 1970s/early 1980s
trend). This problem was exacerbated by the state's repression between
1985 and 1989. This served to demoralize the staff even further.
Since 1990 the demoralization has come from a different source, namely,
the threat by overseas funders to withdraw support. (Most of the
funding for the left-commercial newspapers came from European Economic
Community (ECC) sources. This source was curtailed in 1991, and due to
end entirely in March 1992). Because the left-commercial press failed
to develop effective management and advertising bases, a total
withdrawal of overseas funding would be catastrophic (see Ntshakala &
Emdon, 1991).
On top of these problems, state repression up to February 1990 made
both printers and distributors nervous. Hence, even a company as large
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as the Argus Company would not print a South edition with Mandela's
photograph in it (while he was still a prisoner), for fear of upsetting
the state.
In spite of these problems newspapers like South survived for some
years. In the process they provided an invaluable learning ground
where leftists could learn the skills of running the sort of large
scale (self-financing) newspapers which a post-apartheid South Africa
will demand. At the same time they filled an important niche in South
Africa's information network. They drew attention to the fact that
left-wing news exists. The degree to which the guild press began
(since the late 1980s) to cover leftist news is, in part, attributable
to the fact that the left-commercial and social democrat presses put
this sort of news onto the wider social agenda.
The formation of ~ social democrat press
Mail
the example of the Weekly
The Weekly Mail is often lumped into the category of 'alternative
press' together with the likes of Grassroots and South. If, however,
one examines the Weekly Mail it becomes clear that, whereas the
progressive-alternative press and the left-commercial press have much
in common viz-a-viz their political alignment and even regarding
aspects of their journalistic practice, the Weekly Mail is different.
Weekly Mail is part of the South African left-wing press. However, it
(together with the Vrye Weekblad) constitutes a sub-genre on its own.
This is not really surprising given that a different contextual dynamic
gave birth to the Weekly Mail. The other left-wing presses were the
outgrowth of initiatives of the suppressed subaltern groups themselves.
From the outset these other newspapers saw themselves as 'organically
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connected' to the (black) masses being suppressed by apartheid. The
same is not true of Weekly Mail. Weekly Mail arose out of a different
set of circumstances. It emerged from the closure of the Rand Daily
Mail in 1985 (Mervis, 1989: 524-535). When the Rand Daily Mail was
closed the left-wing . journalists working there found themselves de
facto unemployable in South Africa because the rest of the guild press,
being conservative, saw them as "a bunch of political activists"
(Mervis, 1989:522). Following the Vaal uprising in 1984 the white
establishment was very 'jumpy'. Hence, fifth columnist ('white
leftists') were no longer welcome . Weekly Mail was a part of the same
general 1980s political ferment in South Africa which led to the
establishment of the other left-wing papers. It was clear that if
these former Rand Daily Mail left-leaning staffers wanted to work again
as journalists they would have to start their own newspaper. They did
this by forming WM Publications in 1985. The editorial in the first
edition of the Weekly Mail set the tone for this new press genre:
The Weekly Mail is not just another newspaper. Consider how it
was started. Not by businessmen more interested in the accounts
than the news. Not by a political party wanting a mouthpiece for
its views. It was started by a group of journalists put on the
streets by the closures of the Rand Daily Mail and the Sunday
Express .... We also felt that it was time we made sure that our
journalism was no longer dictated by interests outside journalism.
We are tired of being at their mercy. It was time to have a
newspaper created, controlled and owned by journalists.
From the very formation of WM Publications -- the controlling
company of the Weekly Mail the structures and practices were stamped
with the uniqueness of a new South African press genre. From the
outset the Weekly 'Ma i l represented a hybrid of left-wing and liberal
practices, both journalistically and organizationally. WM Publications
is a registered commercial company. However, it is strongly influenced
leftist principles. Hence the shareholders in WM Publications are
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divided into two categories. Firstly, those who have bought shares in
WM Publications but who are NOT working journalists on the Weekly Mail
are excluded from voting rights over policy decisions. In this way
owners of capital are not given any control over editorial policy
matters. Such policy is the reserve of Weekly Mail editorial staff
only. This policy registers something of a Frankfurt School-type
concern with the process by which capital seems ultimately able to co-
opt oppositional ventures into the 'culture industry'. A second
category of share is those reserved for Weekly Mail staff. These
latter are 'voting shares'. The number of shares anyone has depends on
the length of service s/he has on the Weekly Mail. As the Weekly Mail
staff has grown so the number of voting shares have grown, and in this
way the voting rights of the original staffers has declined in
proportion to overall policy control. In this way policy decision-
making is democratized and given to the workers themselves on the
Weekly Mail.
When it came to building an internal working structure the Weekly
Mail also adopted a hybrid of leftist and libertarian practices. Hence
management and editorial functions were strictly separated in
accordance with libertarian principles. However, full democratic
participation of the staff in editorial decision-making was encouraged.
Internally the company was structured as non-hierarchically as
possible. Line-functions (eg. an editor, business manager etc)
existed, but all staff were paid the same (commercially unfavourable)
saiary, and all were part of a democratically-structured policy forming
process. Staff meetings, where policy is thrashed out, take place twice
a week. The staffers (32 in 1989) also have 2 representatives on the
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Board of Directors. Any staffer can raise an item for discussion at
Board level. Further, the Weekly Mail has a policy of equitable
salaries -- staff are paid in accordance with length of service, so
that a receptionist and editor starting work on the same day will
receive the same salary. However, a functional pecking order was
established for quick decision-taking on a day-to-day basis.
Although leftist, the Weekly Mail never saw itself as 'organically
connected' to the MDM in the way the progressive alternative or left-
commercial presses did. (Because of this 'connectedness' these other
two press genres were often referred to colloquially as the 'comrade
press'). Rather, from the outset the Weekly Mail stressed its
independence. Those working on Weekly Mail defined themselves as
anti-apartheid and left-wing, in fact, journalists working for the
paper (and Vrye Weekblad) were often members of MDM-affiliates (the
liberal press banned its staffers from joining these. However, this
press refused to 'consult' with left political movements or affiliates
regarding 'appropriate' editorial content. Further, the Weekly Mail
saw its right to criticize both the apartheid state and left-wing
mistakes as sacrosant. An 'internal' criticism of the left-wing was
seen as healthy. It was a position which inevitably produced some
tension on occasion between the Weekly Mail and left-wing activists.
During the 1980s some of them called for the Weekly Mail to be made
'accountable' to MDM structures. That the Weekly Mail successfully
resisted these pressures during the counter- hegemony phase has created
a tradition of independent leftist journalism. This may prove a
valuable legacy when a South African left hegemonic media is
constructed. Such an approach complements any New Leftist media policy
based upon either Poulantzas' or Habermas' principles. This legacy of
360
independent leftist journalism seems the best guarantee against sliding
into a (left) media infrastructure that is a closed circuit of self-
affirming, unchallenging and unchallenged ideas. This was the sort of
sycophantic media that brought such discredit upon leftist praxis in
Eastern Europe.
Weekly Mail has, to a large extent, invented its own style.
However, there does seem to have been some influence on the Weekly Mail
style of the sort of quality social-democrat journalism found on the
British Guardian newspaper. Anton Harber, co-editor of the Weekly Mail
described his aim (in mid 1989) as to produce: a good quality newspaper
based upon good writing, accuracy and in-depth analytical reporting,
but with an explanatory approach in which the context to the story is
always given. He said: "What we have always refused to do is to feed a
line to our readers", and he added, "the MDM has now come to see the
value this policy has for the South African struggle".
Journalistically, Weekly Mail worked creatively within the State of
Emergency context : A co-editor of the Weekly Mail, in fact, commented
that "the State of Emergency gave us our journalistic gap." The
Emergencies certainly reduced the flow of information within the
country to a mere trickle after 1986. The guild press totally backed
down in the face of state threats, and generally 'over-interpreting'
the media regulations in a way that did little credit to South African
journalism. (The Natal Witness was one of the few exceptions to this
general rule). Professionals inside the country felt especially cut
off from facts about what was happening. The Weekly Mail filled their
need for information. In the process it attracted a very up-market
highly educated readership. It is, however, a very 'narrow' readership
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base (of 25 000) based primarily in Johannesburg and Cape Town. For
this reason it proved unable to sustain a larger publication such as
the Johannesburg-daily, the Daily Mail. The 1990 attempt by the WM-
group to establish the Daily Mail, in fact, only served to financially
cripple the Weekly Mail itself. This ultimately served to push the WM-
group into negotiations with Argus Holdings for a 'take-over' which
'guaranteed' Weekly Mail editorial independence.
The Weekly Mail pushed the Emergency media regulations to their
limits, using legal methods to fight state pressure. A pattern
developed: the Weekly Mail spearheaded the resistance to state media
restrictions. They would test the waters, and if challenged would go to
court. In this way they often (but not always) succeeded in pushing the
media regulations backward, winning a small additional journalistic
space. Not surprisingly, a 1987 CCSU survey (conducted by this author)
of editors, news editors and chief-sub-editors found that all those
interviewed on the guild press (both English and Afrikaans) read the
Weekly Mail. All admired the Weekly Mail for its 'guts' in fighting
for 'journalistic space', even if they disagreed with its politics.
This has given the Weekly Mail an influence well beyond its actual
readership. In fact, the Weekly Mail seems to have been instrumental
in putting much left-wing news onto the guild press agenda due to a
'copy-catism' {in which guild press journalists have followed the
Weekly Mail's lead in covering certain types of leftist news. Their
ability to do this has also grown apace. In 1985 the Weekly Mail was a
sm~ll, understaffed shoe-string operation. As a result it had to use
whatever freelance copy was available. However, as the paper grew, and
its costing-structure improved so it was able to increase its staffing
complement. The result was that within four years the Weekly Mail
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could afford to internally generate its own investigative reporting,
and had money available to spend on tracking down stories.
Weekly Mail has been very much a pioneer in South African left-wing
journalism in creating a commercially viable leftist-press. Management
explicitly avoided becoming dependent on foreign or church subsidies --
again stressing their policy of independence. This policy bore fruit
in the form of a degree of security, at least up until the Daily Mail
debacle which left the Weekly Mail with a large printing-debt owing to
Caxtons (an Argus Holdings subsidiary). The attempt to establish a
daily newspaper seriously damaged the Weekly Mail's finances. When the
Daily Mail closed the Weekly Mail was forced into a 'debt management'
relationship with Caxtons. As a result, from September 1990 to April
1991 the Weekly Mail lost a degree of its much cherished independence
to an Argus-owned company. Although the Weekly Mail regained its
independence once the Caxtons' debt was paid, WM Publications remain in
a seriously weakened financial condition and will probably only become
profitable once more from 1992. The additional equipment and staff
brought into WM Publications by the Daily Mail venture means the Weekly
Mail is no longer under-resourced. However, it has simultaneously
placed a great debt-burden onto the Weekly Mail.
Some outside funding found its way into WM Publications. However,
this funding .wa s not used for direct running costs, but for the
training of new journalists. This sponsorship was channeled into the
'S.A. Newspaper Education Trust'. Although not used to fund the
running of the newspaper, this Trust has, of course assisted the Weekly
Mail in the form of providing some funds to pay the new and
inexperienced staff in both editorial and administrative positions.
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Weekly Mail put much energy into attracting advertising, and employs
an advertising director and two representatives. The Weekly Mail also
did a lot of research into its readership profile. The results were
collated into a presentation-package marketed to advertising agencies.
The paper also acquired an ABC certificate in order to convince the
advertising agencies to take them seriously. In 1990 the Weekly Mail
attracted enough advertising to achieve a 30%-70% (advertisements-copy)
ratio. Although most South African commercial tabloids work on a 50%-
50% ratio (and the broadsheets on a 60%-40% ratio), the Weekly Mail
attained financial viability on the 30-70% ratio. This makes it less
dependent on advertisements than the establishment press. A key means
of achieving this highly favourable costing-ratio has been through a
creative use of Desk-top Publishing (DTP). The Weekly Mail's DTP-system
makes it possible to run the newspaper at one-third of the cost of
normal press operations.
The Weekly Mail's creative use of DTP and laser-printing made it a
leader in the field of new print technology in South Africa (if not in
the world). Had it not shown this technological creativity, it is
doubtful that a left-wing newspaper of this sort could have been kept
successfully afloat. Weekly Mail perhaps represented the classic South
African example of an Enzensbergian (or Benjamin-type) leftist 'gap-
seeking' approach to the superstructures. In this way they
demonstrated the value of rejecting the view that some communication
technologies are complex, and hence are for the First World rather than
th~ Third World. The way in which the Weekly Mail creatively used so-
called First World information technology for an African struggle is
perhaps an important (Enzensbergian) legacy for Leftists in other
African situations to emulate. It is, in fact, unlikely that South
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African leftists would have been able to develop the press network they
did in the second half of the 1980s without exploiting this technology.
One key advantage the Weekly Mail has over the other left-wing
press, however, is the profile of its readership. The Weekly Mail
attracts left-wing professionals nationally, although most readers live
in two key urban areas -- the Pretoria-Witwatersrand area (50%), and
Cape Town area. (It also has a significant readership amongst exiles
abroad). The readership profile is one that appeals to advertisers
in 1989: 77% of readers were executives or professionals; 67% had a
university degree; 34% had a post-graduate qualification; 43% had a
household income of over R6000 per month, and 21% had a single income
of over R6000 per month. It is a market-niche that the Guild Press
ignored, which left a space for the Weekly Mail to fill.
The positioning of the Weekly Mail as a social democrat project,
located 'between' the practices of the 'comrade' press and the liberal
guild press has produced some interesting spin-offs for South African
journalism . Guild press journalists have felt less threatened by the
Weekly Mail than by the practices of the other left-wing press. This
is perhaps the reason why towards the end of the 1980s the Weekly Mail
often seemingly served as a conduit of news-leads and general 'leftist
views' into guild press discourse. Both a co-editor of the Weekly
Mail, Anton Harber, and the Star's editor, Richard Steyn have (during
discussions with this author) pointed out that the gap between the
guild and left-wing press narrowed in the three years prior to 1989.
This had occurred from both sides. On the one hand, the mainstream
press had been forced to take note of left-wing news they had
previously ignored. On the other hand, the left-wing press had had to
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take note of 'commercial' considerations and be responsive to readers
(by, for example, covering entertainment and sports). The 1980s saw
considerable changes in South African journalism, and the Weekly Mail
was a key player in these changes.
From counter hegemony to leftist hegemony: the Challenge for the future
During the 1980s the South African left achieved much. The popular
phase of struggle proved to be a supremely successful form of
resistance. Media activists played no small part in the success
achieved. An outcome of these successes is that as South Africa
entered the 1990s, some prospects existed for the creation of a leftist
hegemony. But this required that the Left capitalize on its past
achievements and adjust to the new context. The 1990-Reforms radically
altered the context within which the left-wing press now operated. Max
du Preez, editor of the Vrye Weekblad summed up the change well during
an interview on the SABC English-Service (12.3.1991), during which he
explained why the Vrye Weekblad was changing its format away from an
Afrikaans 'alternative newspaper' and towards a bi-lingual magazine.
He said: "Its yesterday's cause to be an alternative newspaper". Those
running the left-wing presses will have to make significant changes to
their operations if they are to survive and play a part in moving South
Africa into a left-wing post-apartheid era. Weekly Mail and Vrye
Weekblad were the first to recognize the need for such a shift.
A key recognition the Left needs to make is that a left hegemony in
a post-apartheid South Africa is not a certainty. In particular, the
formation of a democratic leftist hegemony is not guaranteed. A major
struggle to consolidate past successes still lies ahead. In this
struggle many still have to recognize just how important the media can
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be for mobilizing the full potential left-constituency during the
transitional phase. The 1990 reforms only increased the need for the
Left to engage in media work. This is especially important to reach
potential supporters (ie. the 'not yet converted' [3], but 'maybe'
group). The Namibian elections for a Constituent Assembly should be a
salutary lesson for the South African Left of the need to engage in
media work. This should be undertaken at a level at least able to
match the considerable efforts the Right puts into this site of
struggle.
Thanks to the efforts in constructing a left-wing press during the
1980s the South African Left built up a considerable pool of editorial
experience. (Unfortunately, media-management expertise was not
developed to match th is). This editorial experience will be useful in
any 'superstructural struggle'. However, for the size of the battle
ahead the pool of skills is still too narrow. Further, unless the
financial problems that all the left-wing press have faced since 1990
can be solved, the pool seems more likely to shrink, rather than
stabilize or grow.
Media training is needed to widen the pool, and especially to
entrench media skills more deeply into grassroots structures. The
latter notion -- of developing a grassroots media-proficiency -- is
especially important if the Left is serious about building a leftist
hegemony upon solid participatory-democratic grassroots structures
(public spheres). A national-level democratic political culture will
be more solidly grounded if such grassroots 'public spheres'
(constructed upon a proficiency in all the technology of Information
Age media-technology) serve as the foundation for a leftist hegemony.
If the Left is serious about empowering 'the masses' and building a
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democratic socialism in the Information Age then it will need to pay
serious attention to the superstructures and the possibilities inherent
therein.
In moving from a counter-hegemony mode of operation to one more
suited to that of a ruling hegemony, the South African Left has much to
take into the future from its 1980s experiences, especially:
1. The experience of Grassroots from 1980 to 1984. This experience
carries with it the legacy of running a democratic grassroots
'public sphere'.
2. The social democrat 'independent' press tradition of a critical
left-wing media. Such a media is required to point to errors made
by leftist organizations and individuals. A sycophantic and
grovelling left-wing press will not serve a left hegemony well. It
will only blind the Left to its own short-comings. The experience
of Eastern Europe provides evidence of this. What is more, given
the real danger of reformed-Right/HNC pressures towards co-option
of the South African struggle, a sycophantic 'Party Press' is the
last thing the Left needs in facing the challenges of the future.
3. The dangers of relying upon others for financial support of a left-
wing media have been illustrated by the left-commercial press. This
press is in serious danger of closure in the 1990s. Caution is
required with regard to Harvey Tyson's offer (made at the Rhodes
Media Policy Workshop in September 1990) that the Argus Company may
possibly cons~der helping the left-wing press with printing or a
piggy-back distribution arrangement (see WIP, No69, 1990). Such an
arrangement would only serve to create dependence. Rather the Left
has to work out a subsidy arrangement that is socially regulated
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(see Louw, 1990) and not dependent upon 'charity'.
4. The reasons for the relative failure of the left-commercial press
(in terms of readerships) will also have to be addressed, as will
the failure of the Daily Mail venture in 1990. As for the
question of where to now for leftist media activists, the answer
will, to a considerable extent, be bound up with the way in which
the future balance of forces are resolved. The struggle is a long
way from over. However, some abstract (theoretical) ideas, with a
view to answering the question 'Quo vadis' will be attempted in
Chapter 6.
FOOTNOTES
[1] In this thesis the term "hegemony" is taken to mean the way a
ruling group rules in the Gramscian (1971) sense. The term
"counter-hegemony" is used in a sense that is derivative of
Gramsci's notion. Counter-hegemony means the way the opposition to
a ruling hegemony can organize itself into a de facto 'government
in the wings'. This phenomena will usually be associated with a
civil war situation. In such cases the opposition can take on many
of the characteristics of a 'hegemony'. However, it is a hegemony-
in-waiting until the ruling hegemony is defeated. The South
African Left (especially as institutionalized in the ANC/MDM)
assumed the shape of such a counter-hegemony during the 1980s. The
reforms of 2 February 1990 heralded a confirmation of the Left's
status as a counter-hegemony. The reforms also heralded the start
of a transition phase: the start of a blurring of the counter
hegemony/hegemony role for the Left.
[2] Ironically, following the decline of BC as a significant political
mobilizing force in the townships, it was the English-language
Guild Press, and the black-titles owned by this Press, which
provided a home for BC-oriented journalists. By the second half of
the 1980s the Argus-owned Sowetan was the major media vehicle for
the BC position.
[3] It is with regard to this concept of political competition and
alliance building that the notion of 'The People' has become so
potentially damaging to the Leftist struggle. This .r h e t o r i c a l term
has led many 6n the Left to collapse the notion of 'the People'
with 'the whole population'. In other words, support is assumed to
be massive. Once this happens the necessity for competing for
political support (in a Poulantzian sense) falls away. In its place
comes the view that support is 'expected'.
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Chapter 6
A PROPOSAL FOR INTEGRATING MEDIA INTO THE RECONSTRUCTION
AND DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA
Any South African Leftist hegemony established during the 1990s
will emerge into a context in which the dominant relations of
production are those associated with the Information Age form of MNC.
This means the pressures for the co-option of the South African
struggle by the (local and international) Right will be intense. The
collapse of Eastern Europe has severely undermined not just the
Marxist-Leninist project, but (by extension) also the 'socialist
project'. It is a collapse that points to the serious need for a Left-
wing reappraisal and reconstruction of leftist praxis (and of leftist
hegemonic practices). There is a desperate need for the development of
South Africa's human resources in the face of the damage wrought by
apartheid. The sort of communication system that South Africa develops
during the initial reconstructive phase will have a long-lasting and
profound impact on the nature of the future society.
The South African Left is in danger of losing the struggle for
superstructural control (to the Right and MNC) because of a leftist
'marginalization' of the importance of the superstructures. The idea of
convening a 'national media summit' to develop a Left media policy
-- was first raised in 1989. David Niddrie noted how the process that
was supposed to lead to this summit died (WIP, No 70/71, 1990:41). The
Rhodes Media Policy Workshop (September 1990) and the Idasa/Campaign
fo+ an Open Media "' Sh a pe and Role of the Media' Conference (November
1990) helped to raise some of the key issues, despite some mutterings
about inadequate 'consultation' with 'the people'[l]. Yet, despite
this, the South African left remains far behind the Right (ie. both the
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NP-dominated State and local capital) when it comes to knowing what
they would do with a future media/communication infrastructure.
This lack of movement in the development of a left-wing medial
communication policy should be a matter of considerable concern. Once
more the Left is demonstrating an inertia when faced with the need to
deal with communication, media and information technology. Too little
account is taken of the legacy of those who have attempted to
reconstruct historical materialism towards a concern with the
superstructures. In the light of the earlier chapters of this thesis
perhaps some general directions can be suggested upon which to base a
media policy: (1) all citizens to be empowered by creating ·t he 'spaces'
in which they can participate in the running of their own lives,
especially (but not exclusively) at grassroots levels; (2) the creation
of public spheres at local level is one way of ensuring that an
active/participatory political culture permeates all through society.
Such a democratic communication infrastructure would also create a
mechanism for the on-going articulation of grassroots 'feeling'. By
empowering citizens at the grassroots, a public sphere could restrict
the acquisition of social power by any comprador-class and/or
technocratic-experts. It will further provide national policy makers a
base from which to work in formulating policies that have mass support;
(3) an active grassroots communication (public sphere/s) could serve as
a brake on the development of a leftist nomenklatura and/or oligarchy;--
and (4) c o n t empo r-a r-y media and information t "ech"';'ology hold ' liberatory
potential' for the construction of a left-democracy based on local
level public spheres. But making use of this potentiality requires
that the Left breaks free of the limitations of orthodox historical
materialism and its imposed inertia; and re-orientes leftist thinking
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into a direct engagement with communication and the superstructures
(see Habermas, 1990).
Rethinking 'Development'
A left-democratic popular communication (public sphere) requires a
minimum of three things: Firstly, an infrastructure that facilitates
an active grassroots participation ie. guaranteed 'access' to the
grassroots and national communication process. A nation-wide serie~ of
Media Resource Centres (MRCs) [2] would be one form such an
infrastructure could take. Secondly, all citizens must have the
necessary training to be able to make use of such facilities, and to
understand the possibilities such facilities have for empowering them.
In fact, the creation of a fully functioning Information Age 'public
sphere' would be impossible without a 'media literate' population,
intellectually equipped to use all the potential available in
contemporary information technology. Thirdly, there must be an
openness towards keeping pace and utilizing the full range of the
developments in information technology. One example would be the
expanding possibilities the new telecommunications technology create
for mass two-way communication (Kaplan, 1990: 17). Hence, the (neo-
Luddite) notion that some technologies are only appropriate for the
'First (North) World' can only serve to retard social progress in
contexts like South Africa. Instead of adopting a Ludditeism, the
'South' rather ne~ds an openness to the (Benjamin/Enzensbergian)
possibilities inherent in any and all technologies. This includes even
those which appear very 'high-tech', like the electronic media. (Media
Development Vol XXXIV, 4/1987, for example, drew attention to many of
the possibilities that 'electronic networking.' has for assisting
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development in the South/Third World. Articles by Rodriguez and Polman
are especially useful in this regard).
The proposal to utilize Information Age technology is not motivated
by a panic-striken Third World desire to 'keep up' (White, 1882: 18-
19). South Africa already has a significant technological-base from
which to work. However, access to this technology has been largely
confined to about 25% of the population (mostly white), and the
existing base has not been utilized for democratic purposes. The
challenges for the Left are: (i) to expand the size of the
technological-base with the aim of giving all citizens access to the
opportunities inherent in the technology; (ii) to develop means of
employing this technology to 'democratize' society; and (iii) to ensure
that technological decay does not set in. The danger of decay could
arise in a number of guises: firstly, pressures from the
underprivileged to redistribute wealth in a 'levelling down' process
could easily translate into a destruction of the existing skills-base
in one sector, without it being replaced in another. Secondly, if the
future state alienated whites, massive emigration could result. This
would effectively export much of the country's technological skills
base -- a phenomenon already seen in other African states when they
gained independence.
All of the above points need to be seen as serious 'development'
concerns in the contemporary South African context. In fact,
'communication', 'access', 'participation' and 'development' need to be
seen as part of a single process (see Nair & White, 1987).
The proposed infrastructure and training requires funds. But there
could be an argument that South Africa is a 'developing society'
373
without the necessary funds [3] to allocate to such a scheme in a post-
apartheid reconstruction. This would represent: (i) a betrayal of the
democratic impulse within the popular counter-hegemony struggle of the
1980s; (ii) a short-sighted and highly limited interpretation of
'development'; (lii) the (unnecessary) ~ facto condemnation of South
Africa to the status of a 'Third (South) World' society for the
foreseeable future, instead of seeking to enable South Africa to become
a full participant in the Information Age; and (iv) a missed
opportunity to reconstruct and develop South Africa into a left-
democratic society solidly grounded within the Information Age. It
requires conceptualizing of the development/reconstruction of South
Africa in a way that 'communication' (and the 'public sphere' notion)
is fully integrated into a wider development programme. It need not
mean massive additional outlays. Rather, it means a creative
'arrangement' of available 'development' funding such that the
infrastructures and training required for democratic communication are
made a part of the overall reconstruction/development plans. In other
words, the development of democratic communication infrastructures
should be part of (and 'piggy backed' upon) all other development work,
rather than be seen as something separate from other development
projects).
The challenge for the South African Left is to find a way to use
the possibilities and spaces of the Information Age to construct a
left-democracy. In meeting this challenge the Left need not start from
a blank book. There exists the work of those who have already
attempted to 'reconstruct' historical materialism such that this
paradigm can deal more adequately with the superstructures (see
Chapters 2 and 3). There is also the work of those who have attempted
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to build a left-wing counter-hegemonic media in South Africa (see
Chapter 5). The Cape's Grassroots project, in particular, went some of
the way to demonstrating, on a micro scale, that the concepts of a
'public sphere' and 'popular communication' are not merely utopian (see
also the Philippines experience as described by Dionisio, 1986). The
South African Left, if it wins the first one-person-one-vote election,
will have the opportunity to demonstrate this on a much larger scale.
But to do so the Left will need to re-orientate itself towards the
'superstructural age'. It will need to develop leftist answers to the
problems of social organization and social struggle in such an era
where the superstructures are so dominant. The key challenges will be
to demonstrate that: (1) 'top down' (HNC) relations of production and
communication do not have to form the basis of either media or social
organization in an information societYi and (2) the Left is able to
creatively use the democratic possibilities inherent in the Information
Age to overcome the legacy of 'socialism-without-democracy' in Eastern
Europe. The South African Left have the potential space to demonstrate
that a practical leftist alternative does exist to both HNC and
Harxist-Leninist vanguardism.
Towards ~ New Leftist theorization of ~ popular media/communication
During the 1980s the South African left-wing media accumulated an
enormous range of experience. This media was influenced by differing
elements of both ~popular' and socialist-democratic principles; some
from external leftist sources, but some of local origin. However, this
media practice was not always accompanied by a theoretical self-
reflexiveness by media activists and media workers. In moving from
counter-hegemony to hegemony, the Left will be in need of theoretical
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self-reflexiveness. From Korsch's perspective such theoretical self-
reflexivity is a valuable part of any leftist praxis. Creating a
theoretical 'ideal' model of left-wing media can serve to create a
useful touchstone for leftist praxis. With the possibility that South
African leftists may soon be in a position to (re)construct the South
African media, a theoretical reflexivity may be valuable at this point.
Such a reflexivity will need to consider the work of those who have
attempted to 'reconstruct' historical materialism, as well as the
experiences of left media activists over the last decade so as to
consider the future possibilities.
In such self-reflexivity a short-hand model is often useful:
Lanigan & Strobl's summary of what they term the 'Marxist' approach to
the media offers a helpful point of departure for conceptualizing a
popular media/communication. They argue that this calls for: "A long-
term strategy for the democratization of the~ media" which has six
political goals. The six goals identified by Lanigan & Strobl (1981:
146-147) are:
(1) Changing the content of the mass media so that consumerism
and persuasion which have permeated deeply into the consciousness
of employees and wage earners is eliminated. In addition to
Habermas, this notion has also featured in the work of the other
Frankfurt School theorists on 'ideology', and in the work of
Mattelart.
(2) Dismantling the capitalist system and thereby the existing
structures of mass communication, and the subsequent creation of a
political "proletarian publicity". The aim is to redistribute
social power. This notion underpinned Enzensberger's view of
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transforming media manipulation from a 'minority' to a 'majority'
phenomenon. It is also the primary concern of culturalists (like
Raymond Williams). They recognise that subaltern groups are not a
passive mass, but are active, creative beings who therefore need
'spaces' for cultural expression.
(3) Creating worker participation in all areas of mass media
production (on editorial, technical, and administrative levels),
liberating the workers in media production from subjugation and
dependence on the providers of capital. This notion can be found in
all leftist writing on media work. Underlying this notion can be
found a concern for ending the alienation caused by a lack of human
control over the conditions in which people work in capitalist
relations of production. It is a view that is especially well
articulated in Marx's 1844 Manuscripts and Lukacs' History and
Class Consciousness.
(4) Transferring media control from private owners to producers;
expropriating privately run media businesses; decentralizing and
demonopolizing media firms and transforming them into socialised
institutions (open to participation on the entire allocative and
operational spectrum). This goal ties into the previous two goals
in so far as it is concerned with a process of de-alienating media
work, and removing top-down minority control. This is central to
this thesis' interpretation of organizing a New Leftist media an
interpretation that draws extensively upon Habermas and Mattelart.
(5) Forming advertising and publicity cooperatives to distribute
advertisements and publicity to all affiliated media on an
equal basis and thereby preventing concentration of communication
powers. This goal would tie into both a Mattelart-and Frankfurt
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School-type opposition to the capitalist-organized culture
industry.
(6) Politically activizing the masses for communicative
" . t' t e" - that is,emancipation and developing commun1ca 1ve compe enc
action oriented toward reaching understanding - in the spontaneous
creation of media programmes by involving the public in the
articulation of objective societal needs and interests. Besides
being a central notion in Habermas' work, this goal also ties into
the culturalist notion of activating popular participation in
cultural production.
Lanigan & Strobl's summary provides a basis from which to begin a
theoretical exploration of a the role of communication/media in
building a democratic-leftist hegemony. (They have not, however,
provided a comprehensive list of all leftist media/communication
concerns). Instead of Lanigan & Strobl's six goals, it is proposed that
leftist debates about democratizing the media can actually be
understood if they are dealt with within three subcategories.
* First, are questions relating to theoretically identifying what
democratic-leftist structures would consist of, and working out how
to practically create such structures. What is at issue here is a
concern with creating democratic-participatory media structures.
White (1982: 3-5; 1984: 22) widens this concern by connecting it to
considerations of 'access' and 'accountability'. These structures
-wi l l editorially complement leftist ideals and societal structures.
Lanigan & Strobl's categories (1) and (2) refer to these issues.
* Second, are the questions relating to the active encouragement of
society-wide democratic practices and the media's role in these. At
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issue here is the generation of democratic practices and dialogue
that penetrate into every sector of society, right through to the
grassroots; and to what extent democratic practices will be assisted
by a democratic media structure. Lanigan & Strobl's categories (3),
(4), (5), and (6) refer to these issues.
* Third, are questions relating to how to prevent the emergence of a
new (minority) ruling group which accumulates power and wealth at the
f h "t' 't Two possl'ble South Africanexpense 0 t e maJorl y ln SOCle y.
distortions of leftist practice in this regard would be a
nomenklatura system, or a co-option of sectors of the Left into
comprador arrangements with MNC. Both would violate the principles
of a (New) left-democracy. White (1984 22) has proposed various
measures to ensure that democratic communication infrastructures,
once implemented, are sustained.
Various projects have attempte~ to institutionalize the above
notions into a left-democratic media practice. Some examples would be
Chile (see Mattelart, 1983: 262); Nicaragua (Mattelart, 1986; and
White, 1989 and 1990); Mocambique (De Vasconcelos, 1990); community
media projects in Britain (Nigg & Wade, 1980); resource centre
projects in South Africa (Karlsson, 1989; and Criticos, 1989); and
the South African Grassroots project. This venture attempted to
prevent: (a) the granting of a privileged position to media
activists/workers; and (b) the development of uni-directional (top-
·down ) communication which would turn the masses into mere passive
recipients of media messages. As Mattelart (1983:362) states:
The left, even if it goes along with the rules of the market,
cannot allow its publications to remain passive objects. A new
culture cannot be imposed. A new culture is created by the
various revolutionary sectors; they create it by participating
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organisationally in its creation."
Participation is the key word in organizing popular media (see
Mat~elart, 1983j Traber, 1989j and White, 1980, 1983a: 7-8, and 1989).
A democratic media system serving a 'popular' counter-hegemonic or
hegemonic structure means building a real two-way communication
network, or 'public sphere'. White (1982, 1984) developed an especially
coherent theorization of the principles underpinning such a left-
democratic media. Christians (1987:22) has noted the need to move away
from the "negative freedom" of the Enlightenment and towards the
positive freedom of a participative culture. Christians (1987) draws
on the work of both White and Paulo Freire (1972) to develop the notion
of communication as "open spaces". In other words, 'spaces' (or
'public spheres' within which this positive freedom can be exercised.
Such a participative-democratic communication structure would represent
the very antithesis of the 'culture industry' (and the 'Enlightenment
culture') described by Adorno & Horkheimer (1979) and Marcuse (1968).
And because it would be a participative media it offers (i) a-----
communicative vehicle for counteracting the social anomie and---- - ----
alienation associated with being 'controlled', rather than being 'in
. -
(see Lukacs, 1971j Marx, 1981: 69-71j and Bahro, 1981: 151)j
and (ii) a space for the full articulation and growth of popular
culture (see Clarke, et aI, 1979j and Thompson, 1963).
What is required is a conceptualization which moves away from_th
notion of media as the source of information. Journalists should be
~ -----
seen as the 'facilitators' of social communication instead of as the
'originators' of media messages (see Richieri, 1983:406-407). This is
especially important in South Africa where decades of neo-fascist rule
stunted the development of an indigenous " de moc r a t i c culture' (amongst
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both the ruling and ruled). A media encouraging the growth of
dialogue, from grassroots level, would be an invaluable 'mechanism' in
the development of a participative-democratic culture. An active
popular culture as described by the culturalists -- is not enough.
What is required is a mechanism for institutionalizing this activity
such that such activity can be further stimulated; and an active
grassroots political culture can directly impact on national policy.
(The latter is seen as a reasonable guarantee against the possible rise
of a co-opted comprador class, and/or nomenklatura oligarchy).
Mattelart (1983:364) argues that media should be seen as:
mechanisms allowing the workers to develop their level of
awareness, and hence their ability to assess and give opinions
about published products and thereby to avoid the risk of
manipulation by those with longer experience.
Ideally, such participation should be implemented during the transition
(negotiation) phase leading to one-person-one-vote system in South
Africa. In reality, it seems unlikely that this will be possible
because: (1) the other (rightist) parties to the negotiations will
block such developments; (2) until the Left comes to power no
possibility exists of funds being allocated to the creation of the sort
of communication infrastructure needed; (3) the transition period will
be characterised by posturing the rhetoric; and (4) the myopic Left has
not recognised how important it is. For this reason it is more likely
that a Leninist 'top-down' communication form will characterise the
transition period. In addition, the ANC is unlikely to have sufficient
resources to develop even an effective in-house counter- hegemonic
dialogical communication structure (able to make its own constituency
effectively part of real decision-making) during this transition phase.
But if a counter-hegemonic dialogue is not a realistic possibility
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this is no reason not to aim for a post-transition (hegemonic) social-
dialogue infrastructure. If the Left succeeds in acquiring power then
social resources will become available for the implementation of a
popular communication infrastructure. In addition, state power will
open the door to granting a legal status to participatory communicaion
(see White, 1984: 22). And the local legacy exists from which to build
such a popular media. In other words, it is a proposal that grows
organically out of the local context (White, 1982: 2). Grassroots in
particular represented a significant attempt to try and structurally
implement the idea of the media as a facilitator of an intra-counter
hegemonic alliance dialogue (see Patel, 1985). The Grassroots
experience represents one potential key for the building of a New Left
hegemony (and culture). The foundation for this is a democratic
(popularist) media infrastructure. Other keys would be the experience
of MRCs and other left-media projects that have been run in South
Africa and elsewhere (see MRC, 1989; DMTG, 1990j Louw et aI, 1990bj
Chapter 5 of this thesisj and White, 1980, 1989 and 1990).
The participatory 'public sphere' seen in the 1980-1984 Grassroots
model could provide especially important lessons in any attempt to
build a (post-transition) South African (popular-democratic)
communication system which does not follow the 'culture industry'
model. From Grassroots can be taken the idea that members of the
community are to be challenged in such a way that they develop
communicative skills and an awareness of events around them (Johnson,
1985). Simultaneously, the 'professional' media workers learn to work
(democratically) with the different groups within the community, and as
a part of that community. They learn not to consider themselves as
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either hierarchically privileged, or as being the source of
information. A left-wing media organized along these lines becomes a
facilitator for communication and learning: skills are developed
throughout the community, and democratic 'habits' are learned by both
intellectuals ('professional' media workers) and the members of the
community organizations involved in the communication process. This is
the basis of any popularist conception of 'media' as a means of
generating 'democracy' rather than as a means of generating
'information'.
A genre of journalism that sees itself as a facilitator of
democracy needs to place an emphasis on feedback (see Morley, et aI,
1982; and White, 1982:4). Within the 'ideal' Grassroots model (1980 to
1984) much emphasis was placed on feedback, with community perceptions
being continually canvassed. This was done in a number of ways:
* the news-gathering meeting (comprised of representatives of community
organizations) critically evaluated the previous edition. In
addition, because the progressive-alternative press intentionally set
itself up as an integral part of the 'democratic movement', its doors
were always open to the community and its organizations. (Also,
prior to the intensification of police repression, the offices of
this press were often used as meeting places by the 'democratic
movement'). As a result, a high level of 'contact' and press-
community liaison was achieved;
* correspondence received was considered an important barometer of
community opinion, and so letters, and letters' pages, were accorded
great attention by those working in the project; and
* the distributors of the newspapers were encouraged to canvass
readers' opinions about the previous edition and to feed this back.
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Taking this micro-level 'public sphere' model and finding ways to
develop it into a into a macro-level (society-wide) hegemonic media
model is a central 'ideal' of any New Leftist reconstruction of the
South African media/communication infrastructure. Perhaps the best
guarantee of a democratic political culture in a post-apartheid
society would be to try and get every constituency to develop its
own media. This complements White's (1989:19, 1984:22) notion of the
"variety" of groups and styles to be integrated into popular
communication. Encouraging diversity would facilitate participatory
(popular) communication. After all, a left-participatory media could
not be expected to deal effectively with non-leftist opinion (see
Louw, 1990). A society blanketed by multitudes of such public
spheres (each serving its own constituency) would provide the
foundation for a mass-based, participative, yet pluralistic political
culture. The experience of progressive church workers offers some
valuable insights in this regard (see Murphy, 1986). This is, of
course, a conception of popular communication read through a
hybridization of Poulantzas' Eurocommunist and Habermas'
reconstructed historical materialist world views. A potential
problem, however, would be to get every constituency to operate such
a democratic media system, especially on the Right (where
participatory-democracy is not a traditional mode of organization).
Building popular democratic media also means re-thinking the actual
management of journalism (see Traber, 1985). From the outset, the
producers of Grassroots recognised that if progressive alternative
newspapers were to be an integral part of the wider movement for
democratic change in South Africa, then it would be inappropriate for
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Grassroots to adopt undemocratic and hierarchical organizational
structures and journalistic practices. This principle informed, to
some extent, each of the left wing presses inside South Africa after
1980, although the form has not always been an exact replication of the
Grassroots model.
The South African progressive-alternative press favoured control of
the process by community and worker organizations. This was achieved
through mandated representatives of those organizations elected to
governing bodies of the papers. (Neither the left-commercial nor the
social democrat press, however, adopted this principle). This
community control principle did not exclude the existence of a small
core of 'professional' permanent staffers. In fact, the actual success
of such publications depended to a large extent on the availability of
permanent skilled staffers. However, to use the example of Grassroots
(in its 'ideal' form): such staffers were subject to the 'control' of
the GB. The executive committee was re-elected annually, hence
ensuring 'popular' control or what White (1982: 5) would call
"accountability". Because the permanent staffers had to work along-
side various sub-committees (news-gathering; advice; production;
finance and advertising; and distribution) their 'accumulation of
power' was curtailed. However, by working alongside the community
members, the intellectuals in question won the respect of the
community. Such staffers were paid considerably less than those
working for the other presses. As a result, working for a progressive-
alternative newspaper demanded considerable 'commitment' to the ideals
underpinning the 'popular democratic' movement. The sort of staffers
attracted were prepared to work within the framework of democratic
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control over their work. A new genre of popularist journalism emerging
out of the process.
Trying to make democracy work
It is, however, easy to produce 'ideal' models about democratic
journalism. It is less easy to make it work in practice: firstly,
there is the potential problem of finding a way to ensure that the
writers (from the news-gathering committees) and leftist correspondents
(in the case of 'national' news) do not willfully present a distorted
picture of the organizations they support . (Such 'distortion need not
even be ' wi l l f u l ' , but could occur by 'omission'). Such a practice
would not benefit any counter-hegemony (or hegemony) because it would
not thereby provide them with the sort of accurate picture they need to
operate effectively. An example since 1990 is that both the
progressive-alternative and left-commercial presses demonstrated an
ANC-sycophantism harmful to the Left: none of these newspapers exposed
the failure of the ANC to organise itself or its constituency into an
effective post-reform political force.
Secondly, because it is easier to use authoritarian methods and to
organize structures using hierarchical pecking-orders, . practical
democracy is continually at risk in practice. Both the South African
left-commercial and social-democrat presses did, in fact, experience
this problem during the 1980s. (For a discussion of such problems at
New African see Ntshakala & Emdon, 1991) .
. Thirdly, democratic organization becomes very difficult when Right-
wing pressures and repression are operative. This, for example, became
a real problem in South Africa between 1985 and 1989 when the community
networks which underpinned the left presses were largely smashed by
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state repression. Of course, Habermas (1976) would attempt to find a
way to turn even this problematic to the advantage of the Left. He
would argue that MNC's need for a commandarist style means that the
system cannot ultimately 'deliver' its promise of 'democracy'. When
MNC relations of production are under real threat because of demands
for real democracy, the Right will, of necessity, resort to 'obvious'
repression. But Habermas would argue that the Left can turn this
contradiction (a "legitimation crisis") to their advantage. This is
where Habermas' and Enzensberger's ideas merge. The legacy of the
South African struggle in the 1980s, in part, validates this notion.
Rightist repression actually came to fuel, rather than stop the
struggle once the popular grassroots had been 'activated' beyond a
certain threshold.
Fourthly, popular democratic communication can also lend itself to
two forms of leftist 'distortions'. Firstly, careerist leaders can
learn to use the language and style of 'popular democracy' to
manipulate popular-left structures for their own advancement. The
rhetoric of 'democracy' can be used to achieve de facto minority
control (see Ntshakala & Emdon, 1991). Such manipulation is difficult
to overcome, because anyone challenging such practices will be accused
of 'divisiveness'. Secondly, an unrealistic 'anarchistic' impulse can
be 'empowered' by popular communication structures. In other words, all
decision-making can be effectively blocked by a 'democratic
proceduralism' in .wh i c h the demand is raised that everybody
participates in all decisions. Such a procedural ism can effectively
halt leftist praxis and give the Right an advantage over the Left.
Those operating popular-left communication structures should be
continually aware of these dangers.
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Fifthly, how can left intellectuals (eg. journalists) be prevented
from becoming a new elite -- an Information Age nomenklatura. Korsch's
view is that there is a division of labour between base and
superstructural activities. But both Korsch and Benjamin would not see
this as a reason for an anti-intellectualism or anti-
superstructuralism. (As White (1989:18) notes, "distrust and tension"
often characterises the response towards intellectuals from popular-
community groups). Both Korsch and Benjamin would rather want to see
the Left to recognize the importance of harnessing the power
intellectual/superstructural activity can produce. The question is how
to prevent the division of labour becoming hierarchically fixed such
that the petit bourgeoisie (who 'inhabit' the 'information realms')
come to uncritically adopt the social practices of a new ruling elite.
In the Information Age the danger of such an acquisition of social
power and status is extensive. As Gramsci noted, the superstructural
activities are the 'organizational' roles in society. This means an
inbuilt propensity exists for the transformation of those groups
,
occupying those realms into new ruling elite roles. What is needed is
a recognition that a unified bloc requires diversity arid division of
labour. A hegemonic-alliance must be structured in such a way that
both extremist positions of: (i) an intellectual elitism, and (ii) an
anti-intellectualism are avoided.
In the sixth place, the organization of counter-hegemonic democratic
communication networks represents a comparatively easy task compared to
trying to organize a popularist hegemony. After all, popularist
counter-h~gemonies, by their very nature, are smaller than hegemonies.
A hegemony has to incorporate everyone in a society, rather than merely
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the opposition.
But in considering the role of popular media in the creation of a
left-democracy (ie. a macro-scale consideration) one need not confine
oneself to only the communicological aspects. (In other words those
issues discussed by Mattelart, White, Habermas, Enzensberger, and CCS).
In working through the relationship of popular communication to
leftist-democracy, the theoretical work of Gramsci and Poulantzas read
together offers some valuable insights. Within the general parameters
of 'reconstructing' historical materialism, these two help to congeal
many of the issues central to developing left-democratic communication.
Poulantzas (1980) and Gramsci (1971) provide a theoretical basis for
conceiving of how a New Leftist hegemony (a socialist-democratic
pluralism) might be organized. In this way they provide a means for
(i) 'concretizing' Habermas' notion of a 'public sphere' and (ii)
widening Mattelart's work on 'popular communication' so that the
'socio-political' (rather than just 'media') implications are revealed.
With the South African left (potentially heading into a period of
hegemony construction), theoretical ruminations are not out of place at
at the time of writing. Poulantzian/Gramscian (left-pluralist
hegemonic) propositions also help to bring into focus some of the
communicological issues that arise from trying to organize a popular
communication infrastructure:
(i) Should media structure(s) be centralized, decentralized or a
mixture of both. How this question is resolved has enormous
implications for what sort of hegemony will be constructedj for
the nature and extent of possible participationj and for the
likelihood of the emergence of a new ruling elite. From a
Poulantzian perspective a de-centralized (and hence more plural)
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media would be preferable.
(ii) How to attempt to prevent the emergence of a new class of
'manipulators' (ie. a new petit bourgeois media elite tied into a
comprador or nomenklatura class). In the Information Age the
potential for media and information workers to acquire social
power is very great. This power is linked (in the present world-
wide 'culture industry') to MNC interests. What role can the
media play in either facilitating or blocking such a development?
The Gramsci-Poulantzas notion of hegemony construction offers a
conception of diffused and pluralized power, and hence (at least
potentially) of a reduction of centralized (vanguardist) power.
(iii) How to create the conditions for permanent social change, and/or
prevent social inertia witnessed in the East European failure to
deal with Information Age relations of production? In Marcusian-
type language this might be termed keeping the dialectic 'alive',
and/or preventing the development of the 'one-dimensional man'
phenomenon. A Gramscian-Poulantzian conception of the dialectic
would be built upon the notion of pluralist competition for
(economic and superstructural) resources -- a competition that
would drive the process of social change.
(iv) How to create democratically participative/interactive media
without this dissolving into a media (and social) anarchism. One
is not talking of a free-for-all, but rather of a pluralist, yet
popular media (see Louw, 1990)j and
(v) Whether capitalist media-marketing should be rejected, or turned
to socialist-advantage. The Eurocommunist perception of
Poulantzas would be open to the Left making use of the techniques
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developed by MNC. This can be extended to the wider
Enzensbergian question of whether it is possible or desirable for
leftists to 'keep their hands clean'.
Most importantly, a Poulantzas-Gramscian view is able to conceive of a
society ordered in accordance with a recognition of the permanence of
social diversity. This view also sees this diversity as positive in
terms of an active social dialectic. Building a {New} Left hegemony
upon such a recognition necessitates an alliance-type politics of the
sort associated with popularist politics. A Poulantzian-Gramscian view
provides a conceptual framework around which a left-democratic ordering
of society {and left-democratic media, or Habermasian 'public sphere'}
can be built. Recognizing the permanence of social diversity also means
the Left needs to focus in on the shifting patterns of social power,
and skewed power relationships. In other words, a notion wider than
'class' and 'economic relations of production' alone {see Habermas,
1990}. This increases the importance of 'political communication' and
'public opinion' in leftist praxis {Habermas, 1990: 18-21}.
What Poulantzas specifically offers is a way of constructing a
theory which combines historical materialist conflict theory with the
notion of political pluralism. The result is the negation of the
notion of pluralism as a functional stable social structure/process,
where stability is generated through a pluralistic overlapping of
interest groups. {For an example of such a functionalist view of
pluralism see Dahl, 1961}. A stable functionalist pluralism contradicts
an historical material concern with inherent social conflict. A
dynamic pluralism {a situation of social conflict} is, however,
compatible with a leftist position in which dialectical-conflict is
emphasized (for example, Lukacs and Marcuse). Poulantzas produces a
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way of reading pluralist-democracy in a non-functional way. In true
Eurocommunist fashion, Poulantzas accepts the idea of autonomous, yet
overlapping interest groups. Although he could be accused of paying
little attention to the notion of dialectical conflict, his ideas none-
the-less are fully compatible with the idea of a dialectical conflict,
or Enzensberger's concept of media praxis.
From Gramsci we can take the notion of hegemonYj from Poulantzas the
notion of class fractions. The two together give us a way of
conceptualizing a hegemonic alliance of pluralist 'fractions'. In terms
of a Gramscian-Poulantzian view, society can be conceptualized of as
consisting of two separate sets of alliances. Each alliance can be
conceived of as consisting of the overlapping interest groups ('class
fractions') that pluralists speak of. But from Gramsci's perspective
such alliances are not 'natural' functionalist phenomena. Instead they
have to be brought into being by hegemonic labour during which time
various patterns of class fractions are welded together. Social
conflict occurs between the two alliances. Such a reading produced a
New Leftist understanding of social conflict and democracy. This
understanding has important implications for both the theory and
practice of left-wing media/communication [4]. The Gramsci-Poulantzas
approach slides easily into Habermas' notion of a 'public sphere' as
democratic communication and a dialogical (pluralist) conflict. It
also provides a conceptualization of society which increases enormously
the importance of the media (and culture) for the Left.
This reading shows that a Left-alliance, and its conflict with the
Right-alliance, has to be 'worked at' (before, during and after any
transfer of power to the Left). Such hegemonic-work can take place at
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at least five levels: (i) each separate sub-group of the alliance needs
to be 'created C , organized and held together; (ii) the interactions
between the sub-groups need to be organized ('managed'); (iii) the
over-arching alliance and its relationship(s) with its sub-components
needs to be 'created', organized ('managed'), and held together; and
(iv) the relationship (conflict) between the Left and Right alliances
must be organized. This latter hegemony-work includes (v) the
attempts to disrupt the Rightist-alliance and its sub-components, as
well as attempts to 'recruit' from out of the right alliance those sub-
groups and individuals who may be 'compatible C with the Left-alliance.
Each of these five aspects is intimately tied up with
communication/media work.
The notion of alliances between 'fractional' interests also lends
itself to the conceptualization of micro-level conflicts and hegemony
building. Local (micro) struggles need to be seen in the context of
larger struggles. However, 'local' should not be allowed to degenerate
into what Mattelart & Piemme (1983:416) call 'localism'[5]. In South
Africa (as in the USSR), localism could assume an especially dangerous
form if linguistic differences became entangled with such local level
democratic structures. At any rate, the notion of facilitating
local/grassroots struggle grants greater autonomy to micro-level
engagements. (This also means a recognition that the Left can advance
in one local area and simultaneously retreat in another. It also
allows for a more .p l u r a l i s t i c - d e moc r a t i c understanding of (left)
hegemony construction. This reduces the possibility of the emergence
of a centralized nomenklatura ruling elite. From a media/communication
perspective this means that different Left-media can be encouraged to
serve different local groups, different issues, class fractions, etc.
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Each 'fraction' could conceivably be served separately, as a parallel
operation to creating a unified alliance. Pluralism need not inhibit
, , . f . t' It' . 1'unity', and/or 'unity need not mean un1 orm1 y. 1S preC1se y
such pluralism that drives dialectical change (and/or prevents inertia)
because the alliance patterns would (presumably) continually be
shifting. Hence social conflict would be on-going. In such a scenario
a 'public sphere' would facilitate the conflicts which drive the social
dialectic. Hence, communication becomes a key feature of both left-
democracy and left-revolution.
Running together aspects of Gramsci and Poulantzas' work provides
left-wing media theoreticians and practitioners with a conceptual
framework of how to set about building a democratic (pluralist)-leftist
media. This conceptual framework is of potential use in developing a
leftist scheme for avoiding the East European failure to utilize the
possibilities inherent in the Information Age to develop a left-
democracy. A media network should: (i) help create and maintain
popular-grassroots (participatory) democracYj (ii) assist in militating
against vanguardism (and other pressures towards anti-democratic 'top-
down' rule)j (iii) provide structures small and accessible enough
(because they are at the local and 'fractional' level) to allow mass
democratic (two-way) participation; and (iv) provide a learning-
experience through the participation it facilitates. This should:
improve the . self-image (in the Fanon sense) participants would have of
themselves; spread technical and social skills; and teach a respect for
democracy itself).
South Africa entered a transitional phase in the 1990s. It is a
transition in which the Left will -- if they are able to successfully
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mobilize the power inherent in their large constituency -- be key
players. A window of opportunity exists for: developing South Africa
into a fully-fledged player in the Information Age; but for using the
potentialities of the Information Age in a leftist way so as to develop
a left-participatory-democracy (based on the popularist principles so
central to the South African struggle of the 1980s).
A role for Media Training and Media Resource Centres in democratic
development
Theory may be important, but within a Korschian totality, practice
is equally important. There is a need to go beyond popularist media
theorizing and conceive of the practical requirements for the
development of a left-democratic hegemony based upon a national 'public
sphere'. An important challenge for the South African Left would be to
show that a mass participative democracy can be practically built
using: the experiences of the South African popularist counter-hegemony
phase; the popular communication experiences as developed in other
contexts (for example, as described by Mattelart and White); and the
(co-opted) information technology of MNC.
If the Left take on such a challenge, two key practical requirements
are: firstly, a nation-wide grassroots media infrastructure of both the
local-level Grassroots (public sphere) type, and Media Resource Centres
(MRCs). This could serve to create an infrastructure that local
communities can themselves control (see White, 1989: 17-18). Secondly,
mass training and .e du c a t i o n to enable and encourage all citizens (who
want to) to use such an infrastructure must be developed. This, of
course, implies a degree of central (state) planning to create such an
infrastructure. This sets such a proposal apart from White's (1988:34-
35) view that the democratization of communication will not come about
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as a result of national planning, but rather will come from the
'margins' (White, 1984:36). What White (1988) perhaps points to is the
need for care to be exercised: a national plan to democratize
communication will come to nothing unless grassroots support for such a
scheme exists. At the very least this perhaps requires that MRCs only
be placed in a community after consultations and negotiations with the
affected community (although ideally, as White (1982:8) notes,
communication policy-making itself should be formulated within a
participatory process). What is ultimately being proposed is a scheme
that draws on both 'group communication' and 'people's communication'
concepts (White, 1989). In other words, a 'top-down' group
communication plan is proposed. However, it is a planned intervention
aimed at facilitating/ encouraging a bottom-up communication, including
"comunicacion popular" (White, 1980:4,8). Post-apartheid South Africa
may provide a unique opportunity for such a scheme to be attempted --
it may not be replicable elsewhere.
In the reconstruction and development of South Africa in the post-
apartheid era a nation-wide MRC infrastructure seems the most direct
way for establishing the framework for a popular-participative
political culture ('public sphere'). This should be built upon the
back of Information technology. However, this will require that the
Left find a way to remove the asymmetrical power relationship
associated with existing information technology (White, 1982:20-22). In
other words, this technology must be co-opted into a system of
participatory controls which 'democratizes' the potential inherent
within the Information Age. A nation-wide MRC programme would have a
number of advantages; it would provide: (i) the basic rudimentary'
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infrastructure around which to construct both a local level and
national level public sphere (ie. participative left-hegemony); (ii) a
vehicle not only for direct media participation, but also for media
training and media education. (Such education would be especially
important during the early phase of trying to implement a popular-left
hegemony based upon a public sphere); and (iii) a context ('space') in
which to bring together, in a participative working arrangement,
community members, trade unionists, activists in other spheres of
community life, and intellectuals (information workers, writers, film
makers, academics, etc). Such an MRC network has the potential for
activating both popular culture and a mass-based participative
political culture.
Building such a national (macro-level) MRC/public sphere network
would be an enormous challenge never before attempted. In seeking a
way forward in this regard, some British micro-level community media
projects (see Nigg & Wade, 1980) give some clues as to how to proceed
with implementing the ideas found in Habermas and/or Mattelart's work
[6]. The experiences of these British community media projects can be
summed up thus:
* Resource centres were set up in underprivileged communities;
* Centres were located for easy community access.
* A wide variety of media equipment was kept in these centres.
* This equipment was made available to community groups.
* The centres were staffed by trained media activists.
* The media activists did not produce media. Rather, they helped
community members to make their own media by (i) helping them with
technical advice; (ii) teaching community members how to use the
equipment; (iii) booking out the equipment; and (iv) servicing and
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maintaining the equipment.
* By making media equipment and training available, underprivileged
communities were given the opportunity of creating a local level"
social dialogue (or public sphere). In other words, they talked to
themselves about issues they saw as important in their communities.
This enabled the community to mobilize itself and so develop
grassroots democratic organization.
* The resultant media could also be used to get messages though to the
'establishment'. In other words, the community was given a media
voice. In addition, the media could be shown to other similar
(underprivileged) communities and so serve as a catalyst for similar
mobilizing excercises there.
* The approach is an important alternative to Leninist vanguardism. It
is a 'public sphere' that empowers citizens to take control of their
own lives and communities. They are also enabled to communicate their
perceptions and wishes. White (1980, 1989) discussed Latin American
moves to establish this sort of community-empowering communication.
It is conception that gets to the very heart of the underpinning
assumption of a New Leftist popular communication: let all people
speak for themselves [7]. This should not merely be a paper right (as
in the libertarian media model). Rather, ALL sectors of society
should be guaranteed the actual resources and facilities to make
their views known (see White, 1984: 22).
Each of the community media projects described by Nigg & Wade (1980)
hold important lessons for a possible South African pop~lar
communication/media policy. Each illustrates how Information Age
electronic-media technology can be co-opted for left-wing social
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organization. In other words they demonstrate the possible (popular-
democratic) organizational-style for the building of the local'
(grassroots) sections of any nation-wide public sphere. Such a style
could serve as a model for organizing the network of MRCs previously
proposed in this chapter. Any argument that these experiences are
inappropriate for South Africa because Britain is more developed is
spurious given the integration of South Africa into the MNC/Information
Age. Further, even though each of the above three projects utilized
electronic media technology, there would be no need for South African
MRCs to limit themselves to only electronic media. South African MRCs
could utilize the operating-style developed in these British media
projects and apply them to any form of media -- print, electronic,
paint media, etc. Each MRC in South Africa could be tailored to the
local context -- ie. MRCs in highly urban areas ·( e g . Hillbrow/ Berea/
Yeovillej Cape Town Central/Seapointj Albert Park/Berea/Pointj or
Sunnyside/Arcadia) could stock all media technology but perhaps
'emphasize' a cable TV network, 'electronic networking' (see Media
Development Vol 34, 4/1987), and video (see Media Development, Vol 36,
No 4/1989j Festa & Santoro, 1987j and Lazerus & Tomaselli, 1989). MRCs
in informal settlement areas (eg. Inanda or Winterveld) could
'emphasize' a local community radio station and print media. ( Media
Development Vol 37, 4/90 looked at various possibilities for using
radio for local level democracy and development). MRCs in suburban
areas (with lower .u r ba n population densities) could possibly emphasize
community newspapers of the Grassroots genre. MRCs in rural areas
could emphasize cassette tapes, local community radio, or a combination
of cassette tapes and radio.
In seeking models for the construction of community media and MRCs
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one need not only look to overseas experiences. In addition to
Grassroots' type experiences, South African leftists have also gained
experience in constructing MRCs in the process of building a counter-
hegemony during the 1980s. An example would be the Media Resource
Centre (MRC-UND) at the University of Natal, Durban (MRC, 1989) [8].
The key assumptions underpinning this project have been 'participation'
and 'access' on the part of underprivileged groups (Criticos, 1989).
Further, the MRC-UND facilitated the spreading of media skills in the
Durban area through facilitating the running of media training courses
and workshops for community groups and trade unions. Thereafter, those
trained have had available, on an on-going basis, the MRC-UND's
workshop area for the production of media. MRC-UND staff have been
available to .give advice when problems arose. However, these staff
will not produce media for community groups since community members are
expected to produce their own media. Rather the staff merely assist and
advise. A complementary organization, the DMTG, provided media-
training to community groups requesting such training. Once trained the
MRC's facilities were available for on-going media-production. Through
this MRC facility, Durban's grassroots community groups, ' a nd trade
unions were enabled to become active media producers -- something that
they would not have been financially able to do without the existence
of the MRC-UND. The MRC-UND has thus represented -- despite problems '
(see Deacon, 1991) -- a small step on the road towards democratizing
media in the Durban area by making communication resources available to
groups who would otherwise have been denied access to media resources.
If local level 'public spheres' are to be built in South Africa then
a network of MRCs, such as the one pioneered by the MRC-UND, will be
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required to facilitate the process by providing 'access' to media
resources on a mass scale.
The challenge for South African Leftists will be to attempt to see
if the small-scale counter-hegemonic media projects such as
Grassroots, MRC-UND, DMTG, the projects described in Nigg & Wade
(1980), and the Latin American experiences in building 'communication
centres' (White, 1989) -- can serve as a conceptual basis upon which to
build a (macro-scale) left-hegemonic media system -- ie. a national
media system which can facilitate mass participative democracy.
Transferring petty bourgeois leftist counter-hegemonic experiences
into the construction of a leftist hegemony will be fraught with
conceptual, methodological and ideological difficulties (Tomaselli et
aI, 1988) Lazerus and Tomaselli, 1989; Tomaselli and Prinsloo, 1990;
Deacon, 1991}. But once in a position of hegemony, the Left would have
the advantage of access to state funds and infrastructures. Althusser,
for one, noted the central importance of ISAs. A crucial ISA the Left
would 'inherit' would be the education system. This superstructure
holds enormous possibilities for the implementation of any program to
create a popular public sphere. Indeed, a prerequisite for multiplying
the (micro) experiences of popularist media like Grassroots, MRC-UND,
DMTG, and other community media projects into a macro-system is the
requirement for a massive media training/education programme. Such a
programme is perhaps best conceived of as a part of the reconstruction
of the primary and secondary school system. This will, ' in any case, be
required in a post-apartheid South Africa. MRCs need to be linked into
the network of primary, secondary and tertiary educational institutions
(especially during the take-off phase). This will make it possible to
create a media literate population and the necessary media
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infrastructure by a process of 'piggy backing' the building of a
community media/MRC 'public sphere' onto the education-development
drive. Such an approach would use up considerably less of the
society's scarce (development) resources. It would however require some
mechanism for cutting through the red-tape and bureaucratic defence of
autonomous 'turfs' that would be bound to occur. It would also require
a 're-orientation' of education syllabi in order that media be placed
more centrally into such syllabi. This education-based orientation is,
to some extent, a 'top-down' approach. But if South Africa is to fully
enter the Information Age this will, in any case, be a good move. In
the Information Age media literacy and proficiency in using the media
is not a luxury. It is a prerequisite for functioning as a full social
being. 'Access' to MRCs is important, but not enough; the provision of
media literacy and skills training are equally important.
Media training/education is needed to provide the mass of citizens
knowledge of the media necessary to operate a democratic communication
system (see White, 1982:5-6). Media training is thus the short-to-
medium term key to passing on the full potential of the Information Age
to all South Africans, and/or for co-opting MNC Information Age
technology for the construction of a democratic-left hegemony in
Enzensbergian/Benjamin fashion. It becomes vital that considerable
attention be paid to the quality of both media education (ie. the
diffusion of media literacy amongst the wider public) and training (ie.
the production of media workers).
Towards ~ New Leftist approach to teaching media
In examining all aspects of cultural production and consumption
(including media and the teaching of media) CCS begins by asking two
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fundamental (and interrelated) questions: who benefits? and who loses?
At heart these are questions of power and context; and questions of how
power affects cultural meanings and practices (Boyd-Barrett et aI,
1987; and Punter, 1986).
If the objective is to empower all citizens through a public sphere
infrastructure then 'critical' and 'aware' media producers·and users
are called for [9]. For Habermas this gets to the heart of the leftist
project in the contemporary world: to use the public sphere to
'generate ferment', and 'work for a redistribution of power' (Habermas,
1990:19-21). A prerequisite for a functioning popular communication is
a citizenry that is fully equipped to make use of the 'democratic
spaces' information technology may provide. Considerations on equipping
the citizenry for popular communication is an area that Mattelart
leaves too fallow. Both media producers and users need to be taught
to be continually aware of the power relationships underpinning media
messages (and media technology). In this way they will learn to
understand the social implications of how they, and others, are
relating to the media. Journalists, for example, should be taught to
go beyond merely knowing how to produce a news story. They also need
to consider who benefits/who loses through them using a particular
style of news-gathering? Why have they been taught to do their job in
a particular way? Why are newsrooms and the wider media-institutions ·
configured the way they are? Why has certain media technology been
developed (and by whom), while other areas of research-and-development
are left fallow?
In similar vein media users need to be made more aware and
questioning of existing (and possible) patterns of media ownership;
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news selection; television programming; etc. Both media producers and
users need to learn about how existing media-relations (including the
influence of both state intervention and market forces) may be
manipulating them, and may be curtailing the possibilities inherent in
communication-technology. People need to be made more aware of the
immense potential the media holds for improving their lives. It can do
this through facilitating more social interaction and by making
information, entertainment and a participative political culture more
readily available for all. The potential such an accessible and
participative media holds for accelerating cultural innovation and
growth i s enormous. If . Habermas is correct, once people know the
potential they will demand access to this potential. Skewed power
relationships will not be tolerated once people know they are skewed
(Habermas, 1990:19). For Habermas (1980) this demand is the key to
building a "rational society". By this means a society and/or hegemony
is constructed in accordance with both democratic and socialist
principles ..
If the media is to be 'liberated' it needs to be accompanied by a
critical and informed citizenry. This requires 'teaching the media' in
a particular way: an understanding of context needs to be incorporated
into all media training and media education. Linked to this would be
the notion of social struggle (Tomaselli, 198Gb). Media literacy
requires that people be made aware of the struggles taking place in
society; the way those involved in the struggles manipulate and/or are
manipulated by the media; and how certain players in the struggle have
advantages afforded them by their direct ownership of, or behind-the-
scenes influence over, media institutions. A public with such
knowledge (of media, context and struggle) would be equipped to be
404
critical 'readers' of media texts. In this way they would be less
susceptible to manipulation by the media, and by the interests behind
the media. Hence, a successful media education programme would make
the very notion of 'user' and/or 'consumer' of media somewhat redundant
because a fully media-literate public would be less dependent and/or
more akin to active co-producers of media-messages. In fact, the
products of a successful media education programme would presumably
demand an active (popular) communication system of the Mattelart or
Habermasian sort. A 'top-down' consumer-only media would no longer be
acceptable.
Teaching all future (and present) media producers and users about
the relationship between power and ideas would make for a more
'rational' use of media. CCS's argument is that both media workers and
consumers would benefit from medIa-instruction that contextualizes
media in these terms (Tomaselli, 1986b). The manipulative power of
media (or perhaps more specifically the power of the controllers/owners
of the media) would thereby be reduced. The effect should be to help
human beings regain control of the media (and the social communication
process), and overcome what the Frankfurt School called the 'culture
industry'. This would, in effect 're-humanize' (see Lukacs, 1971; and
Marx, 1981) the media, by potentially creating a social dialogue, or
public sphere. (In this way a truly interactive democratic cultural
production would be facilitated). But an important pre-requisite is for
people to learn about the media in its contextual setting. This
knowledge will enable people to become active co-manipulators of media
variables and thereby co-creators of culture and hegemony. This notion
amounts to turning the Frankfurt School on its head: the School was
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(rightly) concerned at the way in which the culture industry was able
to co-opt even the most oppositional forces, thereby 'killing' the
revolutionary 'dialectic'. By turning this School on its head we can
arrive at the notion of the Left attempting a counter-eo-option: the
opportunities and gaps offered by the superstructures developed by MNC
should be co-opted for Leftist purposes.
The above approach aims to empower everybody involved within social
communication media workers and media 'consumers'. There is thus a
need to train two separate sectors; or, to put it another way, to train
all parties to the process -- namely, producers and receivers. (These
these two categories are ideally interchangeable within the
communication process). Hence two types of instruction are required:
1. Media worker production. This requires what will be termed Media
Training; and
2. The creation of widespread media literacy in the broader public.
This will be termed Media Education.
Both are equally important if full popular-democratic use is to be made
of the technology available in the Information Age.
Media Training ~ the Production of Media Workers
By the end of the 1980s South African media workers were generally
of a low quality. This is due to two primary causes. Firstly,
apartheid and the social crisis it caused chased many of the best media
workers out of the profession. The better journalists simply became
tired of media restrictions and censorship; and the narrow conservative
sycophanticism of most of the 'mainstream' media. Secondly, over the
previous two decades media managements (especially in the Press)
through staffing and salary policies, created a situation where it was
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difficult to attract and retain good media workers. The effect on the
circulation of information was negative. South Africa's mainstream
media simply failed to deliver a comprehensive picture of society. The
white ruling elite, in particular, became victims of a narrow culture
industry. This significantly 'blinded' them throughout the 1980s by
shielding them from the social dynamics of the South African struggle.
(A similar phenomenon occurred in Rhodesia in the 1970s -- see
Frederikse, 1982). Because South Africa's media 'consumers' have not
been provided with any media education they are seemingly unaware of
the extent to which they have been 'short-changed'. So they have not
demanded any better. This being the case, media managements in turn
saw no need to upgrade their product and/or their media workers. A
spiral of declining standards set in.
If people are to make informed decisions about their lives they need
information concerning the whole spectrum of events and opinions in
society. In this way they are able to make rational behaviourial
choices. The fall in journalism standards can be illustrated by, for
example, the way the Natal newspapers have handled a crucial local
issue like the Natal violence issue (see Emdon, 1990). The incompetent
way in which the SABC's senior staffer, Clarence Keyter, reported the
biggest news story of 1990 the release of Nelson Mandela from prison
-- offers another example. If South Africa is to develop into a
democratic society the existing poor information flow will need to be
addressed: media workers will need to be upgraded as a starting point.
This requires training new media workers to a much higher standard than
has been the case up to now. And perhaps we also need to think of ways
to upgrade many existing media workers.
This leads to the question -- what sort of media training? Media
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training to complement a popular media infrastructure will need to be
of a particular kind. Firstly, the idea of a purely technicist media
training is highly problematic. Media training should go beyond only
trying to produce technically competent people. However, technical
competence in one's craft is the foundation of being a practicing media
worker. Hence, basic techniques and practical skills should be core
components of media training. But training in 'technique' should also
attempt to stretch the understanding of 'technique' so as to
incorporate an understanding of the technological possibilities
inherent within any medium for its use for improving democratic
discourse, empowering people, etc.
So non-technicist media training is called for (but without
abandoning a technical component to the training). However, emphasis
would be placed on the need for critical media people. This means
media workers who understand: (i) the full range of media theories;
(ii) their social context (and its mutability); (iii) the meshing of
existing media institutions into the power relationships in society;
(vi) possible alternative configurations of media organization/media
technology; and (v) the relationship between existing "me d i a technology
and research-development-funding. This requires an education in
critical theory, where the connectedness of theory and practice is
emphasized. Len Masterman (1985) has proposed a number of
'theoretical' areas in which media trainers should be conversant, such
as: ideology; rhetoric; and audience.
Although it is proposed that media training aimsto produce critical,
thinking media people, not technicists, it is equally important to
recognize that it is also not enough to produce pure media (or
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communication) theorists. Karl Korsch's discussion of the danger of
'theoreticism' has already been discussed. Media/communication
theorizing can too easily become an ivory tower theoretism and/or an
intellectualism outside of a real organic concern with the social
context within which media workers have to work. (where is
'Secondly?)
Thirdly, media trainees would ideally be placed into a direct
working relationship with community groups as a practical extension of
the above training (Tomaselli et aI, 1988a). This could be achieved
through the proposed nation-wide MRC programme. In other words it
could be expected of all media worker trainees (and perhaps media
workers themselves) to engage in 'community service' in the MRCs. In
other words, in designing media syllabi, it is important that the
training institutions (and thereby the trainees) have to form some sort
of 'organic relationship' to the energies of the social struggles
taking place around them in society. That means learning to consult
with community groups in a form which does not grant the media
'experts' a socially superior position by virtue of their knowledge.
It means learning practical grassroots democracy. This process should
go a long way towards overcoming the arrogance which media workers
often display towards those they come into contact with.
Such direct interaction is also an excellent way of teaching media
workers to distinguish which interest group wants what; and why. It
becomes a way of teaching media workers to understand their
relationship to different interest groups in society. This approach
helps trainees learn to recognize the link between ideas and the real
world. For example, media workers should be trained to recognize how
any idea expressed can potentially be picked up by certain vested
409
interest groups and used by them to serve their own narrow interests
for reasons completely unrelated to the original intention of the
formulator of the idea.
Fourthly, educators have to build an understanding of 'power' and
'struggle' into their syllabi from the very outset. This is important
in order to: (i) avoid having their products co-opted in unintended
waySj and (ii) in order to produce media workers who will themselves be
less likely to be unintentionally co-opted.
Fifth, trainers must be cautious when using media training methods
imported from overseas. The tendency is to rely on methodologies and
texts from especially Europe and North America. Teachers of media
should first consider the extent to which training methods from the
first world perhaps carry with them the ideological baggage of a highly
developed technicist society. If so, would using such a method not fail
to equip future media workers with knowledge appropriate for the South
African context, which has very different social problems to those of
Europe or America. In fact, could the uncritical use of first world
media-training methodologies not represent .a no t he r form of cultural
colonialism? However, this problematic must not be allowed to develop
into the extremist position of rejecting all European/American texts
and techniques as necessarily 'imperialist/colonialist' and
'inappropriate' for a so-called Third World situation. Such an attitude
can only serve to retard the development of South Africa into a full
participant of the Information Age.
Media Education ~ the production of ~ media literate population
The Left needs to engage in a serious re-think about the
superstructures and the potential role of the superstructures in
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empowerment. For a (New Leftist) mass democracy to operate, all
citizens need to be active participants in a multi-directional social
dialogue of the sort discussed by Habermas, Mattelart and Enzensberger.
But to create such a discourse a basic media literacy is first
required. All citizens need to (i) understand the media; (ii)
understand its possibilities and limitations; (iii) have access to the
media; (iv) be able to critically 'read' media messages; (v) be in a
position to make an on-going input into a plural (Poulantzian) media
system if they so wish; (vi) recognize the importance of their
participation as citizens if democracy is to work; and (vii) believe
that their participation does make a difference (ie. feel 'empowered').
Within such a system media workers would become the facilitators of
social dialogue, rather than 'experts' with sole access to the
production of media messages. In other words, the antithesis of 'top-
down' (and manipulative) media systems in both Western Liberal-
democracies and in the Marxist-Leninist state socialisms.
If a starting point is required in such a mass media-literacy
programme the logical place would be to educate people in 'how to read'
a media text critically -- ie. to 'see through' the appearance of
'self-explanatoriness'. Media literacy requires a recognition that
there is no such thing as a media message that is a self-explanatory
reflection of reality. All media messages are 'constructs' and carry
with them the hidden ideological baggage of both their creator and of
the creator's context. The South African Left have generally had
little difficulty in 'seeing through' the ideological constructs of the
NP (eg SABC and Afrikaans Press) or of capital (eg. the English
conservative-liberal Press). But they have often been less successful
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in seeing through the ideology of newspapers like City Press or The
Sowetanj and very uncritical when it comes to reading left-wing media
texts. The latter are seen as 'truth' [10]. When building a left-
hegemony, the Left should not to replace one form of closed sycophantic
media (seen during the NP-hegemony) with another equally closed and
sycophantic (but leftist) communication system [11]. Such a 'flip-
flop' situation was, for example, witnessed in Zimbabwe. A democracy
based upon participative-citizens requires the capacity to read all
media texts critically, even those with which one might 'agree'. Some
might argue that it is not possible to educate all people into critical
media users. A leftist cannot accept such an argument because such
acceptance would violate the very basis of the leftist-project.
Creating critical recei vers of media messages is a useful, however,
only a first step on the road to building a popular-left hegemony. What
is important is the recognition that producing critical message-
receivers is not sufficient. This is because reception (even critical
reception) still implies a second-class statusj and/or a de facto
acceptance of the superior position of the message-producers. If an
interactive-democratic (popular) communication system is to be
constructed, then ultimately everybody has to be made a producer (or at
least potential producer) of media messages. This is the underlying
principle of developing "people's communication" (White, 1989)j a
principle that should not be dismissed as necessarily utopian, not even
in 'developing societies' (see Nair & White, 1987). The information
technologies exist for society to solve the impediments in the way of
creating a fully popular-democratic (dialogical) communication system.
It is now a question of getting policy makers to allocate the necessary
resources to solve the problems and to create the necessary popular
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communication infrastructures so as to realize the latent
possibilities. And one way to nudge society into creating such a
network and/or solving any impediments is to create a media literate
population who know what possibilities await them in a hegemony re-
ordered around a popular communication system.
But because creating a fully-interactive media network will
presumably take a long time and considerable resources, a start has to
be made somewhere. It would be unrealistic to expect to implement a
'public sphere' network that completely blanketed the country on day
one. Rather it would have to be built incrementally. In the
intervening period -- and as a preparation for making all citizens
interactive media users -- the public could be taught to be critical
receivers of media messages. In fact, because of the growing impact of
media on the 'second hand' world people now 'live' in, it may well be
that in our contemporary world it is far more important to teach school
pupils (and even those at tertiary level) how to critically read an
everyday media text rather than how to appreciate Shakespeare.
Critical users of the media would greatly enhance the possibility for a
democratic hegemony. It could even be suggested that an electronic
media literacy is becoming more important than printed-text literacy.
The point is, once one has learnt to be a critical media receiver, one
by definition 'understands media' (~nd how it is produced, and its
possibilities). Thereafter, the transition to becoming an active co-
producer of media messages is not such a massive jump.
How does one produce a media literate population? This question has
been more comprehensively answered elsewhere, such as Masterman (1985)
and Louw, (1990a). In broad outline a media literacy syllabus might
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contain sections on: How the media works; information and media
technology -- its ontology, its limitations, and its possibilities~ and
the concepts of 'audience' and 'ideology'; how to read signs, codes and
narrative structure. The Frankfurt School's notion of the 'culture
industry' can also be useful: it provides a useful basic conceptual
framework around which to build a critical media literacy programme.
Teaching Media ~ turning citizens into media producers
Any attempt to turn the mass of grassroots c itizens into active
media producers will require a marriage of both media education and
media literacy programmes. To be able to drive an Information Age
'public sphere' citizens will need to be media literate (as provided by
media education). They will also need the necessary media skills (as
provided by media training). A practical way of achieving this would
be (i) for MRCs to be organized along the lines of the community media
projects discussed by Nigg & Wade (1980), and (ii) for such MRCs to be
integrated into a (complementary) primary and secondary school media
education programme.
A possible way forward?
For South Africa to realize its full potential, it will need to
rethink what 'development' means in the Information Age. It will also
need a massive improvement of its education system. But planners
should do not necessarily fixate themselves upon merely creating a
print-literate population.
Book-literacy is important. But in the contemporary world so too is
literacy in the other forms of media, especially the electronic media
for example, television, film, video, and computers. To be players
in the contemporary world South Africans will need to be fully
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integrated into the global electronic grid of information. For the
Left this creates a particular kind of challenge. This is how to avoid
South Africa being integrated into the network as a 'Third (South)
World' HNC dependency. In such a scenario South Africans would be
integrated merely as passive uncritical 'takers' from a neo-colonial
system. Rather, the South African Left have to work at developing a
fully media-literate population. This is important in order that (i)
South Africans have the opportunity to be critical users of such a
global system, and (ii) to be a media trained population so as to be
active contributors to such a system. Further, (iii) a serious
challenge will be to demonstrate that being a part of the Information
Age does not necessarily mean accepting the top-down and alienating
relations of production associated with HNC. The Left will need to
demonstrate that a left-democratic alternative mode of Information Age
social organization can be built. This Habermas calls a "radical
~emocratic process for the formation of public opinion (1990: 19). For
Habermas the process of democratic communication should be more
important to the Left than the actual content of the communication: he
recognizes that democratic communication is the key mean to "re-
distribute power". This, for Habermas, represents the heart of the
Leftist project in the wake of the collapse of the Harxist-Leninist
interpretation of the leftist project (Habermas, 1990:19). In the
South African context specifically, 'participation', 'development' and
'medial communication' need to be worked into a single programme for
building a post-apartheid society with democratic (and more equally
distributed) power-relationships.
This opens up the exciting possibilities for South African leftists
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as they move from counter-hegemony to hegemony construction. The
challenge is not merely benefiting from the latest socio-technological
developments derivative of the Information Age, but also potentially
enhancing democracy in this society by creatively using the the latest
media technology. The challenge is to grasp the opportunities offered
by the flux of the post-apartheid reconstruction of society to
demonstrate that a left-popular democracy can be built by co-opting the
technologies developed by MNC.
FOOTNOTES
[1] The popularist phase of struggle has created a political culture
. bu i l t on the principle of 'consultation with the masses'. To some
extent this culture is no longer served leftist praxis in the
1990s. Continually waiting for 'mandates' from 'the masses', and/or
waiting for 'mandated people' to act has paralyzed action. In his
closing address to the ANC's national consultative conference in
December 1990, Nelson Mandela called attention to the impossibility
for any leadership to 'consult' grassroots over every decision (New
Nation, 21.12.1990: 5). One example would be that very few people
are actually interested in 'media/communication policy'. It the
Left are going to await the successful outcome of mass consultation
on this issue the result might be that no media/communication
policy ever emerges. Perhaps there needs to be a recognition that
'consultation' itself is not always 'democratic'. Firstly, the call
for 'consultation' can be used by skillful populists and
vanguardists for their own political ends. Secondly,
'consultation' as an organizing principle needs to be used with
great circumspection. It can easily lend itself to a 'Khmer
Rouge'-type (anarchist) logic and hence become anti-organizational
and paralyze all action by 'blocking' instead of 'facilitating'
creative developments.
What would be helpful in this regard is to learn to differentiate
between 'consultation' and 'participation'. The former too easily
lends itself to populist co-option (a real danger from a future
reformed-Right if it wins some comprador allies). On the other
hand participative structures (public spheres) -- based upon people
becoming involved at the grassroots (with matters that interested
them) -- is less likely to lead to a populist anarchism or to be
co-opted by skillful populist leaders. This is where a democratic
communication infrastructure acts as a corrective. A national
'pu~l~c sphere' could institutionalize a ('direct') 'participative'
pol1t1cal culture, and hence remove the necessity for
'consultation' based on (two-step) . 'representative' logic.
[2] ?reating MRCs need not entail the construction of entirely new
1nfrastructures, and/or a massive resource outlay. Rather, it
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requires creative thinking. For example, every school, college and
university in the country already has some of the infrastructure
required by a~ MRC. Such institutions already blanket the country.
Creating MRCs could therefore, initially involve primarily a re-
arrangement of existing resources around such educational nodes
(and, of course fighting bureaucratic red tape and vested interests
which might block such developments). Such an education-based
network alone would give an enormous percentage of the population
relatively easy access to MRCs. Then too, other social actors might
be incorporated into an MRC development scheme, for example
religious bodies. There already-exists a massive countrywide
network of churches, mosques, temples, synagogues, etc. This
network could provide a significant rudimentary shell for MRC
construction.
[3] Certain sections of left and liberal opinion, for example, argue
that allocating funding to basic housing is more important than
media during post-apartheid reconstruction. Housing is important,
but so to is democracy. And, in any case, a participative media
infrastructure (and the training to use it) represents, in the long
run, a greater guarantee of housing for all: by empowering people
with such a democratic communication system, all would be given the
means to make their demands heard on an on-going basis (for
housing, jobs schools, etc). The key to democratic development is
to give people the means to decide for themselves what they want,
and the means to articulate their wants. A democratic
communication system is central to such development.
Another argument against such media development is that the South
African masses are not 'ready' for such 'first world'
infrastructures. This sort of logic applauds the rural-peasant-
based 'African model' of development (Barratt-Brown, 1984: Chapter
14). This is a strangely 'patronizing' and 'colonial' mind set. It
implies that Africans are not ready for so-called first world
technology and that Africa needs 'appropriate technology'
(Robinson, 1979; and Schumacher, 1974: Chapter 12). 'Appropriate'
means 'less sophisticated' which, in a sense, implies keeping
Africa 'backward'. It is thus surprising that so many Africans have
adopted this pro-rural approach (see Nyerere, 1968; and
Onyemelukwe, 1974). If consulted, it seems unlikely that most South
Africans would opt for the 'backward looking' route if they were
given the choice. South Africa has the resources to integrate
virtually all its citizens into an urban-based Information Age
society within a reasonable time frame, if the will is there to do
so. But this will require a significant rearrangement of existing
resources via a 'development scheme' to create the infrastructures
and provide the necessary training.
In this regard I disagree with those who oppose, as a matter of
principle, all aspects of the "integration model" in favour of
"self-reliance" (see White & McDonnell, 1983: 18-19). These
principles, although motivated by a positive desire to avoid
'dependency', often, in practice, translate into a 'backward
looking' model of development. As Enzensberger noted, a refusal to




the anti-progressive and reactionary route.
For an application of a Gramsci-Poulantzas approach to a media
problematic see this author's attempts to link 'libertarian' and
'socialist' principles in the formation of a media policy (Louw,
1990).
White (1982: 22-24) has also raised the question of the potential
danger that elites could allow the development of local media as a
form of tokenism. In such a scenario, local participatory media
become a way of deflecting that which threatens established ruling
elite interests. This is done by turning this media into a sort of
'side show'. In other words, local media can become a way of
creating a non-threatening space that does not really impact upon
the main national debate.
[6] Two of the British Community media projects described by Nigg &
Wade (1980) hold interesting insights which could be incorporated
into a South African MRC-network. These are:
* The West London Media Workshop (WLMW) was a 1970s attempt to use
media as a vehicle for mobilizing a grassroots public sphere.
Despite issues that called for community action to redress them,
those living in this run-down area seemed incapable of organizing
themselves into a community. The aim of WLMW was to strengthen the
political and social cohesion of a deprived neighbourhood. WLMW was
but one media project housed in the West London Community Action
Centre. Public-funding was made possible because of Labour Party
control at the local municipal level. WLMW saw itself as locating
video equipment and communication skills in the community on a
permanent basis and allowing skills to develop through contact.
WLMW media activists sought to prevent themselves becoming a
specialist team producing polished consumer products FOR the
community. Rather they facilitated local people taking control of
their own lives and learning to control the flow of information
{about themselves} within, and out of, their community (instead of
merely relying on external - top-down - communication from the BBC
or commercial newspapers). WLMW thus facilitated community-based
people learning to operate a grassroots popular communication
system. Media skills were not learnt in abstract, but were rather
diffused so as to encourage people to mobilize themselves around a
broad range of issues, ego housing, community facilities,
education, etc. The wider community became involved because the
equipment and facilitators were located within the community. This
ultimately helped to diffuse the messages produced to a wider
audience because one project led organically to the next. By
putting equipment into the hands of an active group of local people
exciting interactive processes were generated. Different community
groups began to come forward with ideas for videos. In these cases
the emerging community-based media group worked with that community
o:ganisation so as to jointly produce the video. A directory of
v~deotapes was eventually compiled and distributed widely amongst
educators and social workers. This increased the distribution of
the tapes (and their 'issues') outside immediate locality so that a
wide audience was ultimately reached.
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* Channei 40 was a state-funded local Cable Television Station set
up in mid-1970s in Milton Keynes to improve communication and the
information flow within this new English town. As 'community
television' it was not about newsworthiness, but about 'the
ordinary', and what concerned the grassroots community. As "open-
access" media it was specifically not run by professionals (who
decide what is appropriate as 'news'). Rather, it is run by the
community itself. They decided for themselves what to communicate.
Any resident could opt to get involved as a programme maker. In
other words s/he could learn to use the portable, battery-operated
cameras; or the mobile recording unit; or help in the studio as a
presenter or camera operator. Or could opt to merely be a viewer of
the programmes (geared to information, community affairs, local
entertainment or local sports). The primary requirement for the
scheme was portable equipment which could be loaned out to the
community; full-time staff to maintain and manage the equipment;
and a studio with post-production and editing facilities. Channel
40 was continually 'advertised' by staffers to motivate the
community to make use of the facility. Permanent technicians were
available to provide (technical) help during the production
process. But these technicians played no role at all in the actual
content being broadcast. The cameras were operated by community
volunteers, while the control room was run by the employed staff.
The mobile unit was operated by volunteers together with staffers.
In order to operate as a training scheme, technical staffers were
intentionally self-effacing (ie. they made 'suggestions' rather
than gave 'instructions'). As facilitators they needed to remain
neutral and 'passive', although this proved difficult to maintain.
[7] Of course, the implications of facilitating and encouraging people
to 'speak for themselves' is that they might use such public
spheres to arrive at anti-leftist positions. The challenge for the
Left is to: (i) learn to compete with other positions for popular
support. In a New Leftist Gramscian-Poulantzian conception of
hegemony, it is for the Left to engage in hegemonic struggle to win
the consent, support and participation of the majority for leftist
policies; and (ii) if such a democracy resulted in the majority
opting for non-leftist social organization (because leftists were
unsuccessful at winning majority support), then the Left would have
to accept such an outcome, since it would be regarded as
unacceptable to 'impose' (undemocratically) leftist policies onto a
society. (This would, however, not prevent the Left from re-
engaging in struggle to win back support).
[8] The Media Resource Centre at the University of Natal (MRC-UND) grew
out of the 1985 'Media in Education and Development' (see Kendall,
1988) conference. It has aimed to provide training, production
facilities, and media information/research data to educators,
community groups and trade unionists, and to help empower groups
traditionally disempowered in South Africa. Although not always
fully realized, the project was an attempt to redress the skewed
distri~u~ion of media and training resources -- ie. underprivileged
communltles and counter hegemonic groups traditionally had no
access to such resources (MRC Annual Report, 1989). At the heart of
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this MRC is a large workshop and media production area on the
University of Natal's Durban campus. Ideally this facility should
have been located nearer to the underprivileged communities it
aimed to service. (The campus is located in a high income area, not
easily accessible to poor communities). However, in the 1980s it
was safer to locate such facilities (servicing the Left) on
university campuses because they were then less likely to be bombed
by agents of the rightist state. Facilities at MRC-UND included:
copiers, computers, binding equipment, cameras, light tables,
button-making machines, audio-visual equipment, a video duplication
rack, etc. The workshop area was open during office hours and
arrangements could be made for evening and weekend use by community
and trade union groups. The MRC thereby acted as a collective media
resource point in the Durban area during the second half of the
1980s. It was used by groups who would otherwise have been debarred
from active media work by a lack of ~ccess to facilities, and hence
acted a resource that proved to be of great value, to those .
building the Durban-based affiliates of the MDM in the 1980s. The
MRC's intervention thereby altered power-relationships in the
Durban area, although not necessarily in ways planned and
anticipated by the formulators of the original project. The
original formulation was .pe r ha p s too idealistic in so far as it was
not built upon a rigorous consideration of what constituted an
'underprivileged community'; it ignored the way in which an MRC
based at UND would translate into an 'empowering' of the
facilitators within MRC projects; and it was premised upon a
critical theory with contradictory underpinnings (Deacon, 1991: 6).
For a more detailed discussion of theoretical problems and issues
associated with the MRC-UND project see Deacon (1991) and Tomaselli
& Prinsloo (1990).
[9] There is currently a dearth of 'critical' and 'aware' media users
and producers in South Africa. This was confirmed by DMTG research
during 1989. DMTG, with assistance from CCMS, distributed
questionnaires to all community and trade union groups in the
greater-Durban area to ascertain: what media was being used; what
media-skills members of these groups already had; and what media-
training they desired. The processing of the questionnaires was
followed up by two all-day workshops with these community groups/
unions to report-back on and consolidate the research-finding. The
DMTG found generally low levels of media-skills and media literacy,
and a serious need for media training/education. The pattern in
other South African centres is unlikely to be different.
[10] This 'grading' of the 'ability'/'inability' of Leftists to 'read'
media texts is derived from a series of (DMTG-organized) workshops
run by this author during 1990.
[11] During 1991 a worrying trend has manifested itself in South
Africa's townships, namely a sychophantic adherence to the
political party of one's choice combined with complete intolerance
tO,those ~old~ng other views (see Cargill, 1991). Unless checked,
th~s grow~ng ~ntolerance will undermine any attempt to create a
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